00031711



BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 31 October, 2019

Methuen's Colonial Library

THE EXPANSION OF EGYPT

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA

FROM SPHINX TO ORACLE

SIR SAMUEL BAKER : A MEMOIR (JOINTLY)

THE EXPANSION OF EGYPT

UNDER ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM

BY

ARTHUR SILVA WHITE

HONORARY FELLOW (FORMERLY SECRETARY AND EDITOR) OF THE ROYAL SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; HONORARY CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE SOCIÉTÉ AFRICAINE DE FRANCE

31711

ac

WITH FOUR MAPS

METHUEN & CO.

36 ESSEX STREET, W.C.

LONDON

1899

Colonial Library

GIDB
962
Whi/Exp
31711

TO
HER
MEMORY

PREFACE

IN SPITE of the influence of Islam, which tends to level down national aspirations, Egypt, under the process of Regeneration, has awakened to consciousness as a nation. The creators of Modern Egypt, and the master-builder, Viscount Cromer, have founded their work of reform on Equality and Justice. The development of the Nile lands now enters on a phase of expansion inseparably associated with the fortunes of the British Empire.

The title given to this book sufficiently indicates its scope. Formerly, in the rampant days of Internationalism, there was a Question in Egypt as to her future destiny. That has now been answered—irrevocably—in the terms of British hegemony. But there remains a Problem, as to the means by which Egypt shall achieve her emancipation from International Control. It is a problem that may be dissociated from the direct issues of the Eastern Question, on which it impinges, because the political future of Egypt is no longer enshrouded in doubt. An inexorable law of History commits her to the protection of the leading maritime Power. The events of the last few years confirm this as the natural solution of the Egyptian Problem. The prospects of the future herald it as the highest destiny for Egypt herself. Turkish suzerainty is a myth—a diplomatic fiction. International Control is now an anachronism—a tax upon freedom : blackmail, blood-money.

A physician's diagnosis springs from a searching analysis of the history of a case. I, too, have been compelled to traverse the paths by which Egypt has arrived at her present position of dependence on the Mistress of the Seas. Since physical factors influence or determine political issues and results, I have based my enquiry on the principles of Geography. Since the Nile Valley is under the domina-

tion of Great Britain, I have been constrained to examine the genesis and to outline the course of British Imperial Policy, in order to identify its aims with the development and expansion of Egypt.

Every factor of importance, every event of significance, and every document of consequence should be presented, and their bearing on the question at issue defined, in order to arrive at a true perception of the International Situation in Egypt. This evidence I have endeavoured to produce, in its entirety. Detailed deductions may, of course, in consequence of the complexity of the case, be open to adverse criticism: but accomplished facts speak for themselves, and confirm in a remarkable degree the verdict of History. Egypt must necessarily fall under the exclusive control of maritime primacy.

The heads of my argument are given in the annexed Table (No. 1), in a natural sequence of cause and effect. The divisions of my subject and the order of their presentation conform, in principle, to this arrangement of the material. Details are to some extent relegated to foot-notes.

From an examination of physical factors (Part I) I derive the organic unity of the Nile Valley. In Parts II to IV, inclusive, I produce the internal and external factors which, in their cumulative effect, point to its political unity under the Power holding the Command of the Sea and already exercising a *de facto* Protectorate. The Political Situation in Egypt (Part V) demonstrates the instability of Egyptian institutions; and an elaborate Survey of the Anglo-Egyptian Administration (Part VI), dealing with all the Departments of State, illustrates the extent to which these depend on British Control and initiative. International Interests are shown to predominate and centre in the Suez Canal (Part VII). And in Part VIII, I have sought the most natural solution of the Egyptian Problem. That the solution which I advocate is inevitable, may be gathered from the concluding Parts of my work (IX and X). In or before the year 1905, a British Protectorate, or its equivalent, must, in my opinion, be proclaimed throughout the Valley of the Nile.

TABLE NO. I.

"THE EXPANSION OF EGYPT"

LINE OF ARGUMENT

Introduction.
(*Factors of the Egyptian Problem.*)

(*Physical.*)
Geographical Survey.
Unity of the Nile Valley.

(*Political.*)
Historical Retrospect.
Egypt has always been dominated by the Power holding the Command of the Sea.

Relation to the Eastern Question.
(*Objective and Subjective Factors.*)

Political Situation in Egypt.
(*Internal.*)

International Fetters.
Europe's tacit mandate and the Opposition of France.

Anglo-Egyptian Administration.
Need and success of the Single Control.

Instability of Egypt and check to Reforms.
Proposed Guarantee of the Debt of Egypt and **Emancipation from International Control.**

Political Situation in the Sudan.
(*Colonial.*)

Unity and Integrity of the Nile Valley.
Anglo-Egyptian. Condominium.

Foreign Relations of Egypt.
(*External.*)

Egypt Proper.
(*European Interests.*)
Nominal Suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey.

British Imperial Policy.
(*Pax Britannica.*)
Command of the Sea and Control of Suez Canal.

Domination of the Nile Valley
under a uniform system of Administration corresponding with the *status quo.*

Great Britain the only Power in a position to secure these internal and external conditions of development and expansion.

Eventual Declaration of a British Protectorate
over Egypt and the Nile Valley.

Solution of the Egyptian Problem.

During the two Winters (1896-1898) which I spent in Egypt, much of my time was occupied in examining the political situation, with which I was well acquainted in theory, and in collecting material for my work. The plan of this book was laid down in 1897; and from that I have not found it necessary to diverge. Personal reasons precluded an earlier issue: but the delay has had its advantages. I am now in a position to affirm what, two years ago, I ventured merely to predict. The reconquest of the Sudan and the establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, being accomplished facts, have made all the difference in political speculations.

I am indebted to the courtesy of the Anglo-Egyptian officials, who supplied me with Government Reports and gave me the facilities usually accorded to accredited enquirers, but not in any degree to their co-operation. That is not expected of British officials, especially in Egypt. My views are not inspired, though they are commonly and avowedly shared, by those who are engaged in the work of reform. I do not, therefore, claim any official *imprimatur*. My cardinal source of inspiration was the luminous work of Sir Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt*, which serves as a Shorter Catechism for the Khedivial officials, and suffices as a *point de départ* for a competent observer. The Annual Reports of Lord Cromer[1] and the Egyptian Government Reports have been my main sources of reference. These and other acknowledgments have been made in the text.

The only Egyptian official who took any material interest in my work was the enlightened Under-Secretary for Public Instruction, H. E. Yakub Artin Pasha, to whom I am indebted

[1] Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899 was received after my MS. was completed: but, in the revision, I have given effect to additional statistics, etc. My information is therefore up to date.

These admirable Reports by her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt, have been of the greatest service to me: and, in places where the authoritative views of Lord Cromer are specially pregnant, I have quoted them at length. *The Reader will observe that, in my references, the date of these Reports is the year of their publication as Parliamentary Papers.*

for much sympathetic encouragement and co-operation—in particular, for his scholarly collaboration in the sub-section dealing with 'Egypt of the Past.'

My object is to educate public opinion, at home and abroad, and, especially, to influence those who may be in a position to promote a pacific solution of the Egyptian Problem. Recognition of general principles and of the true significance of accomplished facts may not be a deterrent to opposition: but, at least, this should help to strengthen the hands of Lord Cromer, in our great work of reform, and to support British policy in Egypt. As to the electorate, which endorses that policy, no doubt many people, after the fall of Omdurman, leapt intuitively to conclusions which I have laboriously built up: but, since a British Protectorate over Egypt should, in view of the opposition and risks it is likely to encounter, be supported by the unanimous voice of the nation, I trust that my work may help to convert sceptics and to encourage waverers in the pathway of empire which circumstances have imposed on us.

A. SILVA WHITE

LONDON: *1st May* 1899

CONTENTS

	DIVISIONS	PAGE
Organic Unity of the Nile Valley	I PHYSICAL FACTORS:	
	i The Basin of the Nile	3
	ii The River Nile—	7
	(*a*) The Upper Nile	7
	(*b*) The Middle Nile	10
	(*c*) The Lower Nile	12
	(*d*) The Delta	12
	iii Regime of the River—	13
	(*a*) The Nile in Flood	13
	(*b*) The Nile in Low Supply	14
	iv Irrigation and Agriculture—	16
	(*a*) Irrigation System	17
	(*b*) Agriculture	20
	(*c*) Perennial Irrigation	22
	v Unity of the Nile Valley	28
Influence of Sea-power on the History of Egypt	II POLITICAL FACTORS:	
	i Historical Retrospect—	33
	(*a*) Egypt of the Past	33
	(*b*) Dynasty of Mohammed Ali	45
	(*c*) Egypt under the Powers	64
	(*d*) Egypt under the Single Control	68
	ii Egypt and Sea-power	76
Identification of British Imperial Policy with the Expansion of Egypt	III OBJECTIVE FACTORS:	
	i British Imperial Policy	83
	ii Defence of the British Empire	101
Destiny of Egypt	IV SUBJECTIVE FACTORS:	
	i The Eastern Question	107
	ii The Balance of Power	117
	iii French African Policy	122

DIVISIONS PAGE

V THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EGYPT: Instability of Egypt
i International Status— 131
(a) The Sultan's Suzerainty 131
(b) Firmans 132
(c) The Capitulations 134
(d) The *Caisse de la Dette* 135
ii The Population of Egypt— 135
(a) Tables: Census of 1897 139
(b) Characteristics 141
iii Factors of Equilibrium— 146
(a) The Tutelary Power 148
(b) International Fetters 157
(c) The Opposition of France 170

VI THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION: The British Control
i The Machinery of Government— 183
(a) Sources of Administrative Authority . . . 183
(b) Representative Institutions 185
(c) The Bureaucracy 187
ii Departmental Organization and Administration— . . 193
(a) Finance 193
(b) Public Instruction— 210
§ Government Institutions 219
§ Extra-Government Agencies 238
(c) Justice 246
(d) Interior— 257
§ Central Organization 260
§ Local Organization 264
§ Centralized Administrations 266
§ Decentralized Organization 279
(e) Public Works 281
(f) Foreign Affairs 287
(g) War 287
§ Army of Occupation 294
(h) Trade and Commerce 295
§ Statistical Tables 307

	DIVISIONS	PAGE
International Interests	VII THE SUEZ CANAL:	
	i Politics—	315
	(*a*) Historical Retrospect	317
	(*b*) International Negotiations	320
	ii Commerce—	345
	(*a*) Statistical Returns	345
	(*b*) The Suez Canal Administration	348
	(*c*) Addendum	348
A British Guarantee	VIII REGENERATION OF EGYPT:	
	i Need and Success of the Single Control	353
	ii A Financial Proposal	360
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium	IX THE SITUATION IN THE SUDAN:	
	i The Native Races—	370
	(*a*) Distribution of the Population	371
	(*b*) Tribal Characteristics	373
	ii Historical Retrospect—	376
	(*a*) Occupation of the Sudan	376
	(*b*) The Reign of Terror	381
	(*c*) Re-conquest of the Sudan	382
	iii The Title-deeds of the Nile Valley—	386
	(*a*) Historical Synopsis	387
	(*b*) Analysis of Treaty-rights—	394
	§ The Libyan Desert	395
	§ Abyssinia, etc.	397
	§ Equatorial Regions	407
	§ Bahr el-Ghazal and Darfur	417
	iv The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium	423
Unity	X THE PATHWAY OF EMPIRE:	
	i Domination of the Nile Valley	439
	ii *Pax Britannica*	444

APPENDICES

		PAGE
I	DYNASTY OF MOHAMMED ALI, AND LINE OF SUCCESSION	449
II	FIRMANS, &c.	450
III	DECREE ESTABLISHING THE *CAISSE DE LA DETTE*	453
IV	THE ORGANIC LAW OF EGYPT	457
V	ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM IN THE SUDAN	466
VI	CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS	469
	INDEX	475

TABLES

1	"THE EXPANSION OF EGYPT:" LINE OF ARGUMENT	ix
2	THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EGYPT	147
3	SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY	184
4	DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE	204
5	EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS	221
6	MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS	250
7	ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR	262
8	MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS	282
9	MINISTRY OF WAR, AND MILITARY ADMINISTRATIONS	288
10	THE PATHWAY OF EMPIRE	442

NOTE.—*Orthography of Place-names and transliterations from the vernacular are in accordance with the rules of the Royal Geographical Society. The system, briefly stated, is phonetic: vowels as in Italian; consonants as in English; a single (acute) accent; and the pronunciation of every letter. Old established and recognised departures from this principle of spelling are, however, maintained. It is scarcely necessary to add, that a mere approximation to the sound is alone attainable, in transcribing Arabic words and names.*

MAPS OF NORTH-EAST AFRICA

(at end of Volume)

1 Orographical Features

2 Climatological Data

3 Zones of Vegetation

4 Political Boundaries and Data

I

(Physical Factors)

ORGANIC UNITY OF THE NILE VALLEY

i THE BASIN OF THE NILE

ii THE RIVER NILE

iii REGIME OF THE RIVER

iv IRRIGATION AND AGRICULTURE

v UNITY OF THE NILE VALLEY

PHYSICAL FACTORS

i THE BASIN OF THE NILE

EGYPT is—to use the phrase of Herodotus—the 'gift of the Nile.' This cardinal principle of political dependence on physical conditions should be kept steadily in view. It is only by understanding the interaction between physical and political phenomena, that we can hope to lay the foundation of a rational policy in Egypt and the Sudan. 'Gift of the Nile'

It is therefore necessary for me to define the physical factors which control the political and economical situation in the Valley of the Nile.

The mighty river, which the ancients worshipped as a God, issuing from its lake-reservoirs, drains nearly the whole of North-East Africa. Its catchment-basin is so vast, that the area of one hundred British Isles might be contained in it. Its length, from the principal source-streams, situated close to the Tanganyika watershed at an altitude of over 7000 feet, is not less than 4000 miles. The watershed confining its basin approaches very near to the source-country, but widens out enormously in the Upper and Middle regions, closing in gradually on the banks of the Lower Nile until it merges in the Deltaic flats. Nile basin

The Red Sea drainage-area, with its short wadis, is of relatively slight hydrographical importance. The water-parting between the Nile and the Red Sea passes over desert country, for the most part occupied by barren hills, although mountains of over 6000 feet are found and, near Abyssinia, even as high as 8000 feet. Contiguous hydrographical areas

An enclosed hydrographical basin between the sea and

Abyssinia embraces a large portion of Somaliland; and there is another inland basin, or riverless region, extending along the Continental axis between the Nile watershed and the Indian Ocean drainage-area, which reaches from Abyssinia in the north to the eastern shores of the Victoria Nyanza in the south. This is for the most part an arid steppe, the interest and importance of which centres in Lake Rudolf, to the north of which are some fine grass-lands.

Organic Unity I mention these contiguous hydrographical areas in order to illustrate the organic unity of the Nile Valley. Physically speaking, the Nile basin is isolated by the prevalence of desert and steppe-lands which entirely surround its watershed, except in the remote south-west where it joins that of the Congo.

Vegetation The zone of desert, which girdles the Earth and raises inimical barriers to migration, is supreme between the Atlantic and the Red Sea. The Middle and Lower Nile—traversing the Libyan, Nubian, and Arabian deserts—carries only a thin thread of vegetation through the thirsty land of the Pharaohs. With the exception of the Province of Dongola, a pitiless desert reigns between Aswán and Berber. The arid steppes that prevail between Berber and Fashoda extend to the fertile uplands of Abyssinia. But south of Fashoda and the Sobat confluence, we enter the prairie lands of the Upper Nile and encounter the rich vegetation of the Bahr el-Ghazal and Equatorial Provinces.

Oases Oases occur in many regions of comparative depression throughout the desert area, deriving their water by infiltration from the Nile or from other sources of subterranean supply. In Upper Egypt, Nile water is tapped at depths not exceeding 35 feet, even in summer. Throughout the Delta and Nile Valley, as far south as Esneh, there exists a deposit of water-bearing sands about 50 feet below the surface of the land.[1]

Climate It is only necessary to remember that the Nile Valley extends between the Equator and the Mediterranean, and that the Tropic of Cancer approaches close to Aswán, in

[1] At Tanta, water is tapped at 75 feet. But in the Fayum, borings to a depth of 485 feet yielded no result.

order to realise the general character of the climate, which in the main is Tropical. Between the Equatorial and Dongola Provinces and on the Red Sea Littoral, the *actual* mean temperature of the year exceeds 80° Fahr. Elsewhere, it varies between 72° and 80° Fahr., except in Lower Egypt and Abyssinia, where the variation is from 64° to 72° Fahr.

The mean annual range of temperature increases as the desert is approached. In the fertile regions of the Upper Nile it is inconsiderable, rarely exceeding 10° Fahr. and in places (near the Equator) falling below 5° Fahr. Between Lado and Khartum there is a difference of from 10° to 20° Fahr. between the coldest and the warmest month of the year. Between Khartum and Cairo the difference is from 20° to 30° Fahr. But in the deserts the range is as much as 30° to 40° Fahr.

The diurnal range, which is considerable, does not compensate for the absence of seasonal changes, if regarded as a factor of health; nor does altitude above sea-level secure immunity from the stress of climate, which is specially trying to Europeans on account of the high relative humidity (over 70 per cent.) that prevails over a great portion of the continent of Africa.

Rainfall

The Nile rises in a region of almost perpetual rains. It is re-inforced by sub-soil springs and the heavy rainfall in its western Equatorial basin. The mean discharge of the Victoria Nyanza is probably not less than one thousand cubic metres per second.

The rainfall over the Victoria and Albert Nyanzas, at Gondokoro (Ismailia), and over the upper parts of the Sobat, Blue Nile, and Atbara, is about 80 inches in the year; and in the western source-region of the Nile it approaches 100 inches.[1]

In the eastern half of the Bahr el-Ghazal, the lower half of the Sobat, and the middle region of the Atbara, the annual rainfall is not more than 40 inches. The western half of

[1] This heavy rainfall may be contrasted, for the purpose of comparison, with the mean annual rainfall of the British Isles, which varies from 25 to 40 inches on the East Coasts and from 40 to over 80 inches on the West Coasts.

the Bahr el-Ghazal has a rainfall of about 20 inches in the course of the year; whilst the Bahr el-Arab and the outer zones of the Blue and White Niles and of the Atbara have probably not more than 10 inches. From Berber to the sea, the Nile passes through a rainless zone, in which only occasional showers occur.[1]

The popular fallacy, that the rainfall of Egypt has increased on account of more land being brought under cultivation (*i.e.* irrigation), is without foundation. Rainfall is not produced by such petty local conditions, although these may affect the humidity of the air.

Rainy Seasons In the region of the great Lakes the rainy season lasts from March to December. Elsewhere it is as follows:—April to November at Gondokoro; June to November in the valley of the Sobat; April to September in the Bahr el-Ghazal; July to September at Khartum; July to August in Darfur and Kordofan; light rains in January and February, and heavy rains from the middle of April to September, in Abyssinia.

Over all these regions the maximum rainfall is in the month of August.

Water-supply In the desert hills east and west of the Nile, occasional showers of rain are immediately absorbed and drain down the wadis conducting to the river. In all the principal valleys of Egypt Proper, and in some of the smaller ones, draining into the Nile, there are small wells from 6 to 10 feet deep. The water-supply of Egypt Proper most free from contamination is obtained from the coarse marine yellow quartz sands underlying a thickness of about 50 feet of Nile sand and mud. The thickness of these marine sands has never been ascertained; and at Zagazig, in the Royal Society's boring, 345 feet were pierced without coming to rock, of which the top 20 feet were of Nile sand and mud.[2] Even when the natives obtain a

[1] The data concerning rainfall are taken from the Egyptian Government Report, *Perennial Irrigation* (1894). On the whole, these figures are below the commonly-accepted estimates.

[2] *Cf.* Captain Lyons' *Geological Survey Report* for 1897.

pure-water supply, as at Tanta, they will not avail themselves of it, preferring to drink from the Nile.

ii THE RIVER NILE

In describing the course of the Nile from its source to the sea, I propose to recognise the following natural divisions of its hydrographic system:

Natural divisions

(*a*) *The Upper Nile*, from the Lakes to the confluence of the Blue and White Niles. This is the region of tributaries, all of which are included with the exception of the Atbara, which is not a permanent stream. Khartum stands at the point of this important confluence, about midway in the valley of the Nile and in the very centre of its hydrographic system.

(*b*) *The Middle Nile*, from Khartum to Aswán. This is the region of Cataracts, the bed of the river being obstructed at six localities, where there are rapids. Aswán stands at the foot of this stretch of interrupted navigation.

(*c*) *The Lower Nile*, from Aswán to the apex of the Delta (Barrage). Cairo stands near the foot of this open waterway, and is the political and administrative centre.

(*d*) *The Delta*, or Garden of Egypt, pierced in all directions by irrigating canals and navigable waterways. The Nile reaches the sea through the Rosetta and Damietta mouths. Within this comparatively small area is gathered the wealth, the industry, and the bulk of the population of Egypt. Alexandria is the commercial capital.

Bearing these broad distinctions in mind, we may now proceed to a closer examination of the river. Among the geographical *memorabilia* which I am constrained to introduce under this section of my subject, none are more important than the question of natural communications.

(*a*) *The Upper Nile*

Source-country

The source-country of the Nile is located within an immense irregular triangle, the apex of which is formed by the confluence of its SE. and SW. branches.

The Victoria Nyanza, receiving tributary streams from all sides, is the largest lake in Africa. It is estimated to equal the area of Scotland. The Nile, issuing from this immense reservoir, which is situated 3900 feet above the sea-level, plunges over the Ripon Falls. Here the stream is 400 yards in breadth, and drops 13 feet.

Breaking through the rocky barrier on the northern borders of the Victoria Nyanza, forming by the way many enlargements of its channel, the Nile passes over the Karuma and Murchison Falls, between which are uninterrupted rapids, and precipitates into the Albert Nyanza. The latter lake—1600 feet below the level of the Victoria—is the third reservoir of the Nile, since it is connected with a second and higher-lying reservoir, the Albert Edward Nyanza.

Lake Albert Edward—3307 feet above sea-level—and its outlet, the Semliki river, receive innumerable tributary streams from the high mountain-mass, or *massif*, of Ruwenzori.

The head-waters of the Nile are therefore united in the Albert Nyanza, the importance of which, as a regulating basin, should be borne in mind.

White Nile

From the head of Lake Albert, the White Nile issues as a deep and majestic stream, bound on its long journey to the Mediterranean. With scarcely any velocity or slope, the river pursues an even course for 125 miles to Dufli. Passing through a valley flanked on either side by mountains which recede as the river flows north—eventually leaving only a few sentinel groups to mark its banks—the Nile soon leaves the plateau-country finally behind and enters the grass-lands, where its banks are lost in extensive swamps.

Below Dufli, at a sharp bend in the river, the Fola Rapids occur and continue as a torrent for 125 miles, to a short distance above Gondokoro. From Gondokoro to Bor (74 miles) there is a rapid fall, and the river is confined to a single channel. From Bor to the mouth of the Bahr el-Ghazal (236 miles) the river has a feeble slope and flows through the numerous channels of the *Sudd* region. Here

the matted and decaying vegetation obstructs navigation very heavily: it has to be cut through and kept moving in order to secure a free channel.

Bahr el-Ghazal

The Bahr el-Ghazal, striking the Nile almost at a right-angle to its course, contributes the large supply of water which its tributaries gather from the northern slopes of the Congo-Nile watershed. At the confluence of the Bahr el-Ghazal a large lake is formed, which, in the summer months, when the discharge of the river is feeble, acts as a vast evaporating basin and is therefore a source of loss to the White Nile. The decaying vegetation at this spot colours the river throughout its course to Cairo, during certain times of the year.

The basin of the Bahr el-Ghazal, with which is associated that of the Bahr el-Arab, is a region of dense Tropical vegetation. It is one of the most promising exploitation areas in the Egyptian Sudan, being very fertile, well wooded, and well watered. But the *Sudd* seriously hampers communications.

Sobat

The united stream, a little lower down (62 miles), receives through its right-bank the periodic waters of the Sobat, draining from the southern extension of the Abyssinian highlands. With this accession to its strength, the White Nile takes up a definite northern course and flows as a bold though sluggish river, for 560 miles, to Khartum.

The action of the current, the whole way to the sea, is on the right-bank, owing to the prevailing north-westerly winds. Tributaries drive the water to the opposite banks.

Khartum

At Khartum, the Blue and White Niles mingle their waters. Situated in the very heart of the hydrographic system of the Nile, 1280 feet above sea-level and 1865 miles from the Mediterranean, Khartum is essentially the metropolis of the Egyptian Sudan.

Blue Nile

The Blue Nile, originating in the Alpine heights of Abyssinia, is in itself an important river-system. It, too, like the White Nile, has its lake-reservoir,—the Tsana, situated 5840 feet above sea-level and covering an area of 1160 square miles. Out of this high-level lake the Blue

Nile issues from the south, pursuing a very irregular course, for 839 miles, up to its union with the White Nile, at Khartum. The river is comparatively clear in the summer, but in Flood (from the beginning of June to the end of October) it is of a reddish brown colour, owing to the alluvia held in suspension. During the Flood season, the Blue and White Niles discharge an equal volume of water; but in the summer the latter is the chief source of supply. At the confluence, the river is lowest in April and highest in September.

Abyssinia

Abyssinia represents an important nucleus in the catchment-basin of the Nile. Its picturesquely sculptured highlands rise on two sides from forbidding steppes. In the north the country falls in gentle declivities and in low hills to the desert between the Nile and the Red Sea. In the south it is united by isolated groups of mountains and high-level valleys with the main axis of the continent. In the east the mountains are abrupt and precipitous; and practically no drainage waters find their way in that direction. But in the west the slopes are more gradual; and on that side they carry tributary waters to the Nile. The highest peaks of Abyssinia are evenly distributed, several attaining altitudes approaching 15,000 feet. But, owing to the mountainous character of the country, its torrential rivers pursue very tortuous and destructive courses.

(*b*) *The Middle Nile*

The United River

"From Khartum, the Nile, as a sober and respectable stream that has abandoned the frolics of its youth, enters a new phase, and one which is often experienced by man in the middle course of life: serious troubles come. It has to contend against a hostile environment and to struggle for mere existence. It soon receives, it is true, a small increase of power from the tributary waters of the Atbara; but from thence to the sea its onward course is unaided and a very exhausting one indeed. The Nile has to traverse 1600 miles, for the most part through the most arid desert in the world, which seriously saps its strength, before it relinquishes

the burden of its existence on the shore of the Mediterranean.

The Atbara is fed by the torrents of Abyssinia. Although its river-bed is dry in the summer, it is a considerable stream in Flood (July to October: maximum in August). Being heavily charged with volcanic detritus, the Atbara provides a large proportion of the fertilising mud which the Nile carries in Flood. The Atbara

Between Khartum and Aswán—a distance of 1124 miles—there are 351 miles of broken water and rapids (commonly called the Cataracts) with an aggregate fall of 656 feet, and 773 miles of free channel with a total drop of 312 feet. The details in regard to these barriers to navigation are of sufficient importance to warrant the description that follows. The Cataracts

The *Sixth Cataract* begins 52 miles below Khartum and ends 147 miles from the Atbara junction. Its length is not much over one mile, and the drop in the river is about 20 feet. Berber is 15 miles downstream of the Atbara confluence.

The *Fifth Cataract* begins 28 miles north of Berber. It is 100 miles in length and has three principal rapids. The fall in the river-bed is over 200 feet. Abu Hamed is situated at the foot of this cataract.

The *Fourth Cataract* is between Abu Hamed and Dongola. It has a drop of 160 feet over a course of 68 miles. Between the Fourth and the Third Cataracts is the town of Dongola.

The *Third Cataract* is 45 miles long, and falls 36 feet. It has two rapids.

The *Second Cataract* is 73 miles further downstream, and at its foot lies the town of Wady Halfa. This, the famous Batn el-Haggar, or 'belly of rocks,' is 124 miles in length and falls 216 feet. It has four rapids.

The *First Cataract* is 214 miles from the Second. It has a drop of 16 feet in 3 miles. The mean width of the river is over 500 yards; and the mean depths are 30 feet in flood and 6½ feet in summer. Aswán lies at its foot.

Professor George Forbes has reported to the Egyptian Government on the question of utilizing the Cataracts as a means for generating electricity.

(c) The Lower Nile (Aswán to the Barrage)

A navigable waterway

This is the playground of tourists, and needs no detailed description. The slope of the river is slight in places where the Nile Valley is narrow; its width is contracted and its depth considerable. In places where the Valley is broad, converse conditions prevail.

The distance from Aswán to the Barrage is 605 miles, in the summer. With the Nile in Flood this distance is decreased by 31 miles. The mean velocity of the stream in Flood ranges between $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet and $3\frac{1}{4}$ feet per second, whilst in summer it is, on a rough average, under 2 feet per second.

Cairo stands at the foot of this navigable waterway.

The Fayum

Shut in on all sides by the desert, except towards the Nile Valley, with which it is united by a narrow passage, the depression of the Fayum slopes away to the west and terminates in a wide, shallow lake, 78 square miles in area. The surface of the lake is 138 feet below sea-level and 223 feet below the Nile in Flood. Although the water is brackish, fish of the fresh-water type abound.

Zoology

A complete Survey of the fish of the Nile is about to be instituted. The Egyptian Government has engaged the services of a specialist to make a complete collection of Nile fish; and the authorities of the British Museum will assist in working out scientific details. Protective measures will then be taken to prevent wanton destruction.

(d) The Delta

The swift-running stream of the Nile in Flood has a tendency to heap up on the river-banks deposits of loam and sand, which gradually increase in height until these form a deltaic ridge. This ridge, being artificially strengthened, confines the river within a definite course.

The Nile empties itself into the sea through the Rosetta

and Damietta mouths. Behind the sandy foreshore, upon a spit of which the town of Alexandria is built, there is a chain of salt lakes, into which the numerous interlacing canals of the Delta drain off their surplus waters.

iii REGIME OF THE RIVER

Some conception of the regime of the Nile is necessary, in order to understand the system of irrigation, upon which the prosperity of Egypt depends. Since Egypt is the ancient 'gift of the Nile,' its irrigation works are the most precious product of modern progress. Irrigation in Egypt takes the place of rainfall in other countries.[1]

(*a*) *The Nile in Flood*

White Nile

The green harbingers of flood from the swampy region of the Upper Nile are driven down the river by the heavy rains which, near Gondokoro, begin in April. The river at this spot[2] begins to rise in the middle of April, and reaches its maximum during the last days of August. This rise is felt at Khartum about the 20th of May, and at Aswán about the 10th of June. At Cairo the green water announcing the coming flood is seen about the 20th June.

In an average year, the discharge of the White Nile at Khartum begins to increase on the 20th May. This increase is maintained to the 15th or 20th September, when the maximum Flood of the White Nile and Sobat reach Khartum and attain a discharge of 4500 cubic metres per second.

Blue Nile

The Blue Nile begins to rise fairly rapidly about the 5th June, and reaches its ordinary maximum of 5500 cubic metres per second by about the 25th August. The maximum Flood of the Blue and White Niles (8000 cubic metres per second) is rarely attained before the 5th September. The alluvial deposits brought down by the Blue Nile reach Aswán about the 15th of July and Cairo ten days later.

[1] My information in this section is derived from the Egyptian Government Report, *Perennial Irrigation* (1894). Appendix III.

[2] The regulating effect of the great Lakes is well felt at Gondokoro, which is one of the keys for understanding the flow of the Nile.

Atbara

After this, the rise of the river is rapid: for the Atbara is in Flood shortly after the Blue Nile, and its swollen waters increase with great rapidity. The discharge of the Atbara in Flood is from 3400 to, occasionally, 4900 cubic metres per second.

Aswán

The ordinary maximum discharge of the Nile at Aswán (10,000 cubic metres per second) is generally attained on the 5th September. An early maximum at Aswán is usually followed by a low summer supply; whilst a late maximum is nearly always followed by a high summer supply. At Aswán, where the Nile enters Egypt Proper, a *low* Nile Flood is about 21 feet, a *mean* Nile Flood is about 24½ feet, a *high* Nile Flood is about 27 feet.

Ruling factors

The Sobat, the Blue Nile, and the Atbara are the ruling factors in Flood; and the White Nile is the ruling factor during the remainder of the year.

Egypt Proper

The Nile, in its passage through Egypt, rises slowly till about the 28th July, and then rapidly through August. It reaches its maximum about 5th September, and then falls very slowly through October and November.

Cairo

At Cairo, the river rises slowly through July and fairly quickly in August, reaching its ordinary maximum on 1st October, remaining all but stationary during the rest of that month, and falling rapidly in November. The breadth of the stream at Cairo during the Winter is about one quarter of a mile.

(*b*) *The Nile in Low Supply.*

Fall of the waters

The Atbara, being a torrential stream, falls more rapidly than the other affluents of the Nile. By the end of October, its waters have practically disappeared. The Blue Nile falls rapidly after the middle of September; but the White Nile (with its large basin, gentle flow, and numerous reservoirs) falls very slowly.

In an ordinary year, the mean discharge of the Nile in low supply is, at Gondokoro, no more than 550 cubic metres per second. From thence to Khartum the river loses heavily by evaporation: so that the discharge of the

united Blue and White Niles in low supply is not increased. The Atbara contributes nothing. Between Khartum and Aswán there is a further loss from evaporation and absorption.

In a very bad summer, when the Nile-sources supply 660 cubic metres per second, the discharge of the river at Khartum is reduced to 340 cubic metres per second and at Aswán to 210 cubic metres per second. So soon as the daily fall of the river becomes less than the daily loss by evaporation, all the pools and ponds cease to aid the stream; and, if these are extensive—as they are to the south of Fashoda—they diminish the discharge considerably by their large evaporating areas. In the two months of low discharge, the great reservoirs of the Nile are the sole sources of supply.

Control of Summer supply

It will thus be seen how essential it is for the people of Egypt to control the source-region of the Nile or to ensure its being in the hands of a friendly Power.

Barrage

The drop in the surface of the river is very considerable at the bifurcation of the Nile. The difference between the mean high and low supply is nearly 20 feet at the Barrage and 23 feet at Cairo.

The dissipated Nile

It is estimated that, in an average year, the amount of water that reaches the sea is about 65,000,000,000 cubic metres—or less than one-fortieth of the rainfall. Between Khartum and Cairo the daily loss of the river by evaporation and absorption is about one-sixth of the supply. The total amount of solids carried to the sea in one year is about 36,600,000 tons.

The usual discharge (or excess of rainfall over evaporation) of Tropical and sub-Tropical rivers is about one-fifth of the rainfall; while European rivers discharge between one-third and one-fourth.

The Congo alone discharges as great a volume of water as probably all the rivers of Africa taken together, the Nile in this respect ranking fourth.

Speed of current

In conclusion, it may be interesting to note the time taken by the waters to travel from their source of origin to their efflux.

From Lake Victoria to the sea, the water in low supply takes 90 days, and in Flood 50 days. From the source of the Blue Nile to Khartum, the water in low supply takes 17 days, and in Flood 7 days. The waters of the Atbara and Sobat in Flood take about 5 days to run their course.

iv IRRIGATION AND AGRICULTURE

Periods of Progress

Mena, the traditional first king of Egypt and the founder of Memphis (4400 B.C.), is reputed to have introduced the Basin system of irrigation. Whence he acquired his knowledge and experience it would be interesting to learn.

The system he conceived was maintained, and well maintained, down to the year 1830, when Mohammed Ali determined to introduce into the Delta the principle of Perennial Irrigation, and summoned some French engineers to his aid. Had the French engineers been given a free hand, their efforts would doubtless have been rewarded by the success that has since been achieved by their English successors. But their advice and control were not backed by the necessary authority. The great Barrage below Cairo, constructed by Mougel Bey, remains, it is true, a monument for all time; but it was not of any practical use until it was repaired by Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff and Mr Willcocks.

The Anglo-Indian engineers, who came to Egypt in 1883 and 1884, have since remodelled the irrigation system of Egypt and placed it upon a permanent and scientific basis. The names of Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff, Sir William Garstin, and Mr Willcocks—not to mention others among so many who have distinguished themselves—will long be remembered among those of the country's principal benefactors. Their crowning achievement has been the introduction of a storage system by which Egypt can develop the maximum of her natural resources in proportion to her population. In 1898, the great Reservoir scheme was adopted, an English syndicate providing the funds for its realization.

In five years' time, the irrigation system of Egypt Proper will be complete and practically uniform. Though Basin

irrigation may still linger in certain districts of Upper Egypt, Perennial or semi-Perennial irrigation will be the boon of the peasant and the wealth of the nation.

(*a*) *Irrigation System*

Between the deltaic, and therefore raised, banks of the Nile and the hills forming its watershed there is a series of natural depressions, across which, at right-angles to the course of the river, dykes are built. The Nile Flood, being diverted into this chain of basins, inundates the land for a period of six or seven weeks. The water, having deposited its fertilising mud, is then drained off, either into a lower basin or back into the river. The slope of the country is about $\frac{1}{10,000}$. After the harvest is gathered, the land is allowed to lie fallow until the next Flood—a period of loss in production which falls little short of half the year. **Basin system**

Basin irrigation is still the rule in Upper Egypt, and Perennial or semi-Perennial irrigation are the exception. There are 120 of these basins, the areas of which vary between 500 and 35,000 acres. From Aswán to Assiut, the country is divided naturally into depressions bounded by gravel or rocky spurs, where the Sharáki[1] works constructed by Colonel Ross have ensured a better supply of water. Between Assiut and Cairo, summer irrigation is given to the higher lying lands, while the lower lying lands remain under Basin irrigation. Below Assiut, for instance, the Ibrahimía Canal irrigates a large tract of riverain country (240,000 acres) under sugar-cane; and one of its branches, the Bahr Jusuf, carries water into the Fayum. **Upper Egypt**

From the irrigation point of view, Upper Egypt falls under two natural divisions at Assiut, the lower half of which is regarded by engineers as Middle Egypt—a distinction which I mention but need not confuse the reader by adopting.

[1] Sharáki are those lands which have to be relieved from taxation, owing to their receiving no water within a given year. The low Nile of 1877 thus cost the Government £E1,100,000, and was followed by a famine. But the low Nile of 1888, after Sharáki works had been introduced, resulted in a loss of only £E300,000, followed by scarcity in some districts.

The perennially and semi-perennially irrigated tracts are intersected by numerous canals. Land under cotton is watered every twenty days (from 15th March to 15th August), and land under sugar-cane every fifteen days.

The Gate of Egypt

Aswán is the Gate of Egypt Proper. Here, on Elephantine Island, a Nilometer has registered the rise and fall of the Nile from time immemorial. The new gauge, erected in 1869, is divided into cubits[1] and twenty-fourths of a cubit. Its register is known and understood by every cultivator throughout the land, who, at the most critical periods, awaits its dread verdict with the deepest concern.

Good and bad Niles

In order to irrigate by flow the greater part of the islands and higher lying lands of the Nile Valley, 16¼ cubits are required. With 17½ cubits everything is flooded. But if, after filling the basins, there are from 17 to 18 cubits continuously, for any length of time, this high head of water produces great pressure in the Delta and brings out the whole population on its banks and embankments. On the other hand, if the Nile is between 14 and 15 cubits, there is no direct and free flow in the high lands; and should it not rise above 14 cubits, there is a most disastrous failure of supply in the canals that feed the basins.

Seasons

Egypt being the 'gift of the Nile,' the year is properly divisible into three well marked seasons corresponding with the phases of the river—Summer, Flood, and Winter.

The Summer season extends from the 1st April to the end of July. Water is then a most valuable commodity, the river being at its lowest. During this season, the most critical period, when the supply is inadequate, is the sixty days between the middle of May and the middle of July.

The ensuing Flood season begins on the 1st July and lasts till the end of November, when the river overflows its banks.

The third or Winter season embraces the months of December, January, February, and March. During this period

[1] A cubit or 'pic' of water equals 54 centimetres (1·628 feet). A Nile gauge is also erected at the head of the Victoria Nyanza (Uganda). Gauges at Lake Albert and elsewhere are contemplated, the readings of which will be most useful to the Irrigation engineers.

the Nile is confined within its banks, and carries a supply of water in excess of the actual requirements of agriculture.

Lower Egypt

About fourteen miles below Cairo stands the great Barrage, at the apex of the Delta or bifurcation of the Nile. The object of these two regulating dams is to raise the level of the river for the better irrigation of the Delta. From this centre, the entire irrigation of Lower Egypt is directed and controlled. The Regulators are built across both branches of the Nile, and are separated by a revetment wall, in the centre of which is the head of the Rayah Menufía. The latter is the chief of the three main canals which are fed by the high-level water above the Barrage and irrigate the three areas into which the Delta is thus naturally divided. The Barrage itself rests on sand and fine mud, which provide very insecure foundations. The cavities under the piers of both branches have recently been filled up with cement grout.

In the Summer, the two branches of the Nile are nearly dry and the land is parched, except in places where there is a scanty supply of water. But in the Flood months the Delta is a land of swift-flowing streams and green fields.

The perennially and semi-perennially irrigated tracts are intersected by numerous canals, provided with regulating sluices to drain off the water; and the land is irrigated about every twenty days. The main canals of supply, the distributing canals, and the numerous drains eventually discharge into the great lakes under the foreshore of the Delta. This is the region of the Birriya—a vast tract (1,200,000 acres) of waste and salted lands, about half of which might be brought under cultivation by an increased water-supply.[1]

Canals and Communications

The canals of the Delta are of four classes. Those of the first class are provided with swing or lift bridges, regulators, locks, etc.; and along these canals large boats can be navigated all the year round. In canals of the second class, large boats can be passed down during part of the year.

[1] The work of washing and draining the Birriya, and thus bringing more land under cultivation, is proceeding slowly.

And in canals of the third and fourth classes, small boats can pass throughout the whole and through a portion of the year, respectively. There are, therefore, at least two main lines of navigation by which boats can reach Alexandria in the west and Damietta in the east at all seasons of the year. In addition to these, railways and over one thousand miles of agricultural roads form a network of communications in the Delta.[1]

(*b*) *Agriculture*

Staple Cultures Broadly speaking, the staple cultures of Egypt are cotton in the Delta and sugar in Upper Egypt. The richest crops are raised in the Delta and in the *Sefi* canal areas of Upper Egypt. Every year more and more land is put under cotton, while areas under sugar-cane have been extended.

Cultivated Areas Nearly five million feddans, or acres, are under cultivation. In Upper Egypt there are 2,215,000 acres, of which 460,000 are under Perennial or semi-Perennial irrigation, and 1,755,000 acres are irrigated only in Flood. In Lower Egypt, the entire area (2,740,000 acres) is under Perennial or semi-Perennial irrigation.

Uncultivated lands The swamps or dry salted plains in the north of the Delta cover an area of 1,200,000 acres, all or most of which is capable of being reclaimed by introducing Perennial irrigation for the cultivation of rice and cotton. The cultivation of rice, except in districts favoured by a large water-supply, steadily diminishes. It is barely profitable to raise; but its efficacy in the reclamation of salted lands cannot be doubted.

Crops In the fertile lands of the Delta, the Winter and Flood crops provide food for men and animals, whilst the Summer crop represents the capital of the country. Land under

[1] Over 200 miles of agricultural railways have already been opened for traffic. Of the light railways in the Provinces of Behera and Gharbia, 92 miles were opened for traffic in 1898. In three other Provinces, the 'Chemins de Fer Économiques' opened 61 miles for traffic in November, 1898; and will shortly complete another 40 miles. Native capitalists are now constructing light railways in the Fayum. 'It is unlikely,' says Lord Cromer, in his Report for 1899, 'that the Government will be called upon to pay anything in the shape of guarantee money to any of the Companies.' All these are in addition to the Government railways in the Delta, etc.

Perennial irrigation yields two or three crops in the year. Land under Flood yields a winter crop.

The Summer crops are cotton,[1] sugar-cane, millet, rice, vegetables, and fruit. The Flood crop is maize or millet. The Winter crops are wheat, beans, barley, vegetables, and clover.

Yields

The annual aggregate yield of the cultivated area of Upper Egypt has an estimated value of £E12,215,000, or £E5.50 per acre, divided as follows:—Summer crops, 280,000 acres yielding £E2,800,000; Flood crop, 530,000 acres yielding £E1,600,000; Winter crops, 2,010,000 acres yielding £E7,035,000. There are also 2,600,000 date trees yielding £E780,000 per annum.

The annual aggregate yield for Lower Egypt is valued at £E20,000,000, or £E7.30 per acre, the greater part of the land being double-cropped. This yield is divided as follows:—Summer crops, 1,000,000 acres yielding £E10,000,000; Flood crop, 1,200,000 acres yielding £E3,600,000; Winter crops, 2,100,000 acres yielding £E6,300,000. There are also 1,000,000 date trees valued at £E200,000.

'Robber economy'

The land tax is so high that it does not pay proprietors to raise wheat and beans, etc., alone. They therefore cultivate sugar and cotton, which, in the absence of scientific culture, are apt to exhaust the fertility of the soil. This is what the Germans call 'robber-economy.' Artificial manure is, in the absence of flooding, necessary for double-cropped lands; whilst, before any large reclamations of land in the Delta can be attempted, an increase of the Summer water-supply is necessary.

Water-supply and drainage

The climate of Egypt is specially suitable for the cultivation of its staple products. But whilst sugar can be grown all the year round, cotton is raised at seasons when land in Upper Egypt under Basin irrigation is either parched or flooded. In order to give a constant and well regulated supply of water to these regions, it is necessary to introduce Perennial irrigation: that is to say, to dig *Sefi* or summer

[1] The cotton crop of 1897 was the largest on record, but realised the lowest average price since 1888.

canals deeper than the old *Nili* or flood canals, so that the land can be watered at all seasons of the year. But Perennial irrigation involves a very perfect and costly system of drainage, without which the land would soon become water-logged and unproductive.[1]

(*c*) *Perennial Irrigation*

Cause and effect

Among reproductive public works none are more profitable than those of the hydraulic engineer, the returns of which may be calculated in advance with a marvellous degree of certainty. The economic conditions of Egypt are so simple, that in no other civilised country can cause and effect be traced with greater confidence and be more rapidly realised. The physical and political factors of the situation are so intimately related, that it is no exaggeration to say, in Lord Rosebery's words, that 'Egypt is the Nile.'

'Doctors differ'

There is of course a difference of opinion, on technical points, as to the effect likely to be produced by the total suppression of the Basin system in Upper Egypt. It is feared that, without basins, it may be difficult to drain the land, except by instituting costly works, such as the conversion of the Bahr Jusuf as a drainage-outlet into the Fayum and continuing it along the foot of the hills down to the Barrage. But all are agreed that the maximum

[1] Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899 contains the following remarks on drainage:—

'The Commissioners of the Public Debt, continuing their liberal policy of 1897, granted a special credit of £E255,000 in 1898, for drainage works in Lower Egypt. A further sum of £E26,000 was expended on such works by the Irrigation Department from its ordinary resources. The total drainage expenditure for the year, exclusive of maintenance, was, therefore, £E281,000. For this sum, 308 kilom. of new drains were dug, and 267 kilom. of old drains widened and remodelled.

'A further credit of £E200,000 from the General Reserve Fund has been granted for expenditure on drainage in 1899.

'The benefits to be derived from expenditure of this nature are evident. Every landowner in the country understands the advantage of a drain, and every one appreciates the work which is now being done. In a few years' time the country will possess a complete system of drains; the projects for the future are all well in hand and fairly mapped out. Five years of annually decreasing expenditure should see them all finished, so that by the time that the increased water-supply resulting from the Nile reservoir is available, the country will be able to make use of it without risk of water-logging and deterioration of the soil.'

Flood at Cairo will be reached earlier, and that the fall of the river will begin earlier, than under the present system of intermittent irrigation. One drawback to Summer irrigation in Upper Egypt is, that it will impoverish the soil unless manure is used.[1] But the fear that the deposits of 'red' water will be intercepted by the great dam or barrage at Aswán is, I believe, illusory, because the sluices will not be closed until the clear Winter water begins to flow, and then only gradually. The deposits in Upper Egypt are deep enough for wheat, corn, and beans; but the cotton and sugar-cane roots strike deep and require much soil.

Distribution of water

Under the present system, the deep Perennial irrigation canals take water all the year round; but the Flood irrigation canals are closed with earthen banks till the middle of August, when they are all opened, producing an immediate effect on the discharge of the river. In the Delta, the experiment of permanent rotations has been remarkably successful since its introduction in 1896. The surplus supply of water has been reduced, the infiltration and water-logging of land has been diminished, and the drainage canals have performed their prime function. During the summer months, temporary rotations have been enforced: and the equitable distribution of water is, in consequence, one of the most popular benefits enjoyed by petty land-owners.

The need of more water

But, in spite of every economy and the most impartial administration, more water is required. In the Delta more water is necessary during the summer months for the cultivation of rice, for flushing the main branches of the Nile, and for reclaiming desert and salted lands. In Upper Egypt more water is required for Summer cultivation, especially in the Fayum. The total supply of water really needed for the whole of Egypt is estimated at 3,610,000,000 cubic metres per annum, with a maximum discharge in July of 630 cubic metres per second.

[1] 'Our rule,' however, says Sir William Garstin, in a recent Report [Egypt, No. 1—1898] 'in all irrigation projects is, that, of the total area of land commanded by a canal or pumping-station, only one-third can be advantageously cultivated in any one season. This limit permits of the rotation of crops, and prevents the land from becoming exhausted by over-cropping.'

Periods of demand

Throughout Egypt, the demand for water decreases from the 1st November to the 1st December. During March the demand increases steadily, when the Summer crop is being sown, and continues through April and May. There is a maximum demand in June for all Summer crops, while no Winter crops are in the ground; and this demand increases from the 1st July, when the early maize is sown, to the 15th July. Throughout August, September and October there is a maximum demand for the whole of Upper and Lower Egypt.

Methods of supply

This demand can be met only in one of two ways: either by the creation of a storage basin—*i.e.* filling up a contiguous depression in the desert from the Nile in Flood—or by throwing a dam across the Nile at a suitable spot, and thereby impounding the waters, after the Flood, in a storage-reservoir within the valley of the river itself. A third plan would be to dam the great Equatorial Lakes and, to send their surplus water down in time to reach Egypt through May, June, and July. Lake Albert, as well as Lake Tsana in Abyssinia, are suitable as regulating basins; whilst the Victoria Nyanza could be utilized as a vast reservoir: but they are so distant, that the loss of water by evaporation and absorption would be a serious drawback. A storage-reservoir in the river valley, as near as possible to the areas of demand, is obviously the most practical and feasible plan: and this scheme has been adopted by the Egyptian Government.

A reservoir of pure water

The great reservoir at Aswán will be filled in November and December after a low Flood, and in December and January after a high Flood, subsequent to the passage of the waters most heavily charged with deposits. The Nubian desert is free from impure or harmful salts; and the reservoir waters, being kept constantly in motion, will not stagnate. Between November and January the Nile water is quite clear, and will therefore have a purifying effect on the green water of the river in June and July.

Effect on regime of the Nile

The question of water storage for Lower Egypt is independent of that concerning Flood protection. Improved Perennial irrigation in the Delta will not affect the Nile in Flood. The canals will continue to serve as at present. In

Upper Egypt, the absorption during Flood will be diminished by one-half, and south of Sohag there will be no great changes of level. But between Sohag and Kushesha, where there is an escape, there will be a rise of 1.28 feet, as compared with the maximum gauges under Basin irrigation; and on this reach of the Nile considerable changes will be experienced.

The great Reservoir scheme

At the head of the First Cataract (Aswán), there is an extensive outcrop of syenite and quartz diorite extending across the valley of the Nile. The river itself is broken up into numerous shallow channels; but sound rock is obtainable everywhere, at convenient levels, on which to construct a dam. This is the best site for a reservoir, its only disadvantage being that Philæ Island, lying to the south, will be partially submerged (leaving, however, the Temple of Isis free) between the 1st February and the 15th June. Though the antiquities of the island are more interesting to the tourist than to the archæologist—being recent Ptolemaic and Roman—the high-level dam will be reduced so as to inflict as little damage as possible. Its length will exceed that of the great Barrage, and its height can eventually be added to, should the need of Egypt be found greater than the susceptibilities of the sight-seer.

This scheme,[1] the contract for which was signed in February, 1898, may be outlined as follows, overpage.

[1] The detailed scheme is as follows: '(1) The area now irrigated in summer from the Ibrahimía canal, north of Deirut, to be increased, so as to bring it up to one-third of the total area commanded. (2) The basins to the west of the Nile and to the east of the Bahr Yusuf from Deirut to Kosheshah are to get perennial irrigation from the Ibrahimía canal, one-third of this area being irrigated in summer. (3) The balance of the water available will be utilized by pumping-engines on the west bank of the Nile north of Assiut and on the east bank of the Nile. (4) The basins to the west of the Yusufi and the western part of Kosheshah basin will remain as at present, or they will be required for discharging the southern basins.'

Of the 1065 million cubic metres of water which the Aswán reservoir will hold, according to the official estimate, '680 millions are to be given to Upper and Middle Egypt south of Kosheshah, of which 510 millions will be required to ensure the proper irrigation of the land that is to get perennial irrigation. The remaining 170 millions will be used for supplying pumping-stations, and this volume should irrigate 70,000 feddans of summer crops.'—*Report on the Administration of the Irrigation Department* for 1897 (Cairo: 1898).

Aswán

The dam at Aswán will create a reservoir in the valley of the Nile, and hold up water to R.L. (river-level) 347.78 feet, or 65.62 feet above the present low Summer supply. Its capacity is estimated at 1065 million cubic metres.

Assiut

An open barrage is to be constructed at Assiut, which, by raising the level of the river in Summer, will deliver water at a higher level than at present, increasing the discharge into the Ibrahimía canal. Summer irrigation will thus be given to the Basin lands extending northwards to Minia and Beni Suef, and will be further extended in the Fayum, which is included in the 'Middle Egypt' area. South of Assiut the country will benefit by the increased water-supply, and new pumping-stations will be erected.

Delta

The Delta and Giza Province will have an assured Summer supply (the latter through large pumps on the river) and sufficient surplus water for the reclamation of salted and desert lands. Weirs, or supplementary dams, will be thrown across both branches of the Nile below the great Barrage, in order to permanently reduce the maximum head of water pressing on the latter (during regulation) from 13.12 feet to 8.20 feet.

Anticipated benefits

The gain to the country by extended Perennial irrigation and an increased water-supply, which the above scheme will ensure, will be of two kinds. There will be a direct gain to the State through the sale of reclaimed lands and the consequent increase of annual revenue derived from them; and there will be an indirect gain to the State, as well as a direct gain to the country, resulting from the increased value of agricultural produce, the rise in the price of land,[1] and land

Three locks will be built, and a navigation channel made on the west of the river at Aswán to enable boats to pass up and down.

[1] Land in the Domains and Daïra Sanieh (Government properties) which is now worth £13 or £14 per acre, will, it is estimated, be worth probably £20 after the completion of the above works.

'When "Sefi" or summer crops are substituted,' says Sir William Garstin, in a recent Report [Egypt. No 1.—1898] 'for those grown in the flood basins, the value of the increased yield of the land averages from £E2 to £E2½ per acre. . . . Again, we know from experience that the difference in rental value between land under perennial irrigation and that under basin cultivation is £E1 per acre higher in the first case than in the second. This being so, the former category

rents. There will also be, no doubt, a commensurate increase of Customs' revenue, owing to the augmented wealth of the country, and railway traffic; while new industries (such as pisiculture) will probably be created.

Sir William Garstin's estimate in the above respect, attached to Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1898, works out as follows:—

(*a*) *Annual increase in the wealth of the country*

	£E
Upper Egypt	420,000
Middle Egypt	1,176,000
Lower Egypt	600,000
Giza Province	212,000
Insurance of Cotton Crop[1]	200,000
	2,608,000

(*b*) *Direct annual benefit to the State derived from the above*

	£E
Upper Egypt	63,000
Middle Egypt	198,400
Lower Egypt	85,200
Giza Province	31,800
	378,400

(*c*) *An additional sum to be obtained from the sales of the reclaimed land* £E1,020,000

could undoubtedly stand without difficulty a higher rate of land-tax than the latter. As the rate of fair taxation is generally admitted to be just under 30 per cent. of the rental value, it follows that land to which summer irrigation is given should be taxed by one-third of a pound (*i.e.* by 30 piastres) higher per acre than that in the adjoining basins in which the flood crops are alone grown.' The average yield of 'Sefi' land over all Egypt is rather more than £E7 per acre.

[1] 'One of the most important results which will accrue from the reservoir, although difficult to set down in figures, will be the insurance of the existing cotton crop against failure, even in years of sufficient summer supply. . . . The mean annual value of the cotton crop may be estimated at the sum of £10,000,000, even at the present prices. . . . The average of bad years is one in every five. We may then fairly assume that the value of the insurance of this crop is represented by a sum of £E200,000 per annum.'

These calculations 'presuppose the existence of the most unfavourable conditions of season and supply which can be imagined.' The Giza Province, which is treated separately, being under special conditions, forms the connecting link between the irrigation systems of Upper and Lower Egypt.

Sources of information

In concluding this section of my subject, I have to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Reports of the Irrigation Department, and in particular to those of Mr Willcocks, who designed the new dam and barrage. Not being an hydraulic engineer, I have borrowed liberally from these authoritative sources of information.

V UNITY OF THE NILE VALLEY

Physical insularity

The organic unity of the Nile basin is a physical fact of great political significance. The river and its tributaries flow from the heart of Africa to the far-distant Mediterranean Littoral, being surrounded on all sides, save one, by desert and steppe lands. The watershed passes over barren and uninhabited tracts except in the extreme south-west, where it abuts on the Congo basin. The Nile Valley may therefore be said to be physically isolated.

Political isolation

Politically, no less than physically, Egypt turns it back on Africa and faces Europe and Asia, with the fortunes of which continents its past development has been closely associated.

European political settlement in Africa, by following the lines of least resistance, has, in modern times, coincided very closely with the oceanic drainage-areas. The inland drainage-areas have been practically deserted by man, as they have been paralysed by Nature. Thus, commercial intercourse in Africa, under whatever guise, has been rigidly controlled by the means of transport afforded by the great river-systems, and flows naturally from the sources of supply in the interior to the bases of demand on the coasts—a fact which should rather discourage the 'Cape to Cairo' enthusiasts. But this aspect of the question will be dealt with later. At present

we are concerned only with physical phenomena and the resulting economical conditions.

Control of the Upper Nile

It is clear, that any European Power holding territory on the Upper Nile might, by the institution of irrigation works, deflect or tamper with the water-supply which is the life-blood of Egypt. Although it would be impossible to hold up the White Nile in Flood, it would be quite easy to dam any part of its course in the Summer, and so prevent water from reaching Egypt for the *Sefi* cultivation. *In the two months of low discharge, the great reservoirs of the Nile are the sole sources of supply.*

Moreover, a barrage at the head of the Victoria Nyanza or of the Albert Nyanza would convert these into storage-basins. Egypt would then be at the mercy of flood and drought, which a hostile Power might dispense at its will. The cost of erecting effective dams would, of course, be enormous. Though, therefore, a somewhat visionary danger, it is better to be on the safe side and to exclude all European Powers from the entire basin of the Nile save the Protectoral Power, whose interests are identical for the very reason of her responsible position in Egypt. The Lake reservoirs are to Egypt what the snows of the Alps are to the Po, and what the Italian Lakes are to the plains of Lombardy.

Abyssinia

From the fact that Egypt receives her fertilizing waters from Abyssinia, which consequently lies within the Nile Basin, it follows that any European Power seeking to obtain a controlling influence over that country must be carefully watched, and, if necessary, effectually restrained from accepting concessions or exercising privileges that might conceivably interfere with the regime and functions of the Blue Nile and Atbara. Egypt must always, as a matter of self-defence, be in a position to dominate Abyssinia, either directly or indirectly.

Destiny

These considerations point to the recognition of the complete unity of the Nile Basin as the basis of a national policy imposed by nature and dictated by the teaching of history. In the latter respect it will presently be my purpose to demonstrate, that Egypt has always been domi-

nated or controlled by the Power holding the Command of the Sea.

Egypt's physical and political insularity is, therefore, an incontestable fact which sufficiently accounts for her dependence at the present day on the Mistress of the Seas.

II

(Political Factors)

INFLUENCE OF SEA-POWER ON THE HISTORY OF EGYPT

i HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

ii EGYPT AND SEA-POWER

II

POLITICAL FACTORS

i HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

THERE are four phases in the history of Egypt, each of which inculcates a principle of national development. These I propose to deal with successively. Landmarks in history

In the first phase, I shall trace the influence of sea-power on her history. The favourable geographical position of Egypt and her natural resources as a granary necessarily challenged the ambition and the cupidity of nations seeking to establish political and commercial supremacy in the Mediterranean and to command the trade-routes to the Far East. Egypt of the Past, from the time of Alexander the Great to the present day, has, in fact, always been dominated or ruled by the Power capable of exercising the Command of the Sea.

Under the dynasty of Mohammed Ali, Egypt was drawn into the vortex of European politics. But in this, the second, phase I shall limit my view to the deposition of the Khedive Ismail, who practically mortgaged his country to the European bondholders.

In the third phase, it will be seen that Egypt under the Powers resulted in the failure of Internationalism.

Finally, under the Single Control, Egypt has made such strides in national development and expansion, that her progress now entitles her to ampler recognition in the comity of nations.

(*a*) *Egypt of the Past*[1]

At the period when Alexander, by the death of his father, Philip, became heir to the throne of Macedonia and to the The Persian Empire

[1] For the facts and their presentation under this sub-section of my subject, I am indebted for the most part to an elaborate Memorandum specially prepared for me

hegemony of Greece, the empire of the Persians extended over the whole of Western Asia, including Syria. For over two centuries Egypt herself formed one of the satrapies of this vast empire.

The Persian navy, composed of the united fleets of the satrapies of Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and the Islands, had been seriously crippled through the defeats inflicted by the Greeks: namely, off Artemisium and off Salamis (480 B.C.), at Mycalé (479 B.C.), off Cyprus and at the mouth of the Eurymedon (470 B.C.). It was owing to the support given by the Phœnicians and Egyptians, no less than to the dissensions among the Greek Republics, that the Persian navy was not entirely destroyed and was able to survive these disasters. Carthage was not then the formidable naval Power which, a century or so later, contested with the Romans for the empire of the world.

Alexander the Great

In consequence of its crippled state, the Persian navy was not in a position to dispute the Command of the Sea when Alexander undertook his expedition against the King of Kings. As commander-in-chief of the Greek forces, Alexander therefore had the support of the Greek Fleet, on his right wing, during his victorious march through Asia Minor and Syria to Egypt.

For two years after the battle of Issus (333 B.C.) Alexander had left Darius severely alone, owing to the presence of the Persian Fleet in the Ægean, which interrupted his communications with Greece. But, after the conquest of Egypt, Alexander, on his way to Tyre, learnt of the destruction of this fleet by one of his admirals. He was therefore free to pursue his conquest of the East, with the assurance that, his sea-power being undisputed, the Greek base of supplies and reinforcements was inviolate.

Having reached India, he despatched a fleet under Nearchus, who sailed up the Persian Gulf and the Tigris and explored the shores of Arabia, with the object of discovering

by H.E. Yakub Artin Pasha, Egyptian Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Public Instruction, whose leisure and scholarship were at all times generously placed at my disposal.

a trade-route between Greece and the Far East. Retiring to Babylon, with the spoils of war, Alexander died there, suddenly, in 323 B.C. His empire being partitioned among his generals, Egypt fell to the share of Ptolemy, whose genius, being equal to his opportunity, founded the strongest and most durable dynasty as well as the most prosperous and puissant Empire.

The Ptolemies and Sea-power

With the aid of the powerful navy under his command, Ptolemy I. Soter made himself master of Cyprus and of the coasts of Palestine and Phœnicia. His empire, in the year 300 B.C., extended over Egypt, Libya, Cyrenaïca, Arabia Petræa, Judea, Phœnicia, Cœlesyria, and Cyprus.

His immediate successors, being capable and far-seeing statesmen, appear to have foreseen the domination of Rome. Thirteen years before the first Roman fleet was built, and gained a victory under the command of Duillius, Ptolemy II. Philadelphus sent an embassy to Rome (273 B.C.) to offer his good wishes to the Senate and to seek its friendship. Puteoli then became the favoured harbour of Alexandrian ships.

Thereafter, until Egypt became a Roman Province (30 B.C.), the Ptolemies cultivated and enjoyed the friendship of Rome as the basis of their foreign policy, which chiefly engrossed their attention. Rome, on her side, regarding Egypt as a political dependency,[1] did not incorporate the country in her Empire until forced by circumstances to do so.

Meanwhile, during the third century, B.C., the powerful navy of the Ptolemies dominated the Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek States. Their maritime supremacy gave them the dominion of the entire littoral of Asia Minor, from Cilicia to the Hellespont, and enabled them at the same time to extend their influence, not only over Thrace and Macedonia, but even over the coasts of the Black Sea.[2]

[1] The Roman Senate was appointed, by the will of Ptolemy XIII., guardian to Ptolemy XIV. Dionysos II. and Cleopatra VII.—who were to marry each other. This gave rise to the landing of Cæsar in Egypt, to support Cleopatra (48 B.C.), who was banished by Ptolemy XIV.

[2] 'The Empire of Egypt, founded by the first King, still [under Ptolemy II.] included Palestine and Cœle-Syria, as well as the outlying and not very secure

Enjoying the Command of the Sea, and a favourable geographical position, the European commerce with the Far East, by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea as well as by Syria and Arabia, became the monopoly of the Kings of Egypt. Alexandria being the entrepôt of this traffic, its founder thus left to his successor a noble inheritance, which was carefully fostered by prudent statesmanship under the influence of sea-power.

Rise of the Roman Empire

In the western portion of the Mediterranean, the struggle for supremacy between Carthage and Rome was waged during the period of Egypt's highest power in the eastern portion (252 B.C.) In 241 B.C. a great naval victory, off the Ægates islands, gained by the Roman Consul Lutatius Catulus, put an end to the first Punic War. This victory gave to Rome undisputed possession of Sicily (237 B.C.), the islands of Corsica and Sardinia having been annexed in the previous year. The Roman Empire thus impinged more and more on the Greek world, and thereafter tended to displace the Ptolemies from their Command of the Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean.[1] During the third Punic War (149-146 B.C.), Rome finally subjugated the Carthaginians: and by the destruction of Carthage (146 B.C.) she became absolute mistress of the Western Mediterranean. Corinth also was destroyed in the same year.

In 193 B.C. the Romans had defeated the fleet of Antiochus the Great at Cyssus (Tchemé) and established their supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, where, from this

province of Cyrene. There is even evidence that in Syria, at one time in this reign, there were Egyptian garrisons as far as the Euphrates. As soon as Demetrius disappeared, and the great empires of Thrace and Syria lost their established sovereigns, Ptolemy resumed control of the Ægean Sea, with its coast cities and islands. How far this naval supremacy reached, and what cities it did not include, we cannot as yet tell with certainty. At all events, the confederacy of the Cyclades, some cities on the Thracian coast, perhaps even on the Euxine, recognised the sway of Egypt, administered apparently by the King's high admiral, Philokles, himself King of Sidon. . . . The stations from which all this naval empire was controlled were Thera, and probably Cyprus.'—('A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty,' by J. P. Mahaffy, p. 68.)

[1] The Romans sent a friendly message to announce their victory in 201 B.C. over Carthage and to convey their thanks for the neutrality of Egypt.

time onwards, their sea-power was not menaced by a rival. Egypt, it is true, possessed an independent navy; but the later Ptolemies enjoyed merely the semblance and guerdon of royalty, whilst Rome exercised a dominant influence throughout the adjacent countries.

A period of civil wars and internecine feuds, which lasted for more than one hundred years, bathed the Roman Empire in blood. The power of Rome was, however, so firmly established, that none of the formerly independent provinces which she had reduced to her sway had either the strength or the courage to make any serious attempt to rise against their oppressors. This period of internal strife was brought to a close by the battle of Actium (31 B.C.).

Incorporation of Egypt

By the destruction of Antony's Egyptian fleet, Augustus put an end to the civil wars and gained the supreme sovereign power. Had Antony conquered, he would probably have been left in undisturbed possession of Egypt for some years longer; but it was inevitable that, sooner or later, Egypt should fall to the Power that exercised the Command of the Sea. As the only autonomous State in the Mediterranean, Egypt's comparative independence, even in the hands of a Cleopatra, was, in effect, a danger to the Roman Empire: and therefore Egypt had to be incorporated. Besides, the commercial value of Egypt had long been an attraction.

Other Roman Provinces were under the immediate authority of the Senate: but so well did Augustus understand the power which the possession of Egypt conferred, that he transformed the kingdom into an Imperial Province, directly dependent on the sovereign.[1] Moreover, he entrusted the government of the country to Patricians, and not to Plebeians; and he banished all who held to the Ptolemies, providing liberally for their wants.

Pax Romana

At the beginning of the Christian era, Roman rule was supreme over the three ancient continents, and Roman sea-

[1] The Province was treated as an Imperial estate. Egypt, in a sense, commanded Rome, which was dependent on the tribute of corn. The Red Sea trade with India and the Far East became an Egyptian monopoly.

power dominated the then known world. This mighty Empire was held together by a standing army of only 400,000 men and a naval force of 50,000 marines. It is to be noted, however, that the proportion of the naval force to the land force—one-eighth—was much higher than that commonly adopted in olden times. It may therefore be argued, from this fact, that the Romans attached high importance to sea-power and intended to afford adequate protection to their very extensive and active sea-borne commerce. In particular, their commanding naval strength was designed and calculated to crush any attempt at revolt in the countries subject to their rule or influence.

Fall of the Western Empire

This universal peace—or *Pax Romana*—prevailed practically till the third century of our era. It had resulted from the three hundred years of warfare on land and sea which was terminated by the decisive fleet-action off Actium. It was interrupted by the rising of the northern nations, and ultimately by the invasion of the Goths in the year 250. The Goths were signally routed, and with great loss, nineteen years later by Claudius II.; and the seat of empire was removed to Byzantium in 321; but the Western Empire eventually succumbed to the repeated assaults of the Barbarians on its northern borders: Rome, its capital, being taken and pillaged by Alaric in 410.

Decline of the Eastern Empire

The Eastern Empire, on the other hand, (comprising the Balkan Peninsula, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Africa, and the islands of the Mediterranean), maintained its integrity and preserved its unity by virtue of its sea-power and more favourable strategic position. The Empire defended itself against its enemies—Persians, Slavs, Barbarians, and all nations that attacked it on land and by sea—until the seventh century, when it sank to its lowest ebb.

Arab Conquest and Empire

Between the years 620 and 640, the Arabs, or Saracens, became masters in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt[1]; and

[1] The Persians drove the Romans out of Egypt in 616, and governed the country for ten years, until the revolt of the Arabs, under the teaching of Mohammed, deprived the king of Persia of his best soldiers, thereby enabling

soon afterwards the whole of North Africa fell under their dominion.

It is true that, at this period, the Byzantines possessed a war-fleet; but it was maintained for the protection of commerce rather than for offensive operations. As a matter of fact, during the seventh and eighth centuries, the Arabs were in a position on no less than nine occasions to undertake, without opposition, expeditions by sea to contest the possession of Constantinople, which they besieged several times. Instead of strengthening their navy, however, the Byzantines relied exclusively on their 'Greek fire' for the destruction of the Saracens' ships, when these made their appearance under the walls of the Imperial city. They also attempted to rid themselves of the Arabs, as they did of their other adversaries, by offering subventions to secure peace.

But the impetus of the Arab conquest was irresistible. In addition to their acquisitions in Syria, Egypt, and in North Africa generally, Cyprus, Crete, Sicily, and Sardinia fell into their hands; and, in the eighth century, they invaded Europe, conquering Spain, Southern France, and Southern Italy. Having secured the Command of the Sea, these cumulative conquests were made within a comparatively short space of time.

In a word, the Eastern Empire fell, primarily, in consequence of its neglect of the navy which had built it up and protected it; and it became a prey to its enemy so soon as it relinquished the Command of the Sea. The Arabs supplanted the Byzantines as Masters of the Mediterranean; and, meeting no hostile fleet to dispute their supremacy, they inherited the Command of the Sea.

The possession of Egypt secured, at the same time, to its Mohammedan masters the monopoly of commerce with the East during a period extending over two centuries.

the Romans to re-establish themselves in Egypt. The Arabs soon began to press on the frontiers of the Roman Empire and to threaten Egypt, which they eventually entered in 639. Theodorus and his troops withdrew from Alexandria in 642; and the Roman Empire in Egypt then came to an end.

The rival Khalifates

Dissensions in the Arab Empire divided the Khalifate into two mutually hostile camps. The Abbassides, descendants of Mohammed's uncle, settled at Bagdad and dominated the East, ruling Egypt between the years 750 and 870; the Ommyades founded the Khalifate of Cordova, and established their rule in Spain (756 to 1031).

Neither section of the Arab Empire attempted to preserve its sea-power. The Abbassides were menaced by the invasion of the Turks, from the eighth century onwards; the Ommyades were incessantly harassed by the Christians of the West. But, not being threatened at sea, both Empires neglected their naval forces, and suffered in consequence.

The Fatimites

From the ninth century, Yemen, Egypt, and the north of Africa became virtually independent of the two Khalifates. A formidable power, the Fatimites, became masters of the northern littoral of Africa in the tenth century; and, not being opposed at sea, they took possession of the islands of the Mediterranean as well as of the sovereignty over these waters, and founded Cairo (969), which became the centre of their dominion. Here the Fatimite Khalifs reigned for two centuries. They crushed the rival Khalifate of the Abbassides, subjugated Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and for a time exercised supremacy over all the East.

But during the period of their growing ascendancy in those lands, the Fatimites lost their possessions in the West. The Normans of Sicily on the one side, and the Berbers on the other, established themselves in the islands of the Mediterranean and in North Africa, westwards of Egypt. Not possessing a navy, the Fatimites were unable to offer effective resistance against the Crusaders, who, in the eleventh century, possessed themselves of the coasts of Syria and Palestine.

The Ayubites

Arabia, in its turn, seceded from the Fatimites; and in Egypt itself they were supplanted in the twelfth century by the dynasty of the Ayubites, founded by Saladin (Salaheddin Yusuf).

Saladin organised an army and created a formidable navy. He reconquered Jerusalem from the Christians, and transmitted the sovereignty of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia

to his own family, which preserved it for a hundred years.

In the thirteenth century, the Europeans, recognising the dependence of Syria on Egypt, undertook the conquest of the latter. In 1240, Louis IX. of France laid siege to Damietta and captured the town; but the King and his entire army were made prisoners at Mansura. Neither the ships nor the armies of the Europeans were sufficiently powerful and disciplined to conquer the Arabs and Berbers by sea and the Turks by land. After their expulsion from the East, they disappeared for a long time as a maritime power in the waters of the Levant.

The Mamluks

The dominion of Egypt passed from the hands of the Ayubites into those of the Mamluks, who established their government in 1250 and ruled until the sixteenth century. This military caste remained, however, in Egypt and continued to prosper until the French invasion of 1798, being finally exterminated in the massacre ordered by Mohammed Ali in 1811.

The Venetians

The Venetians (or Venicians), having secured the commerce of the Far East which passed through Egypt and Syria, endeavoured to preserve their monopoly by assuming a protectorate over Egypt and defending her against the other naval Powers of the Mediterranean. But their commerce, which was seriously injured by the discovery of America (1492), was ruined through the opening up of the maritime route to the Indies by the Cape of Good Hope (1497). Egypt also suffered severely by this diversion of traffic, because the Mamluk princes and nobles received about one-fourth of the value of the merchandise that passed through their country. In effect, she experienced a commercial eclipse during the next three centuries.

The Ottomans

Lacking the protection of Venice, which was based on commercial interests alone, and being herself too impoverished to raise and maintain a navy of her own, Egypt fell under the sway of the Ottomans. In 1517 Egypt became a Turkish Pashalik.

Nevertheless, before Tuman Bey was deposed by the

Sultan, Egypt made a strenuous attempt to recover the Indian traffic. Assisted by Venice, and with the connivance of the King of Calicut, Egypt built and launched a fleet which, sailing for India, fell in with and vanquished a Portuguese squadron off the Bombay coast. The Portuguese, being thereby spurred to fresh exertion, despatched a fresh fleet against the Egyptians, and routed them, off Diu, in 1509. Thereafter, the Atlantic route was secured for the commerce of the Indies, which ceased to enrich the Mediterranean, although a portion of it was diverted to Constantinople. The Sultans of Turkey, on their side, instead of forming an alliance with Venice, in order to contest the Atlantic monopoly of the English, Dutch, and Portuguese by invading Bombay, attacked Venice as a short cut to commercial supremacy, at the same time neglecting the development of the caravan-route between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (Aleppo to Basra). By pursuing the shadow they thus lost the substance of their commercial greed.

Two events of capital importance had marked the latter half of the fifteenth century: the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, and the complete and final expulsion of the Moors from Spain. The victory of Mohammed II. put an end to the Byzantine Empire, by the fall of the capital (1453); and the capture of Granada, after two years' siege, by Ferdinand, the Catholic, terminated (1492) eight centuries of struggle between Christians and Mussulmans for the possession of Spain.

Expulsion of the Moors from Spain

The history of this long strife for domination in the Iberian Peninsula presents many striking examples of the immense advantages, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, which the Command of the Sea bestows. It was owing to their sea-power that the Arabs were in a position to invade Spain. In consequence of their Command of the Sea, they were also enabled to depend on a steady flow of reinforcements, and thus to reap the full benefits of their victories and to consolidate their rule. Charlemagne, on the contrary, when he crossed the Pyrenees to wrest Spain from

the Saracens, penetrated no further than the Ebro, because, although powerful by land, he possessed no naval force either in the Northern Seas[1] or in the Mediterranean.

Ferdinand and Isabella were well aware that their dominion required to be strongly supported by sea as well as advanced on land. They therefore built up a navy, and thereby secured immunity against any hostile return of the Arabs driven out of the Peninsula. Moreover, this navy also enabled Ferdinand to conquer the kingdom of Naples and to make himself master of the Western Mediterranean.

Sea-power of the Ottomans

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the inheritors of the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Turks, had also turned their attention to sea-power, and endeavoured to revive their ancient supremacy. The control of the Mediterranean was therefore disputed from this period between the Ottomans and the Spaniards until, in 1517, the former seized Egypt and, a little later, the dependent States of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers.

After these important acquisitions, the Ottoman Empire regarded herself as Mistress of the Seas from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Sea of Azov, and as far south as Aden.

Battle of Lepanto

This vaunted supremacy was overthrown, and Ottoman expansion was completely checked, by the crushing victory gained over their entire naval force by the Allied fleets of Spain, Venice, Genoa, Malta, and of the Pope, under the command of Don John of Austria, at the great battle of Lepanto (1571). Never, since the battle of Actium, had such a decisive naval engagement been fought for the sovereignty of the seas, involving, as it necessarily did, the question also of world-empire. If its results were not so immediate, nevertheless it is from this disaster that the decadence of the Ottoman Empire may be said to date. Although the Allied fleets neglected to follow up their victory, the fact was none the less established, that the Turks could be vanquished at sea, and that this defect was the vulnerable point of their

[1] In his old age, Charlemagne had the mortification to witness Norman pirates, against whom he had no fleet to oppose, ravaging with impunity the coasts of Northern Europe, on which they were able later to establish themselves.

Empire. The Turkish navy having been all but annihilated, the European fleets found leisure to develop their strength and resources without having to encounter any naval Power capable of hampering their movements.

Battle of Tchemé

For a long time after the battle of Lepanto, the disorganised Turkish fleet was not in a state to risk an engagement. In spite of repeated efforts, it took nearly two centuries for the Sultans to again raise an efficient navy. But the maritime power of Turkey recovered only to be finally shattered. In 1770, it received a crushing blow through the defeat inflicted by the Russian fleet under Admiral Elphinston[1] and Prince Alexis Orloff in the bay of Tchemé, off the Skio channel, west of Smyrna.

The ensuing contest for naval supremacy carried on between the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and the maritime republics of Italy, was indecisive, and resulted only in crippling all of them.

Great Britain and France

But in and from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, two European States sprang into the first rank as maritime Powers.

England, first under Elizabeth but particularly under Cromwell, entered into rivalry for the Command of the Sea against the Dutch, the Spaniards, and the Portuguese. The flag of Great Britain was displayed in the Mediterranean. On the capture of Gibraltar (1704), it was raised as a symbol of her naval supremacy, and has never since been lowered. Nelson nailed it to the mast at Trafalgar (1805).

France, in her turn, under the impulse given by Louis XIV., and directed by Colbert, became also a first-class naval Power.

[1] The Russian fleet was in a deplorable condition, after its long voyage from the Baltic; and, but for the aid given by British seamen at the ports of call, and particularly in the action at Tchemé, it could not have met and overcome the Turks. The four fireships prepared by Elphinston were taken into the bay by Lieutenants Dugdale and Mackenzie. To these officers, and Commodore Greig, the victory was primarily due. It is interesting to note this early association of British officers with the Russian navy. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the Russian navy was created and trained by English and, especially, Scottish sea-captains. But, in our brief alliances with Russia, we did not find her naval aid very effective. Nelson openly scoffed at it.

During the eighteenth century, the rivalry of the European nations for supremacy at sea was reduced to a duel between Great Britain and France, culminating in the French Revolution.

In 1798 Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt, and subsequently Syria, principally with the object of dealing a vital blow to British Colonial expansion. But, in the same year, Nelson gained a decisive victory over the French squadron in the Bay of Abukir, which, in addition to Sir Ralph Abercrombie's victory on land, forced the French to evacuate Egypt in 1801.

It will be noted that Great Britain, herself, did not attempt to occupy Egypt, after driving out the French. She restored the authority of the Sultan.

Great Britain Mistress of the Seas

Four years later, Mohammed Ali was proclaimed[1] as Pasha of Egypt; and Great Britain, by her crushing victory over the allied French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar, became Mistress of the Seas.

Ever since, an inexorable law of world-empire has compelled Great Britain, under penalty of the forfeiture of her maritime supremacy, upon which it is based, to approach nearer and nearer to Egypt.

(*b*) *The dynasty of Mohammed Ali*

The year 1769 was notable for the birth of three great military leaders — Napoleon, Wellington, and Mohammed Ali.[2] Over Mohammed Ali, who prided himself on being a Macedonian, the conquests of Alexander, no less than the careers of Wellington and Napoleon, exercised a dominating influence.

First British Expedition to Egypt—1801

An Albanian of humble parentage, the first three decades of his life were passed in obscurity. At the age of thirty, he was still in his native village of Kávala, engaged in a tobacco business. His three sons—Ibrahim, Tussun, Ismail

[1] By the Sheikhs: but the Porte acknowledged his position in the following year.

[2] Mohammed Ali's career is so admirably and fully described by Mr Cameron in *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century*, that I have drawn my facts almost exclusively from this source.

—lived to achieve military distinction, the first becoming one of the leading generals of his time.

When Napoleon invaded Egypt, Mohammed Ali joined the Sultan's army as second in command of a local levy. In the rout of the Turkish force which landed at Abukir, he himself narrowly escaped the fate of so many of his comrades, who were driven by the French into the sea, by being drawn into the gig of Sir Sidney Smith. Two years later, the latter's successor, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, landed the Albanian contingent at the same spot; and Mohammed Ali fought side by side with the British troops under Hutchinson in their victorious march (1801) on Cairo.

Mohammed Ali's dynasty may therefore be said to have been saved and founded under British auspices, as against the French, who sought to conquer Egypt and Syria for themselves in 1798-1801. Four or five years later, British sea-power and arms having placed him in a position to achieve his destiny, Mohammed Ali became Pasha of Egypt.

The decadent domination of the Mamluks had been easily destroyed by Napoleon's veterans. They, in their turn, were escorted out of Cairo, with all the honours of war but with none of its fruits, to the inspiriting tune of 'Hieland Laddie.' In a brilliant campaign of six months, the British Expeditionary Force compelled 30,000 French troops to evacuate Egypt. A British garrison having remained in the Delta till 1802, the Treaty of Amiens provided for its withdrawal in the following year.

The strategical relations between Egypt and India were here first demonstrated by the despatch of British reinforcements from the latter and from the Cape of 6000 men. Since that day, this connection has been upheld: in 1878, in consequence of the San Stefano treaty; in 1882, when the Arábi revolt was crushed; in 1885 and 1886, for operations against the Dervishes at Suákin; and in 1896, for the same object.

The French evacuation left two rival parties struggling for supremacy in Egypt. The owners of the soil—and therefore of the resources of Egypt—the Mamluks, with a superior

and better disciplined force, were pitted against the Turkish brigands whose object was to restore the Pashalik. Mohammed Ali bided his time until other adventurers had, by their downfall, prepared the way for him. Having succeeded to the command of 5000 insubordinate Albanians, he then took possession of Cairo in the Sultan's name and sought the suffrages of the sheikhs and populace by posing as a demagogue. He was thus brought into direct conflict with Khurshid, the Sultan's nominee as Pasha of Egypt, whom he besieged in the citadel, having previously permitted Khusrev, his predecessor, to escape to Constantinople, thereby leading to the historic enmity between them. The Sultan, being powerless to resist, acknowledged Mohammed Ali in 1806 as Pasha of Egypt, though subsequently he made several unsuccessful attempts to remove him.

Second British Expedition to Egypt—1807

The Mamluks had been driven up the Nile by Mohammed Ali; but their numbers did not exceed 10,000. With the object of supporting them against the Turkish domination in Egypt, Great Britain, reversing her previous policy, despatched a second expedition to the Nile. Having restored the authority of the Sultan, she now attempted to destroy it, apparently out of chivalrous regard for a moribund cause whose ablest leaders were dead.

It is painful to have to record the disastrous issues of this ill-conceived campaign, which lasted through nine months. Alexandria and Rosetta were occupied without encountering resistance. Later, at Rosetta, where the garrison was surprised and overcome by 500 Bashi Bazuks, a British force had to besiege the town for twelve days, whilst another detachment was sent up the river to El-Hamád.

Meanwhile, Mohammed Ali, having defeated the Mamluks at Mangabat, and, with the aid of the French Consul Drovetti, having roused the population against the infidel invaders, despatched an Albanian army of 4000 infantry with 1500 cavalry for the relief of Rosetta. The British force, being divided, was overcome in detail; a great many of our men were killed and wounded, or sent as slaves, with every mark of ignominy, to Cairo. Of the four thousand who had landed

only one month previously at Alexandria, only about one-half now remained.

In celebration of these victories, the triumphant Pasha and the ribald populace of Cairo strolled in the Ezbekía gardens between a double line of English heads set up on poles. The degradation to our prestige could no further go. After ransoming the prisoners who wished to return home, we humbly withdrew from Egypt.

The Mamluks were now thoroughly discredited for having invoked the aid of infidels; whilst Mohammed Ali was able to pose as the Defender of the Faith and the Liberator of Egypt. His power having been enormously increased by his military successes, the foundations of his throne, cemented by English blood, may be said to have been laid thereby.

Nevertheless, as he did not trust his Albanians, who were getting out of hand, and Cairo being in a state of anarchy, he took refuge in the citadel.

Extermination of the Mamluks

The Sultan, ever anxious, like his predecessors, to reduce the military pride of his most successful and popular generals, now called upon Mohammed Ali to prove his devotion by undertaking an expedition against the Wahábis, of Arabia, who had taken possession of the holy cities and interrupted the pilgrimage to Mecca. Not daring to disobey, Mohammed Ali temporized until, on the one hand, he was able to secure his position in Egypt against the Mamluks, and, on the other hand, to raise funds for the expenses of the campaign.

His first act was to seize and alienate the administration of the Wakfs, without actually destroying the principle of their religious foundation; his second, to abolish the private tenure of land. By the destruction of all title-deeds, the land became Crown property, or, rather, the private estate of Mohammed Ali, who appointed mudirs and omdehs to administer it. These rapacious officials gradually dispossessed the original proprietors, and squeezed and maltreated the Felláhin serfs, in order to make up the total assessment of taxes. So long as this was paid, Mohammed Ali did not trouble himself as to the manner in which it was imposed.

Thus, government by *kurbash* was introduced into the provinces, and flourished until the emancipation of the peasantry under the British Occupation.

Having provided the necessary funds, the Pasha of Egypt built at Bulak and launched in sections at Suez a fleet of 30 brigs for the transport of his artillery and impedimenta. When, later, more money was required, he squeezed the Copts and Felláhin on his own account, and raised another £300,000.

He now felt compelled to deal with the Mamluks before sending his army out of Egypt. In spite of their mistrust, he induced the Beys to attend a great public function at the citadel, and confided to his son, Tussun, the order for their massacre. After the accomplishment of this treacherous act, from which none escaped, the Mamluks in the provinces were hunted down and killed. Altogether, about 5000 of this worthless and profligate sect were put to the sword in 1811. Their encouragement of art was their sole legacy to Egypt.

The Wahábis were a puritan sect whose founder, Abdul Waháb, had preached the doctrine of the Korán in its original purity and upheld the Orthodox traditions. For sixty years they had maintained their military domination over Central Arabia, routing the Turkish armies sent against them and preying on the pilgrims to the holy city. Under their great leader, Saud II., they reached the height of their power as a Bedwin confederacy.[1] The Wahábi War—1811-1818

Against these redoubtable bandits, Mohammed Ali now despatched his son, Tussun, a mere boy, with the Albanians he hoped to dispose of by the fortunes of war. His fleet gave him the control of the Red Sea; and the coastal trade of the Arabian ports subsequently paid the expenses of the expedition.

After some successes and a few reverses, the Egyptian army at the seat of war was joined by Mohammed Ali, himself, who, having achieved some victories, returned hurriedly

[1] Great Britain, herself, had to send expeditions against the Wahábi pirates in the Persian Gulf.

to Egypt in order to counteract a conspiracy fomented by the Porte. Hostilities were not brought to a close until Ibrahim, the Pasha's eldest son, was sent to replace Tussun in his command. Saud being dead, Ibrahim finally subdued the Wahábis and captured their last stronghold of Deraya.

Conquest of the Sudan—1820-1823

Mohammed Ali now turned his attention to the Sudan, where he hoped to find gold for his Treasury and recruits for his army. Ismail, his third son, was given the command of the first expedition, which set out in 1820. To protect his flank against menace from the Libyan Desert, Mohammed Ali despatched an expedition against the warlike and fanatical Siwans, whose oasis, after a hard-won victory, was annexed to Egypt.

Ismail was entirely successful. He occupied Berber and Shendi, and penetrated to Sennar.

In the following year, Ismail being joined by his brother Ibrahim, the former went up the Blue Nile, the latter up the White Nile. Ismail reached Tomat, on the Upper Atbara; but, on returning to Shendi, he fell a victim to his depredations,—he and his staff being burnt alive in the palace by an incensed populace. His brother Ibrahim, falling ill, had to return to Egypt; but his followers penetrated far into the Dinka country.

Meanwhile, a third expedition, sent out by Mohammed Ali, annexed Kordofan in 1822. Khartum was founded, and the surrounding country thoroughly subjugated, in 1823.

Devastation of the Sudan

During the ensuing fifteen years, the Sudan was a shambles, under the brutal rule of the Egyptian slave-traders and taskmasters. The search for gold had been profitless; the caravan-trade had been ruined: but the country abounded in 'black ivory' and recruits for a Sudanese army. In 1838, Mohammed Ali himself paid a surprise-visit to the Sudan, penetrating as far south as Fazokl, and returning to Alexandria after an absence of only six months.

The state of the Sudan became even worse as time passed. It was a land of exile for the Felláhín, and a happy hunting-ground for unprincipled Pashas, until Baker

and Gordon put a stop, at least temporarily, to the most glaring iniquities of Egyptian rule.

The Pasha's despotic rule

The conquest of the Sudan not proving a profitable enterprise, Mohammed Ali was impelled to raise money nearer home. His ruling ambition being to make himself independent of the Porte, he required vast sources of wealth. A despot in government, he now became a monopolist in trade, dealing direct with European buyers. He fostered native industries, in the hope of becoming independent of European manufactures: but failed in the attempt. He welcomed foreigners, whom he tried to interest in his 'reforms,' because he had need of their financial co-operation. His monopolies were, of course, illegal, under the Capitulations: but he succeeded in gagging or outwitting the European Consular body, until, in 1838, Henry Bulwer's Commercial Treaty with Turkey abolished monopolies, and thereby led to his economic downfall.

The Egyptian army, under the care of the Frenchman known as Suliman Pasha, who introduced the Continental system, had made great strides both in discipline and training. It numbered 150,000 Regular troops, with 100 field-pieces. Vast sums were spent on the acquisition of a second-hand navy, through the purchase of warships, partly with a view to impress the Porte and partly to protect Egyptian commerce against the Greek pirates.

The first navy, raised in this manner, was destroyed at Navarino. But the second was built at the arsenal of Alexandria, and proved its metal under Ibrahim. In 1832, Mohammed Ali possessed no less than 8 battleships and 15 frigates, carrying 1300 guns, and manned by 12,000 men. The lesson of British naval supremacy was ever before his eyes: but he neglected to profit by it. For this he suffered. It was British sea-power that drove him out of Europe and of Asia, and British clemency that secured him the peaceful possession of Egypt.

Battle of Navarino—1827

In 1824, the Sultan again called on the Pasha of Egypt to show his devotion to the Padishah. He appointed him

Pasha of the Morea, and ordered him to subdue the Greek insurgents.

A squadron of 60 ships of war and 100 hired transports left Alexandria, with 17,000 troops, under the command of Ibrahim Pasha. It was in this campaign that Egypt, through the cruelties perpetrated by Ibrahim's army and the wholesale enslavement and deportation of Greeks to Alexandria, finally alienated the sympathies and tolerance of Europe. Great Britain, France, and Russia sent squadrons to the Morea, which, combined under the general command of Sir Edward Codrington, boldly entered Navarino harbour and, being fired on, at once engaged the enemy. Few of the 65 Turco-Egyptian ships escaped destruction.[1] A French garrison occupied Greece; and Codrington sailed to Alexandria, where he compelled Mohammed Ali to conclude a convention for the evacuation of the Morea. The treaty of Adrianople (1829) secured the independence of Greece.

After Navarino

The destruction of the Turco-Egyptian fleet at Navarino fell more heavily on the Sultan than on the Pasha. The disaster at Tchemé had compelled Turkey to make a supreme effort to revive her navy. After Navarino, Turkey practically ceased to exist as a maritime power. It was from about this period that Russia began to enter into rivalry with Great Britain for naval supremacy in the Black Sea and Mediterranean. In consequence of the increasing maritime strength of Russia—who, in 1853, burnt a Turkish squadron in the roadstead of Sinope—Great Britain, supported by France and Austria, three years later, guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, involving the sealing up of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

Campaign in Syria and Asia Minor—1831-1833

Twice had Mohammed Ali exhausted the resources of Egypt, without succumbing; in his wars for the Padishah. Nevertheless, in 1829, the Sultan again taxed his fealty by commanding him to send his fleet and 20,000 men to

[1] Thirty Turkish warships and transports, and seventeen Egyptian vessels, carrying 5000 Greek slaves, are said to have reached Alexandria. Ibrahim had lost the half of his army.

Stambul. As the Pasha had reason to believe that, before Navarino, the Turkish admiral was under secret orders to seize an opportunity of kidnapping the Egyptian army, he was on his guard against such a palpable ruse. The baited Pasha therefore temporized until, by the force of circumstances, he was placed in the position of a rebel: and, as such, he invaded Syria with 9000 infantry and 2000 cavalry.

This fine army, under Ibrahim Pasha, with the invaluable Suliman as chief of his staff, had the support of the Egyptian fleet at Jaffa. The Syrians, groaning under the Turkish yoke, hailed Ibrahim as a deliverer, and eventually flocked to his standard.

Acre fell (1832) after a siege of six months, and became the Egyptian base. With his 9000 Fellâhin and mercenaries, together with as many more volunteers recruited from the Druse and Bedwin populations, Ibrahim marched to Damascus, which opened its gates to him. Holding a safe line of communications, Ibrahim then set out for Homs, where the vanguard of the Turkish army was encamped, the main body being fifty miles behind. Here the Ottoman commander, being unable or unwilling to deny Ibrahim, decided to give battle. The result was, that the Turks were utterly routed; and the main body, hearing of the disaster, mutinied, and fled to the north. The victorious Egyptian commander, after a brief visit to Aleppo, set out in hot pursuit, and completed their discomfiture.

In consequence of these reverses, and in the panic that followed them, the Turkish fleet abandoned Alexandretta. Ibrahim, seizing his advantage, sent forward a detachment under Abbas to occupy Adana. Receiving reinforcements from his fleet, he advanced on Konia, near which the Turks had concentrated 50,000 men. Here he defeated the Grand Vizier Reshid, routing his entire army, with insignificant losses to himself. Konia was the third pitched battle won by the Egyptians, fighting against heavy odds, in an eleven months' campaign that had resulted in the conquest of Syria and the violation of Asia Minor.

Ibrahim, with an army of 30,000 men, now penetrated,

in the depth of winter, to within one hundred miles of the Bosporus, to Kutaya, from whence he threatened the capital and demanded compliance with his father's orders. Nothing but the proximity of a Russian squadron, with 13,000 troops, prevented him from occupying Constantinople, and there dictating his own terms. The Sultan was compelled to agree to the Convention of Kutaya (1833). The Firman of 1832, outlawing and deposing Mohammed Ali, was revoked: and a new Firman (6th May, 1833) confirmed the Pasha in the possession of Egypt and Syria.

The Egyptians retired to Syria; and the Russians evacuated the Bosporus: but, the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (where the latter had concentrated) placed the Sultan under a Russian Protectorate and closed the Dardanelles to the warships of other nations. Thus, by astute diplomacy and prompt action, Russia, who a few years previously had obtained the chief credit of liberating Greece, temporarily usurped the rôle of Great Britain. She was, however, deposed from this position by the Treaty of London (1840), to which she, but not France, was a Signatory Power—the latter adhering to its stipulations only in the following year, after the evacuation of Syria.

Fall of Mehammed Ali

In 1841, Mohammed Ali lost Syria; but, through the influence of Lord Palmerston, he secured the hereditary possession of Egypt. The history of this disastrous campaign may be briefly told.

The conqueror of Syria, coquetting with the fickle diplomacy of France, who was playing a double game, openly defied the Powers, and prated of his 'rights'—the legitimate fruits of his son's victories—or, in other words, the recognition of his complete independence. The Powers, dealing leniently with him, though a rebel to his suzerain, decided[1] to maintain his state of vassalage to Turkey, giving him Egypt for his family and Syria for his lifetime.

[1] In the Treaty of London (1840), signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and of the Sultan. Under Article II. the Powers undertook to 'cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria.'

Ibrahim was at Damascus, with an army of 250,000 men of all arms, when a British squadron arrived at Beirut, accompanied by a few Austrian ships and 4000 Turks. A landing was effected; but Beirut was bombarded without result, until, eventually, after some Turkish victories on land, Suliman evacuated the town and fell back on Damascus. The British fleet then sailed to Acre, and, with the help of its allies, captured the fortress, thus for the third time at this spot demonstrating the effect of sea-power in the Levant.

The Egyptian navy—comprising no less than 21 battleships, 17 frigates, and 18 brigs, with 40,000 men—was all this time shut up with the fleet surrendered by the Turkish admiral in Alexandria. As a 'fleet in being,' it might have been used to great advantage: but a few British cruisers sufficed to hold it in check. The French fleet, on which Mohammed Ali had relied, never came to his aid.

Ibrahim was now thoroughly beaten. With his stricken army, numbering over 60,000 men, he commenced his retreat from Damascus; but only a remnant of this gallant band and of the host of camp-followers ever reached Egypt.

The collapse of Mohammed Ali's dream of empire was thus complete. Nevertheless, it required the almost brutal frankness of a British sea-captain to make him realize his downfall. When Sir Charles Napier arrived at Alexandria, he said to the Pasha of Egypt: 'If your Highness will not listen to my unofficial appeal to you against the folly of further resistance, it only remains for me to bombard you: and, by God, I *will* bombard you, and plant my bombs in the middle of this room here, where you are sitting!' After that, there was nothing more to be said; and, although Napier's irregular guarantee was repudiated by the Porte and the Powers, Lord Palmerston, who supported him, obtained its essential provisions: the unmolested evacuation of Syria, and a recommendation to the Sultan to leave the Pasha free in Egypt. The retention by Mohammed Ali of the hereditary tenure of Egypt was, consequently, confirmed by the Turkish Firmans of 13th February and

1st June 1841; and the Tribute was fixed at 80,000 purses (£363,635).

Broken down by his reverses and, subsequently, by physical infirmities, Mohammed Ali died eight years later, a dotard.

The reign of Mohammed Ali

The career of Mohammed Ali might have been more successful, if less brilliant, had he applied to himself the lesson taught to Napoleon, which in principle he recognised: the dominating influence of British sea-power, whenever it was exerted. He is reported, by Burckhardt, to have said: 'The great fish swallow the small: and Egypt is necessary to England . . . who must some day take Egypt as her share of the spoil of the Turkish Empire.' But, although he always wished to be the friend of Great Britain, he lent himself readily to the intrigues of her rival in Egypt. He had a wholesome fear of Palmerston and Wellington, neither of whom took him seriously; but, being ignorant of European politics, he was unaware of Palmerston's dominant influence in the cabinets of Europe. The first half of his reign was spent in consolidating his position in Egypt; the second, in ambitious attempts at winning an empire. He despoiled his country for barren conquests; and his tyrannical rule was a curse to his people: but he extended his frontiers, and raised Egypt to the rank of a first-class State. In spite, too, of his reckless expenditure on armaments and military adventures, and the robber-economy he practised in the Delta, he left Egypt more prosperous than he found her. Although his 'reforms' were mythical; although his irrigation projects and canalization works were inspired by, and carried out for, personal ends, these introduced into the country the European element which its development demanded. It was his over-reaching ambition in Syria, and his manifest incapacity to pacify and administer the country, that led to the active interference of Europe. He was under the impression that the security of Egypt depended on the possession of Syria; but, by his tyranny, he roused the entire native population against him, and, through his ignorance, he overlooked the cardinal principles of sea-power.

That the down-trodden Fellâhin should have been led to

such brilliant victories over their Turkish masters is not so remarkable as it might appear. Ibrahim, himself a great leader, was splendidly served by Suliman, as chief of his staff, and by the foreign mercenaries that composed the conquering elements in his army, as well as by the warlike local levies; but his easy successes over the Turks were due in a still greater measure to the intrigues of Khusrev, the Sultan's War Minister and the implacable enemy of Mohammed Ali. Khusrev himself wished to be nominated Pasha of Egypt and to lead the Sultan's army against the rebels; but his Imperial master could not spare him. In revenge for his discomfiture, he wilfully crippled each expedition that set out against Ibrahim. The Sultan having massacred about one-fourth of the Janasseries at Constantinople and dispersed the remainder, the Turkish army at that time, in default of the better element that evaded or escaped service, was an undisciplined rabble. With inefficient troops under their command, and with Khusrev's malignant and powerful influence at headquarters causing dissension and producing further disorganization, the Turkish commanders had no chance against Ibrahim's brilliant generalship and dashing exploits.

In the year that Mohammed Ali paid homage to his suzerain at Stambul, Ibrahim was received and fêted in England. The latter, after a few months' regency, during his father's imbecility, died in 1848. On the death of Mohammed Ali in 1849, Abbas (the son of Tussun), who had taken over the regency from Ibrahim, succeeded to the Pashalik, in precedence of his uncle Said.

Abbas I. was a Turk of the old School. He had no sympathy with his grandfather's weakness for Levantine institutions and foreign society: indeed, he openly expressed contempt for these, and made some attempts to stem the tide of the European pacific invasion of Egypt. But the opening up of the overland route and the prospect of pillage had attracted a swarm of adventurers and concession-hunters to Egypt, against whom Abbas sought safety in flight. He shut himself up in his palace, refusing all intercourse with

Abbas I.—1849-1854.

foreigners; he freed trade by abolishing what remained of the commercial monopolies; he reduced the army, and suppressed public institutions that owed their origin to artificial inflation: in a word, he adopted a severely reactionary policy. He was only thirty-six years of age when he became Pasha of Egypt. Five years later, he was assassinated in his palace, and was succeeded by his junior uncle, Said. His brief, inglorious reign was notable chiefly for the introduction of railways in the Delta, in order to facilitate the transit of mails and passengers between Alexandria and Cairo. These were constructed at the suggestion of the British Government, whose interest in a quick route to India eventually predominated over French obstruction.

Said—1854-1863

Said, having been educated in France, and being of an amiable and pliant disposition, readily fell under the sway of European influence. He admitted all to his intimacy; and, having been carefully trained to fill his high position, he confidently gathered up the reins of government into his own hands, ignoring his native advisers. Egypt being free from public debt, and commerce being unshackled and prosperous, Said made a very good beginning as a benevolent autocrat. He protected the peasantry by granting (in 1858) a Land Law, which secured the Felláhin in their freehold rights; and he extended the railways and canals. Indeed, but for the influence of M. de Lesseps, who, as a prime favourite, hunted him all over the country in the fixed determination to obtain a concession for the cutting of the Suez Canal, the genial Pasha might have succeeded better in giving effect to his good intentions. In 1856, Said finally capitulated, and ratified his promise of 1854, being assured by M. de Lesseps that the canal would be constructed with French capital and would make the Pasha master of the situation in Egypt. The falsification of these hopes is too evident to-day to require further demonstration. In spite of British opposition to a scheme that threatened her own naval interests and held out little prospect of benefiting Egypt, the Porte, as suzerain, eventually confirmed the concession.

Disease and anxiety broke down the feeble physical and mental equipment of Said, who, after nine years' honest endeavour to benefit his country, died in 1863.

Ismail—1863-1879

From my present point of view—the influence of sea-power on the history of Egypt—the reign of Ismail was chiefly significant for the opening, in 1869, of the Suez Canal. This event profoundly affected the commercial and naval situation in the Mediterranean, leading not only to the diversion of international commerce and the redistribution of trade-centres, but also to the creation of a nodal point in the primacy of the seas which of necessity fell under the controlling influence of the dominant maritime Power. Thus, an Egyptian Question, in its widest sense, was created, second only in importance to the analogous situation on the Bosporus.

The Suez Canal

The labours of George Baldwin, the first British Consul in Egypt (during the French Revolution), of Mr Briggs, an English merchant at Alexandria, and, in particular, the life-long perseverance and initiative of Lieutenant Waghorn, in Mohammed Ali's reign, had contributed to and resulted in the revival of the overland route to India, thus preparing the way for M. de Lesseps. First under Said, and subsequently under Ismail, the Suez Canal was built and opened as the principal pathway of commerce to the Far East. Intended originally for sailing vessels only, its financial success was ensured by the invention of the compound engine, which economised the consumption of coal, and by the growing commerce of Great Britain, which contributed two-thirds of its receipts. The Company, originally Egyptian, was saved from bankruptcy by the sixteen millions of capital which Ismail sunk—part of which went to pay off the iniquitous Award of Napoleon III. in 1864; but it was subsequently alienated, and brought under French administration, or the autocracy of M. de Lesseps. Egypt, at the present day, derives no profit from the Canal, except indirectly through the British Occupation, which is the logical result of its construction. The purchase by Lord Beaconsfield of

Ismail's Suez Canal shares[1] gave Great Britain a *locus standi*, which she did not before possess in the control of Egypt, and a share with France in the administration of the Canal.

The prosperity and safety of this international highway are, or should be, the common concern of Europe and a bond of union between Great Britain and France for the promotion of good and stable government in Egypt. But its neutralization is assured only so long as the integrity of Egyptian territory, under Turkish suzerainty, is preserved.

Career of the Prodigal Pasha

The career of Ismail—the prodigal son of a warrior Pasha—need not detain me long in the telling. In the apt words of Sir Alfred Milner, it was 'a carnival of extravagance and oppression.'[2] He ran *amok* among the stockbrokers of Europe and carried despotism to the height of crime. In twelve years he spent over one hundred millions of money, and brought Egypt to the brink of bankruptcy. He created liabilities of which not more than about ten per cent. was spent on the constitution and legitimate development of public works and native institutions. He squandered fortunes in *bakhshish*, the building of palaces, vice-regal display and ambitions, and on voluptuous living. But he wasted far more by his reckless and unscrupulous methods of raising money. All this was done in spite of the capable expert advice at his service—an advice which lacked authority—until, by his despotism, Ismail's mad career was brought to a close by the united action of Europe.

Everything was in his favour when the prodigal Pasha came to the throne. Egypt's revenue was sufficient for all practical purposes of economical and national development, whilst her public debt barely exceeded three millions. The American civil war had opened up immense markets for cotton, the staple product of Egypt, whereby the exports rose in two years (1862-1864) from four to fourteen millions in value, and the imports from one to five millions. But, surrounded as he was by a host of European finance-mongers

[1] Purchased (1875) for £4,000,000 (from which Ismail derived an immediate profit of £500,000) and now worth about £20,000,000, representing a revenue of £700,000.

[2] "England in Egypt," by Alfred Milner, to whose guidance through the tortuous paths of Ismail's career I have trusted.

and concession-hunters—who acquired rights, too often for the mere purpose of extortion—and led away by illusory dreams of aggrandizement, he, on the conclusion of the American War, which put an end to the inflated prosperity of Egyptian commerce, was drawn into the clutches of European capitalists, eager to lend him money for any purpose but demanding their pound of flesh. Thus, by the end of 1876, Ismail had saddled Egypt with a debt of eighty-nine millions, concurrently with the increase of taxation on land amounting to half as much again. His well-meant efforts to raise sugar, in place of cotton, in order to supply the markets of the world, were a failure from the first, owing to his ignorant and extravagant administrative expenditure. Having driven Egypt into the arms of the bondholders, whose claims were championed by France, he plunged still deeper, resorting to every conceivable shift and expedient in order to buttress up his failing credit and to provide money for his privy purse, until, at last, the Powers intervened to save Egypt from absolute bankruptcy.

The Debt of Egypt

Great Britain, who enjoys the leadership in world-finance as well as the primacy of the sea, necessarily took a prominent part in the enquiries that were then instituted. The preliminary Report (1876) of Mr Goschen and M. Joubert was followed (1878) by the appointment of a Commission with fuller powers. Ismail's desperate opposition was fruitless: and he himself was deposed, in June 1879, from the position he had so criminally abused. The Law of Liquidation (1880), which gave International authority to the *Caisse*, did away with the Floating Debt that Ismail's short loans at usurious interest had raised, and consolidated his numerous borrowings into four great loans, composing the Debt of Egypt, as follows:—

Privileged Debt	£22,629,800
Unified Debt	58,043,326
Daïra Loan	9,512,804
Domains Loan	8,500,000
	£98,685,930

A lower, but reasonable, rate of interest was fixed: five per cent. on the Privileged and Domains, and four per cent. on the Unified and Daïra, debts or loans. The bondholders did not complain, being sure of their coupon.

After this Law was passed, it was found that fully half the revenue of Egypt had to be devoted to the service of the Debt, thereby causing a retrenchment in expenditure which crippled the development of the country and contributed in a measure to the dissent which found expression in the Arábi revolt. What Egypt saved on the one hand, she lost ten times over in the *débacle* of the Sudan and Lower Egypt.

Convention of London (1885)

When order was restored, it was seen that the financial equilibrium of Egypt, and therefore its political stability, required not only a new loan, in order to meet the resulting liabilities, but also some radical changes in the Law of Liquidation. France having been satisfied by the payment of the Alexandria Indemnities, and Russia and Germany by the appointment of Commissioners to the *Caisse de la Dette*,[1] the Powers agreed to the Convention of London (March 1885), by which the financial liabilities and the tutelage of Egypt were finally regulated and established on an equitable and stable basis. Moreover, Egypt was authorized to raise a new loan of nine millions, under the joint guarantee of the Powers.

Ismail's reign

The squalid details of Ismail's financial profligacy have obliterated, except in the minds of impartial and friendly observers, many of the schemes by which he hoped to advance the interests of his country. Although the internal state of Egypt had been reduced to chaos and anarchy, under Ismail's unprincipled despotism, the *corvée*, and the *kurbash*, the external prosperity of the country had been marked by its growing commerce and an increase of revenue. Canals, telegraphs, and railways had enormously increased their mileage; and harbours had been built at Suez and Alexandria. Ismail, too, spent half-a-million on Sir Samuel Baker's expedition to the Sudan—perhaps with the object of ingratiating himself in English public opinion—and there-

[1] Established by the Decree of 2nd May 1876.

by extended the frontiers of Egypt in the south; and he cordially supported Baker's successor, Gordon, under whose energetic administration the finances and prosperity of this slave-harried region were greatly relieved and advanced.

Though Ismail lavished five millions on the Porte, chiefly in *bakhshish*, he had something to show in return. He obtained possession of Suákin and Massawa by adding £30,000 to the annual Tribute. On 27th May 1866, he, with the help of Nubar, obtained a Firman altering the line of succession to primogeniture in his own family (thereby cancelling Mohammed Ali's Firman of June 1841, and disinheriting Abdul Halim and Mustafa Fazil) in consideration of an increase of £280,000 to the Tribute. By the Firman of 8th June 1867, he acquired the hereditary title of Khedive.

Firmans still operative

On 8th June 1873, an important Firman was issued that replaced all preceding Firmans. "It confirms the rules of succession already established; provides for a Regency during minority; authorizes the Khedive to make laws, to make non-political conventions with foreign Powers, to contract loans without permission, to keep an unlimited number of troops, and to build ships of war, ironclads excepted. The Tribute is maintained at 150,000 purses (£675,000). This Firman is still in force, in so far as it is not controlled by the Firman which was issued on the 2nd August 1879."[1] The latter (revised version), granted to Taufik on his accession to the Khediviate, made two important reservations: the Khedive was prohibited from contracting loans without the consent of the existing creditors, and from maintaining more than 18,000 troops.

Ismail's epitaph

In taking leave of Ismail and all his works, I return to the point from which I started. At the inauguration of the Suez Canal, Ismail entertained the European royalties, notabilities, and busybodies, with princely hospitality; and took the opportunity of boasting, with perfect truth, that he had detached Egypt from the continent of Africa and united her to that of Europe. Let that be his epitaph. He died in 1895, after an exile of sixteen years.

[1] Professor Holland, in *The European Concert* &c.

(*c*) *Egypt under the Powers*

Ismail's legacy

During the last six years of Ismail's reign, the Powers of Europe had gradually established a control over the country which ominously overshadowed that of the Khedive and his suzerain. Ismail, having mortgaged Egypt to the bondholders, whose securities were assailed by his reckless conduct and corrupt government, the Powers intervened to protect their own subjects. But it was not until the institution, on 1st January 1876, of the International Courts[1]—which enforced, or attempted to enforce, European claims—that the Powers obtained a legitimate footing in the country. This was the parting of the ways in Egyptian history.

International Control

The International Control, being legitimized, led to prompt and decisive results. Mr Cave's Report having exhibited the chaos of Egyptian finance, the Decree of 2nd May 1876 established the famous *Caisse de la Dette*, charged with the duty of receiving the revenue set aside for the service of the Debt, including the hypothecated taxes, together with powers to sanction or repudiate fresh loans and to sue the Government before the International Courts. Close upon the institution of this *imperium in imperio* sprang the Dual Control (Decree of 18th November 1876), as a result of the Goschen-Joubert mission on behalf of the bondholders.

Dual Control

The Dual Control had a troubled history up to its suspension two years later (Decree of 15th December 1878); but, on the accession of Taufik, it was revived (Decrees of 4th Sept. and 15 Nov. 1879), Major Baring and M. de Blignières being appointed Controllers-General, with instructions from their respective Governments to inform the Khedive that the exercise of political influence by any other of the Powers would not be tolerated.

The Dual Control was a decided advance on the Internationalism that had been rampant hitherto. From its institution sprang the administrative reforms that have since

[1] The new codes were operative for a few months previously (Oct. 1875). The powers of the Courts, limited at first to five years, have since been renewed by successive Decrees. The International, or Mixed, Tribunals superseded the Consular Courts under the Capitulations, but did not abolish these.

been elaborated and extended under more favourable conditions. But the Dual Control, before it had time to prove its effectiveness, was overturned by the Arábi revolt. Moreover, it lacked authority, which alone could give weight to its advice, and encouraged the malcontents to protest against foreign influence in general and the Dual Control in particular. Thus, in 1882, the Chamber of Delegates, being revived (after a moribund existence of sixteen years) through the growing influence of the Nationalists, claimed the right of regulating the Budget. The Nationalists, having strengthened their position under Mahmud Sami's Ministry, with Arábi as War Minister, caused further friction, leading to a political deadlock and, after a protest from the Controllers, to the resignation of M. de Blignières. This was the beginning of the end. Anarchy ensued. But before describing the result, it may be well to enquire into the cause, which certainly was not the miscarriage of the Dual Control.

Arábi revolt

Prior to the Arábi revolt, things were making for an increase of Turkish influence in Egypt. This influence—the shadow of which was seen in the restrictions on Taufik's Firman—was, however, through the apathy and unreadiness of the Sultan, not destined to become permanent, in spite of the correct attitude of Great Britain towards the Suzerainty. It was on account of the favouritism shown to Turkish officers that the Arábi movement first gathered weight. But neither this disaffection in the army nor the arrears of pay for which the Felláhin soldiers subsequently clamoured were at the seat of the popular upheaval that shook the country: since, in its later development, it sprang largely from the agitation fomented at Stambul.

Contemporaneously with the rise of the Mahdi in the Sudan, which followed the abolition of slavery, the Arábi movement at first found expression in a perfectly legitimate and well-founded protest against the whole social fabric of Egypt—the result of many years' misgovernment and despotism—and, in particular, against an invertebrate Administration that had neither the support nor the sympathy of

the people. It developed further into a popular cry against European influence, which under Ismail had been of the most questionable and baneful character, and, by a natural transition, into a menace against all Christians. Arrears of pay, the brutal treatment of both officers and men, were not sufficient to rouse the Felláhin to revolt, under the feeble leadership of Arábi and his lieutenants. It required the stimulus of fanaticism, and the august patronage of the Khalifa, Egypt's Suzerain, to quicken the movement into life. It was the *Jehad*, or Holy War against infidels, that drove the patient Felláhin against British bayonets at Kassassin.

The military revolts of February and September, 1881—mere mobs demanding arrears of pay—were easily repressed. Then came envoys from the Sultan, and an outbreak of the endemic jealousy between France and Great Britain, who nevertheless combined in supporting the Khedive during the Ministerial deadlock of January 1882. The political crisis during the early days of May brought the British and French squadrons to Alexandria. But, in spite of ultimatums, Arábi refused to retire. Anarchy and massacres ensued.

International action

On the 8th June, envoys from the Sultan were again well received at Cairo; and, three days later, the rebellion broke out. The Powers appealed to the Sultan: but the Suzerain of Egypt, in response, shrugged his shoulders and sent a decoration to the arch-rebel, Arábi. After the bombardment of Alexandria, the six Powers submitted an Identic Note, formally inviting the intervention of the Sultan, in support of the Khedive. But the Porte was neither ready nor willing to intervene.

Taufik—1879-1892

France having refused to co-operate, Great Britain was left alone to suppress the rebellion and to restore the authority of the Khedive. Her first care was to protect the Canal; her second, to concentrate a sufficient force to 'smash' Arábi before the insurgent movement had time to inflict greater damage. Sir Garnet (now Lord) Wolseley arrived on 20th August. Arábi was 'smashed,' at Tel-el-Kebir, on 13th September 1882. The following day, Arábi

surrendered himself and 10,000 men at Cairo to two squadrons of British cavalry that had ridden straight from the battlefield to the walls of the citadel. Next day, Sir Garnet Wolseley led the British Expeditionary force into Cairo. The authority of the Khedive was then formally re-established.

Abolition of the Dual Control

Before the close of the year, Great Britain agreed, but France objected, to the abolition of the Dual Control. Nevertheless, it was abolished by the Decree of 18th January 1883. The resulting proposals contained in the British Circular to the Powers and the Suzerain were accepted by all except France and the Porte.

Single Control established

Sir Auckland Colvin was appointed as Financial Adviser; Lord Dufferin reported on the reorganization of the country: a Constitution was signed by the Khedive on the 30th April, and promulgated on the following day. Major Evelyn Baring (now Viscount Cromer) was nominated British Resident. He arrived at Cairo two days after Hicks Pasha had started from Khartum on his ill-fated march to El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan: and, therefore, too late to avert the disaster which English experts had foretold.

Moral

These events stand forth in striking contrast. France objected to the abolition of the Dual Control, but refused to co-operate in making that Control possible. Turkey protested, after the bombardment of Alexandria, but refused to intervene: indeed, morally speaking, she forfeited her suzerainty by supporting the defeated rebels. Great Britain crushed the revolt and restored the authority of the Khedive: but she refused the legitimate fruits of her single-handed victory, although these lay at her feet and were pressed on her by the European residents, including many Frenchmen. Alone of all the Powers having interests in Egypt, she was ready and able to interfere effectively. She saved the country from anarchy and the Canal from destruction. She asked nothing in return save pledges of good government. But it was public opinion at home that drove the Gladstone Ministry into the breach, and the effective mobility of our land

and sea forces that turned the tide of battle and saved civilization, law, and order in Egypt.

Practically, after Tel-el-Kebir, there was no law but British martial law until we set up the authority of the Khedive. Had we annexed the country then, as all Europe and all Egypt expected of us, we should probably have met with no opposition beyond a tedious academic discussion. We neglected the opportunity, because we had no statesmen capable of interpreting the functions of sea-power and the inevitable destiny of the dominant maritime and colonial Power. We believed that, by the fall of Arábi, we were 'out of the wood.' Indeed, we were but entering it.

(*d*) *Egypt under the Single Control*

British Policy Having been driven, by the force of circumstances and the pressure of Public Opinion, into a position of responsibility for Egypt, we tried to limit our action in every way. Our Policy—if policy it could be called—was based on the optimistic but searching and admirable Report of Lord Dufferin, and was vaguely outlined by Lord Granville in his despatch to the Powers of 3rd January 1883. The position which Great Britain had so unwillingly, but so effectually, assumed in Egypt imposed upon her Majesty's Government "the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress." Exactly a year later, Lord Granville added a rider, which, like a lady's postscript, was more pregnant than his famous despatch. He wrote to Sir Evelyn Baring: "It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces, that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend; and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices."

British Action Our action, however, was less valiant than our words. It

was fitful, inconsistent, and blundering. We tried to please everybody and to do everything at once; we endeavoured to evade responsibilities by shutting our eyes to accomplished facts and their logical result; we adopted measures which we had subsequently to abandon, in face of the opposition these aroused. True, everything was against us: our equivocal position, which incensed France and did not satisfy the rulers of Egypt; the social reaction from the free-booting days of Arábi, and the financial bondage of the peasantry to Levantine usurers; disasters in the Sudan, followed by abandonment; an empty exchequer and a full quiver of public and private grievances. The years 1884 and 1885 were the darkest period in the history of the Single Control.

In particular, our attitude towards the Sudan made us intensely unpopular in Egypt. We first disclaimed all responsibility as to its future; but, after the disaster to Hicks' Expedition, we insisted on its abandonment. This caused the resignation of the patriotic Sherif Pasha, who had been Prime Minister since the restoration of Khedivial authority. Riaz being in the sulks, owing to our lenient treatment of Arábi, there remained only Nubar, on whom we fixed all our hopes. But Mr Clifford Lloyd, who ran *amok* among Egyptian reforms, upset everything. There was chaos in Cairo. We summoned a Conference of the Powers, which ended in talk. Lord Northbrook's mission still further complicated matters, by involving us in a dispute with the *Caisse* and the Mixed Tribunals, as regards the suspension of the Sinking Fund: and we were forced to retire from a position which, though illegal, was a rational solution, dictated by common prudence and accepted in principle by the London Conference of 1884. Eventually, after further discussion, and after the Powers had negatived our proposal of a British guaranteed Loan, the London Convention was signed (March 1885) by the High Contracting Parties. A loan of nine millions, authorized by the Porte and guaranteed by the six Powers, gave Egypt her financial law and freedom but shackled her with multiple fetters;

whilst the freedom of the Suez Canal was approved in principle.[1]

In spite of our heroic but ill-conceived Campaign in the Sudan, which ended in the death of Gordon and the abandonment of the country to anarchy and barbarism, and in spite of the many excellent reforms introduced into Egypt—in particular, the improvements in irrigation and relief of the *corvée*—we had not succeeded, so far, in justifying our position or in creating respect for our advice. Public Opinion at home being ill-informed at that time, and the British Ministry waiting on events instead of endeavouring to control these, we drifted between Scylla and Charybdis, and only floated into smoother water when the Convention of London defined our position in Egypt. This International Agreement is still the chief land-mark in the political situation. From it all the Powers take their bearings. From it dates the period of real progress in internal reforms, which, in January 1887, permitted a reduction of numbers in the Army of Occupation.

Rehabilitation of Great Britain

Between August 1885 and July 1887, Great Britain made an earnest and honourable attempt to regularise her position in Egypt, to satisfy Turkey and France, to conciliate the other Powers, and to redeem her promise of evacuation. With the object of fixing a limit to the duration of her Occupation of Egypt, which had been urged on behalf of the Sultan, but at the same time of providing guarantees for the security and permanence of the reforms instituted by her, no less than for the 'territorial immunity' or neutralization of the country, Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff was entrusted with the task of negotiating a Convention with the Porte. On 24th October, 1885, a preliminary Convention was signed, and was promptly ratified, appointing a British and a Turkish Commissioner to proceed to Egypt, in order to co-operate with the Khedive in the reorganization of the Egyptian army, in

[1] In 1884, Lord Granville negotiated with France for the neutralization of Egypt, having previously proposed (3 Jany. 1883) that this ideal but impossible scheme should apply only to the Canal. These negotiations came to naught.

the pacification of the Sudan through the offices of the Ottoman Commissioner, and in the institution of an enquiry relating to 'the general settlement of Egyptian affairs.' In the event of the points on which the two Governments needed further information being favourably reported on by their respective Commissioners, the High Contracting Parties were to consider the propriety of executing a definitive Convention 'regulating the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt in a convenient period.'

Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff and Mukhtar Pasha, being appointed High Commissioners, proceeded to Egypt, where they remained for over a year, the former paying a visit to England at the end of 1886. Both had, in the meantime, reported to their Governments.

Abortive Convention with Turkey

In January, 1887, Sir Henry returned to Constantinople, in order to consult with the Sultan, at his urgent request, concerning the terms of our proposed evacuation. On the 22nd May, a definitive Convention was signed on behalf of the Queen and the Sultan, respectively.

The main provisions of this Convention were as follows: (1) The British troops were to be withdrawn at the end of three years, or as soon after as possible, coinciding with the disappearance of internal and external danger to the political and territorial integrity of Egypt; (2) two years thereafter, British supervision over the Egyptian army was to cease; and (3) on the exchange of ratifications between Great Britain and Turkey, the Powers were to be invited to give their adhesion to the terms of the Convention, and to recognise and guarantee the inviolability of Egyptian territory. Both the Sultan, by reason of his suzerainty, and Great Britain, on account of her responsible position, agreed to mutually recognise their corresponding rights to re-occupy Egypt, should circumstances arise that imperilled the main objects of the Convention; but, so soon as such dangers were past, they undertook to withdraw their armies. Moreover, among other safeguards for the tranquillity and safety of Egypt, a Protocol was attached, providing for the institution of 'a local and uniform jurisdiction and legislature,' to

which foreign residents would be amenable, thereby guarding against the abuses contingent on the Capitulations.

It will be seen, therefore, that the proposed right of re-occupation by Great Britain constituted both the strength and the weakness of the Convention—the former because the Tutelary Power endeavoured to meet her obligations and redeem her pledges, the latter because of the opposition of France. France, supported by Russia, energetically opposed the ratification of the Convention by Turkey; Great Britain at once ratified it, and obtained the moral support of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Thus, the Triple Alliance sided with the maintenance of the *status quo* under certain necessary guarantees; but the present Dual Alliance opposed it. Ratifications being withheld, the negotiations came to naught.

Results

Nevertheless, this abortive Convention was an important land-mark in British policy, and achieved one notable result. It established the *bona fides* of Great Britain—to the temporary loss of her prestige in Egypt—and it registered the fact that French opposition alone prevented her from redeeming the promise of evacuation within a definite period. Therefore, morally speaking, all such promises made prior to July 1887, are now null and void, and only those made since that date are binding on her Majesty's Government.

Except during the period of the Rosebery-Iddesleigh interregnum at the Foreign Office, the negotiations were conducted, on behalf of the Queen, by Lord Salisbury, whose despatch of 15th January 1887, addressed to Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff, defined the situation in terms of historical importance.[1] The British Commissioner was withdrawn;

[1] 'The Sultan is pressing the Government of Great Britain to name a date for the evacuation of Egypt, and in that demand he is avowedly encouraged by one, or perhaps two, of the European Powers. Her Majesty's Government have every desire to give him satisfaction upon this point, but they cannot fix even a distant date for evacuation, until they are able to make provision for securing beyond that date the external and internal peace of Egypt. The object which the Powers of Europe have had in view, and which it is not less the desire of her Majesty's Government to attain, may be generally expressed by the phrase "the neutralization of Egypt"; but it must be neutralization with an exception designed to maintain the security and permanence of the whole arrangement. The British

but Mukhtar Pasha, his Turkish colleague, has remained in Egypt ever since. He has no definite mission; but he represents the principle of Turkish suzerainty. He is not wanted in Constantinople, being far too popular as a great military leader; and he is not wanted in Egypt, except perhaps by the intriguers: in fact, he hangs, like Mohammed's coffin, between heaven and earth.

The Regeneration of Egypt, during the last fourteen years, has been the theme of countless critics, both friendly and hostile. Her financial recuperation and prosperity, her social and economical emancipation and development, have been the wonder of the world. In spite of every conceivable obstacle placed in its way, the Single Control has raised Egypt from a position of bankruptcy and bondage to the rank of a solvent and progressive State. The reforms and methods introduced into every department of the Administration will be dealt with elsewhere: and the cumulative effect will then be seen. Here I have simply to record the fact, that the results have not only justified the existence of the Single Control, but, owing to the absence of any concerted action on the part of the Powers, the tacit mandate of Europe may be said to have been given to the maintenance of the *status quo* in Egypt. France, with the half-hearted support of Russia, stands alone in her opposition, the effect of which retards reform and shackles Egypt with fetters that

The Regeneration of Egypt

Government must retain the right to guard and uphold the condition of things which will have been brought about by the military action and large sacrifices of this country. So long as the Government of Egypt maintains its position, and no disorders arise to interfere with the administration of justice or the action of the executive power, it is highly desirable that no soldier belonging to any foreign nation should remain upon the soil of Egypt, except when it may be necessary to make use of the land-passage from one sea to another. Her Majesty's Government would willingly agree that such a stipulation should, whenever the evacuation had taken place, apply to English as much as to any other troops; but it will be necessary to restrict this provision, as far as England is concerned, to periods of tranquillity. England, if she spontaneously and willingly evacuates the country, must retain a treaty-right of intervention, if at any time either internal peace or external security should be seriously threatened. There is no danger that a privilege so costly in its character will be used unless the circumstances imperatively demand it.' (Milner's 'England in Egypt.')

bear very heavily on the country and the people. If, in short, France were to fall into line with the other Powers, there is no reason why the existing Condominium should not eventually lead to the gradual emancipation of Egypt from all foreign Control, apart from certain checks and guarantees that were vaguely and inadequately outlined in the Drummond-Wolff Convention. But, as will be seen when the situation is closely examined, the opposition of France is a constant and apparently inextinguishable factor, which can lead but to one solution—its elimination by *force majeure*, as the logical result of conditions thereby created.

Under Taufik, the Anglo-Egyptian Administration entered on the path of assured progress and prosperity, and, by degrees, enlisted the sympathies and support both of the people and their representative Ministers. The Liberal and Conservative elements of the Constitution were worthily upheld by two Egyptian statesmen, Nubar and Riaz, whose rivalry and antithesis of policy and character were profound. Both Ministers, but particularly Nubar, who had served every ruler of the Mohammed Ali dynasty, contributed to the success of the Single Control. Both came into serious conflict with the Tutelary Power: and both, in consequence, lost their position and influence—Nubar, over the question concerning the reorganization of the Police; Riaz, over the appointment of Mr (afterwards Sir John) Scott as Judicial Adviser. Riaz was succeeded by the present Prime Minister, Mustafa Pasha Fehmi, who has always loyally supported the British Control.

'Justice and Water'—which, in the opinion of Nubar, were necessary for Egypt in order to become 'great and flourishing,' have been given to her in ever-increasing measures, until the peasantry have recognised their emancipation from centuries of thraldom and oppression, and the land has yielded an enormous increase of revenue. Official corruption has practically been eliminated; rigid retrenchment and a proper system of accounts have saved wastage and secured financial stability; reproductive public works have increased the revenue; taxation has been reduced, and large Reserve

funds have been created. The Service of the Debt is no longer a matter of anxiety.

Of internal reforms nothing more need be said in this place. These will be discussed *seriatim* in the sections dealing with the Anglo-Egyptian Administration.

The external dangers to Egypt have now been wholly removed. Her territorial integrity on the Mediterranean and Red Sea Littorals is guaranteed under the Condominium. The security of her frontiers in the south has been achieved by the gallant exploits of her own army, in co-operation with the British Contingent and under the leadership of British officers. For years after the fall of Khartum, Egypt had to defend her frontiers against the raids of the Dervishes. Osman Digna invested and constantly attacked Suákin, until deprived of his base at Tokar. Hordes of Dervishes kept up an intermittent warfare on the Frontier Province, until Nejumi—the conqueror of Hicks, the leader of the final assault on Khartum, and the 'only general' of the Khalifa—was defeated, and he and most of his gallant followers were killed, at Toski. The Anglo-Egyptian Campaigns, to Dongola and to Khartum, together with the operations from Kassala, finally overthrew the power of the Khalifa and crushed the last vestige of his barbarous rule in the Nile Valley. Reconquest of the Sudan

Thus, internally and externally, Egypt now enjoys prosperity and peace under British Control and protection.

On the premature death of Taufik in 1892, his son, Abbas Hilmi, succeeded to the Khediviate. Taufik had cordially co-operated with the British Control, once it was firmly established, without losing touch with native ideas and sympathies. He was the solvent between Eastern prejudices and Western progress, and essentially the man of the situation. He thus earned the affection and gratitude of his people, as well as the forbearance and respect of the Tutelary Power. His successor, on the other hand, is frankly reactionary, carrying opposition to a point which on more than one occasion has challenged the fate of Ismail. This regret- Abbas II.—1892

table obstruction to the permanence of British reforms will, however, be dealt with in another place. The heir-presumptive is Mohammed Ali, the second son of the lamented Taufik, whose sympathy for English ideals is above reproach.

ii EGYPT AND SEA-POWER

General principles

In concluding this outline of Egyptian history, I venture to register the general principles which, up to this point, I have sought to establish. The inter-dependence of physical and political phenomena in Egypt is sufficiently marked to serve as a key to the present International situation and to suggest the inevitable solution.

The physical and political factors determining and controlling the expansion and destiny of Egypt may be outlined as follows :—

The zone of deserts which girdles the earth in about the latitudes of the Sahara is nowhere more inimical to the migration of man than in the region under discussion. But for the magnificent waterway of the Nile, Egypt would be overwhelmed by the death-dealing desert which, leaping the Red Sea, pervades Arabia and penetrates northwards through Central Asia to the Pacific slopes. This 'gift of the Nile' is therefore the chief highway between the deserts that separate the principal centres of population in Europe and Asia ; and consequently, though physically united to Africa, its history has been determined by the other continents. At the same time, the organic unity of the Nile Valley is a fact which my detailed analysis of the physical conditions has, I trust, now definitely established.

Geographically speaking, Egypt is homologous to the Sea of Marmora, and the Suez Canal is the Bosporus of the modern Mediterranean World. The former unites the seas, the latter draws together the continents, of Europe and Asia. In other words, the Suez Canal being the nexus between East and West, Egypt necessarily becomes the chief nodal point of International commerce, as well as the principal strategic base of sea-power and world-dominion.

The unique geographical position of Egypt has, from time immemorial, challenged the ambition of the Mediterranean peoples whose commercial and political supremacy have in any way depended upon the Command of the Sea. My Historical Retrospect emphasises the insularity of Egypt, the control over which has always been vested in the Masters of the Mediterranean. Thus, the past history of Egypt establishes the theory that her destiny is dependent on the Command of the Sea; whilst contemporary politics invest this postulate with the force almost of a natural law. The dominant naval Power now controls the fate of Egypt. Truly, 'history repeats itself.'

During our era, Egypt has seen nineteen dynasties, none of which have exercised effective political power for more than a hundred years at a time, although *de jure* dynasties have lasted longer. By 1905, the Mohammed Ali dynasty will have completed its century: but a *de facto* foreign Government has already supplanted it. I particularly wish the reader to bear that psychological date in mind: the centenary of the proclamation of Mohammed Ali as Pasha of Egypt, and of the battle of Trafalgar, which gave us the Command of the Sea.

In spite of the most persistent efforts to evade responsibility for Egypt, circumstances have driven Great Britain to become sponsor for her future destiny. The well-known economical law, that any re-arrangement of the channels of commerce must be followed by a re-distribution of trade-centres, may, and does, partly account for Great Britain, as the chief possessor of the sea-borne trade of the world, taking a vital interest in the Suez Canal; but there is another natural law, more elusive but not the less evident, which impels her to exercise a dominant political influence over Egypt. This law of empire has been so well defined and expounded by the leading authority on the interpretation of sea-power, that I cannot do better than to quote his words, in support of my argument.

Captain Mahan, discussing an analogous case, the annexa-

tion of Hawaii,[1] with reference to the future sea-power of the United States, remarks :—

'So the Isthmian Canal [Central America] is an inevitable part in the future of the United States; yet one that cannot be separated from other necessary incidents of a policy dependent upon it, whose details cannot be foreseen exactly. But because the precise steps that hereafter may be opportune or necessary cannot yet be foretold certainly, is not a reason the less, but a reason the more, for establishing a principle of action which may serve to guide as opportunities arise. Let us start from the fundamental truth, warranted by history, that the control of the seas, and especially along the great lines drawn by national interest or national commerce, is the chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of nations. It is so because the sea is the world's great medium of circulation. From this necessarily follows the principle that, as subsidiary to such control, it is imperative to take possession, when it can be done righteously, of such maritime positions as contribute to secure command.'

Deduction

This principle is applied and enforced in another article[2] by the same author, who says :—

'Like all natural forces, the impulse [of expansion] takes the direction of least resistance; but when in its course it comes upon some region rich in possibilities, though unfruitful through the incapacity or negligence of those who dwell therein, the incompetent race or system will go down, as the inferior race ever has fallen back and disappeared before the persistent impact of the superior. The recent familiar instance of Egypt is entirely in point. . . . Whether the original enterprise or the continued presence of Great Britain in Egypt is entirely clear of technical wrongs, open to the criticism of the pure moralist, is as little to the point as the morality of an earthquake: the general action was justified

[1] 'Hawaii and our Future Sea Power,' by Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S. Navy. (*Forum*, March 1893.)

[2] 'The Future in relation to American Naval Power,' by Captain Mahan. (*Harper's Magazine*, March 1897.)

by broad considerations of moral expediency, being to the benefit of the world at large, and of the people of Egypt in particular—however they might have voted in the matter. But what is chiefly instructive in this occurrence is the inevitableness, which it shares in common with the great majority of cases where civilized and highly organized peoples have trespassed upon the technical rights of possession of the previous occupants of the land—of which our own dealings with the American Indian afford another example. The inalienable rights of the individual are entitled to a respect which they unfortunately do not always get; but there is no inalienable right in any community to control the use of a region when it does so to the detriment of the world at large, of its neighbours in particular, or even at times of its own subjects.' So far, Captain Mahan.

The finger of destiny appears, therefore, to point to the eventual acquisition of Egypt by Great Britain. My belief is that this destiny will be fulfilled. And it is because I hold this belief, in common with many others, that I feel the time has come to face the situation frankly and boldly.

Conclusion

What that situation is, it will now be my purpose to define, in all its bearings: to disclose its responsibilities as well as its advantages, and to prepare the public mind for the inevitable solution of the Egyptian Problem. In spite of the recent recrudescence of an Imperial Spirit—called forth by more than one affront to our national honour, and therefore liable to suffer a reaction—I am by no means convinced that the British electorate is prepared to endorse a policy of annexation, whether by direct or indirect methods. Although the national will may postpone, if it cannot eventually obstruct, that power behind Nature which shapes our destiny, nevertheless so serious a step should not be taken in the absence of public conviction. My purpose, consequently, is to carry conviction to the point of formulating a clear and reasoned policy, which shall have the force of bearing down all opposition, both at home and abroad. Furthermore, I am prepared to show that a British Protectorate over Egypt will, in all probability, be gradually

brought about by normal and pacific means, with the tacit consent, if not under the legal mandate, of Europe, if peace can be preserved for another six years.

In order to do justice to my theme, and, in particular, to carry conviction to English readers, it will be necessary, not only to connect the Egyptian Problem with the broad issues of the Eastern Question, but also to trace the development and expansion of the British Empire itself up to the point we have now reached. This collateral evidence will not therefore be a digression, but, I believe, a corroborative argument in favour of the principles I am endeavouring to establish and of the policy I venture to formulate. With such evidence before him, the reader will then have no difficulty in coming to a definite decision as regards the question of future domination throughout the Nile Valley.

III

(Objective Factors)

IDENTIFICATION OF BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY WITH THE EXPANSION OF EGYPT

i BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY

ii DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE

III

OBJECTIVE FACTORS

i BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY

THE crisis in foreign politics through which we are now passing appears to point to an inevitable re-distribution of the Balance of Power in Eurasia, in view of which the leading European nations and the United States of America are manœuvring to secure the best strategic positions. Whilst, however, the self-seeking policy of them all is an obvious fact, the preponderating world-wide interests of Great Britain necessarily attract the greatest amount of attention and afford many inducements or pretexts for friendly and hostile combinations. Never, perhaps, within living memory, has the general situation at a period of profound peace been fraught with wider issues. But in spite of threatening incidents and of problems still unsolved, a commendable spirit of moderation and of pacific intervention has so far prevailed.

Our 'splendid isolation'

To Great Britain the gain has been incalculable: since she has learnt, in unmistakeable terms, her true position among the nations. Many a war has produced a less instructive object-lesson. Her apparent isolation and the general mistrust with which she is regarded have been met on her side by a demonstration of independence and strength the significance of which will become apparent in the course of my present enquiry.

Never before have we entered upon a more critical phase of our existence as an Empire. Never before have we been stronger, for peace or for war, than now. And never before have we had so favourable an opportunity of formulating a national policy which, whilst guaranteeing all vital interests,

shall render us independent of European rivalries, except in so far as the Balance of Power is concerned.

It is a commonplace to speak of the British Empire as being the greatest, the most powerful, and the most pacific that the world has ever seen. Our Empire is an eclectic epitome of all preceding empires: and therefore signalizes a genuine advance in the development of national life. It owes its origin, its growth, its power, not to statecraft nor to State-aid, and relatively little to aggressive wars. It is not of artificial expansion through the selfish nursing of monopolies; still less is it the sequel to an ambitious Imperial policy: for we do not aim at world-dominion, in a military sense. It is the People's Empire—bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh—the creation and the heritage of a freedom-loving race. In a word, it is a political organism, fulfilling definite national functions; and, as I shall endeavour to show, an organic unity, with obvious co-ordination of its parts: not the inarticulate, irresponsible structure conceived by the average British tax-payer.

Again, the British Empire makes for peace and not for war. Peace, it has been said, and said with truth, is the greatest of British interests: its preservation is therefore the first duty of our statesmen. Peace at any price we cannot afford to accept; but peace at a long price is merely a sum in arithmetic to a commercial state such as ours. By peace we gain time to develop along natural lines: and a large measure of time, judged by human standards, is required for so complex an organism as the British Empire to attain to full maturity as a responsible world-power. To ensure peace, however, we must be prepared for war; and, in these days of mammoth armaments, this necessarily involves a burdensome tax upon national industry: though, properly speaking, it amounts merely to an annual premium on war-policy.

Great Britain, owing to her geographical position and sea-power, is to a large extent withdrawn from the issues of Continental politics; but, as a member of the European system, she cannot escape her share in the responsibility of maintaining the Balance of Power, upon which peace between

the nations is based. Her insularity, guaranteed by the supremacy of her navy, carries with it the choice of retiring from any disturbance of the International equilibrium—since her own shores are inviolable—or of throwing her whole weight on the side of peace. Thus, oscillations caused by European strategic movements concern us very nearly, though not so closely and intimately as the other Great Powers, whose vital interests are chiefly Continental. If it were not for our growing responsibilities in the Mediterranean and for the hydra-headed Eastern Question, we might even look forward to the day when our Foreign Policy should become merged in that greater Colonial Policy which takes account of tariff-wars rather than of the strife of nationalities. For, theoretically speaking, the prosecution of a more vigorous and enlightened Colonial Policy must inevitably relieve, almost automatically, the increasing burdens of our Foreign Policy: since an Empire such as ours, united in a more conscious and responsible *Kriegsverein*, might boldly accept its destiny as a League of Peace and be in a position to defend its integrity against any probable combination of hostile Powers.

It is necessary to refer to these elemental conditions of British Policy in order to prepare the ground for the arguments that follow,—which, in short, grow out of them. If the prestige which attaches to our sea-power were by experience to be proved as ill-founded as the great Chinese myth, recently dispelled by the achievements of Japan, then the only safety for the British Empire would lie in European alliances. At present we are free, or nominally free, from these dangerous encumbrances: and in this freedom lies the secret of our strength.

Our Empire is an *Ocean Empire*. Only the maritime Powers are in a position to aim a vital blow at our territorial integrity. We have but two land-frontiers to protect against invasion: North-West India, where Nature has raised almost impregnable breastworks, and Canada. Cradled on the sea, it is from the sea we derive our political unity no less than our daily nourishment and our strength as a world-

power. The ocean unites, and does not divide, the scattered members of an empire whose cohesion is dependent on sea-power.

Organic Unity

If, therefore, it can be shown that this cohesion is no artificial or imaginary bond, but one growing out of the natural co-ordination of its parts, and that the circulation of all vital interests is of necessity stimulated by nourishment from within and by pressure of opposition from without, the organic unity of the Empire becomes a demonstrable fact. If sentiment were the only tie—as is too often asserted—between the Mother-country and her Colonies, the Empire would run grave risks of disruption. Sentiment, however, plays but a subordinate part; and it is entirely over-ruled by self-interest, which forms the best possible basis for an imperishable union.

Historical Retrospect

Let us consider for a moment how this great Empire of ours has grown up beyond the seas; what it really is, and what are its national functions. To establish my thesis, I must pursue two lines of argument—the historical and the geographical. Both may be dealt with as briefly as possible. Take, first, the historical, in which the late Sir John Seeley is a reliable guide.

When Elizabeth, the much-courted Queen of England, finally decided against the Hapsburg system of royal marriages, which in her time were the object of the highest statesmanship and controlled the dynastic fortunes of States no less than their territorial acquisitions by dowry, she was influenced by her love of peace—national rather than domestic. This fortunate choice, isolating her to a large extent from the battlefields of European rivalry—in spite of her championship of the Reformation—led, by a curious combination of circumstances, to the foundation of the British Empire. She gave us our insularity: not consciously,[1] nor with any prophetic views of empire, but

[1] It is not to be supposed that, in laying the corner-stone of the British Empire, Elizabeth grasped the full meaning and resource of sea-power in our insular position. But it is interesting to note, that one, at least, of her sea-captains understood its leading principle. Writing to his sovereign, on 30th March 1588, Sir Francis Drake remarked: 'Her Majesty and people are not to fear any

through the irony of negation. She was anxious to secure peace, almost at any price; and the secret of her policy was 'masterly inactivity.' In the second half of her reign, however, she was forced into a war with the Spanish Monarchy —the united sea-Powers who, by virtue of a Papal Bull, claimed the undiscovered Ocean-world as theirs by Divine Right: and the issues of that war revolutionised Europe. England rose from the sea as a commercial and maritime State, and entered upon a course of legitimised piracy in the New World. When the seventeenth century dawned, the two Protestant States, England and Holland, stood forth as the coming sea-Powers; and the two Catholic States, Spain and France, faced each other in fixed rivalry for military ascendancy on the Continent. The Dutch Republic and the English Monarchy pursued a common policy, at the expense of Spain and Portugal; though the former was at first the more enterprising in her efforts to create emporia beyond the seas. England, on her part, was impelled by a blind instinct to seek the line of least resistance towards commercial and political independence: in fact, it was only under James, who united the English and Scottish crowns, that Great Britain embarked upon a conscious policy of colonization, properly so-called. Cromwell himself clearly foresaw the true destiny of England, and interpreted it by his Navigation Act—which aimed a vital blow at the Dutch monopoly over the carrying-trade—as well as by the capture of Jamaica: but under Cromwell we were an aggressive Power, the foremost military and maritime State in Europe. It required a foreign Prince, William of Orange, to unite the dynastic and commercial interests

invasion in her own country, but to seek God's enemy and her Majesty's where they may be found . . . for, with fifty sail of shipping, we shall do more good upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home.' This was the lesson of the Armada. Moreover, as Drake added, a month later: such a policy would be 'better cheap'—a recommendation that had much weight with Elizabeth. If British policy there was at that period, it was a policy of piracy, well suited to the times, and in no sense derogatory. Thus, we observe the genesis of our Ocean Empire to be due, not to ambitious designs of conquest such as the Hapsburgs cherished, but to the genius of our sea-captains and the natural adaptability of their followers.

of England and Scotland on the one hand and of England and the Netherlands on the other. The battle of the Boyne laid the foundations of the present European system;[1] and the War of the Spanish Succession, carrying with it the question of monopoly in the New World, finally settled for us our character as a Commercial State.

Elizabeth, Cromwell, and William III. were, therefore, the three rulers who mainly contributed to the growth of British policy. The first withdrew us from European entanglements and alliances, and wedded us to the Ocean. The second adjusted, though in a very summary and inadequate fashion, the differences between the two kingdoms and Ireland, laid the basis of our commercial policy, and outlined the future greatness and scope of the Empire. The third gave us the rudiments of a durable constitution, freed England and Europe from the French ascendancy, and fixed the main lines of British policy as it exists at the present day.

England sought the Ocean for a wider and a fuller life. She found this in America, and, as time went on, in other parts of the world. Sturdy emigrants, driven from their Mother-country by religious persecution; bold adventurers, to whom the illimitable horizon made an irresistible appeal; and genuine colonists, who followed in their path: each and all bore with them their birthright of freedom and created new homes in a New World.

The great English Revolution, whilst it laid the basis of a national policy, also ushered in that series of wars with France, or chiefly with France, which came to an end only with the fall of Napoleon. This traditional rivalry even

[1] The late Sir John Seeley calls the struggle on the Boyne 'the decisive battle of European civilisation.' Ireland, suffering from the Penal Code, and because of her Catholicism, became the battlefield of Europe; and was overrun by Dutch, French, and German troops, rather than by English, Scottish, and Irish. This decisive conflict led to the fall of Louis XIV., and changed the map of Europe. In fact, the second English Revolution, says Seeley (*Growth of English Policy*, ii. 308), 'was an event which decided the whole subsequent course of European history, and was speedily seen to have done so. It is in this respect the unique event in the history of England.'

imposed its law upon Europe during the eighteenth century. It was for us a period of incessant strife, during which the Empire grew, not by peaceful settlement, as for the most part it had grown during the previous century, but by conquest. In the Napoleonic wars, the leading land-Power was pitted against the leading sea-Power: and in the end victory remained with the sea.

Finally, the Victorian age has been characterised by unexampled Colonial expansion, chiefly through peaceful settlement, and by an unprecedented advance in national life and industry. Our inventors and scientists have revolutionised the conditions of international intercourse, and have been universal benefactors. The Ocean-world has been Anglicised.

We thus see, that, in our search for a national policy, we have oscillated between a pacific and an aggressive attitude —opposite poles, marking the extreme swing of the pendulum. Historical facts appear, however, to indicate that the British Empire finds the widest scope for its dynamic development and expansion under conditions that provide for peace, unfettered commercial intercourse, and unchallenged naval supremacy. The latter, it is true, may be provocative of war: but it is an essential condition of our insularity, upon which the inviolability of our national rights depends, and, as such, counterbalances the immense standing armies of Continental States. If used oppressively, it would undoubtedly lead to a European coalition against us; but, used in moderation and for the defence of national rights, it is a guarantee for the peace of Europe from which every pacific Power may and does derive advantage.

Principles of British Policy

The fundamental principles of British Imperial Policy may consequently be embodied in the three watchwords— Conciliation, Amalgamation, and Consolidation: conciliation towards the outside world, amalgamation of interests within the Empire, and the consolidation of its component parts on the basis of Free Trade, free institutions, and the freedom of the sea. The first may be secured by Diplomacy; the second by statesmanship; and the third by naval supremacy.

permitting free play to our national genius. With each of these aspects of Imperial Policy I shall deal in due course.

Whilst the historical argument in favour of our withdrawal from Continental rivalries may, perhaps, fail to carry the conviction I have sought to establish, much greater confidence may be placed in the geographical argument of insularity and organic unity. That, by necessity as well as by deliberate choice, we do occupy a position of isolation (or, as we would say, of independence) in international politics, in consequence of our world-wide interests and the jealousy these excite, is a fact universally recognised; and, in view of the comparatively recent revival of Colonial enterprise[1] on the part of European States, it is evident that this unfortunate rivalry must increase as time goes on: thus necessitating on our side a corresponding activity in strengthening the bases of British Unity. Not so self-evident, however, is the hypothesis of the organic unity of the Empire.

Unity of the Empire

A glance at the map may possibly convey a precisely contrary signification, if only to those who suffer from geographical astigmatism. The component parts of the Empire are seen to be situated in every continent and in every sea, and to range through every zone of temperature. All races,

[1] This Colonial revival began in 1884, when Germany rushed feverishly into the field. The *Times* of 20th October, 1896, instituted a comparison between the accessions of territory gained by the respective Powers, with the following results:

	1884.	1896.	Actual Addition.
	sq. miles.	sq. miles.	sq. miles.
France	869,000	3,391,000	2,522,000
Great Britain	8,530,770	11,129,860	2,599,090
Germany	208,670	1,231,740	1,023,070
Belgium	11,370	1,011,370	1,000,000
Italy	110,620	610,620	500,000

Germany also has set the pace in the Far East, with results yet to be observed.

all religions, all forms of government, are represented in this political microcosm. Nevertheless, they converge to the point of geographical unity. Infinite diversity is the distinguishing mark of our physical environment; comprehensive complexity is the obvious character of our political system. We are not, in fact, a simple marine organism, but a highly developed maritime State: not an aggregate of rudimentary functions, but a self-conscious and responsible entity with co-ordinated powers of adaptation.

An Empire embracing the world in its every-day national functions, depending for its existence on the Command of the Sea and on the safety of its sea-borne commerce. An Empire which, it is estimated, has cost over five thousand millions Sterling, and is not yet paid for—the National Debt amounting (in 1898) to £634,435,704. An Empire whose capitalists have fertilized every civilized country in the world: to whom the world owes two thousand millions Sterling. An Empire whose commercial fleets monopolise sea-borne commerce—that of the United Kingdom alone being valued at £865,000,000. An Empire which enjoys a comparative monopoly of the external commerce of many extra-European States, as also a predominant share in the commerce of other foreign countries. An Empire with Diplomatic and Consular officials in every civilized land and at every commercial centre—a marvellous organization, and a costly one. An Empire with fleets of warships dominating every strategic sea-area, with naval bases and coaling-stations girdling the earth, with cruisers ready, at short notice, to patrol every strategic sea-route or to convoy British mercantile fleets along the ordinary trade-routes. An Empire with a military organization which, though relatively small in detail, is sufficiently effective for a maritime State, with Indian and Colonial establishments kept up at full war-strength or capable of immediate re-inforcement. Finally, an Empire with a complex system of administration which fosters the organic development of British communities from a position of tutelage to that of self-government, and which guarantees individual liberty and equal justice to every subject of

her Majesty. These are the outstanding features of our Empire.

Dominant characteristics may be classified and examined under two divisions—internal and external. With the first we associate all Colonial interests; under the second we group all foreign relations affecting the Empire as a whole.

The English Cosmos is primarily constructed out of islands and peninsulas. It is true that Canada, British South Africa, and India are connected by broad bases with continental masses: but, politically speaking, they turn their backs upon the three Continents and face the Ocean. Their centres of gravity impinge upon the shores facing the Mother-country.

Australia is an island-continent. New Zealand is antipodean only as regards her geographical position: in all else she closely approximates to the Mother-country. The minor British Possessions are all islands, portions of islands, or peninsular lands, with few exceptions, of which the most notable are the African Dependencies and two small American colonies. We may therefore claim to be, physically and politically, an Ocean Empire.

Other interesting homologies may be noted. Great Britain lies off the continent of Europe and is flanked by Ireland. Australia is situated near the coast-line of Asia and has its satellite-island in Tasmania. Canada, united physically with what were once British Colonies, has its island-pendants in Vancouver and Newfoundland. India, the peninsula-continent, has Ceylon for its jewel.

Since, therefore, we find some physical correspondence between the aggregates of the Empire, we may be prepared to discover a sympathetic or complementary relationship in regard to their political institutions and national life. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are self-governing Colonies, with a predominant white population—colonies of settlement, built up chiefly by immigrants from the British Isles, which have undergone a natural process of development and expansion: consequently, their political institutions are in close affinity with those of the Mother-country.

The same, too, may be said of their national life, under the modified conditions of climate and circumstance, illustrating the universal law of transformation. The most striking characteristics of our race—free institutions, great industrial activity, and individual commercial enterprise—which contribute to the promotion of British Unity, find unfettered scope in congenial climates and undeveloped lands.

It is quite otherwise when we enter the Tropics or penetrate into sub-Tropical countries, where the prodigality of the soil offers an easy livelihood to the indigenous inhabitants. Northern Europeans cannot establish permanent homes in climates so dissimilar to their own and in countries where they form a mere fraction of the population. Their superior attainments and resources enable them, however, to act as rulers and taskmasters. Consequently, in all such countries under the British flag we find colonies of exploitation, or Dependencies. Of such are India, the African Colonies and Protectorates, and the West Indies.[1]

Apart from minor distinctions and the endless qualifications evident in so complex a structure as the British Empire, we are justified in adopting two broad geographical classifications: Colonies of Settlement and Tropical Dependencies. Under the former we include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and, to a modified extent (owing to the predominant native populations), Cape Colony and Natal, all of which lie in the Temperate regions, except the northern part of Australia. Under the latter we group India, all Crown Colonies, Protectorates, and the numerous emporia or commercial settlements, islands, naval and coaling stations lying within the Tropics. So that, when we speak advisedly of British Colonies, we mean only the great self-governing Colonies, which in truth are merely an extension of the Mother-country beyond the seas. The remainder (with

[1] In the West Indies, Europeans have, it is true, established permanent homes: but their descendants have undergone inevitable degeneration, by partial assimilation with local elements.

the exception of isolated commercial settlements, forming a distinctive class of their own) are, properly speaking, appanages of empire. Other classifications, such as that of the Colonial Office, based upon degrees of self-government, are equally true; but, from our present point of view, regarding the Empire as an organic unity, we must rigidly adhere to the biological relations between political aggregates.

Colonial Commerce

Thus, though our Tropical Dependencies are less intimately associated than are the self-governing Colonies with the internal development of the Empire, they play an important part in its organic functions. The economical inter-dependence between the Tropics and the Temperate zones—the one complementing the other as regards natural and manufactured products—is the measure of this bond of union. Vital circulation between them, or the interchange of commodities, is controlled by the universal law of Demand and Supply, flowing along the lines of least resistance. From the Mother-country to the Colonies, this vital circulation is to a certain extent impeded by tariff-barriers, which, as in foreign countries, are raised to protect local industries from being flooded by the enormous volume of British exports. The Colonies themselves are not sufficiently advanced to absorb this pulsating stream of British origin into their undeveloped systems. Consequently, the bulk of British exports (72 per cent.) go to foreign countries; and chiefly to those from whom we derive our raw materials and food-supplies—exports paying for imports—though India is one of our best customers. On the other hand, from the Colonies to the Mother-country, as also from foreign countries to the United Kingdom, no fiscal barriers are placed in the way of imports—except a few imposts, for revenue purposes only—because of our dependence on the world at large for the greater portion of our food-stuffs and for nearly the whole of our raw material.

The juxtaposition of coal and iron leading to the creation of active manufacturing centres, Great Britain, by her fortunate possession of these natural advantages, has become

one vast workshop and warehouse from which other nations, as well as our own Colonies, have been compelled to purchase, in the absence of local competitive industries or cheaper markets of the same kind. This is one, if not the chief, reason why British Colonies take the bulk of their imports from the Mother-country,[1] although, partly for fiscal purposes and partly on account of a constitutional inconsistency,[2] they do not discriminate between her and foreign States. The most notable exception is Canada, whose commercial intercourse with the United States is naturally stimulated by geographical contiguity and by the complementary conditions of their respective resources. But, in these days of steam and enterprise, mere mileage is not the chief controlling factor. For practical purposes, cheapness of production and cost of freight are, other things being equal, the true measure of contiguity between centres of demand and areas of supply.

These fundamental conditions of British trade are, however, undergoing a change which is not generally recognised. In some respects, commercial intercourse between Great Britain and her Colonies is improving, if not in the same ratio as that between the Colonies and foreign countries. The ties of sentiment, of a common language and methods of business, play an important part in International commerce: but they are not in themselves sufficient to keep the Colonies in leading-strings. Canada and Australia are naturally gravitating, not only towards each other, but towards every open market in which they can dispose of their products: thus, Canada has

[1] Colonial imports from foreign countries amount, collectively, to about 30°/₀, whilst Colonial exports to foreign countries reach 40°/₀, of the external traffic.

[2] The obstructive treaties with Belgium and the German *Zollverein* (1862 and 1865, respectively,) do not prevent differential treatment by the United Kingdom in favour of British Colonies, nor differential treatment by British Colonies in favour of each other; but they do prevent differential treatment by British Colonies in favour of the United Kingdom—a logical inconsistency, if the Empire possess that organic unity which we claim for it. Canada and Australia are no less a part of the Empire than is Algeria a Department of France. By permitting the Colonial clause to remain in our commercial treaties, we practically deny the unity of the Empire. At the same time, it would be very costly to the United Kingdom to abolish it.

important relations with the United States, and Australia has opened up a direct market in Germany. India, too, is likely to develop her relations with the Far East, and to enter into closer competition with British manufactures. It is true, that the aggregate of our trade with the Colonies, representing only a small proportion of our external commerce, has hitherto varied within narrow limits; and that the bulk of Colonial trade is with the Mother-country and the Empire: thus proving the connection to be more valuable, commercially speaking, to the Colonies than to ourselves. But our community of interests is so vital, so capable of development in directions that may eventually prove necessitous to the Mother-country, that we cannot afford to see the Colonies one by one achieving their commercial independence. Should they ever, indeed, attain to this, the political tie might be seriously weakened: though, in the case of Canada, this has not proved to be the case. No rational measures should be left untried to identify our respective interests, both as regards inter-Colonial and international commerce: and it is therefore satisfactory to note that Mr Chamberlain, unlike many of his predecessors at the Colonial Office, is prepared to adopt business principles in the management of our Colonial relations. We are much in need of an English Colbert.

Value of Colonies

In return for the Imperial guarantees which her Majesty's Government are prepared to give for such national objects as the creation of direct steamship and cable communications between Canada and Australasia, the Colonies might reasonably be expected to lower their fiscal barriers, as Canada has recently done, thereby losing the 'favoured nation' treatment by Germany. In spite of their indirect expense to Great Britain as a maritime Power, all the self-governing Colonies pay their way, costing the Mother-country nothing for local administration; and the same may be said of our richest Dependency, India, as well as of most of the Crown Colonies. Even Egypt pays for British tutelage and protection. Every other European Power has, on the other hand, to contribute a large annual sum of money towards the maintenance of their Colonial establishments. Consequently, in the sense that

Colonies are founded for the benefit of the Mother-country, the British Empire may be said to be the only prosperous Colonial Power of our day.

Spain and Portugal, the earliest colonising States of modern times, still retain vestiges of their national glory: but the United States has relieved Spain of Cuba and the Philippines. Holland, who preceded us in the path of colonisation, continues to struggle with a fluctuating balance of profit and loss in the Dutch East Indies—perhaps on account of the poet's stricture:

> 'In matters of commerce, the fault of the Dutch
> Is giving too little and asking too much.'

France, our traditional rival, has of recent years entered upon a course of ambitious colonial expansion; and has many possessions beyond the seas—playfully called *France d'outremer*—which are maintained only at a heavy annual deficit.[1] Finally, Germany is now serving her apprenticeship as a Colonial Power, and has had to pay heavily for her indentures; although the Emperor already regards Germany as 'a world-power.'[2] Only Great Britain has learnt the secret of making Colonies pay for their up-keep and be prosperous at the same time. Moreover, the colonies and coaling-stations of any foreign Power at war with us are practically at the mercy of the British navy: while our own Colonies afford valuable naval and military bases which are theoretically impregnable, so long as we uphold the Command of the Sea.

[1] Roughly speaking, French Colonies cost the mother-country more than those of all other countries put together; and the French army and navy cost more than those of any other Power. France spends over eighty millions on her Colonies. In 1897, French exports to the Colonies amounted to 118 millions: and, assuming the profit to be 20 per cent., the cost price was 95 millions. This showed a net loss of about 60 millions. Moreover, in French Colonies there is, with the partial exception of Algeria, no colonisation, properly so-called, but only military occupation.

[2] 'Greater Germany' costs the mother-country eleven million marks annually. It is colonised by some 700 Germans, of whom 250 are officials. The 'thousands and thousands' of whom the Emperor spoke are chiefly in British Colonies and in the United States.

International relations

We are now in a position to consider the relations between the British Empire, as an organic Unity, and its environment of friendly and hostile States. In periods of peace, this relationship is controlled chiefly by economic laws; in time of war, by the survival of the fittest.

The complementary functions between the Tropics and the Temperate zones co-inciding with the actual geographical distribution of our Dependencies and Colonies, it might at first sight appear possible for the Empire to gradually attain to the position of a self-contained State with regard to a dependable supply of food-stuffs, if not also of raw materials: but this ideal consummation, for reasons that are obvious, does not come within the sphere of practical politics.

Our Diplomatic relations with foreign States are so intimately associated with our commercial connections, that the two cannot be separated. From their conjunction arises that inevitable rivalry, friendly or otherwise, which is as characteristic of national as it is of individual intercourse. There is little or no room for the play of affinities and for community of sentiment in International politics, because the family of nations is composed of units more diverse in structure and temperament than is the family of individual units. For the same reason, when communities spring from a common ancestry—as in the case of Great Britain and her self-governing Colonies—greater correspondence of structure and functions is a natural resultant. But even consanguinity is no guarantee of peace. Family quarrels and family feuds inevitably arise from incompatibility of temper and hasty actions. Hence the secession of the United States: hence, also, the incompleteness of any Britannic Confederation that does not include the greatest of Anglo-Saxon colonies.

Taking things as we find them, however, the British Empire is singularly united, in spite of marked diversity among individual members and of the vast size of the aggregates. Its mission—if it have a mission—is to weld together the nations of the world by that community of interests which arises spontaneously from free commercial

intercourse. Consequently, its policy of Free Trade is an instrument well adapted to achieve this end, theoretically speaking. Our *Pax Britannica* is to the Old World what the Monroe Doctrine is, or was, to the New World. Thus, Great Britain and the United States may be said to have developed a common national policy, which finds its most eloquent expression in the mutual desire for pacific arbitration on all points in dispute between them, and its fittest instrument in the English language,—the *lingua franca* of the world and the mother-tongue of no less than 120 millions of people.[1] It is therefore devoutly to be hoped that the United States will develop sufficient strength to support her share in the burden of promoting universal peace.

Universal peace being, however, a synonym for the Millennium, its consideration does not come within our purview. We are not all sure, though we confidently hope, that we are the fittest to survive. Hence the interaction of warring forces, which are only held in check by that frail leash known as the Balance of Power.

Balance of Power

The Balance of Power in Europe is a calculable factor. It gives its law to the world: and, for the present at least, the European Hegemony is not seriously threatened. We may therefore regard it as the controlling factor in International relations, and one from which, in spite of our insularity, we cannot wholly emancipate ourselves.

The old civilizations, which in Asia still enjoy a large measure of temporal power, are without coherence; whilst modern civilization is crystallizing through the affinity of world-intercourse, and is developing greater and greater solidarity. Even an Asiatic people like the Japanese can now

[1] The Chinese language is spoken by an even greater number (360 millions) of people: but it is strictly localised, and is broken up into numerous dialects, the sole point of union being their common ideographis, or graphic characters. On the other hand, our own language is familiar to many non-English people, and is essentially the medium of common intercourse between the seamen of all nations. The populations of the British Empire and of the United States amount in the aggregate to about 573 millions, or nearly one-third of the total population of the world. The British Empire alone covers one-fifth of the earth's surface, and counts a population of 350 millions.

assimilate it. The ocean is, in fact, the great Amalgamator. All highly developed nations are pressing towards it: cutting canals from their chief inland emporia towards their nearest seaboard, piercing isthmuses that obstruct free maritime intercourse, building trans-continental railways and uniting oceans—thus opening up new routes, by rail and steamship, for International commerce. It is the age of maritime canals. In time, no doubt, Berlin and Paris will be seaports, as Manchester is to-day. And, above all, when the Nicaragua Canal is built, a new stage of International development will be reached: namely, that in which the Pacific shall vie with the Atlantic for supremacy in human interests, in the same way that the Atlantic competed with the Mediterranean after the discovery of America. The course of empire moves ever westward, and with it the centre of gravity of world-power.

As the opening up of new channels of commerce gives rise to the inevitable displacement of trade-centres, it follows that, by the inauguration of an inter-oceanic canal in Central America, a new nodal point will be created, by which International commerce will be profoundly affected. The United States, having already entered the arena as a Colonial Power, will then be forced to take up a positive and progressive, as against a negative and retrogressive, attitude towards the unsolved problems of America and Asia. Commercially, she will benefit more than ourselves from this new ocean-highway;[1] but, strategically, she will court a serious menace by admitting the navies of Europe, past her chief naval base, into the very heart of her military system. Even if the canal escape neutralization—which, in

[1] When the Nicaragua Canal is opened, British freights to San Francisco will be handicapped, as compared with the cargoes from the Eastern States of the Union, by practically doubling the present comparative distances. Moreover, the Atlantic States of North America will be within a short distance from the Pacific States of South America; although it is believed that, south of Callao, the carrying-trade, by sailing vessels at least, would follow its present course round the Horn, in order to escape the canal dues and the light baffling breezes under the Equator. But, in that case, steamships would replace sailing vessels, and carry American trade further south.

view of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, is unlikely—political domination over the isthmus (then the true path for sea-power) cannot vitally affect the nation that holds the Command of the Sea.

With Great Britain and the United States dominating or controlling the two *foci* of International commerce, (the principal strategic bases of the Eastern and the Western worlds,) a new community of interests will spring up; and probably lead to an Anglo-American Alliance[1] of the most far-reaching character, in which Germany and Japan may find a place. Our *Pax Britannica* might then secure the peace of the world.

ii DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE

Considerations such as these lead one to the conviction, that the possession of Egypt is essential to the consolidation of the British Empire. Egypt lies athwart our path of empire, and blocks the arterial route of our commerce with the Far East. In the hands of a hostile Power, Egypt would be a menace to us. In the possession of a neutral Power, she would still constitute an obstruction, only to be removed, on the outbreak of hostilities, by the violation of International Law. But under the control of the Mistress of the Seas, Egypt represents the principal strategic area in the Old World, linking the United Kingdom with her Possessions in the Far East. Value of Egypt

Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt—a chain of fortresses and naval bases—in the hands of the dominant Maritime Power, may be said, in popular parlance, to command the Mediterranean. But, as the strength of a chain is that of its weakest link, Egypt would be an encumbrance to us, and Strategy

[1] Captain Mahan, who, in common with others, including myself, foretold the present expansion of the United States, says:—'When we [Americans] begin really to look abroad, and to busy ourselves with our duties to the world at large in our generation—and not before—we shall stretch out our hands to Great Britain, realizing that in unity of heart among the English-speaking races lies the best hope of humanity in the doubtful days ahead.' ('A Twentieth Century Outlook,' *Harper's Magazine*, Sept. 1897.)

This is what Mr Balfour aptly calls 'race-patriotism.'

a source of danger to the Empire, if she were open to invasion by the land-forces of the Great Powers. The 'insularity' of Egypt—which I claim to have demonstrated in the earlier sections of this book—alone justifies our occupation of that country, which otherwise would conflict with the principles of sea-power, upon which the defence of the Empire is based.

Under present conditions, no European Power could seriously menace Egypt until the Command of the Sea had been wrested from us: in which case, the loss of Egypt would be a mere incident in the *débacle* of the British Empire. Our principal concern is to prevent Tripoli and Syria from falling into the hands of the Dual Alliance. Egypt's most vulnerable frontier is the isthmus of Suez: but, even on that side, deserts oppose obstacles to the invasion of the Delta.[1]

Therefore, the defence of Egypt is for us chiefly a question of naval strength, inseparable from the general strategic position in the Mediterranean. It involves, as a corollary, British domination over the entire Nile Valley. This has now practically been secured. And, along the remainder of the route to India, the chief strategic positions have already been occupied by Great Britain.

Identity of interests

Thus, the development of Egypt during the present century has marched step by step with the expansion of the

[1] The possession of Syria by France would place her, as the ally of Russia, in a favourable position for attacking Egypt by land: because, apart from the Command of the Sea, she could draw her supplies from Russia through countries which, under such circumstances, would probably be Russian. On the other hand, the possession of Syria by Great Britain would require a larger army than we can dispose of or could hope to obtain by raising and drilling local levies. Our policy should be to keep France out of Syria by supporting the new German pretensions in that region, since it seems hopeless to organize an autonomous State. Germany, the friend of Turkey, has made prodigious strides, since 1884, in consolidating and advancing her commercial and political interests. Besides drilling the Turkish army and supplying armaments, Germany has created political interests at Constantinople and vested interests in the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. In the race for railway extension to the Euphrates Valley, Germany has a front place. It is well, therefore, to remember, that it is essential for us, and vital to our Indian Empire, to dominate the Persian Gulf and all its strategic approaches—or, rather, to prevent any other European Power from securing a footing there. Our decisive battles must be fought at sea, and not on land.

British Empire through the Mediterranean World. In all essential respects, the interests of Great Britain and of Egypt are identical: freedom in the Nile Valley, and peace outside its borders.

The Mediterranean may be compared to a bridge, uniting Great Britain with India and the Far East, of which Egypt is the keystone. Commerce will maintain a right of way in time of peace; but only naval supremacy can secure it in time of war. If the Mediterranean were not the chief strategic area in the world, we might be contented to rely on the Cape route alone: but since it is so constituted—for reasons that will become apparent in the next stage of my enquiry—the British Colonies share equally with the Mother-country in the benefits which the possession of Egypt bestows.

The essential duty of our navy is to keep open and protect communications by sea. Whilst the question of naval supremacy can only be settled by fleet actions, resulting in the destruction of the enemy's ships, the chief functions of the navy, as the bulwark of British Unity and the protector of British commerce, are: (1) to destroy, or to render impotent through sealing up, the naval forces of the enemy, blockading his ports with squadrons capable of achieving these ends; (2) to cut off the enemy's supplies; and (3) to dominate and control every strategic area and trade-route linking the British Isles with her Colonies, as well as to protect British sea-borne commerce in all parts of the world. If our navy prove capable of performing these functions, it will retain the Command of the Sea, thereby guaranteeing the inviolability of our shores and the integrity of the Empire.

Since experts concur in the belief that the decisive naval battles of the near future, in which we are likely to be engaged, will in all probability be fought in or about the Mediterranean, the possession of Egypt by Great Britain necessarily becomes a matter of vital concern to her.

The Egyptian Problem

The question therefore arises: can the Egyptian Problem be solved independently of the Eastern Question, or must a

definite solution be postponed until the Ottoman Empire is partitioned among the Powers? My belief is, that, since for centuries past the Ottoman Empire has been losing ground —not suzerainties, lightly held, but provinces directly under its control—without causing a general scramble, Egypt will fall, like over-ripe fruit, into the hands ready to receive it. This contention I shall endeavour to establish in the following pages.

IV

(Subjective Factors)

THE DESTINY OF EGYPT

i THE EASTERN QUESTION

ii THE BALANCE OF POWER

iii FRENCH AFRICAN POLICY

IV

THE DESTINY OF EGYPT

i THE EASTERN QUESTION

MY purpose in this section being to dissociate the Egyptian Problem from the direct European issues of the Eastern Question, and to connect it with the wider though correlative issues now being established in the Far East, it will be necessary for me to take a broad view of the situation. General principles

In effect, this situation points to the creation of a new Balance of Power, owing to disturbance of the equilibrium, both in Europe and in Asia, arising from (1) the entrance of Germany into the arena of the Eastern Question, consequent on the adoption of a vigorous Colonial policy, (2) the constitution of the Dual Alliance, (3) the rise of Japan as a naval, military and commercial Power in the Far East, (4) the concentration of the scattered energies of Great Britain, and (5) the awakening of America, and her entry into the comity of nations through the acceptance of responsibilities resulting from the conquest of Spanish Colonies.

These epoch-making events have entirely altered the character of the so-called Eastern Question. Formerly, this was strictly localized in South-Eastern Europe, where the advance of Russia created a Concert of the Powers to contest her possession of Constantinople. Checked in this direction, Russia naturally expanded along the lines of lesser resistance, towards the confines of India and across Asia to the Pacific shores, thereby displacing the centre of gravity of world-power and giving birth to fresh opposition on the part of nationalities and interests threatened by her domination in Eastern Asia. Since, therefore, the expansion of Russia is

the exciting cause of the Eastern Question, the issues in the Near East and the Far East cannot be dissociated, but must be considered in conjunction.

In this sense, the Egyptian Problem may be said to be independent of the Eastern Question, because the latter is mainly concerned with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, or, more directly speaking, with keeping Russia out of Constantinople and preventing a general scramble in the partition of Turkey. Although the *de jure* possession of Egypt must ultimately affect the Balance of Power in the Mediterranean, the *de facto* Occupation by Great Britain, amounting to a virtual Protectorate, has practically settled an issue which only the united will of Europe can assail. The non-intervention of the Powers up to this point amounts to a tacit mandate, which, for all practical purposes, is sufficient for the present to regularise the position of the Tutelary Power.

Russia rightly regards herself as the inheritor of the Eastern Empire. As such, the possession of Constantinople is as vital to her as the possession of Egypt is to Great Britain: and for much the same reasons. The birth of the Eastern Question may therefore be sought in the policy of Peter the Great, who, with an intuitive knowledge of the effect of sea-power, welded the dynastic fortunes and shaped the destiny of the great Muscovite Empire established by him: the result of which was seen in the Treaty of Kainarji (1774), imposed by Russia on her traditional enemy, which, by emancipating the Crimea and opening the Black Sea, proved to Europe the inability of Turkey to defend her frontiers, and thereby raised questions involving the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the future ownership of Constantinople. The autocratic government of the Tsars, their single-minded and steadfast purpose, the fixity and continuity of their foreign policy, have over and over again, during the last half-century, borne down the fitful and inconsequent opposition of Europe. Events have proclaimed, in unmistakable terms, the destiny of Russia to inherit the lands and the powers of an enemy she has so often crushed and

now holds at her mercy. That this interpretation is not exaggerated, and that the policy of Russia has been neither overbearing—considering the circumstances—nor regardless of the interests of Europe, will be seen in the historical retrospect that follows.

Historical Retrospect

Impressed by the encroachments of Russia on the north-western borders of the Black Sea, and by the ambitious policy of the Empress Catherine, Pitt, in 1791, first sounded the alarm and called upon the nation to arm against the coming danger. Then, if ever, a British national policy was indicated, the object of which was to prevent Russia from establishing exclusive supremacy over the Ottoman Empire, leading to political domination in South-Eastern Europe. But, although Pitt carried Parliament with him, he did not succeed in his object. Public Opinion in England was not, indeed, seriously alarmed until Russia, by her share in the overthrow of Napoleon, and as the head of the Holy Alliance, sought to pose as 'the liberator of Europe.' Nevertheless, we acted with Russia in freeing Greece from the Turkish yoke; and France herself was forced to join in this popular movement of Christendom.

Checked in her advance on Constantinople by the attitude of Europe, Russia then began to expand through Central Asia, and thereby infected the public mind of England with a sense of the danger threatening our Indian frontier.

The unseemly quarrel among the Powers regarding the exercise of control over the Holy Places in Palestine, admitted under the Capitulations, was brought to a head by the demand of Russia to be the sole protector over the Christian subjects of the Porte, by virtue of the Treaty of Kainarji. It was this pretension, and not merely the principle of Ottoman integrity, that roused a storm of popular feeling against Russia in 1853. The principle it involved was, that the fate of Turkey was a European and not exclusively a Russian interest: and for this contention we determined to fight.

By her military conquests, and by her destruction in 1853 of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, Russia made evident her power

to deal as she wished with her stricken foe. She was at that time entrenched beyond the Danube, and possessed a powerful fleet at Sevastopol, her naval base in the Black Sea. Turkey lay at her feet.

The Crimean War (1854-1855) was undertaken by Great Britain and France, as the champions of Europe, in support of the principle to which I have alluded. Russia's 'treacherous act' at Sinope (which was an ordinary act of war) afforded a pretext for the entry of the Anglo-French fleet into the Black Sea. It was a war dictated by British policy. It was a war directed against Russia's distant naval base, accessible to our sea-power. It was a war which, with the aid of France, exhausted the strength and resources of Russia, resulting in the destruction of her fleet and of her naval and military arsenal. The Turks, under General Sir Fenwick Williams, made a firm stand at Kars, and stopped the advance of Russia in that direction.

The Treaty of Paris (1856) was the fruit of all this bloodshed. It created the Concert of Europe, by embodying our national policy as a Public Law of the Continent. It imposed on Russia the relinquishment of all her treaty-rights with Turkey—the result of a century of warfare—and not only the abandonment of Sevastopol, but also the prohibition to create another Black Sea fleet. It consequently released Turkey from naval menace, and from compromising engagements regarding her Christian subjects. But, in particular, it admitted the Ottoman Empire 'to participate in the advantages of the Public Law of Europe.' Thus, Turkey was introduced into the European System, and was given a recognised position in the Balance of Power, on the understanding that she should carry out reforms that were the common concern of Europe and essential to her own emancipated state.

Both the war and the Treaty negotiations were conducted principally by the British Government and their agents, with the enthusiastic support and concurrence of the nation. Public Opinion thereby endorsed the policy of Lord Palmerston and the Public Law of Europe.

At the time when Mohammed Ali was vigorously advocating his rights in Egypt and Syria, and while France was giving him some support, Lord Palmerston wrote (5th June 1838) to the British Ambassador at Paris: 'My own opinion has long been made up. We ought to support the Sultan heartily and vigorously with France, if France will act with us; without her, if she decline. I foresee difficulty in getting the Cabinet to take any vigorous resolve. Very few public men in England follow up Foreign Affairs sufficiently to foresee the consequences of events which have NOT happened.' Three days later, he wrote again: 'The Cabinet agreed that it would not do to let Mohammed Ali declare his independence, and separate Egypt and Syria from the Turkish Empire. That would result in a conflict between him and the Sultan; the Turks would be defeated [as they were, one year later, at Nezib]; the Russians would fly to their aid, and a Russian garrison occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles, which, once in their possession, they would never quit. We are prepared to give naval aid to the Sultan against Mohammed, and intend to order our fleet to Alexandria, so as to give Mohammed an outward and visible sign of our inward resolve. We should like the French to go there too at the same time. I write this on the supposition that France is honest, and can be trusted. *It must not be forgotten that one great danger to Europe is the possibility of a combination between France and Russia*, which, though prevented at present by the personal feelings of the Czar, may not always be as impossible as it is now.'[1] Finally, in 1853, Palmerston stated: 'We support Turkey for our own sake and for our own interests.'

Therefore, to us, the most important clauses of the Treaty of Paris were those dealing with the Black Sea. The question of reforms had, comparatively speaking, merely an academic interest, and did not appeal to the national conscience, except when this was outraged by more than an ordinary act of brutality on the part of the Sultan. Our

[1] Cameron's *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 177-8.

systematic evasion of moral responsibility is a terrible indictment: the selfishness of our policy became, indeed, the by-word of Europe.

The restrictions imposed on the development of a great State like Russia were as vexatious and intolerable as they were unreasonable, and were not to be borne by a Power capable of disputing them. Consequently, Russia seized the first favourable opportunity to burst her fetters. In 1870, when France lay under the iron heel of Germany, and the other Powers were rigidly neutralized, Russia denounced the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris: and in the following year, by the Treaty of London, the neutralization of the Black Sea and the prohibition to establish arsenals were abrogated, a further Convention between Russia and Turkey providing for the size and number of warships which each Power might maintain in those waters. Both these treaty engagements are still in force; and Turkey continues to uphold 'the ancient rule as to the Straits.'[1]

Meanwhile, Turkey had done nothing to redeem her pro-

[1] 'By the Treaty of the Dardanelles, of 5th January 1809, between Great Britain and the Porte, it is recited, that ships of war have at all times been prohibited from entering the channel of Constantinople, viz. the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Black Sea, and that this "ancient regulation of the Ottoman Empire" ought in future to be observed towards every Power in time of peace, and Great Britain promises "on its part to conform to this principle." . . . The four Powers, by a Protocol dated 10th July 1841, and the same Powers, with the addition of France, by a Treaty signed on the 13th of the same month, engage to respect the ancient rule; the Sultan by the Treaty also engaging to uphold the rule, while reserving to himself to allow the passage of light vessels in the service of the Missions. This Treaty was superseded by Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and the annexed Convention, which is to have the same validity as if it formed an integral part of the principal Treaty. This Convention is still in force, having been confirmed by Article 2 of the Treaty of London, of 1871, which, however, allows the Sultan to open the Straits in case of necessity to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. . . . The so-called "neutralization" of the Black Sea, effected by Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the Treaty of Paris, and by the annexed Convention between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan, after being repudiated by Russia in 1870, was rescinded by Art. 1 of the Treaty of London, which expressly abrogates Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the Treaty of Paris, together with the annexed Convention, and by a special Convention between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan, of even date with the Treaty of London, and afterwards communicated to the representatives of the other Powers.' (Prof. Holland in *The European Concert*, pp. 224-7).

mises regarding the introduction of reforms. In 1860, the massacres (of the Maronites by the Druses) in the Lebanon found the Concert of Europe in a position to deal effectively with the emergency. France, as the mandatory of Europe, occupied the Lebanon ; and a European Commission introduced a semblance of order. But in 1866 Europe left Turkey free to wreak her vengeance on Crete, which had been given back to her, in 1830, at a moment when the brave islanders had nearly achieved their independence. Again, in 1875 the Concert failed to deal with the situation arising from the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It required the massacres and atrocities in Bulgaria (1875-6) to rouse the public conscience of Europe to a sense of its responsibilities : a crisis that led to the definitive Treaty of Berlin (1878).

Our own action throughout these events was contemptibly selfish, and absolutely inconsistent with our professions and moral obligations. Moreover, we, who had created the Concert of Europe on the Eastern Question, deserted it in 1876, when all the Powers, including Russia, sought our co-operation. Rather than endorse the definite and practical scheme proposed by Russia, who, in the event of its non-acceptance, threatened to act alone, we sent our fleet to Besika Bay, we declined to subscribe to the Berlin Memorandum, and we affirmed our neutrality at the Conference at Constantinople. Russia then declared war against Turkey: and, in a brilliant campaign, brief though it was and in the depth of winter, she advanced to Adrianople and threatened the capital. The campaign for Russia was all the more difficult because the Turks held the Command of the Sea.

Indeed, Russia herself was more loyal to the principles that governed the Concert of Europe than were we. In the Treaty of San Stefano (which she might have enforced, had her naval power been greater) she showed great moderation and practical wisdom.[1] Although she had made great

[1] The lesson of this war has not been lost on Russia—now the third Naval Power. The progressive annual expenditure on her navy reached seven millions in 1898; and the amount appropriated for new construction during the next seven

sacrifices, and Turkey was entirely at her mercy, (splendid as her resistance had been,) Russia asked little or nothing for herself. She stipulated for the free access of all nations, in time of peace and of war, to the Black Sea. She liberated the Christian nationalities of the Balkans, and made provision for the protection of the Cretans and Armenians. And she compelled Turkey to abandon her two principal lines of defence against Europe,—on the Danube and in the Balkans.

Ottoman independence, which had been a fiction since 1829, was thereby definitely abolished: and serious encroachments were made on the integrity of the Empire. But, in effect, the proposals of Russia agreed in principle with our own policy of reform in Turkey—a policy which we had done nothing to support. Emanating from a quarter in which we had been accustomed to seek snares rather than wisdom, we protested against the propositions of Russia, having previously voted £6,000,000 for armaments. Our motive, apparently, for this obstructive and blustering action, was to gain for Europe the credit and the advantages which Russia alone was entitled to enjoy. Our excuse was, that the San Stefano Treaty annulled the Treaties of 1856. This was perfectly true: but the Treaty of Paris was based on the utterly fallacious assumption, that Turkey was willing and able to carry out internal reforms, without any practical check or restraint being imposed on her. Thus, our own interests were advanced and upheld at the cost of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

We succeeded in our selfish designs. A Conference was held at Berlin to revise the San Stefano Treaty. But the Berlin Treaty did not depart materially from the Treaty of San Stefano. It reduced the area of Bulgarian territory, and out of it created Eastern Rumelia. It replaced a virtual Russian protectorate over Armenia by an ineffective

---

years is twenty millions. The Russian navy is not wanted for the protection of her sea-borne commerce, which only amounts to seventy millions. It is wanted 'to conquer the art of the sea,' in the quaint words of Peter the Great. Its influence is now felt in the Far East: in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and elsewhere.

European protection. As a result, we see to-day massacres in Armenia and constant friction in Macedonia, where 'trouble in the Spring' is the annual forecast of progress.

Then we, who had successfully protested against Russia dealing direct with her vanquished enemy, actually entered into a secret alliance with Turkey, and concluded the infamous Cyprus Convention, with the object of stopping the advance of Russia in the Asiatic Provinces of the Sultan. The result was that we deeply offended Russia (which led to trouble in Afghanistan), and we proclaimed our duplicity to Europe.

Having nothing but Diplomatic representations to fear, Turkey continued on her path of brutal oppression, bestial outrage, and incredible misgovernment, playing off one Power against the other and holding her own against all attempts at coercion. So scandalous did this state of affairs become, that, in 1880, a Conference of Ambassadors was held at Constantinople; and an Identic Note was issued by the Signatories of the Berlin Treaty. This Note declared, that no reforms had been carried out, and that the shocking misgovernment of the country 'would lead in all probability to the destruction of the Christian population of vast districts.' It also emphasized the fact, 'that, by treaty engagements, Turkey was bound to introduce the reforms which had been often indicated,' and that these reforms were to be 'carried out under the supervision of the Powers.'[1] But nothing was done to give effect to our good offices, except the forcible cession of Dulcigno to Montenegro.

The net result of all this muddling was seen in 1894-95, when the Sultan deliberately plotted and carried out the massacre of from 50,000 to 75,000 Armenians. We could do nothing to avert the extinction of the Armenian nation, nor to save the survivors from forcible conversion to Islam, because, in the words of Lord Salisbury, our fleet could not

[1] *Cf.* 'Our Responsibilities for Turkey,' by the Duke of Argyll, whose lucid and responsible statement forms the indictment I have faintly sketched in these pages.

'cross the mountains of the Taurus.' Only Russia was in a position to save the situation: but Russia refused to act alone, allowing it to be assumed that the Cyprus Convention stood in her way.[1]

Finally, recent events in Crete have displayed the incompetence of the European Concert to deal with an emergency when circumstances are unfavourable to united action.

The fate of Turkey

No further evidence need be adduced in order to establish the contention, upon which I base my further arguments, that the fate of Turkey is the common concern of Europe. It is neither an exclusively Russian nor a directly English issue. The Concert of Europe is responsible for its solution, under the *corpus juris publici orientalis* established by the treaties cited.

Our naval supremacy has forced us to take a leading part in the various phases of the Near Eastern Question. Our Imperial expansion has withdrawn us more and more from its direct issues. Hence: uncertainty of aim, inconsistency of action, and bungling diplomacy on our part. Instead of seeking an accord with Russia, sufficient to guarantee our material interests and to support our moral responsibilities, we have adopted a policy of pin-pricks, which has only spurred her on to fresh efforts, although she has not occupied a rood of territory claimed by us. Russia now dominates Turkey; and British influence at Constantinople has steadily declined. Her alliance with France is directed against British sea-power rather than against the Triple Alliance.

The closer one examines the Near Eastern Question, the more evident it becomes, that it is to the interest of every Power in Europe, France not excepted, to keep Russia out of Constantinople as long as possible. The danger to Europe foreseen by Lord Palmerston has taken shape: Russia and France are allied—an Autocracy with a Re-

[1] We did nothing then to remove that impression—at least, nothing definite. The Convention is still in force, although its obligations have been repudiated by members of her Majesty's Government, speaking from their place in Parliament, on the ground that Turkey has not performed her contingent obligations to 'introduce necessary reforms.' Neither, for that matter, has Great Britain taken any adequate steps 'to make necessary provision for executing her engagement.'

public. These extremes of government have indeed met: but their disseverment may be prognosticated with equal prescience. Russia will continue to advance until her frontiers are coterminous with those of the Great Powers of Europe or with buffer States mutually set up between them. Naught but force can restrain her from obeying this natural law.

If Russia were at Constantinople, she would bestride the continents of Europe and Asia as a conquering Colossus. With the Black Sea as a Russian lake, the control of the Straits as a safe retreat for her ships, and with the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor as new fields for expansion, Russia would indeed become a menace to Europe, and in time might aspire to dominate the Mediterranean lands and Sea.[1]

ii THE BALANCE OF POWER

Alliances

The Balance of Power on the Continent is, in effect, the balance of armaments. Europe is divided into two camps, represented by the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance, both of which can put five million soldiers into the field. The Triple Alliance is a League of Peace. The Dual Alliance is a combination for Defence or Offence. Between the members of these rival combinations there exist or have existed certain understandings. Thus, Austria and Russia two years ago came to an agreement over the situation in

[1] At present, the Tsar of Russia is advocating a Crusade of Peace,—no doubt with perfect sincerity on his own part. But the Cabinets of Europe are sceptical. It is difficult to reconcile this advocacy with the stern facts, that (1) the Russian war budget for the year 1898 was increased to nearly one-half of that of the seven preceding years—amounting to twenty per cent. of the total annual expenditure of the State; and (2) that Russia, like France, maintains a navy out of all proportion to her maritime interests. Russia, indeed, has need of peace. She has need of peace until she has built her trans-continental railways, developed the resources of her Asiatic territories, absorbed Manchuria, and turned Port Arthur into a second Kronstadt, as the impregnable naval base for a Pacific fleet. But, that Russia has serious designs on India is a proposition as difficult to believe as the accomplishment would prove. Constantinople and India have, in my opinion, been Political Bogeys that have frightened us out of our wits. Europe will look after the one; our sea-power and the Himálayas should guarantee the other.

the Balkans. Italy, under the Marquis di Rudini, coquetted with Russia, in anticipation of a fall. And even Germany, the leader of the Triplice, is supposed to have come to an understanding with Russia regarding their coterminous frontiers. Thus, the members of the Triple Alliance have each sought to conciliate or to neutralize Russia. But none of them have courted France.

France, for a long time after the downfall of the Empire, stood isolated, nursing her humiliation and preparing for a war of revenge. She was a standing menace to Europe in those days.

In February 1874, when the Emperor of Austria visited St Petersburg, the Tsar, in proposing a toast, used these words: 'In the friendship which binds us and also the Emperor William and the Queen Victoria, I see a sure guarantee of peace.' But, on the lapse of the *Kaiserbund*, Russia also was isolated.

In spite of efforts to keep them apart, Russia and France gravitated towards each other by the force of circumstances. Their union is perhaps only a Platonic alliance, being based on reciprocal interests of the moment: but it has had the effect of strengthening the Triple Alliance, and, in particular, the position of Italy, whose value has been thereby enhanced.

Position of Great Britain

Although debarred from forming permanent and vague alliances with the European Powers, Great Britain has often entered into temporary alliances with them; and at the present time she is understood to stand in some such relationship, for specific ends, with the Central Powers. In general terms, it may be said with truth that the interests of the Triple Alliance and of Great Britain in the Eastern Question are identical: and this identity of interests may be said to extend to the Far East.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for Great Britain to come to an understanding with France regarding the European issues of the Eastern Question, because our respective interests are diametrically opposed in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, for reasons already stated, it is not only possible, but in the highest degree desirable, for Great Britain to

establish an *entente cordiale* with Russia and to come to a definite agreement with her in the Near East and the Far East.[1] Rivalry there may be, and must inevitably be, between the dominant military and naval Powers of Eurasia; but if there are many points of contact, there are also as many opportunities of compromise: the twin-continents provide ample scope for the development and expansion of both Empires. If diplomacy fail to establish an *entente*, it must be because our statesmen are blind to the teaching of history. But, happily, they are not altogether blind: every day one sees the shackles falling from their eyes. 'Mervousness,' as the Duke of Argyll once stigmatised the popular rancour towards Russia, has resulted in a policy of pin-pricks: but it has not kept Russia out of Merv, nor has our 'scientific frontier' in North-west India been endangered thereby. Childish obstruction has not prevented Russia from securing ice-free ports on the Pacific: one cannot 'keep out the Atlantic with a mop.' And naught but the united power of Europe can stem the course of Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean.

Attitude of Russia

On $\frac{18}{30}$ May 1877, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Russian Ambassador in London, that the Imperial Cabinet 'recognised that, in any case, the future of Constantinople is a question of common interest, which cannot be settled otherwise than by a general understanding; and that if the possession of that city were to be put in question, it could not be allowed to belong to any of the European Powers.'[2] This correct attitude of Russia towards the Near Eastern Question (although in 1853 and 1877 she acted alone) has been attested by her past, as my Historical Retrospect proves, and is emphasized in the present by her alliance with France—a Power to whom the possession of Constantinople is a matter of supreme import-

[1] Since this was written, an understanding has been arrived at (April, 1899) between Great Britain and Russia, as regards spheres of influence in China and on other points of mutual interest in Asia. But, in the absence of details, I merely record this welcome news; and trust it may form the basis of an *entente cordiale*. The Agreement is understood to refer only to railway enterprise.

[2] 'The Great Alternative,' by Spenser Wilkinson (p. 84).

ance. Is it, therefore, too much to expect of the future, that, whatever and whenever may be the final crisis, Europe will be in a position to deal with it, consistently with the interests of all the Powers?

The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire has been intrenched at Constantinople for four centuries. It has been in a state of decay ever since the loss of its sea-power. It has been in a condition of disruption ever since Russia on the one side, and the Christian Powers of Europe on the other, pressed heavily on its borders. Two centuries ago, these terrible Turanian invaders, then at the height of their power, stood before the walls of Vienna—the gates of the West: but to-day the Osmanli Turks have been hustled out of Christian Europe; and their rôle on the Continent is practically restricted to that of a Political Bogey, which, by permission of its unchristian jealousies, is still permitted to worry its flanks.[1] There is now no cohesion between Mohammedan countries: no radiating centre of civilization and culture: and therefore, as Mukhtar Pasha confessed to me, no progress as a whole is possible. Islam owes its stability chiefly to its intolerance. It has no other power of cohesion. Moreover, the Sultan of Turkey is not the rightful Khalifa, but a usurper: he does not belong to the Quraish tribe; while the title and office are elective, not hereditary. Islam looks for another Deliverer: and may find him in the Senussi Mahdi, a lineal descendant of the Prophet.

The Ottoman Empire has for two centuries been undergoing a process of disintegration which shows no sign of

[1] 'The assumption of a collective authority on the part of the Powers to supervise the solution of the Eastern Question—in other words, to regulate the disintegration of Turkey—has been gradual. Such an authority has been exercised tentatively since 1826, systematically since 1856. It has been applied successively to Greece, to Egypt, to Syria, to the Danubian Principalities and the Balkan Peninsula generally, to certain other of the European provinces of Turkey, to the Asiatic boundaries of Turkey and Russia, and to the treatment of the Armenians. . . . On the one hand, the Turkish Empire is placed, as it were, under the tutelage of Europe; while, on the other hand, the claim of any single Power to settle the destinies of that Empire without the concurrence of the rest has been repeatedly negatived.' (Professor Holland in 'The European Concert in the Eastern Question'—page 2.)

abatement. Her outlying provinces have one by one been wrested from her. Her hold over Egypt is, to-day, a diplomatic fiction, promulgated by the Powers whose interest it is to maintain in principle the suzerainty of the Sultan. Total disseverance from the Porte would not, therefore, affect the political situation in Egypt, except as a point of International Law; nor would it materially affect the *de facto* Balance of Power in Europe: but it would affect the situation in the Far East, by giving Great Britain military control over the Suez Canal and the residuary rights that accrue to Egypt on the lapse of existing concessions.

British Policy

The position consequently stands thus. The law of empire compels us to annex Egypt: but the Public Law of Europe restrains us. France will oppose an out-and-out annexation, with the moral, if not with the active, support of Russia. In the latter case—which at present seems a most unlikely contingency—we must give Russia a free hand in Turkey, so as to detach her from her ally.[1] If the Triple Alliance oppose this arrangement, they must either join us, and so help us to secure Egypt—as against France and Russia,—or they must settle matters between themselves and the Dual Alliance. With Egypt in our hands, we need not greatly fear Russia at Constantinople.

This is putting an extreme case, and not one which, in my opinion, is likely to occur—although the mere threat of such action would help our diplomacy. A more natural and gradual solution will be suggested after an enquiry has been made into the present International situation in Egypt. But I advance this policy of coercion, as a last resort, in order to fix the reader's mind on the Far East. The general opinion prevails, that neither France nor, still less, Russia would be likely to make an avowed British Protectorate over Egypt a *casus belli*. Moreover, we have no desire at present, and no need, to upset the *status quo*.

The Far East

The main interests of the Triple Alliance, so far as these

[1] Not long before the outbreak of the Crimean War, the Tsar Nicholas I. offered Egypt and Crete to Great Britain on the understanding that Russia should be allowed a free hand at Constantinople.

exist, in the Far East are in conformity with our own, and therefore also with those of Japan and the United States of America. Against such a combination, the divergent interests of France and Russia would carry little weight. It is true that Germany joined the European Concert in imposing restrictions on Japan, after her victory over China: but we—wisely, I think—held aloof, and thereby identified our interests with the coming Sea-Power of Eastern Asia. The attitude of Germany may be explained on other grounds, and does not invalidate my contention of a community of interests existing between her and our nominal allies in the Far East. It does not, in consequence, seem too much to assert, that Great Britain in Egypt would serve the interests of these Powers, and in a sense guarantee them against the protective tariffs and exclusive policies of France and Russia. We all want the 'open door,' and a secure highway of commerce to the Far East.

Under these circumstances, I am unable to see how any serious opposition can be raised to a British Protectorate over Egypt, whenever the time shall come for its declaration and under whatever guise it may be assumed. The destiny of Egypt is controlled by our sea-power. The expansion of Egypt is a mere foot-note to the Eastern Question, since the lines of expansion are already fixed.

iii FRENCH AFRICAN POLICY

As a rider to these reflections, it may be worth while to glance at the general tendency of French African Policy: since, it is only the rivalry of France that constitutes any serious opposition to our occupation of Egypt. Of French policy in Egypt itself, I shall speak exhaustively in another place.

Annexation and Conquest

In no part of the world does the Colonial policy of France show better results, broadly speaking, than in Africa; and in no part of Africa has it better chances of success than in Algeria. Nor is this statement subject to any material qualifications, even if we recall the fact that Algeria has already

cost France four milliards of francs, and is even now administered at an average annual loss of 85 millions. It is evident, that France aims at the creation of a vast empire on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the nucleus of which must of necessity be Algeria—her premier Colony. Her Protectorate over Tunis, leaving more scope to individual enterprise, has been productive of encouraging results. Her claims in Morocco and Egypt have been steadfastly upheld.

Tripoli, nominally Turkish but practically under the rule of the Senussi confraternity, is dangerous ground, into which France, with her experience of this powerful and highly organized Mohammedan sect, on the borderland of the Sahara and in Algeria itself, may well hesitate to enter. Further south, the tide of annexation and conquest flows unremittingly. It has filled up, like a flood, every unprotected corner and unoccupied waste: so that there now remain no more lands to conquer but the inaccessible countries of the Central Sudan, which are quite able to maintain their independence. In spite of the *Hinterland* theory—indeed, by reason of it, in the perverse minds of Paris politicians—France has surrounded all the European Colonies on the West Coast of Africa between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; and her energies are at present directed towards further encroachments on the fringes of the Sahara and in the Niger basin.

These facts are worth noting. They point to an ambitious Colonial policy, which, although it may have but few chances of any real and lasting success, cannot fail to thwart and check the aspirations of other European Powers in Africa. As compared with Great Britain, her chief rival, France may be said to hold a far stronger strategic position in North Africa, in so far as that position affects the Balance of Power in the Mediterranean, apart from the Suez Canal. In spite of engagements to the contrary, she has fortified Bizerta, and created a strong naval base there, as well as a secure retreat for her ships (*pace* Santiago !).

Algeria

That so well-situated and so well-favoured a Colony as Algeria should, even at the present day, be a drain on the re-

sources of the Mother-country, is, in truth, a matter of surprise. But the reasons are obvious to those who, like myself, have visited Algeria and investigated the causes of its arrested development. These conditions may be summarised as follows:—(1) The natives have been unfairly treated, and the colonists have been 'coddled'; (2) departmental division of responsibility has led to the practical irresponsibility of the local agents of the Government; (3) the Colony has been treated as a Department of France—*France d'outre-mer*—whereas, in fact, it is a colony pure and simple, in which the European colonists form the mere fraction of a hostile population incapable of assimilation; and (4) not sufficient care has been taken to introduce the right kind of colonist—though the days of the *colon officiel* are over—or even qualified administrators. If an Anglo-Egyptian official were to 'inspect' Algeria, I imagine he would suggest the following as the leading reforms for adoption: (1) that the administration and the finances should be entirely separated from, although under the supervision and control of, the Mother-country; (2) that the Governor-General should be invested with more power, and have under his exclusive control the entire civil staff of the Colony; (3) that the local functionaries and administrators should be more carefully selected and specially trained—above all, that they should be conversant with the Arabic and Kabyle dialects of the districts under their command; and (4) that a policy of conciliation towards the natives should be followed. Once the disabilities of the Colony were removed, and more freedom given to the natural development of its resources, there is no reason why Algeria should not realize the limits and hopes of its productiveness and prosperity, and become the nucleus for Colonial expansion which it is intended to be.

These details are introduced for the purpose of demonstrating the incapacity of France to administer Colonial possessions,[1] and indirectly to indicate the results that

[1] In *The Situation in Algeria* (Scottish Geographical Magazine, April 1894) these arguments were elaborated by me. My paper was subjected to a lengthy review by the *Revue Française de l'Étranger*, etc. (No. 187, July 1894), the

might have been expected had France occupied our position in Egypt. Yet, in Algeria—an ideal African colony—she has had a free hand for over forty years.[1]

Tunis, too, offers another instructive parallel, though in a different direction.[2] France occupied Tunis under conditions equivalent to those that have fixed us in Egypt. She, also, made similar promises of evacuation, which circumstances prevented her from fulfilling. Dr Macdonnel outlines the case with great clearness in the *Nineteenth Century* for December 1898, from which the following extracts are taken. Tunis

The French Expedition landed in Tunis on 30th April 1881, regardless of the protests of the Bey against the violation of his sovereign rights. No serious opposition was offered. On 12th May, a French Protectorate was established by the Treaty of Bardo, the second article of which stated:

'Cette occupation cessera lorsque les autorités militaires et tunisiennes auront reconnu d'un commun accord que l'administration locale est en état de garantir le maintain de l'ordre.'

France set up the contention, which is supported by many international jurists, that the Bey was an independent sovereign: but this was not the opinion of the British Government. Lord Granville wrote, in June 1880, *i.e.* before the Occupation: 'In the view of her Majesty's Government, Tunis is a portion of the Ottoman Empire.' (Affairs of Tunis, C.—2886, p. 5).

France promised, that she undertook no conquest or

---

writer of which said: 'Il est bon de savoir ce que pensent de nos actes les étrangers qui nous étudient avec réflexion et sans animosité; aussi nous semble-t-il utile de faire connaître par extraits résumées les appréciations de M. White. Nous le faisons même d'autant plus volontiers que personnellement nous partageons son avis.'

[1] The French captured Algiers in 1830. It took 27 years to conquer the *Hinterland*.

[2] The development of Tunis shows better results than Algeria because it has not been strangled by red-tape. Being under one-man rule—the French Resident—it is the only Colony that has really succeeded.

annexation, and that the Occupation was to be temporary. This assurance was often repeated, both in the Chamber of Deputies and to our Diplomatic and official representatives. Thus:—

'M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire repeated the assurance so often given, that he considered the annexation of Tunis to France would be a mistake and a misfortune.' (Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, 6th April 1881—or, three weeks before the invasion).

'Le Gouvernement de la République ne cherche pas de conquêtes ; il n'en a pas besoin.' (M. Jules Ferry, President of the Council, in Chamber of Deputies, 11th April.)

'The Foreign Minister [M. Saint-Hilaire] begged me to report at once to her Majesty's Government, in the name of the Republic and his own name, and in the most formal and explicit manner, the assurance that the French Government did not intend to annex Tunis. If it should be found necessary to occupy for a time certain points in the Regency with French troops, the Occupation, his Excellency said, would be of an essentially provisional character, and would cease as soon as sufficient security had been obtained for the punctual execution by the Bey of the new arrangements which would be effected by treaty which he would be required to make.' (Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, 10th May.)

On the same date—two days before the Treaty was signed—the French Foreign Minister informed General Cialdini:

'All the Bizerta territory will be evacuated as soon as the Bey's good faith and respect for the Treaty is secured.'

The Treaty of Bardo, itself, was equally explicit. The avowed object was to secure the re-establishment of order and the safety of the French frontier of Algeria.

The Sultan and the Bey protested. Italy protested, and looked to Great Britain for support. A French army of over 30,000 men was in possession of the country: and France, immediately after the Occupation became an accomplished fact, frankly confessed her intention to establish a Protectorate, with all its consequences.

These are only a few samples. Their application may be seen in the following remarks of the French Foreign Minister, on 15th April 1884, to a correspondent:[1]

'Je suis absolument de votre avis sur le rôle de l'Angleterre en Egypte; vous n'avez qu'a faire ce que nous avons fait à Tunis, où les choses marchent bien. C'est l'intérêt de votre grand pays, en même temps que l'intérêt de la civilisation et de l'humanité.'

It would appear, therefore, that France is scarcely qualified to act, in the name of Europe, as the champion of the Sultan's suzerainty in Egypt, or to pose as the outraged repository of our self-denying ordinances. Although French policy in Egypt is avowedly designed '*pour embêter les Anglais*,' we ourselves gave up, quite recently, our Capitulations with Tunis; and in 1893 we relinquished our carrying-trade between France and Algeria (though we then held the bulk of that trade), in order to permit the enforcement of protection. Such actions are in striking contrast.

[1] From the Memoirs of the life of the late Mr Henry Reeve, C.B.

V

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EGYPT

i INTERNATIONAL STATUS

ii THE POPULATION OF EGYPT

iii FACTORS OF EQUILIBRIUM

V

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EGYPT

i INTERNATIONAL STATUS

(*a*) *The Sultan's Suzerainty*

THE Sultan's suzerainty over Egypt has always been loyally recognised, in principle if not in fact, by the Protectoral Power. At the same time, as Sir Samuel Baker pointed out,[1] it might with reason be contended 'that the Sultan sold his right of interference when he altered the Mohammedan Law of Succession to the eldest son of the Khedive Ismail for the sum of £344,000 a-year, as an increase of the Egyptian Tribute.' It certainly was then a debateable point, whether the Sultan could sell his positive right and then resume his original position? But, in my opinion, her Majesty's Government had a much clearer title to contest the Sultan's suzerainty when, after the Arábi revolt had been crushed, the authority of the Khedive was restored: because the Arábi movement was openly supported by the Sultan. Such action, however, was not taken, any more than the extreme step of annexation. We were then, as we are now, supporters of the principle, though not of the practice, of the Sultan's suzerainty. In principle, the Sultan might call upon Egypt to send troops to his aid: but, in practice, this act of fealty would be embarrassing, especially if the Sultan were at war with Great Britain or any European Power.

Egypt

Again, the Sultan's suzerainty extends, presumably, over the Egyptian—or, rather, Anglo-Egyptian—Sudan: but it cannot touch the predominant partner. These territories,

The Sudan

[1] 'Sir Samuel Baker: a Memoir' (page 336).

too, are declared to be inalienable: but the British and Egyptian flags float at Khartum, and elsewhere in the Sudan, between Wadi Halfa and Fashoda.

Clearly, the Sultan's suzerainty is a diplomatic fiction, substantiated merely by the fact of his receiving the annual Tribute, which, virtually speaking, is now an indemnity.

Status of Egypt

Sir John Scott, late Judicial Adviser to the Khedive, defines the actual status of Egypt in the following authoritative terms:—

'One word as to the relations of Egypt to Turkey. No doubt, Egypt is still part of the Ottoman Empire. But successive Firmans have conferred so much power on the Khedive, that his relations to the Sultan are rather those of a tributary Prince than of a subject. As Sir Alfred Milner says, in "England in Egypt," "no delegation of sovereign power, short of its absolute abandonment, could well have been more complete." Full administrative autonomy is given by the Firmans in the following terms: "the civil administration of the country with the power of elaborating and carrying-out according to what is just all necessary regulations and internal laws." (Firman, August 2, 1879.) The Khedive can even make international agreements, such as treaties of commerce, provided they have no political character.

'Taxes are levied and money is struck in the name of the Sultan; and the Khedive can neither part with any of his rights nor abandon any portion of his territory. But, as long as he pays his Tribute, he is practically independent of the Sultan in all matters of internal administration.' (*The Times*, 22nd January 1899.)

(*b*) *Firmans*

Organic Law of Egypt

The Firmans constituting the Organic Law of Egypt are those of 8th June 1873 and 2nd August 1879. Both are still in force. The former, altering the Order of Succession in favour of Ismail's family, by the law of primogeniture, consolidated all previous Firmans; the latter, or Firman of Investiture of Taufik Pasha, imposed certain restrictions.

Textual extracts from these and other operative instruments, bearing on the situation, are given in an Appendix (II) at the end of this book. The main provisions may be briefly summarised, as follows:

Administrative Autonomy

The principle of Egyptian autonomy was laid down in the Separate Act annexed to the Treaty of London of 15th July 1840. For the due observance and fulfilment of this Act, the representatives of the Great Powers, dealing direct with the Sultan, made themselves responsible. Article V provided that 'All the Treaties and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire shall be applicable to Egypt.' But in the definitive Firman, granted to Ismail, no mention is made of this stipulation, which provides for the Capitulations being applicable to Egypt. The assumption, that these are therefore abrogated, has not, however, been advanced by any of the Great Powers or by the Porte.

Subject to International privileges

Reservation of Sovereign rights

Again, in Taufik's Firman of Investiture, emphasis is laid on two important points of International Law: the promulgation of Conventions concluded between Egypt and Foreign Powers, and the inalienability of Egyptian prerogatives and territories. In both cases the representatives of Great Britain and France demanded explanations from the Porte. In reply, the Porte, in the first instance, reduced its claim to a right of veto; and, in the second instance, an evasive answer was returned, which did little or nothing to clear up the ambiguity of the phrasing. These points are illustrated in my Appendix (II).

It will be noted, too, that the difference in address between Ismail's Firman and Taufik's Firman emphasizes a distinct diminution in the authority of the Sultan—*i.e.* a lapse from the first person to the third person—and that, perhaps in consequence, the Sultan laid particular stress on the inalienability of territory, the sacred rights of Sovereign power, and the liability of the Egyptian army to serve in the defence of the Ottoman Empire.

Legal Opinion

I again quote, from the same source, a high legal opinion on the meaning and value of these Firmans:

'It may be worth noting,' says Sir John Scott, 'that the

Firmans which confer these rights are not mere emanations of the will of the Sultan which he can sanction to-day and abrogate to-morrow. The principle of Egyptian autonomy which they progressively develop was first declared in 1840 by the Sultan, in co-operation with the European Powers; and, as recently as 1879, the Firman of Investiture of Taufik Pasha was published, with a protocol of interpretation, signed by the representatives of England and France and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs at Constantinople.'

(*c*) *The Capitulations*

Limitations to Sovereign power

'Limitations to the Sovereign power of the Sultan, as Suzerain of Egypt, are defined in the ancient series of treaties commonly called the Capitulations. Such treaties are held by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, as well as by the United States of America and Brazil.

Immunities and privileges of foreigners

France has been the leading champion of the Capitulations in Egypt; but all the Powers have abused the privileges conferred on their subjects by these treaties, amounting, as they do in effect, to those conveyed by extra-territoriality. The immunities enjoyed by foreigners, under the Capitulations, are principally: (1) exemption from taxation, apart from customs' dues and land-tax on real property, (2) inviolability of domicile, and (3) exemption, partial or otherwise, from the jurisdiction of local Courts. In spite of the Judicial reforms introduced into Egypt, the Consular Courts still exist. Moreover, the Capitulations introduce all kinds of obstruction to municipal and State legislation: and all 'protected subjects' of the Powers profit by them, even though they be unconvicted criminals.

No change in this anomalous, and indeed scandalous, situation is practicable, except with the unanimous consent of the fourteen Powers holding Capitulations with Turkey, so long as the Sultan's suzerainty is upheld. There is, however, no tax now paid by natives that is not also paid by Europeans liable to it.

The Mixed Tribunals are a compromise between the principles of extra-territoriality (upheld by the Consular Courts) and amenity to the National Tribunals. Their composition and functions will be referred to in another place. International Courts

(*d*) *The Caisse*

Another International restraint on the administrative freedom of Egypt is exercised through the powers conferred on the *Caisse de la Dette publique*, which was established by the Decree of 2nd May 1876. This Decree I have published as an Appendix (III); and any further remarks I have to offer will be made elsewhere. The Powers are represented on the *Caisse* by six Commissioners. The French, Austrian, and Italian members were constituted in 1876; an English member was elected in 1876; a German and a Russian member were added in 1885.

ii THE POPULATION OF EGYPT

The people of Egypt cling to and feed on the Nile like so many parasites in the economy of Nature. They owe their existence to the régime of this great river, which brings to them from distant lands soil for their fields and water for their crops. Like a god, the Nile creates and sustains life in the aridity of its desert course. The density of population in the various Provinces of Egypt necessarily coincides with the areas of highest fertility.[1] Parasites

A Census of the Population was taken in 1897. The previous (1882) Census was unreliable, owing to its occurrence on the eve of the Arábi revolt: but it may be instructive to compare the results, during a period that corresponds with the British Occupation. Growth and decay

The total population of Egypt in 1897 was 9,734,405. In 1882 it was 6,813,919. In fifteen years, therefore, the population of Egypt has increased by 2,920,486,—or 43 per

[1] The density of population to the square mile may be taken, roughly, as follows:—Egypt Proper, 22; Sennar, 10; Kordofan and Darfur, 9; Upper Nile, (north of Lado), 8. In the surrounding States, the figures are, approximately: British East Africa, 10; Abyssinia, from 2.5 in the extreme South to 23 in the Central regions; Eritrea, 5; British Somáliland and French Somáli Coast, 3; Italian Somáli Coast, 4; Wadai, 27; Tripoli, 3.

cent.—showing a yearly average of 2·76 per cent. At the beginning of the century, the population (estimated during the French Expedition) numbered only 2,460,200.[1]

(*a*) *Tables* (*Census of* 1897)[2]

The following Tables are taken from the Census of 1897 :—

Census of 1897

I.—General Population

Population, by Sex:	
Males (50·8%)	4,947,850
Females (49·2%)	4,786,555
	9,734,405

II.—Centres of Population

Centres of Population:	
Towns and villages of the sedentary population	3,675
Hamlets, etc. do. do.	12,202
Hamlets do. Bedwin	1,712
Camps do. do.	540
	18,129
Habitations:	
Houses in occupation	1,422,302

III.—Population, according to Mode of Life

	Total.	Percentage.
Sedentaries:		
Natives and Foreigners	9,160,431	94·1
Semi-sedentaries:		
Bedwin living in their own hamlets, or among the sedentary population	485,303	5·
Nomads:		
Bedwin living in their camps	88,671	0·9
	9,734,405	100·

[1] The population of Egypt, at the time of the Emperor Augustus (27 B.C.), was computed at 25 millions, including Tripoli. It must have been quite 18 millions. And a few centuries later, after the Arab Conquest, it was calculated at about half that number. In 1821, under Mohammed Ali, it was about 2,536,400. In 1846, it was about 4,476,440. The mean annual increase during the present century has been 3 per cent.

[2] I received the definite and final results of the Census of 1897 ("Résultats Généraux") too late to make all the necessary corrections, which, for purposes of general comparison, are immaterial.

IV.—NATIONALITIES

Census of 1897

Population.	Total.	Percentage.
Egyptians	9,621,879	98·85
Foreigners	112,526	1·15
	9,734,405	100·

Egyptians.	Total.	Percentage.
Natives	9,007,755	93·62
Born in other parts of the Ottoman Empire	40,150	0·42
Bedwin	573,974	5·96
	9,621,879	100·

	Foreigners.		Total.
	In Towns and Villages.	In the Ports.	
Greece	37,993	182	38,175
Italy	24,232	235	24,467
Great Britain	17,334	2,223	19,557[1]
France	14,113	42	14,155[2]
Austria-Hungary	6,870	247	7,117
Russia	1,271	1,922	3,193[3]
Germany	1,075	202	1,277
Spain	765	...	765
Switzerland	472	...	472
U.S. America	286	5	291
Belgium	236	20	256
Holland	180	67	247
Portugal	31	120	151
Sweden and Norway	63	44	107
Denmark	70	2	72
Persia	1,301	...	1,301
Divers	758	165	923
	107,050	5,476	112,526

[1] Maltese, 6,463; Indians, 614; Army of Occupation, 4,909.
[2] Algerians, Tunisians, 3,901.
[3] Bukhariots, etc., 430; Military transport, 1,793.

Census of 1897

V.—Religions

Population classed according to Religion.	Inhabitants.	Per-centage.
Moslems (*of all sects*) . . .	8,978,775	92·23
Christians *do.* . . .	730,162	7·50
Israelites *do.* . . .	25,200	0·26
Divers	268	0·01
	9,734,405	100·

Christian Cults and Sects.	Inhabitants.	Per-centage.
Copts (*Orthodox, Protestant, and R. Catholic*)	608,446	83·33
Orthodox (*other than Copts*) . .	53,479	7·32
R. Catholics *do.* . .	56,343	7·72
Protestants *do.* . .	11,894	1·63
	730,162	100·

N.B.—The majority of Copts belong to the Orthodox rite; and the Protestant Copts are more numerous than Catholic Copts. These distinctions were not clearly reported on the Census sheets.

VI.—Education

Population classed according to Education.	Males.	Females.	Total.
Able to read and write .	435,993	31,893	467,886
Illiterate	4,511,857	4,754,662	9,266,519
	4,947,850	4,786,555	9,734,405

N.B.—The number of male children under 7 years who are not of an age to receive education can be put at about 18 per cent. of the total population; and deducting also the Bedwin, who do not attend schools, the proportion is as follows, for the male population:

Able to read and write, 12 per cent. Illiterate, 88 per cent.

In large towns the proportion is as follows:

Able to read and write, 29 per cent. Illiterate, 71 per cent.

VII.—Professions

Census of 1897

Population classed according to Profession.	Males.	Females.	Total. Both sexes.
Having professions, including servants	3,176,734	71,173	3,247,907
Without professions	1,771,116	4,715,382	6,486,498
	4,947,850	4,786,555	9,734,405

N.B.—The number of male agriculturists or cultivators may be calculated at about 2,050,000, forming thus about two-thirds of the male population following a profession.

VIII.—Population of Chief Towns

(Comparison with Census of 1882)

Chief Towns.	Population in 1897.	Population in 1882.
Cairo	570,062	374,838
Alexandria	319,766	231,396
Tanta	57,289	33,750
Port Said	42,095	16,560
Assiut	42,012	31,398
Zagazig	35,715	19,815
Mansura	34,997	30,439
Damietta	31,288	34,044
Fayum	31,262	25,799
Damanhur	27,236	19,624
Kena	24,364	15,402
Minia	20,404	17,145
Suez	17,173	10,919
Giza	16,820	11,410
Beni Suef	15,297	10,085
Sohag	13,930	8,774
Aswán	13,005	6,421

Census of 1897

IX.—SUMMARY
(Comparison with Census of 1882)

	1897. Inhabitants.	INCREASE SINCE 1882.	
		Inhabitants.	%
General Population	9,734,405	2,920,486	43
Sex:			
Males	4,947,850	1,547,766	45
Females	4,786,555	1,372,720	40
Population:			
Lower Egypt	5,676,109	1,667,363	42
Upper Egypt	4,058,296	1,253,123	45
Nationalities:			
Egyptians	9,621,879	2,898,846	43
Foreigners	112,526	21,640	24
Egyptians:			
Natives	9,007,755	2,563,025	40
Born in other parts of the Ottoman Empire	40,150	8,376	26
Bedwin	573,974	327,445	133
Bedwin:			
Living with natives	304,417	283,104	1330
do. in their hamlets	180,866	53,866	42
do. in their camps	88,671	9,525	9
	NUMBER.	INCREASE SINCE 1882.	
Centres of Population:			%
Native towns, villages	3,675	21	...
do. hamlets	12,202	3,559	41
Bedwin hamlets	1,712	889	109
Camps of Bedwin	540	413	325
	18,129	4,882	36

X.—FOREIGN RESIDENTS

(Comparison with Census of 1882)

Census of 1897

Nationalities.	Percentage (1897).	1882. — Foreigners.	1897. — Foreigners.	DIFFERENCE 1897. More.	DIFFERENCE 1897. Less.
Greece	33·94	37,301	38,175	874	...
Italy	21·72	18,665	24,467	5,802	...
Great Britain	17·37	6,118	19,557	13,439	...
France	12·59	15,716	14,155	...	1,561
Austria-Hungary	6·32	8,022	7,117	...	905
Russia	2·83	533	3,193	2,660	...
Germany	1·14	948	1,277	329	...
Spain	0·68	589	765	176	...
Switzerland	0·42	412	472	60	...
United States of America	0·26	183	291	108	...
Belgium	0·23	637	256	...	381
Holland	0·22	221	247	26	...
Portugal	0·14	36	151	115	...
Sweden and Norway	0·09	15	107	92	...
Denmark	0·07	14	72	58	...
Persia	1·16	1,476	1,301	748	...
Various	0·82		923		
	100·	90,886	112,526	24,487	2,847
				+ 21,640	

(b) Characteristics

Movements of the Population

There has been a considerable redistribution of the population in the Delta, since 1882, owing to the diversion of commercial traffic. The population is engaged almost exclusively in agriculture, although some attention is paid to the rearing of cattle, etc. (oxen, buffaloes, camels, and donkeys). Trade and commerce form, at present, an insignificant proportion of the industrial enterprise of the people.

Mussulmans

Religion and politics are so closely intertwined in Eastern countries, that we have only to recall the fact of the bulk of the population of Egypt professing the Mohammedan faith, in order to estimate the social condition and economical development of the country. Later, we shall see the cumulative effect of British reforms and administration on the well-being of the Khedive's subjects. The Egyptians are less zealous bigots than their co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire, partly on account of their race, and partly, I think, on account of their agricultural and pastoral pursuits. If bigotry and fanaticism there be, these are confined to the towns, where agitators may occasionally be found. A characteristic note of this submissive and God-fearing people may be heard daily at the citadel, during Ramadan, when the sunset gun is answered by a roar of relief from the fasting population of Cairo.

Copts

The Copts do not form an important or influential element of the population of Egypt; and they are more concerned with promoting their material interests than with the observances of their religion. By the last Census (1897), they were numbered at 608,446—embracing the Orthodox, Protestant, and Roman Catholic adherents of the Coptic Church; but it is possible that their number is greater, owing to the attempt of many to evade declaring their male issue, for fear of the conscription. In Upper Egypt, they are found principally at Assiut, Girga, etc. In the Delta, too, they gravitate to the large towns, where they find employment as clerks, artisans, gold and silver workers. Their thrifty habits must be the principal cause of their prosperity: since, as a class, they are scarcely so capable as the Mohammedans; and, although they have for centuries been prone to subservience and subject to oppression, they hold a considerable amount of landed and house property, from which the Church ultimately benefits.

The Coptic Church

Prior to Mohammed Ali's reign, the hostility of the Mussulmans compelled the Copts to worship in secret and to hide their faith. The Church Missionary Society and, after their withdrawal, the American missionaries and

United Presbyterians did much to revive the Coptic Church, which was then in a more corrupt state than it is now. The Coptic Patriarchs, in the attempt to concentrate all power into their own hands, acted autocratically, and debased the Church. Even at the present day, there is constant friction between the Patriarchate and the Council. The latter has more than once been suppressed by Cyril, who has been the Orthodox Patriarch for the last twenty-four years, and who, in spite of the agitation among lay members, is not sufficiently amenable to the Government, which endeavours to hold the scales even, or to the elders of the Church.[1]

The attempts made by the Archbishops of Canterbury and, more recently, by the Pope to acquire influence over the Coptic Church have, so far, failed. At the present time, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox parties, at daggers-drawn between themselves, are wooing the powers that be in Egypt, who have no other object than to safeguard the general welfare. Three years ago, the Pro-Patriarch Macaire[2] attempted to advance the interests of his party and of the Papacy by carrying the campaign into Abyssinia: but he met with discouraging results. The Abyssinian Church is not very robust: but Menelik patronises Cyril, the Orthodox Patriarch, to whom he gives a small pension, and to whom he looks for the nomination of his *Abuna*, or Metropolitan. This struggle for ecclesiastical supremacy in Abyssinia is, of course, not without importance, from a political point of view: but the Orthodox Copts, although they are establishing schools

[1] It is only within the last three years that the Patriarch has adopted a more conciliatory attitude, and has made concessions to the party of reform. Although he is reported to command great wealth, he is not compelled to account, either to the Government or to the Council, for its disposal. One informant told me, that the Patriarch could command ten millions of money: but a Coptic friend assured me, that the income of the Church (apart from monasteries) was only £500 a month. These resources the Patriarch holds in trust for his successor. Nothing could be simpler or more patriarchal than his mode of life and his surroundings, so far as I could judge from the visit I paid him and to the Coptic dignitaries at Cairo, who received me with the greatest cordiality.

[2] Appointed by the Pope and enthroned (July 1899), as Cyril II., at Alexandria.

for young people in Abyssinia, have no political propaganda or influence.

Status

The Copts live on fairly friendly terms with the Mohammedan population of Egypt. If occasionally there are religious differences, these chiefly arise from local prejudices, such as an objection to a Coptic cemetery in the country. Against their general status they have now no reasonable ground for complaint. But their so-called grievances are formulated under three heads: they complain (1) that they do not receive a fair share of honours, (2) that they are not admitted to the higher administrative posts, and (3) that public money is not spent on their churches and church festivals. Such frivolous censures answer themselves. Coptic disabilities have not prevented Boutros Pasha from becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the Coptic community bears too small a proportion to the Mohammedan population to be specially distinguished or signally favoured.

Other religious bodies

Roman Catholics, under the so-called protection of France and Austria, are found in all the large towns. They and the Greek Church number each over 50,000 adherents. The Armenian Church gathers in all Armenians, except a few hundred who belong to the Armenian Catholic Church under Rome. There are also some thousands of Maronites, chiefly in Cairo, and Syrian Catholics, who have their own places of worship; while Jews are found in all the large towns.

The Protestant Church is, numerically speaking, chiefly represented by the American Mission, which has Presbyterian chapels and schools all over Egypt. There are also Protestant or Anglican churches at Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez.

Among Christian cults or sects, the Copts are in a vast majority (83·33 per cent.).

Missionary enterprise

The American Missionary Society proselytises to a certain extent among Copts; but its efforts are chiefly directed towards the diffusion of educational and moral influences. As an educational agency, the Mission has achieved a success as remarkable as it has been well deserved.

The Jesuits, who have more influence than the American

Mission, use it to Gallicise their adherents and pupils—whom they seek chiefly in the upper classes;[1] though they may not care to become the tools of their Government. There are also several French brotherhoods, which were among the earliest arrivals in the mission-field.

Broadly speaking—not to mention minor agencies and philanthropic bodies.— missionary enterprise in Egypt attempts no propaganda, but relies on educational and personal influences alone. Nor can it be said to carry much weight, except indirectly through the spread of the English and French languages.

El Azhar: Of far greater importance, in its influence on the population, is the University of El Azhar, at Cairo. This influence, destroyed by Mohammed Ali, has revived under the British Occupation of Egypt, owing to our extreme care not to wound the susceptibilities of the Moslem population. A *mot d'ordre* from El Azhar spreads rapidly through the country: but it must have reason on its side in order to meet with general acceptance. Its authority on religious questions being undisputed, El Azhar is, therefore, apt to launch many political dictums under the guise of doctrinal diatribes.

Foyer of fanaticism The agencies for disseminating the watchwords of Islam are vast. The Kadis in every village—to the number of 4000—have been trained at El Azhar; so also have the 15,000 teachers in the *kuttabs*, or schools attached to the mosques. In the latter, moreover, there are at least 14,000 Imams and servitors. These in the aggregate represent an army of, say, thirty-five thousand men—all, more or less, under the influence of El Azhar.

Of the educational methods of El Azhar I shall speak in another place. Recently, there appears to have been a *rapprochement* between the University authorities and the Education Department of the Government: but this is more apparent than real. The Kadis, who are nominated by the Ministry of Justice, are now required to have some educa-

[1] A son of Fakhri Pasha is being educated at the Jesuit College at Alexandria,—the principal French educational agency.

tional equipment—in particular, some knowledge of Geography and Mathematics, and some efficiency in Arabic caligraphy. The El Azhar students being deficient in these respects, they are not so competent to compete with outsiders for appointments under the Government. Consequently, the University has arranged to participate in the services of thirteen Government teachers. But these Arab teachers being, according to its notion, defiled by contact with Europeans, they are not admitted within the sacred precincts: their classes being extra-mural. This characteristic touch hits off the situation to a nicety.

iii FACTORS OF EQUILIBRIUM

Aspects of the Egyptian Question

The Egyptian Question has a two-fold aspect—internal and external. The internal conditions are associated with the postulate, that Egypt shall 'stand alone': that is to say, be capable of self-government and of maintaining her political integrity. If Egypt were able to stand alone at the present day, there would be no Egyptian Question, properly so called. The external conditions apply to political domination over the Nile Valley, and to the maintenance of Egyptian territorial integrity beyond the confines of Egypt Proper—a point that has already been settled by the downfall of the Dervish oligarchy, and the complete destruction of their power. With each of these aspects I shall deal in turn.

Factors of equilibrium

When I was in Egypt, 'the situation' was constantly coming up for discussion between myself and those who favoured me with their views. One day, I constructed the Table which appears on the next page. This Table seems to me to embody every element of weight in the political situation, and to illustrate more graphically and convincingly than the most elaborate thesis, how susceptible the Egyptian administrative machine is to any disturbance of its equilibrium.

Explanation of Table

We here see the Egyptian Government in a state of just poise; and we have only to imagine some of its constituent

TABLE NO. 2.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EGYPT



factors being subject to agitation, in order to realise the see-saw of local politics. The correlation of its component parts, on either side of the centre of oscillation, is, as nearly as possible, accurate. Clearly, it would not be possible, in a diagram of this kind, to represent the relative weight of each (even if one could make such an estimate): but the machine, as constructed, may be said to balance on the fulcrum of Finance. The central position of the *Caisse*, and its consequent capacity to disturb or restore the balance of political factors in the Egyptian Question, will be noted: it is an *imperium in imperio.*

In all respects but one, the principle of this illustration holds good. The exception is obvious in the outlying pendants of this machine. If you knock away the 'Ottoman Special Mission' and the 'Legislative Council,' the balance of power would scarcely be disturbed; but if you remove the British 'Army of Occupation' and the 'British officers in the Egyptian army,' the voice of the British Agent and Minister Plenipotentiary would be as 'of one crying in the wilderness.'

(*a*) *The Tutelary Power*

The conflict of interests

In spite of the equivocal position of the Protectoral Power, Lord Cromer would be quite able to control every element of the political situation in Egypt if he were to receive at all times the full support of her Majesty's Government. But the British Foreign Office has not the courage of its convictions. In all vital matters, its support is given without hesitation—almost without enquiry: so greatly is Lord Cromer trusted as the *deus ex machinâ.* But, under the complex conditions of British Foreign Policy, it often happens that the situation in other parts of the world precludes any pressure being applied for the promotion of Egyptian interests, when these are opposed by France. Under such circumstances, Egypt has to wait; and under any circumstances she has to pay. Though her Majesty's Government may be convinced of the importance of certain reforms, these cannot always be

pressed at an inopportune moment. To an outsider it might even appear, that the complaisance of France was more important than the need of Egypt—except, as I have said, in matters of vital concern. In the end, of course, all necessary reforms are carried out, no matter what may be the opposition of France: but the constant friction, intrigues, and the anomalous conditions that prevail, are very prejudicial and burdensome to Egypt. All the Powers, in one way or another, directly or indirectly, squeeze *bakhshish* out of that distracted country; and they will continue to do this, so long as there are Capitulations, International posts, duplication of offices, and general uncertainty regarding the future. If Great Britain were given a free hand, all or most of these abuses would be swept away: and a considerable saving would accrue to the Egyptian exchequer. As things are, however, it requires the greatest tact on the part of Lord Cromer to avoid offending French susceptibilities by any action that may bear the construction or even the appearance of nepotism. To govern Egypt is an easy matter; but to satisfy France is a Sisyphean task. All this will become clear when my thesis is developed.

The Khedive

The Khedive of Egypt, as a constitutional sovereign, reigns but does not govern. Nominally speaking, he enjoys a veto on legislation: but this he dare not exercise, if it should conflict with the 'advice' given to him by the British Minister. He need not sign a Decree: and, therefore, under the circumstances, when it is a matter involving organic changes to which he may be opposed, he simply sends back the Decree to the Legislative Assembly, as an open protest, and in order to stand well with the country. The Legislative Assembly may deliberate, and make as many amendments as they please: but if the Council of Ministers do not accept those amendments, they simply state their reasons for non-adhesion—and there the matter ends. Egypt is not quite ready for representative government.

The conflicts between the young Khedive and the

Tutelary Power are less frequent now than they were in the past. Some of these have been serious: but in each case the Khedive has been compelled to submit to 'the masterful hand of a British Resident,' to use Lord Dufferin's phrase.

The character of Abbas Pasha is that almost of a monomaniac. Unlike his brother, Mohammed Ali Pasha, the heir-presumptive, he is not in sympathy with Europeans, whom he habitually avoids. Neither is he an Oriental, as is demonstrated by the fact of his marriage with a slave who formerly belonged to his mother.[1] He does not maintain intimate relations with his Ministers, who are figure-heads of a virtual Anglo-Egyptian Condominium; nor does he cultivate relations with the Ulema. His intercourse with the Sultan, which is controlled by the humour of the moment on the Suzerain's part, is conducted through the intermediary of the Grand Vizier at the Porte. He has no sovereign power: and he resents it. He is the vassal of Europe. Therefore, he chafes under the restraints imposed on him, and lends himself too readily to the intrigues and machinations of the so-called Nationalist or Young Egyptian party, whose influence over him is of the worst possible kind, morally and politically. His one hobby is building—not public works, like Ismail, whom he resembles only in his voluptuous tastes, but stables for his horses, houses for his chickens, etc. He is, however, said to be amenable to the hand that 'gives him money to play with.'

Sir Alfred Milner states that: 'Should the Khedive remain irreconcilable, no genius on earth could make the present system of Egyptian administration a workable one.'[2] But this passage was inspired by the baneful influence of the incidents of 1893, when Abbas dismissed Mustafa Fehmi and began to tamper with the discipline of the army, of

[1] No rigid Mohammedan would contract such an alliance. He might have bought, or otherwise have procured, her as his property, but should not have made her his first wife.

[2] 'England in Egypt.' Preface to the fifth edition, p. xxi.

which he is the titulary head. Lord Cromer found a way out of these difficulties; and administered a wholesome lesson, by which the Khedive and the country have since profited.

The Egyptian bureaucracy

It is clear, that the Khedive must either frankly accept the situation or render himself liable to suffer the fate of Ismail. Our equivocal position in Egypt, which every day becomes less indeterminate, is not only responsible for the intrigues of the Khedive and the Opposition party, both native and foreign, but it also regulates the measure of support given by the Egyptian bureaucracy to the British Control. Egyptians complain, that our power is not sufficiently exercised to encourage, to protect, and to guarantee the adherence and loyal support of the Native officials, who, finding themselves between Lord Cromer's hammer and the Khedive's anvil, have to be both expert and tactful in order to escape being crushed.[1] Some of these timid time-servers naturally ask:

> 'I am His Highness's dog at Kew:
> Pray tell me, Sir, whose dog are you?'

They want to know, 'how they stand with us?' And until they are assured of our protection, as well as of the permanence of the British Occupation, they cannot, as a body, be expected openly to espouse our cause.

[1] In a Report prepared by Mr Cave on the state of Egypt in 1876, he said: 'One of the causes which operates most against the honesty and efficiency of native officers is the precarious tenure of office. From the Pasha downwards every office is a tenancy at will, and experience shows that, while dishonesty goes wholly or partially unpunished, independence of thought and action, resolution to do one's duty and to resist the peculation and neglect which pervade every Department, give rise to intrigues which, sooner or later, bring about the downfall of honest officials.'

'There can be no question,' says Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, 'that in these words Mr Cave hit one of the main defects which the Egyptian shared in common with other systems of Oriental administration. When the era of reform set in, there was no point on which those who, like Nubar Pasha, were well acquainted with the condition of Egypt insisted more strongly than on the absolute necessity of affording Egyptian officials adequate guarantees against an abuse of power by those set in authority over them. In the early days of the British Occupation a law was, therefore, passed; which provided that, although an Egyptian official could be removed to the pension list by a decision of the Council of Ministers, he could not be dismissed from the service unless either his place was abolished, or he had been tried and sentenced to dismissal by a Council

Capacity of Native administrators

Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1898, states:—'I concluded my Report of last year by alluding to the fact that the superior officials in the service of his Highness the Khedive, whether European or Egyptian, had heartily co-operated in the work of reform and good government during the period under review. I am glad to be able to commence my present Report by stating that this good understanding has continued to prevail. However much the growing prosperity of Egypt may be due to the efforts of the European officials who are employed in the Egyptian service, I should be failing in my duty if I did not testify to the fact that those efforts would be relatively unproductive of result were the officials in question not cordially supported by the Ministers under whom they serve. His Excellency Mustafa Pasha Fehmi and his colleagues, in spite of much misrepresentation, have rightly judged that the true interests of their country can best be served by hearty co-operation with a body of officials whose sole object is to apply the knowledge they have acquired elsewhere to the good of Egypt.'[1]

There are, in fact, plenty of capable Native administrators in Egypt; but, under existing conditions, it is not to be expected that the country can produce statesmen: because, to develop such powers, Ministers must have an initiative and a freedom they do not possess and cannot, in consequence,

---

of Discipline for the commission of some specific offence. This law, perhaps, erred somewhat on the side of unduly fettering the action of the Executive Government. Cases, indeed, have not unfrequently occurred of officials who, for one reason or another, would probably have been obliged to leave the Government service, had they been serving in any other country but Egypt, but who have been maintained in their positions owing to the stringency of the law, which gives them security of tenure. If, however, this was a fault, it was one on the right side. Broadly speaking, it may be said that the effect produced both by this law and by the manner in which it has been applied, on the general tone of the public service in Egypt, has been excellent. Under its shadow, native officials throughout the country have been encouraged to do their duty honestly and fearlessly.'

After quoting particular instances, Lord Cromer adds:

'I make these remarks because it cannot be too clearly understood by the native officials, to whatsoever Department they may belong, that their security of tenure is based on a law which is inviolable.'

[1] Egypt, No. 1 (1898): C.—8815.

enjoy. Nubar Pasha was a statesman of the first rank; and so to a limited extent was Riaz Pasha: but neither Nubar nor Riaz were able to save Egypt from bankruptcy, though the latter did make some attempt to arrest Ismail in his down-grade career; and they were quite incapable of adjusting the conflicting interests that destroyed the authority of the Khedive.

The subordinate officials in the Ministries are all Egyptians, in the widest acceptation of that term.[1] In office routine they are expert and zealous. But, once they are advanced to the higher administrative posts, they relax their efforts, shirk responsibility, and shun initiative. They are quite incapable of governing: and, although the Turkish caste may inherit the habit of command, Egyptians will never learn to govern in accordance with European standards of purity and efficiency. The Egyptian Ministers, with few exceptions, are mere puppets, each drawing £3,000 a-year; and they are ruled by their English Under-Secretaries. This is as it should be, (except for the waste of Egyptian money,) and no less than is to be expected under the present tripartite régime.

The Egyptian officials are under no delusions, that their status and prospects would be improved by any concessions to internationalism or by an increase of French influence. As Tigrane Pasha put it to me: 'Egyptian sympathies are more with the English than with the French. The French are too intolerant and meddlesome. In fact, the English

[1] Boutros Pasha, a Copt, once defined an Egyptian as anybody who has settled permanently in the country for a period of fifteen years. Legislation is pending, to regulate the political status of the Ottoman subjects of the Porte, notably of the Syrians, who, although taxed and subject to Egyptian law—if they do not happen to be 'protected subjects' of one of the Powers—are denied the political rights enjoyed by their fellow-Christians, the Copts. 'Under the new law,' says a *Times* telegram from Cairo, of 1st January 1899, 'all persons established in Egypt previous to or during the reign of Mohammed Ali, with their descendants, are considered Egyptians for electoral purposes; and the same applies to all Ottoman subjects established in the country for 15 years, on their making a declaration of domicile. The sole condition attached is, that applicants shall satisfy the Egyptian law of recruitment, under which every man between the ages of 19 and 23 is liable to military service, but may claim exemption on payment of £20.'

have always had a predominant influence in Egypt. They are at least generous. Occasionally, crumbs do fall from the table of the rich Englishman; but none come from the French; and on the Italian table there are no crumbs at all.' What he and other Nationalists complain about is, that the British Control does not protect Egypt against the extortion of foreign rivalries—a contention that is borne out by the facts already stated and by others that will be given later.

In the Department of Public Works, for instance, Sir William Garstin has made strenuous and persistent attempts to advance Egyptians to the higher grades, in accordance with a promise he made, on his appointment, to the Khedive Taufik: but his experience has not been encouraging to others who might be disposed to make similar efforts in that direction. A second-rate Englishman, holding responsible office, would be worse than useless, because he would lower the standard of perfection after which the Egyptians are enjoined to strive. Consequently, none but our most promising young men in the Public Service are given the higher posts, and none but efficient subordinates are permitted to supervise the administration of the various Departments or to conduct their practical work.

Relations between Great Britain and Egypt

The relations between Great Britain and Egypt may be seen and gauged at three points of intimate contact, represented by the Army of Occupation, the British Minister, and the British Officials in the Egyptian Service. In regard to each of these I shall have occasion to speak in my review of the Anglo-Egyptian Administration. The general situation may, in the meantime, be outlined as follows:

The British Minister

The powers conferred on the British Minister, and exercised by him with great tact and moderation, are those of the virtual and responsible ruler of Egypt. Not only has he the right of veto, but from him emanate, directly or indirectly, those large measures of reform which mark the stages of British policy in Egypt. Interfering as little as may be with the machinery of Government or with the discipline and efficiency of the State services, which he leaves under the control of his lieutenants, he acts as the

adviser and intermediary of the British Government and as the 'referee,' so to speak, of the Anglo-Egyptian Administration. Whilst the British Under-Secretaries and Advisers have a free hand in Departmental affairs, and in their zeal for progress are handicapped at every step by want of funds or want of men, the British Minister supports or discourages the initiation of organic reforms, in accordance with the opportunities or disadvantageous circumstances of the moment. He is thus able to secure some continuity of policy and to provide for the development of Egyptian institutions, without raising issues beyond the influence of the Protectoral Power to enforce, or creating friction that would mar the harmony, such as it is, of the complex situation.

The British Officials

That, year by year, the advances in self-government, the strides in reform, and the efficiency of the various Departments have been increasingly evident, is primarily and essentially due to the splendid services rendered by the British Officials in the service of the Khedive. Of these, the Advisers—of Finance, of Justice, and of the Interior—take the foremost rank. In particular, the Financial Adviser[1] exercises a practical right of veto, since he holds the purse-strings: thus, no measure involving expenditure can be passed by the Council of Ministers without the presence and sanction of himself or his deputy. And since reproductive Public Works are the chief requirement for the development of Egypt, the British Under-Secretary to that Department exercises functions of the highest importance.

Egyptian Officials

Many of the principal Egyptian Officials are men of light and leading, and capable administrators. Under a British Protectorate, these officials would gain confidence in their powers and a zeal for their work which are partly denied them by the circumstances of their present position and the ultimate uncertainty of their tenure of office.

The rank and file are manufactured, to pattern, by the Education Department. Patriotic Egyptians tell me that the curriculum of Government Schools and Colleges is

[1] The Financial Adviser can initiate reforms through the respective Ministries.

designedly intended to turn out men capable of filling only the minor posts: but such a charge is manifestly absurd, since individual capacity is nowhere limited by such artificial restraints.

Our masked Protectorate

This *ipse dixit* of Machiavelian designs is, also, often advanced by critics of our Foreign Policy, particularly in regard to Egypt. But the truth is, we appear to be incapable of formulating any Foreign policy at all, worthy of the name, apart from opportunism. Our blundering honesty is too evident in all our dealings with Egypt. If we have stumbled into a position which our traducers seek to fix on us, it is because of the defects of our qualities. Our standard of efficiency is too high for an Oriental people, like the Egyptians, to reach; and it has been raised by the sheer competence of the men we have sent out to direct and control them.

It is a standard to which Egypt, of her own unaided efforts, can never attain. It is a standard which, apart from the Single Control, she could not maintain for a day. Nevertheless, it is the only standard compatible with good government and the due execution by Egypt of her financial obligations to Europe. In short, the concensus of opinion is, that, if the British Tutelage were withdrawn, and Egypt were allowed a free hand, the country would relapse into anarchy. A Dual Control or an International Control might, indeed, fetter Egypt: but it could not prevent, though it would retard, her inevitable lapse from Western standards. One-man rule is the best possible government for an Oriental country: and the stronger the man, the better the rule. Justice! Justice! is what the country cries for. Justice that can be bought and sold is not Justice, though it may be Law. Even International Justice, tempered by politics, is better than that. But Justice that fears no man, and has no ulterior objects, is the only principle of Law that can ensure good government and encourage individual enterprise.

Egypt is a country of such marvellous resources, that it is capable of any degree of development, up to the limits of its high productiveness. The Egyptian population is so industrious and tractable, that it is capable, too, of an unusual

degree of advancement under a paternal government. The progress made in these respects, since 1882, in spite of every conceivable obstacle, is the wonder of the world and the glory of British administration.

That, in the process of reorganization, re-adjustment, and reform, we have insensibly acquired vested interests in, and an increased hold on, the country, is not a matter for wonder or reproach. It is the stern logic of duty; and it is due, in part, to the reflex action of French opposition. Resistance has retarded the momentum only to accelerate it in the end. We have been carried off our feet; and find ourselves squatting in Egypt after all, though in no very dignified position. Natural Law, not national policy, has placed us there, and fixed our position for us. We cannot now evacuate the country, even if we would.

This result is gradually dawning on the people of the British Isles. It is a view that has long been held at Paris and at Cairo. Eventually it may penetrate to Downing Street. But until the situation is fairly faced, and our intentions, as interpreted by our acts, are honestly avowed, we shall continue to meet opposition in Egypt. English capital, until quite recently, was very shy of Egypt; but French capital has entered fearlessly, because of the obvious fixity of our tenure. And it is because French capital is so largely invested in the country, that the opposition of the Quai d'Orsay to our declared Protectorate over Egypt need not be greatly feared.

Is it not, therefore, childish to keep up this make-believe of eventual evacuation? Our masked Protectorate is ruinous alike to Egyptian interests and to our own good name. It deceives nobody. We ought in honour to cast it aside, as the French did at Tunis. *Noblesse oblige.*

(*b*) *International Fetters*

Egypt's vassalage to Europe

Of the International shackles that fetter the freedom of Egypt and reduce her to a position of bondage to Europe, by far the most irksome are the powers invested in the *Caisse* and the limitations imposed on her Administrative

Expenditure by the Law of Liquidation (1880). But there are others which bear heavily on Egypt.

Briefly summarized, the following are the principal International fetters binding on Egypt:—

Inventory of fetters

(1) *The Sultan's Suzerainty*, which imposes certain obligations out of the power of Egypt to perform, and restricts her freedom of action to an extent which, if loyally observed, would conflict with the interests and safeguards of the Protectoral Power.

(2) *The Capitulations*, and their derivatives, which confer extra-territorial rights on foreigners, at variance with the ends of Egypt's regeneration and inimical to the amalgamation of the Juridical institutions of the country. The Consular Courts are an emanation of the Capitulations. Thus, municipal laws or even a simple Police regulation cannot be made binding on foreigners, except with the unanimous consent of the fourteen Powers holding Capitulations with Turkey. In other words, legislation is imposed by Diplomacy.

(3) *The Mixed Tribunals*, which are a distinct advance on Consular jurisdiction, and a step towards union with the Native Courts. These cosmopolitan Courts have exceeded their powers and have allowed political motives to colour their judgments. Originally instituted for the protection of the bondholders, in actions against the Government, and for the administration of Justice in suits between natives and foreigners and between foreigners of different nationalities, the Mixed Tribunals have developed into another *imperium in imperio*, in Egypt, and have interfered with the Administrative freedom of the Government on more than one occasion—notably in December 1896, in connexion with the proposal to apply a portion of the General Reserve Fund to defray military expenditure in the Sudan, in regard to which a difference of opinion arose among members of the *Caisse*, when the Court of Appeal decided that, irrespective of the question of majority or unanimity of votes, the *Caisse* had exceeded its powers. 'In this view of the question,' Lord Cromer states,[1] 'the action taken by the majority of

[1] Egypt. No. 1 (1898)—page 30.

the *Caisse* would have been illegal even if the vote had been unanimous.'

(4) *The 'Caisse de la Dette,'* which exercises, through its veto, a check on Administrative Expenditure, and, through the extension of its powers, can actively initiate legislation. The six Commissioners of the Powers, constituting the *Caisse*, occupy an unique position. Originally the receivers of Revenue set aside for the service of the Debt, in the interest of the creditors, they have, by the force of circumstances, become the responsible agents of the European Powers in regulating the financial position of Egypt, in accordance with the International agreements made from time to time.

(5) *The Mixed Administrations*, which represent so many outworks of European influence in the internal affairs of Egypt. These, properly speaking, should be controlled by the Civil Service. They are a burden on Egyptian finance, and an unreasonable excuse for the duplication of offices, *bakhshish*, etc.

And (6) *moral obligations*, restrictions, and limitations of all kinds, imposed on Egypt by the various International compacts and the equivocal position of the Tutelary Power.

In regard to each of these heads I have some remarks to offer, apart from those already made and those which more properly apply to the Anglo-Egyptian Administration.

The Sultan's suzerainty and the Capitulations

Of the Sultan's suzerainty, which connotes the Capitulations, nothing more need be said in this place, beyond laying emphasis on the fact that the International situation in Egypt practically repudiates it, whilst theoretically upholding it. The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan is equally inconsistent with the principle of the Sultan's suzerainty, which now amounts to little more than a standing protest of the Porte. The continued presence of Mukhtar Pasha in Egypt is only one of the many anachronisms in the political situation.

International Courts

The Mixed Tribunals have received a new lease of life, expiring, unless it be renewed, on 31st January 1900, by which time it is hoped that the Powers will have come to

some agreement regarding the legitimate functions. The French Government, which for eight years opposed the institution of these Courts, now upholds them as the only guarantee of Europe for the proper administration of Justice, in so far as foreigners and European interests are concerned. The Egyptian Government would naturally prefer to improve and enlarge the jurisdiction of the National Tribunals: but, since jurisdictional synthesis appears to be hopeless at present, the Anglo-Egyptian Authorities would renew the powers of these Courts rather than be subject to the checks of Consular jurisdiction, which they have largely superseded. In self-defence, the Government must, however, take such steps as shall remove politics from the purview of the Administration of Justice. The contracts of the Judges of the Mixed Courts lapse with the expiry of the period for which the Tribunals are renewed.

Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1898, remarks: 'The Egyptian Government wishes to be assured that, when, in the exercise of the rights conferred on the *Caisse* by International agreement, that body has assented to any specific proposal, the legality of that proposal cannot be questioned.'

'It will be remembered,' Lord Cromer adds, 'that the Mixed Courts were instituted as a substitute for the Consular jurisdiction in disputes between natives and foreigners, and between foreigners of different nationalities. This is the principle laid down in Article IX. The contention of the Egyptian Government is that, in the intention of the Contracting Parties at the time the Tribunals were instituted, the question of jurisdiction was to be decided with sole reference to the nationality of the litigants, and that the Courts have exceeded their powers by extending their jurisdiction to cases in which any foreign interest is involved. The practical result of this extension of jurisdiction is that civil cases between natives and natives, which should properly be tried by the Native Courts, are now very often decided by the Mixed Tribunals. There can, I think, be little doubt that the wide interpretation given by the Mixed Courts to

Article IX., as it now stands, has led to some abuses. The proposal now made by the Egyptian Government is brought forward with the object of rectifying some of these abuses.'

Unless this proposal is accepted by the Powers, Egypt may possibly be compelled to exercise her right of withdrawal at will, by denouncing the Conventions establishing the Mixed Tribunals, the sudden disappearance of which would cause a serious dislocation of Egyptian affairs. 'Acts of sovereignty,' Lord Cromer states, 'and all steps dictated by political motives, were not intended to come within the jurisdiction of the Courts. Neither were the Courts to take cognizance of any general administrative measure.'

Moreover, only French, Italian, and Arabic are at present recognised by the Tribunals. 'The exclusion of English,' Lord Cromer remarks, 'acts detrimentally to the interests of British and American litigants, and has recently formed the subject of very legitimate complaint on the part of the English Chamber of Commerce at Alexandria.'[1]

[1] In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer makes the following comments :—

'It is obvious that the only satisfactory solution of this question would be to place English on exactly the same footing as French, Italian, and Arabic. For the present, at all events, the adoption of this measure is impossible. It would require the unanimous assent of the Powers, and the difficulty of obtaining that assent, which is in all cases considerable, would in this instance be materially enhanced from the fact that some, at least, of the Powers concerned are unable to give their assent without previous reference to their respective Parliamentary Bodies.

'Under these circumstances, the only course left open was to endeavour to find some remedy for the practical grievances caused by the present system. It is not probable that, in any case, lawyers would plead in English, as all the Judges are not acquainted with that language, but considerable expense and delay is caused to British and American subjects by the necessity of obtaining legalized translations of documents in the English language.

'I placed myself in communication with M. Bellet, the President of the Court of Appeal, on this subject, and am glad of this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgments of his ready willingness to do all that lay within his power to remedy the evils of which complaint has been made. The result was the issue of a Circular, of which I inclose a copy (Inclosure 1), to the Presidents of the various Tribunals, requesting them to dispense with translations whenever the adoption of such a course was possible. I am, moreover, given to understand that an endeavour will be made to appoint Registrars (Greffiers) who speak English to the Courts where that language is most used.' Lord Cromer adds :

Mixed Administrations

Among the principal Mixed Administrations are (1) the Railways, Telegraphs, and Port of Alexandria, the receipts from which are paid over to the Commissioners of the *Caisse*, to meet the interest on the Privileged Debt; and (2) the estates of the Daïra Sanieh and the Domains—properties formerly belonging to Ismail or the Khedivial family—the receipts from which are also paid over to the *Caisse*, to cover the interest guaranteed to the holders of these bonds, or mortgagees. Of these groups of financial obligations, amalgamated in the Debt of Egypt, the first falls properly within the functions of Government to administer; the second is a cumbersome and expensive method of administration, which it is the legitimate interest of none to uphold, and which certainly is outside the province of any government. Each Administration, which could better be controlled by a single responsible official, is saddled with the services of three Commissioners—of a Frenchman, of an Englishman, and of an Egyptian.

The Daïra Sanieh

The Daïra estates and sugar-factories are situated in Upper Egypt. The management of this Commission involved heavy annual deficits until taken in hand by Mr Hamilton Lang, who introduced a better order of things. In 1895, owing to abnormal conditions and adverse causes, the surplus of the previous year was changed to a deficit; but in the years 1896, 1897, and 1898, the Administration showed a handsome surplus, and in 1897 and 1898 a material reduction of the Debt, on the economies resulting from conversion in 1890. In 1898 the estates were sold to a group of French, English and Egyptian capitalists, forming a Syndicate, for the amount of the outstanding Debt—£6,431,500—on terms, advantageous to the Government, which enable the Syndicate to acquire and re-sell the estates gradually. After 1905, when the Debt will be redeemed,

'I do not say that this solution is altogether satisfactory, but it is the best of which, for the present, the circumstances of the case admit.'

N.B.—The following clause has been added for the Tribunal of Mansura:—

'As the majority of ships which pass Port Said are English, it would be advisable to have, if possible, assigned to this town, a registrar's clerk, a commissioner or an interpreter who speaks English.'

the buyers will be allowed a sufficient period of time in which to dispose of the remaining lands. The International Administration will then cease. Not only the Government, but also native cultivators, will benefit by this important transaction. The estates, which at present comprise 256,000 acres of good land, support nine sugar-factories. There was a small surplus in 1898, in spite of a bad season.

The Domains

Less satisfactory is the Administration of the Domains, which the French regard as a stronghold of Gallic influence, it being more exclusively under their control. The original amount of the Domains Loan was £8,288,000, of which over one-half was paid off by 1896. Subsequent reductions of the Debt have been made; and about one-half of the estates were sold by 1898: but the Administration has never shown a surplus over annual expenditure. The annual deficits have reached over £275,000, and have never fallen below £39,000. The outstanding capital of the Loan amounted, in 1898, to £3,508,800.

The estates, which are situated in Lower Egypt, raise cotton, cotton-seed, wheat, and barley. Indian wheat is now being cultivated with success. The estates cover an area of over 200,000 acres, a portion of which is leased to native cultivators, the remainder being under the direct management of the Administration.

In regard both to the Domains and the Daïra Sanieh properties, it may be noted that, the consent of France to the conversion in 1890 of the Privileged Debt was given only on condition that these Administrations should be subject to severe restrictions in regard to the sales of land, by which the process of redemption should be prolonged until 1905.

Railway Board

The receipts from the Railways form an important and increasing item of Revenue. The working expenses involve about forty-five per cent. of the gross receipts.[1] In 1896

[1] In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer makes the following remarks in regard to Egyptian Railways:—

'The railways do not merely suffer from those defects—of which divided responsibility is perhaps the most notable—which are common to all systems of

and 1897, owing to the transport of troops and *matériel*, in connection with the Sudan Campaign, the annual receipts amounted to £1,820,970 and £1,982,883, respectively,—the highest on record. In 15 years, there has been an increase of 84 per cent.

Port of Alexandria, etc.

The Port of Alexandria is another Mixed Administration: but I have referred to it, as coming more properly, under Trade and Commerce (p. 302). As regards the Lighthouse Administration, with which it is connected, Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, remarks: 'I regret to say that the

---

international administration. They possess some further defects which are peculiar to themselves. In the first place, the working expenses are fixed, by international arrangement, at 45 per cent. of the gross receipts. This proportion is low as compared to railways in other countries. Unfortunately, this is not the only evil. The Law of Liquidation, and the subsequent Decrees which have received international sanction, make no adequate provision for capital expenditure on the railways. The proportion of the gross receipts which is at the disposal of the Railway Board, and which is only just sufficient for working expenditure and ordinary maintenance, is, strictly speaking, the only available fund from which money can be taken for the purchase of fresh stock, and, in fact, for all such expenditure as, under ordinary circumstances, is either charged to capital account or exceptionally charged to revenue. The natural result has been that, whilst the country has been rapidly progressing, the railways, being deprived of all power of expansion by the defective administrative system to which they are condemned, have, relatively speaking, stood still. The commercial community complain with great reason of the delays in the transport of merchandise. The Government lose money because they cannot provide the engines and waggons required by traders. At the same time, the members of the Railway Board, and, in fact, I think, every responsible authority in this country, fully recognize the justice of complaints to which they are unfortunately powerless to apply any thoroughly effectual remedy. I have no hesitation in saying that, if the hands of the Egyptian Government were free in this matter, by far the best course would be to borrow at once about £E1,500,000, and thus place the railways in thoroughly good working order. The country would gain by this expenditure, and the increased receipts would certainly far more than cover the additional interest charge. This mode of procedure being impossible, the only resource left is to fall back on the General Reserve Fund. A programme of expenditure, amounting in all to £E1,330,000 in five years, has now been sketched out. . . .

'Something, therefore, is being done towards applying a remedy to the evils which are the natural result of the present system, but so long as that system continues in existence it is almost hopeless to expect that the Egyptian Railway Administration can be placed on a thoroughly satisfactory footing. It was strongly condemned by two highly competent authorities, Colonel Marindin and Mr Farrer, who reported on the general question of railway management in Egypt some years ago.'

negotiations as regards the lighting of the eastern shore of the Red Sea have so far proved unproductive of result. The requisite funds are available. Indeed, the money set apart for the construction of the lights has been invested and is now accumulating at compound interest. . . . It is greatly to be regretted that, by reason of the diplomatic difficulties which beset this question, and which arise from the fact that the spots where lighthouses are required are situated in Turkish territory, mariners should be deprived of the advantages of the lights.'[1]

Caisse de la Dette

The consent of the *Caisse* must be obtained by the Government for all measures involving financial operations or expenditure on a large scale. No loan can be raised without its concurrence,[2] nor, when obtained, can the money be expended without its sanction in regard to details. But, in the present flourishing state of Egyptian finances, perhaps the most objectionable function of the *Caisse* is its power to limit Expenditure by withholding its assent to items which the Government may regard as 'authorized.' Unless such consent can be obtained, the Government must find the money in the best way they can, or abandon the object for which it is required. In any action at law regarding a dispute of this kind, the Government cannot, unfortunately, depend on the Mixed Tribunals giving a judicial decision.

Reserve Funds

The position of the *Caisse* is, therefore, not unlike that of a Parliament; it votes supplies out of its savings, by sanctioning the employment of monies of the General Reserve Fund, for reproductive public works or for philanthropic and economical measures benefiting Egypt. In general terms, it may be said that the *Caisse* is usually willing to promote these ends, unless the hands of the Commissioners happen to be tied by their respective Governments. Thus, over two millions have from time to time been voted by the *Caisse* for public ends. And, in the Budget for 1899, the

[1] The Porte has since arranged for the construction of four lights in the Red Sea.

[2] The Government can, however, open up with a bank a current account not exceeding one million pounds to meet overdrafts well within its power to repay out of its own resources.

Caisse has consented to advance out of the General Reserve Fund £E550,000, to be expended during the current year on reproductive public works and in relief of other Extraordinary Expenditure, properly chargeable to capital account. This benevolent action, commendable as it is, in the interests of the country, may, however, be partly explained by the fact that, when the Reserve Fund exceeds two millions, the Sinking Fund comes into operation, for amortization of the Debt: and, as neither Egypt nor the bondholders require at present to further reduce the Debt, the money can be spent more profitably on public works.[1]

The Reserve Fund of the *Caisse*, accruing from the economies resulting from the partial conversion of the Debt in 1890, is, on the other hand, inviolate. It cannot be touched except with the consent of the Powers. These conversion economies are invested in Egyptian stocks, and are increased at compound interest by annual increments of about £340,000. On 31st December 1898, the value of these stocks was £E3,218,000, showing an increase of £E451,000 in the course of the year.

'There can be no doubt,' says Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1898, 'that, had the money from this fund been available, the Nile Reservoir would have been constructed on terms somewhat more advantageous to the Egyptian Treasury than under the arrangement actually concluded.' Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that, Egypt will have to pay altogether over four millions for about two millions of actual cost, owing to the terms of payment—£157,000 a-year for thirty years, after the completion of the works.

[1] According to Mr Gorst's *Note* on the Budget for 1899: 'When the accounts for 1898 have been closed, and the various payments into the General Reserve Fund effected, the amount of the Fund will be £E4,085,000. From this must be deducted the various advances already granted by the *Caisse de la Dette* out of the Reserve Fund, amounting to £E1,685,000, and also the amount credited to the affected revenues from the Reserve Fund to make up the reduction of land tax of £E216,000 in 1898. The balance of the Fund at the end of the year will therefore be £E2,184,000,' out of which £E550,000 has been voted for the objects mentioned.

These apparently onerous terms were, however, forced upon the Government by the attitude of France, whose support could not be relied on for an undertaking of such magnitude and obvious national importance. Meantime, the Special Reserve Fund of the *Caisse* may be regarded as a Sinking Fund, which accumulates at compound interest, thereby enabling the Government to trench on the General Reserve Fund, when their own Special Reserve Fund is inadequate to cover Extraordinary Expenditure. Elsewhere I shall refer to the expensive and objectionable character of this Fund.

Disposal of Surplus

The right of Egypt to dispose of her own Surplus should not, in justice, be denied to her, under the present stable conditions of government and buoyant finances. As Sir Alfred Milner says, 'it would be immensely to the advantage of Egypt to accept a heavy annual charge for amortization, on condition of being free to deal with the rest of her Revenue as she pleased.' But France has no desire to release Egypt from her leading-strings. Egypt therefore has to pay heavily for European tutelage, and in more ways than one, as will be seen later.

Internationalism

Enough has been said, to illustrate the extent to which Internationalism still survives in the Nile Valley.

As regards duplication of offices, apart from those posts that are obviously ornamental or political, the objection is not so great as it might appear to be. Side by side with an Oriental Government, European coadjutors are required to give effect to Western reforms. In many, if not most, of the Departments, they each have their separate duties: so that their nationality does not count, save in so far as they may utilize their position for exerting political influence.

Far more serious are the abuses of the Mixed Courts and the exactions of the *Caisse*. These cannot be reconciled with an honest attempt to make Egypt 'stand alone,' because they cripple her very seriously, as events have proved, without effecting the object designed. The half-million required for military expenditure in the Sudan was paid back from funds at the disposal of the Egyptian

Government, and was partly covered by their share of the surplus, Great Britain advancing the remainder.[1]

One might quote numerous instances of the absurdities arising from Internationalism. I shall content myself with two.

Illustrations

During the first winter I spent in Egypt (1896-97), the Irrigation Department received a grant of £E250,000, which was given by the Government on condition that the money should be spent within the year. Therefore, the most economical outlay could not be made, in view of the uncertain future. This is an example of the politics of Accounts: the object of the Government was to prevent the *Caisse* getting its double share of any surplus.

The evils of Internationalism are still better illustrated in the Quarantine Board, on which sixteen Powers have their representatives. Although fully competent men, these delegates would appear to vote from political and personal motives alone. As every measure requires to be passed by a majority, it is said that one delegate arranges with another how he shall vote, in exchange for reciprocal support on another occasion. Majorities by personal influence are rather dangerous expedients for arranging quarantine: but, happily, there is an emergency committee of three.[2]

[1] I know for a fact, that the French Government offered to settle this case amicably, out of court: but, being confident of the justice of our cause, we refused. The result was surprising to all: and no wonder. The question was decided on political grounds alone. The English Judge was not on the panel before which the Appeal was laid. The Austrian, the Italian, and the German Judges were in our favour. The Greek Judge accepted a bribe—or so it is said—and went against the instructions of his Government. The French Government were, however, far from pleased at the result of their obstruction: since they had hoped to make use of the refundment of the half-million, in the way that Russia holds the war-indemnity over the head of Turkey, as a lever for political influence. Moreover, the vested interests of Great Britain were naturally increased by her financial aid to Egypt.

[2] I heard some amazing stories of the inefficiency of the Egyptian officials under the Quarantine Board. On one occasion, when the English member of the Board, who also was the President, visited Kosseir, he asked the Egyptian superintendent at that place, if he kept books? Oh yes! the books were kept—in Arabic—and duly shown. Did the Superintendent inspect them? Certainly: monthly—*but* he could not read Arabic! On another occasion, the same official inspected the important disinfecting-station near Alexandria. He admired all the

Sir Alfred Milner justly stigmatizes the effects of Internationalism in the following vivid passage on the situation: Evils of Internationalism

'Wherever you turn there is some obstruction in your path. Do you want to clear out a cesspool, to prevent the sale of noxious drugs, to suppress a seditious or immoral print—you are pulled up by the Capitulations. Do you want to carry out some big work of public utility—to dig a main canal, or to drain a city—you are pulled up by the Law of Liquidation. You cannot borrow without the consent of Turkey; you cannot draw upon the Reserve Fund without the consent of the Caisse; you cannot exceed the Limit of Expenditure without the consent of the Powers. Do you, impeded and hampered on every side, finally lose patience and break through, for however good an object, the finest mesh of the net which binds you, or lay a finger on even the most trivial European privilege—you have a Consul-General down upon you at once. Nay, more, you may have the British Government down upon you, because your action may have brought upon its head the remonstrances of a foreign ambassador, and you may be spoiling some big hand in the general game of foreign politics by your tiresome little Egyptian difficulty. And all the while the foreign papers in Egypt are howling at you for not suppressing nuisances which foreign privilege does not allow you to touch, and for not devoting to further improvements money which international conventions do not allow you to spend. And all the while the natives are grumbling, and with far more reason, because they are not protected against foreign encroachment, and because their money is not set free to be spent upon the objects which they have at heart. And their complaints are naturally directed against their English guides.'[1]

Bad as it is, and vexatious as it must be to a zealous official, Internationalism is, however, a mere bagatelle as compared with the studious, the persistent, the almost

wonderful apparatus, which seemed perfect; but, on telling the superintendent to set it in motion, he learnt that it had not been connected with the main: and there was no water!

[1] 'England in Egypt,' pages 73-74.

diabolic, opposition of France. No one who has lived in the country, and studied the political situation there, can speak in wholly temperate language of the obstruction of France to the regeneration of Egypt. In the next subsection, I shall endeavour to treat the subject with the respect it deserves: since, of all International fetters, this —futile though it be—is the most intolerable, the most exasperating.

(*c*) *The Opposition of France*

Exposé of the Situation

It has been said, that the duty of the Opposition in our own Parliament is to oppose. This also is conceived to be the whole duty of France in Egypt, as interpreted by the London Convention: but with a difference. France opposes everything—not because any given measure, any proposed step, may or may not be to the advantage of Egypt, without imperilling the interests of the bondholders, but because the measure or the proposal—whatever it may be—emanates from a Government in which she has no responsible share. Her frankly avowed intention is to do nothing to help us: or, in effect, to do nothing that shall advance the interests of good government which Great Britain is pledged to promote. From this *non possumus* attitude arises the inconsistency of French politicians, who, while constantly calling upon us to evacuate the country, refuse to aid us in training Egypt to 'stand alone.' If any such reproach be made against them, it is met with the excuse that, although Egypt stands in peculiar need of European tutelage, France is not bound to recognise, far less endorse, the existing situation, amounting to an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Therefore, like a jealous woman, she would rather injure her own interests than renounce the quarrel with her supplanter. She demands a disinterested policy on our part, whilst herself following a most selfish and immoral policy of sheer obstruction.

Circumstances, rather than any preconceived and deliberate policy, have placed Great Britain in a dominant and responsible position in Egypt. France, if she had any designs on the integrity and independence of Egypt, missed

the opportunity to consolidate her own interests by refusing to share in the liberation of the country from the Arábists, whose rule, had it been established, would have turned Egypt into a Turkish province.

Great Britain, with the tacit consent of Europe, restored the authority of the Khedive. Had she then been disposed to claim the *droits de conquête*, none but France, probably, would have restrained her. Having evolved method out of chaos, she turned her attention to 'the creation of an order of things that possessed the elements of stability,' at the same time voluntarily making a self-denying ordinance. In fulfilment of this pledge, she entered into a Treaty with the Sultan, offering to withdraw her Army of Occupation in three years' time, under favourable conditions, but providing for the right of re-entry in case the stability of the Khedivial Government, for which she had made herself responsible to Europe, were again threatened by internal revolt. Owing to this clause, France opposed the Treaty, which was never ratified. Consequently, Great Britain was compelled to create permanent guarantees in Egypt itself.

To effect this object, time is required. It is a task far greater than could possibly have been conceived when Great Britain undertook it, and pledged her ultimate retirement. At that period, even the elements of the problem were not sufficiently understood. Financial bankruptcy and political chaos obscured every issue. Merely to put Egypt on her feet again, so as to enable her to discharge her financial liabilities to Europe, seemed to us the be-all and end-all of Diplomacy. Finance lay at the root of all her troubles, and afforded a pretext for European intervention in the Administration. Thus, the *Caisse de la Dette* gradually became an *imperium in imperio*.

But when English administrators settled down to their task, and discovered the marvellous resources of Egypt, they, in their passion for thoroughness, were led more and more into comprehensive reforms, in order to develop those resources to the utmost. Thus, a standard of perfection has been raised, as a natural evolution of the reform-

ing zeal of capable administrators, which it will take a long time to reach, even if ever it can be reached by an Oriental country. Resistance has only had the effect observable in all organic growth: it has increased the power of thrust. Thus, French opposition to measures that strengthened the British hold on Egypt has been overcome by methods which very naturally have increased that hold. One cannot set artificial limits to the development of social institutions. Economical laws break down such flimsy barriers. Moreover, our diplomacy is not clever enough to devise any scheme of automatic aggrandizement in Egypt: we have simply drifted into our present position on the current of events.

France, however, discredits our *bona fides*. She overlooks the fact, that it is obviously to our interest to create an independent Egypt, capable of maintaining and defending her political and territorial integrity, rather than to accept the enormous responsibility of an open Protectorate. Or, at least, she wishes to share in the European influence exercised over Egypt. She is deeply intrenched in the country: but, whilst claiming to exercise a benevolent interest in its welfare, she, now that the position of the bondholders is absolutely secure, uses her influence almost exclusively for political ends. She poses as the champion of International rights, which Great Britain, who properly is invested with that rôle, has always respected up to the present; and she resists many measures of reform, both financial and legislative, that would unquestionably benefit Egypt, simply because she herself would not share, equally with the Tutelary Power, in giving effect to such measures. In a word, she refuses to help Great Britain's work in Egypt until her Majesty's Government give fresh pledges of evacuation within a reasonable time: and, in her opinion, such pledges were best given, not in words, but by the introduction of a transitional form of administration, in which other European Powers (and especially France) were more adequately represented—a government that should provide for the automatic withdrawal of foreign control and supervision.

Now, that precisely is what her Majesty's Government, according to Ministerial statements, is attempting to accomplish. It is therefore impossible to reconcile the assurances of Great Britain with the contentions of France, because of the hopeless divergence of view. The Protectoral Power, being alone responsible to Europe for the regeneration of Egypt, must be left to fulfil this task, in accordance with her own ideas, until the tacit mandate is repudiated or withdrawn. This mandate, though irregularly acquired, possesses all the force of legitimacy through the continued acquiescence of the Powers, apart from France and her ally, in the political situation.

The position therefore resolves itself into a rivalry between France and Great Britain for domination over Egypt. Great Britain has borne the burden and heat of the day, and, through good and evil report, has honestly striven to follow a disinterested policy, which circumstances now deny her: since, as I have endeavoured to demonstrate in the earlier sections of this book, the law of empire binds her inseparably to Egypt. France has every reason to be satisfied with the financial stability and economical prosperity of the country, in which, without incurring any risk or responsibility, she so largely shares; and she would have no reason to complain if Great Britain imitated French policy in Tunis.

But, in the meantime, Egypt herself suffers by this rivalry; and has had to pay *bakhshish* all round—particularly to France—in order to secure immunity from foreign intervention. Thus, reforms are delayed, and Egyptian interests are sacrificed to European cupidity and aggrandizement. In principle, it cannot, for instance, be denied that Egypt would benefit by the introduction of three reforms: (1) the increase of her 'Authorized Expenditure,' in conformity with the growing needs of the country, (2) further economies and conversions of the Debt, and (3) the application of monies now locked up in the Reserve Fund of the *Caisse* to reproductive public works and the lightening of taxation. It is true, that the *Caisse* has granted considerable sums for public works and the relief of financial burdens: but an enormous

balance remains that might with advantage be invested in the development of the resources of Egypt rather than hoarded for the extinction of the Debt. The Debt of Egypt, like our National Debt, is a good investment for foreigners and natives alike: and it is absolutely secure under the existing *régime*. But to borrow at high interest, whilst holding an unprofitable Reserve Fund, in order to provide means for essential public works, is not good finance. France, by provoking such an issue, does a disservice to Egypt which goes far to destroy her political influence and her popularity in the country, whilst at the same time (as in the case of the Reservoir scheme and, indirectly, of the Sudan Campaign) merely rivetting the bonds of the Protectoral Power.

No French apologist can justify, on financial grounds alone, the obstruction to the three reforms alluded to. Egypt thus pays, and pays heavily, for the promotion of French political interests. This being so, how can she regard France as her friend, and admit her to a share in her government? France, according to her foreign critics, has never shown the least regard for the welfare of Egypt: she has always pursued a selfish and rapacious policy in that country, which, since 1882, has become a public scandal.[1] If France were willing, none of the other Powers, it is freely admitted, would object to Egypt applying a portion of her accumulated savings to more profitable ends than the amortization of the Debt, which, as time goes on, tends to defeat its own object.

It amounts to this: that the financial freedom of Egypt means her political independence of Europe, and therefore the elimination of reasons for interference between Egypt and the Protectoral Power. So long as those relations are not clearly defined, and designed to be of a temporary character, France and her ally, or allies, will do their utmost to obstruct, so far as they decently can, the organic development of the Anglo-Egyptian Administration. But, unless

[1] The persistent opposition of France to the abolition of the *corvée*, no less than her opposition to the application of the Conversion economies in 1890 to the relief of 'Authorized Expenditure,' are cases in point.

Egypt achieves her political independence, how can the support of the Tutelary Power be withdrawn?

Thus, the policy of France in Egypt defeats its own ends by prolonging the British Occupation; and every year that a solution of the Problem is postponed, British influence must necessarily increase. Large vested interests are growing up, as the natural outcome of the situation: and the larger these become, the less likely will the British Government be inclined to abandon them. Recent events, too, have proved how impossible it is to set a limit to expansion or to cripple the action of Egypt's natural protector. Moreover, the ubiquitous policy of Germany in the Near East and the Far East, and her infant Colonial development, prognosticate an increased activity in Egypt, which would complicate the situation—especially for France.

Cannot a *modus vivendi* be found, which, by mutual concession, shall provide for the welfare of Egypt and the due protection of International rights? The Single Control has proved to be the best for Egypt: and therefore it should be maintained, under guarantees to the Powers. Egypt cannot yet 'stand alone.' When Europe shows her confidence in Egypt being able to govern herself, by abolishing the Capitulations and Mixed Tribunals, it will be time enough to withdraw British support and supervision, and to seek for other guarantees of a permanent character.

This *exposé* of the situation is the fairest I can offer. But, since most questions have two sides, I shall endeavour to reproduce the French case, so far as I have been able to ascertain it, from conversations with their accredited representatives.

The Case for France

France has both a moral and a material interest in the destiny of Egypt. It was France, I am told, who helped her to independence from Turkish rule, during Mohammed Ali's struggle, when all other European Powers refused their aid. French *savants* opened the portals into Modern Egypt. Frenchmen introduced the germs of European civilization, and laid the basis of educational and other institutions. French engineers built the Suez Canal and the

Barrage. It was chiefly French capital, too, that enabled M. de Lesseps to inaugurate his great work, which, even to this day, remains French in its administration, though other and higher material interests are represented on the Board of Directors. France also holds fully a half-share in the Debt of Egypt. Finally, as the leading Mediterranean Power, having Colonial interests in the Far East, the independence or the 'neutralization' of Egypt is of essential importance to her.

The French colony in Egypt is numerous; and it includes many high officials in the Khedivial Service. The question of Egypt, which is the only vital one between France and Great Britain, has given rise to regrettable Diplomatic incidents in all parts of the world. A French correspondent, holding a high position under the Khedivial Government, writes to me: 'Vous dites qu'il faut suivre en Egypte une politique disintéressée. C'est absolument mon avis. Si cette vérité était acceptée en Angleterre comme elle l'est en France, nous serious tous d'accord et il n'y aurait plus de question d'Egypte.'

The policy of France in Egypt is, I am assured, not one of sheer obstruction, as is proved by the many votes she has given in the disposal of the General Reserve Fund for public works and philanthropic objects. When demands such as these are made, France necessarily discriminates between grants of money required for purely Egyptian objects and those which, under the circumstances, would be devoted to strengthening, directly or indirectly, the hold of Great Britain on Egypt.

France maintains that our administration operates towards that end, and wittingly. More and more Englishmen are placed in positions of trust; but, in particular, the influence exercised by those in the highest posts is becoming more and more exclusive: so that the initiative has now passed entirely into British hands. In a word, the Administration, in its directoral elements, is purely English: International interests are not fairly represented.

Our standard of efficiency is unnecessarily high for the needs of the country or for the service of the Debt; and it

is designedly raised, so that it shall become impossible for Egypt, or for any Oriental country like Egypt, to attain to it: thus providing an excuse for our continued Occupation and openings for our 'younger sons.' The English take *bakhshish* like other mortals; nor is official corruption and nepotism unknown to them.

In principle it is fair to admit, that the financial situation would be lightened, and Egypt herself would benefit, by reforms such as (1) the adequate increase of 'Authorized Expenditure,' (2) still further conversions and economies of the Debt, and (3) the application of the Reserve Fund of the *Caisse* to reproductive public works and the reduction of taxation—particularly of the land tax. But France refuses to allow a free hand to the Egyptian Government so long as the latter depends exclusively for its support on the British Government.

France maintains, that it would be quite possible, in the administration of the country, to devise methods by which our support could be gradually withdrawn, in conformity with the interests of other nations: that a transitional government, in which all should share, might, in fact, replace the present Anglo-Egyptian Administration. France will do nothing to aid us, so long as we refuse to give some guarantee of evacuation within a reasonable period. She takes her stand on the International position; and accuses us of having been false to our self-denying ordinance, in spirit as well as in the letter: (1) by not respecting the rights of other nations, (2) by not admitting them to a share in the Executive power, and (3) by trying to make the Administration depend exclusively on the British Control. France, in short, claims to be put on the same footing in Egypt as the Protectoral Power: but, failing that, she would not be averse to a return to International Control.

This constitutes, so far as I can make out, the *Apologia* of France. It is unnecessary, in view of what has already been said, that I should meet these contentions point by point. But one or two closing remarks may be added to the discussion.

The case for Great Britain

It is impossible to reconcile this immaculate attitude on the part of France with the following notable cases of French ill-will and obstruction :—(1) Opposition to the Drummond-Wolff Convention; (2) opposition to the Conversion economies in 1890; (3) action in regard to the Domains and Daïra Loans; (4) opposition to the creation of the Mixed Tribunals; (5) obstruction to the equitable taxation of foreigners; (6) opposition to the reduction of the land tax; (7) opposition to the abolition of the *corvée*; (8) unfulfilled promises regarding a proposed Press law; (9) maintaining a separate Post Office; and (10) refusing to make a Commercial Treaty with Egypt. Of her constant intrigues, of her subventions to a scurrilous Press, I say nothing. Such action may be inspired by the French colony in Egypt alone.[1] And, as I have already stated, the obstruction of France is futile. It only makes us do things in roundabout or secret ways, which are wholly un-English: and it gives the local officials a lot of bother. That is all. France recognizes this fact; and French capital attests it, by its confidence in the *status quo*.

The points in contention between the two countries which, in my opinion, never can be reconciled, are: that the Powers could not agree (1) as to the amount of supervision necessary —quite apart from their relative share in it, and (2) regarding the extent to which control should be exercised, in order that Egypt may learn to govern herself—and govern sufficiently well, so as to meet her financial liabilities. Only one-man rule can solve such difficulties.

I certainly believe that our standard is too high, and indeed impossible, for Egypt. But if you fix a lower one, the progress of the country will be slower: and slower development means smaller profits. Perhaps, too, the country is

[1] There are two so-called *députés de la nation* in Egypt, with about a dozen active followers, who keep up the agitation against the British Occupation. The French higher officials maintain, that these Chauvinists exercise merely a personal influence on the French Government, which does not listen to their tirades against French officials in Egypt who display 'Anglophile tendencies.' They, however, may influence the Press. Formerly, in Eastern countries, *députés de la nation* were officially appointed. Nowadays, the office is purely decorative and social.

being exploited, on the principle of a Limited Liability Company, in order to develop its resources to the utmost, in terms of Pounds Egyptian, rather than to alleviate and to improve the position and the prospects of the native population alone. But who is to fix the standard? And who shall determine the *juste-milieu* of Administrative efficiency? There can be no agreement on such points, between France and Great Britain: and attempts to solve the problem would only re-introduce the evils of Internationalism.

The French constantly reproach us, by asserting that we have not kept faith with Europe. But Europe does not protest. On the contrary, the European Powers have consistently supported our principal measures of reform—even Russia, on more than one occasion, refusing to follow blindly in the path of French obstruction.

Finally, it is impossible to say how much French, or how much English, capital is invested in the country. France and England share about equally in the Debt of Egypt. But, as regards the moral debt, there can be no comparison. France has never been the true friend of Egypt: she has always blackmailed the country: and, since 1882, her conduct has been unworthy of the traditions of a great Power,—in particular, of one who poses as the protector of liberal institutions and as the pioneer of European civilization.

But if French Nationalist methods in Egypt are abominable, this is not the fault of the French high officials, who, in their private life and intercourse, are worthy representatives of the great Republic. Of one in particular, and that the most influential member of the group, I may say, that I have rarely met a more cultured or liberal-minded man. But neither he nor they can control the hot politicians of the Boulevards or influence the Chauvinist ministers at the Quai d'Orsay. According to those leaders of French opinion and policy, perfidious Albion is seen at her worst in Egypt: but impartial critics state, we are there seen at our very best. Let the facts speak for themselves!

Si monumentum quæris, circumspice.

VI

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION

i THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

ii DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION: AN HISTORICAL, DESCRIPTIVE, AND CRITICAL SURVEY OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE

VI

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION

i THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

(*a*) *Sources of Administrative Authority*

British prerogatives

SUFFICIENT has been said, to illustrate the tripartite character of the Egyptian Government. Powers of veto and of initiative in legislation are vested in the Khedive, in the International Commission of the Public Debt, and in the British Minister and Advisers: but these powers vary in extent and degree. In effect, all are overruled by the authority with which the British Minister has, through the force of circumstances, become invested, on behalf of the Tutelary Power. Not to mention minor distinctions, the practical prerogatives of the British Representative are sufficiently indicated in Lord Granville's historical despatch of 4th January, 1884, in which these words occur: 'It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces that the responsibility which rests for the time on England obliges her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices.'

The centralized position of the British Minister in the Government of Egypt, the sources from which he derives his authority, and the checks on his liberty of action, may best be seen in the Table overpage.

Khedivial Authority

The Government of Egypt may therefore be said to be conducted by the Tutelary Power, in the name of the

TABLE No. 3.

SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

ILLUSTRATING THE LINE OF INITIATIVE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT



Khedive,[1] whose veto cannot be exercised if it should conflict with the advice of the British Representative.

Legislative Authority

Decrees are prepared by the various Ministries, and are sent up to the Council of Ministers for endorsement. They are then signed by the Khedive: and become law. Legislative Authority therefore reposes in the Council of Ministers and the Khedive.

Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is composed of six Ministers of State, under the presidency of the Prime Minister. The British Financial Adviser, or his delegate, has an *ex officio* right to attend Meetings of the Council of Ministers: and he can veto any measure involving financial change or expenditure, without necessarily assigning a reason.

Relations with the Ottoman Special Commissioner, representing the Suzerainty of Turkey, are maintained through the Prime Minister, who also is Minister of the Interior.

(*b*) *Representative Institutions*

Popular Government

The Organic Law of 1st May 1883[2] provides for Representative Institutions: but, under their restricted functions, which it defines, amendments or resolutions are not binding on the Egyptian Government. The mandate of government is not derived from the Voice of the People. There is no Public Opinion in Egypt.

Local self-government, or the germs of it, is enjoyed by the Municipalities, or 'Local Commissions,'[3] created in

[1] The Civil and Military Households of the Khedive are on a modest basis. These, together with the allowances made to the Khedivial Family, draw an annual grant amounting to a quarter of a million pounds, Egyptian. The Khedive has a mounted bodyguard of sixty men. In the Winter, his Highness resides in or near Cairo; in the Summer, the Court and the principal Ministers adjourn to Alexandria. Turkish is the language of the Court, and is also spoken, almost exclusively, in the highest Egyptian families.

[2] See Appendix IV.

[3] The first nine Municipalities were organized in 1893; but Alexandria and Mansura alone deserve that title, the remainder being, properly speaking, Town Councils. In October, 1898, the Government created a new type of municipality at Mansura, the budget of which is increased by the imposition of optional taxes upon imports and exports: but the Capitulations stand in the way of any considerable extension of the municipal system. These 'Local Commissions' are composed of

twenty large towns. Moreover, the fourteen Provincial Assemblies[1] discuss matters affecting the Mudirías.

The Council of Ministers shows an increasing tendency to respect the popular will, so far as this can be learnt and judiciously supported; to educate the General Assembly in the principles of government; and to carry the Legislative Council on all points of internal reform and legislation. It is satisfactory to note, that the Legislative Council spontaneously and cordially approved the Budget for 1899.

Legislative Council

The Legislative Council meets about once a month, at Cairo. It is composed of thirty Members, of whom fourteen are nominated by the Government, which, moreover, has the right to delegate any functionary to attend its meetings.[2]

The Legislative Council possesses no power of initiative. Its duty is to examine the Budget and to discuss draft Decrees affecting internal administration. The Government are not bound to accept amendments: but, if these are rejected, the reasons for such rejection must be assigned in writing.

General Assembly

The General, or National, Assembly is composed of the six Ministers of State, the thirty Members of the Legislative

---

seven members—namely, the Mudir, who acts as President, local Inspectors of Public Works and the Sanitary Department, and five inhabitants — whilst an Inspector of the Ministry of the Interior sits on each, but has no vote. The proceedings of the Local Commissions, with the exception of Alexandria and Mansura, are submitted to a Central Board at Cairo. The Budgets are supplied by the Government, and amount to from £E400 to £E2500 per annum, according to the importance of the town. On the whole, satisfactory results have followed from the institution of these so-called Municipalities (*cf.* Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899).

[1] Each Provincial Assembly is composed of from three to eight members, popularly elected, and must meet at least once a year. The electorate is comprised of males over thirty years of age, able to read and write, who have paid taxes amounting to not less than £E50 for a minimum period of two years.

[2] The fourteen members nominated by the Khedive, and (also, I believe) the two additional members named by Government direct, receive £E90 per annum. The remaining Members, nominated by the Provincial Assemblies, receive £E250 per annum, with certain travelling allowances. (Members of the General Assembly, during its occasional sessions, receive £E1 per day, and travelling expenses.)

Council, and forty-six Notables. Of the latter, thirty-five are chosen from the fourteen Provincial Assemblies, and eleven are nominated by the Government. This popular body is convoked, by special Khedivial Decree, to assemble at Cairo; and its mandate is for six years. But the General Assembly rarely meets—though it should do so once in every two years; and its deliberations are extremely brief and ineffectual. It has no direct legislative functions; but it possesses a veto on taxation: no new taxes can, in fact, be imposed without receiving the sanction of the General Assembly.

(c) *The Bureaucracy*

Heterogeneous elements

The Egyptian bureaucracy is of a very heterogeneous character. In its native elements, it is composed of the so-called Turkish governing caste, which occupies the highest posts and includes many non-Mohammedan Pashas and Notables, and of the large official body of middle-class Egyptians, whatever their origin may be. In its foreign elements, it is composed of International officials serving under the Khedivial Government, and, in particular, of the high officials representing the Tutelary Power.

The Turkish oligarchy

Although there is no aristocracy, properly so called, in Mohammedan countries, under the democratic banner of Islam, the wealthy landowners and representatives of the leading families in Egypt, many of whom enjoy the personal distinction conferred by the Pashalik, are trained in the habits of command and enjoy a measure of prescriptive right to preferment, subject only to their ability to perform the duties of office in accordance with the more rigid conditions now imposed by Western standards of government. Of this oligarchy, the most capable administrators are, perhaps, found among the Christian Pashas, particularly those of Armenian extraction: but there are also many able Turks and Arabs of the old school, who conform, though grudgingly, to the principles of good government. The Turkish and Levantine Beys form

a still more numerous coterie of this faction. Both hold themselves aloof from the Arab population of Egypt; and, whilst not regretting the uncertain nepotism of the Turkish suzerainty, many resent the International fetters that restrain their cupidity, and hate the European standards that impose fitness and morality on the functions of government. For the most part, therefore, the old-crusted Pashas withdraw to their palaces in the country; and it is only their more ambitious sons who attempt to qualify for high official posts.

In a Mohammedan country like Egypt, it is essential that the majority of Governors of Provinces and other high officials in the Civil Service should belong to the faith of Islam. But there is also a small minority of Christian or European Pashas to whom these posts occasionally fall.

The Arab Sheikhs

The country Sheikhs, who fill minor offices under Government, are the leading men in the villages to which their properties are adjacent, and possess many aptitudes for local administration. Being Arabs, they do not affect the spurious imitation of European dress and manners. Being ignorant, their places are now filled more and more by their sons, who perhaps have been trained in the Government schools, and who gain on the one hand what they lose by compromise on the other: because education has a disturbing influence on the Oriental mind which is not always an advantage to the first generation. Administrative efficiency is not, however, often reached by the village patriarchs.

The Effendi class

Everybody in the Government Service who is not a Pasha or a pauper, a Bey or a Felláh, is an Effendi. The Effendis are the Brown, the Mr Jones, and the — Robinson, Esq., of Egyptian middle-class society. They represent the rank and file of the Government Offices. They swarm throughout the country wherever a stambuli, or frock-coat, and a tabúsh are objects of ambition, *honoris causâ*. Copts, Syrians, Jews, Armenians, or Levantines, they are turned into machines and supplied by the Government schools

greatly in excess of the demand.[1] But, under good chiefs, they make excellent clerks—especially the Syrians and Copts, who are expert at office-routine and accounts.

The Civil Service

The Egyptian Civil Service, in spite of its imperfections, is, in fact, a marvel of perfection for a Mohammedan country. Its *morale* has been enormously improved under the prestige of the British Control; and its efficiency has been greatly advanced by methods that preclude back-stair influence and put a premium on common honesty and individual aptitude. In some of the Government Departments I have seen work turned out that would be creditable to any country.

The Government offices close at two in the afternoon, after which only the high officials are engaged,—principally in Committee work.

The foreign elements

It was not easy to discover the extent to which foreign supervision is exercised over the Civil Service of Egypt. But, considering the importance of this subject, in its bearing on the ability of Egypt to 'stand alone'—apart from her individual capacity for self-government, to which I have alluded—I took great pains to trace, as it were, the arterial flow of British initiative, and to find out the proportion of European support given to Departmental organization and administration. The result of my enquiries will be seen in the Tables illustrating the next section of this work, which were drawn up last year (1898). But, fortunately, Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, publishes the relative numbers, which, although agreeing on the whole with my own estimates, give a more precise and authoritative result. This fortunate coincidence therefore enables me to quote Lord Cromer's figures and remarks, in regard to the composition and numbers of the Egyptian Civil Service:—

The Table given overpage includes all officials in the employ of the Egyptian Government, except those serving

[1] At the same time, those holding Primary and Secondary Certificates can always depend on employment—the Government having more vacancies than they can adequately fill.

under the War Office and the rank and file, whether European or native, of the Police.

The Egyptian Civil Service

Nationalities.	Monthly Pay.			Total Number.
	Below £E30.	From £E30 to £E70.	Above £E70.	
Egyptian . . .	10,342	213	45	10,600
British	316	92	47	455
Italian	256	23	6	285
French	186	58	19	263
Greek	82	7	3	92
Austrian . . .	68	5	4	77
German . . .	21	11	5	37
Other nationalities .	35	6	20	61
Total Europeans .	964	202	104	1,270
Grand total . .	11,306	415	149	11,870

'It will be seen that there are at present 11,870 officials in the Egyptian Service, namely, 10,600 Egyptians, and 1270 Europeans; of the latter, 455 are British. The number of Italian and French officials is about equal, the numbers being respectively 285 and 263.

'In 1882 there were, exclusive of the army, 1242 Europeans in the Egyptian service.[1] The aggregate number of Europeans is, therefore, at present only twenty-eight more than was the case 16 years ago. On the other hand, the functions exercised by the European officials have undergone a considerable change. A complete analysis of the figures would, without doubt, show that, though there may have been some decrease in the number of Europeans in the subordinate places under Government, the number of the superior European officials has increased.

[1] *Cf.* Egypt, No. 3, 1883, p. 15.

'Amongst the Europeans who figure in the Table given above, ninety-four (of whom forty-eight are British) are employed in the service of the Department of Public Instruction. These obviously stand on a different footing to the officials employed in the Executive Departments. One of the principal reasons why they are employed is to train the Egyptians to such an extent as to enable them eventually to take the places of some, at all events, of the Europeans. Deducting these, there remain 1174 Europeans, of whom 407 are British.

'Of these, 892 draw salaries below £E30 a month. Many of those who appear in this category are engine-drivers, lighthouse-keepers, and others, employed in various technical services. I cannot state the precise number of the Europeans employed in services of this description, but it must be considerable.

'One noteworthy point is the relatively large number of Europeans employed by some, at all events, of the International Administrations. Thus, the whole staff of the Mixed Tribunals (including the Judges themselves) consists of 242 Europeans, of whom only 17 are British subjects, and 101 Egyptians. The staff of the *Caisse de la Dette* consists of 50 Europeans, of whom 2 are British subjects, and 10 Egyptians. The Quarantine Board employs 48 Europeans, of whom 16 are British subjects, and 19 Egyptians.

'On the other hand, the important Department of Finance employs 37 Europeans, of whom 13 are British, and 513 Egyptians. The Interior, in all its branches, and including the officers of Police, employs 102 Europeans, of whom 62 are British, and 784 Egyptians. The Public Works Department, exclusive of the Ghizeh Museum, employs 72 Europeans, of whom 28 are British, and 450 Egyptians. The Native Tribunals give employment to 14 Europeans, of whom 12 are British, and 919 Egyptians.

'In none of these four last-named Departments is the administration internationalized. They are for the most part under Anglo-Egyptian control.

'The extent to which European agency is really employed in the Government of Egypt may perhaps best be appreciated by looking to those columns of the Table given above which show the number of European officials in receipt of more than £E30 a month. Excluding 24 officials belonging to the Department of Public Instruction, 282 Europeans are included in this category. Of these, 130 are British, and 152 of other nationalities. 84 British and 97 of other nationalities are in receipt of salaries varying from £E30 to £E70 a month. 46 British and 55 of other nationalities are in receipt of salaries of over £E70 a month. The maximum salary received by any Egyptian official is £E2700 a-year. This is the salary of an Egyptian Minister. The maximum salary received by an European official is £E2000 a year.

'It is difficult to draw any very distinct line between superior and subordinate appointments; but without going into any elaborate analysis of the figures, I may say that the rehabilitation of Egypt, in so far as it has been due to British influence since the Occupation, has been carried out by a body of officials who certainly do not exceed 100 in number, and might possibly, if the figures were rigorously examined, be stated somewhat lower.

'I should add that those 100 have been selected with the greatest care.'

So far, Lord Cromer. The object of the Anglo-Egyptian Administration being to train natives in the methods of self-government and the habits of initiative, foreign supervision and control are abandoned whenever natives are found fit to occupy vacant posts, previously held by Europeans:[1] but, it must be confessed, such opportunities, when France does not object, rarely occur, and the experiments made in that direction have not been encouraging.

[1] Sir William Garstin, in the Department of Public Works, has made it a rule to do with only 60 per cent. of British officials, of all grades. Lord Cromer, in a recent letter to the *Times*, stated, that the number of candidates for employment in the Ministry of the Interior alone was over one hundred and twenty.

ii DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Central Executive

The Government Executive is centralized at Cairo, where there are Ministries of the Interior, of Public Works and Public Instruction, of Foreign Affairs, of Finance, of Justice, and of War and Marine. All the Ministers of State are Egyptians. The Under-Secretaries of State are either Egyptian or English. But, in all the Ministries, a British Adviser or Under-Secretary exercises practical control, under the guidance of the British Minister Plenipotentiary. The Minister of the Interior is the President of the Council of Ministers.

(*a*) *Finance*

The Financial Situation

Finance is the beginning and the end of all things in Egypt, in so far as it connotes the International situation. I am therefore constrained to deal with this intricate subject from the historical standpoint, in order to demonstrate that the political independence and administrative freedom of Egypt have depended, in the past, on the degree of her financial stability and on the measure of her emancipation from International Control.

This International Control is based on the Law of Liquidation (1880) and on the Convention of London (1885). The Law of Liquidation consolidated the Debt of Egypt and set a limit to Administrative Expenditure. The Declaration, at London, of the Great Powers and the Porte, of 17th March 1885, together with the annexed Convention and the Khedivial Decree of 27th July 1885, constitute a body of International Law, modifying the Law of Liquidation and definitely regulating the Financial situation in Egypt. When, therefore, I now speak advisedly of the London Convention, I mean to include all these International instruments, which constitute the organic law, so to speak, of the politico-financial autonomy of Egypt.

It may readily be understood that, under the circumstances, the position of the Financial Adviser to the Khedive is one of great influence. He and the British Minister practically control the political situation, subject to the International

fetters imposed on their liberty of action, by exercising a veto on legislation. If the Financial Adviser does not oppose a Decree, or Draft Bill, at the Council of Ministers, it is adopted as a matter of course. If he should oppose it, the Council votes with him. Thus, in practice, no administrative measure involving expenditure (as such measures usually do) is introduced to the Council of Ministers before previously receiving his official sanction: since it could not be adopted without his endorsement.

The principal officials at the Ministry of Finance are, like the Adviser, Englishmen. Their assistants are either Copts or Syrians, because Mussulmans do not excel in figures and accounts. The simplicity of this Departmental organization therefore absolves me from entering into further details regarding the Administrative system. The Ministry of Finance depends almost exclusively on British control and supervision, and is in close touch with all the Departments of State, as well as with the *Caisse*.

Historical Retrospect

I shall content myself here with quoting an extract from Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1898, illustrating the three distinct phases through which the finances of Egypt have passed during the last fifteen or sixteen years:—

'During the first phase,' says Lord Cromer, 'which lasted from 1883 to about 1887, the whole efforts of the Government had to be directed to the maintenance of financial equilibrium. The circumstances were such as to preclude the possibility either of affording fiscal relief, however necessary, or of incurring additional expenditure, even for the most legitimate objects.

'By 1887 all danger of insolvency was over. The efforts of the reformers, notably those of the Irrigation officers, began to bear fruit. The period of surplus set in. It was then decided that fiscal relief should take precedence over additional expenditure. The *Corvée*, which was, in reality, a very heavy and objectionable tax, was therefore abolished at a cost of £E400,000 a-year. The land-tax was reduced by £E430,000. . . . In all, a reduction of direct taxation to the extent of £E1,100,000 was accorded. At the same time, the salt tax was reduced by 40 per cent., and the postal and

telegraph rates by 50 per cent. The octroi duties were abolished in the smaller provincial towns. The only increase was in the tobacco duty, which was raised from P.T. 14 to P.T. 20 per kilog. [that is to say, to about one shilling and tenpence a pound, or rather less than one-half the English duty on tobacco].

'The period of fiscal relief may be said to have been brought to a close in 1894. It was then thought both possible and desirable to pay more attention than heretofore to the very legitimate demands of the spending departments. Accordingly, money was devoted to remunerative objects such as drainage and railway extension, and also to others, such as the construction of hospitals, prisons, and other public buildings, the improvement of education, etc., which, although not directly remunerative, are equally necessary to the well-being of the country.

'Whilst this stage was in course of progress, the Sudan question was raised. As the Legislative Council approves of the Sudan expedition, it would be sufficient, in so far as their observations are concerned, to say that it is impossible to reap all the advantages of an active Sudan policy without incurring certain corresponding disadvantages. One of these disadvantages is that, albeit the money so far spent in the Sudan has been small in amount as compared to the results achieved, it is, nevertheless, obviously true that that money might have been spent on other objects of unquestionable utility.

'Apart from this truism, however, I should wish to remark that, although, as I stated in my last Report, it may have been an open question in 1896 whether the moment had yet arrived for dealing with the Sudan, there can, I venture to think, be scarcely two opinions on the point that it will be an unmixed blessing to the Egyptians when the matter is finally disposed of, and when Egypt has acquired a settled frontier, free from fear of Dervish invasion or incursion. For many years past, the obvious necessity of dealing sooner or later with the Sudan question has hung like a dead-weight round the necks of all who have been responsible for the government of Egypt. It is, from the Egyptian point of view, well worth making some sacrifice in the direction of postponing

reforms, which are avowedly desirable, in order to enable this weight to be removed. I hope and believe that the sacrifice will not be heavy, nor the postponement of much longer duration than it would have been, had the Egyptian frontier remained at Wadi Halfa. Indeed, the facts which I adduce in this Report are sufficient to show that, in spite of the difficulties arising from recent events in the Sudan, the steady progress which has been characteristic of the last fifteen years has as yet received no sensible check.'

Report of Progress (Statistical)

This progress, in its financial, economic, and social bearings, is well illustrated in the *Statistical Returns* (1881-1897) published by the Government of Egypt in February 1898, and summarized by Sir Elwin Palmer, late Financial Adviser to the Khedive, in the following suggestive paragraphs:

'1. Notwithstanding the increase of about 13 per cent., *i.e.* 614,195 feddans [or acres], in the cultivated area of paying taxes, the Land Tax is now less by £E85,691 than in 1881.[1] The average tax per feddan in 1881 was £1, 2s. 0d. It is now 18s. 3d. The annual tax on land has, since 1891, been reduced by £E507,600. Other Direct Taxes have been reduced by £E223,000; and Indirect Taxes amounting to £E186,000 per annum have been abolished. The tobacco duty having been raised and the smuggling stopped, it now produces over a million,

[1] Mr Gorst, Sir Elwin Palmer's successor, in his *Note* on the Budget for 1899, refers to the Land Tax in the following terms: 'The Land Tax is estimated to produce £E4,661,300 as compared with £E4,872,700 in 1898. The diminution is due to the fact that a reduction of £E216,000 has been effected in this tax, while allowing for a normal growth of £E5,000. Some two years ago, when a general valuation of the cultivated lands in Egypt was made, it was found that certain areas were taxed at an amount that was more than one-third of their net rental value. The amount of £E216,000 represents the sum necessary to reduce the Tax on these areas to exactly the third of the net rental value. The Egyptian Government were not in a position to support such a loss of revenue on their ordinary budget, but the Powers have agreed to the deficiency being made up annually from the General Reserve Fund for a period of ten years from the 1st of January 1898. Their assent is subject to certain reservations which are not likely in practice to prevent the reduction being carried out annually. Before the end of the period of ten years, it is hoped that a re-assessment of the Land Tax will have been completed, whereby the increased revenue which will be obtained from lands now under-taxed will compensate for this and other reductions which will have to be made.'

whereas in 1881 the revenue derived from tobacco amounted only to £E97,168.

'2. Scarcely any arrears of Land Tax now exist, whereas in past years the amounts were very large. The expropriations and sales of crops for arrears have been reduced more than 50 per cent., and are now quite insignificant.

'3. Since 1890, the policy has been to diminish the Direct Taxes, covering the loss of revenue by an increase in the Indirect Taxes, and thus causing a more even distribution of taxes and an increase in the number of taxpayers. The only Indirect Tax, however, that has been raised is the Tobacco Tax, while others have been reduced or even abolished entirely.

'4. The taxation per head of population in 1881 was £1, 2s. 6d. In 1897 it was 17s. 9d.—a reduction of 20 per cent.

'5. 212 miles of new railway have been opened. There has been an enormous development of the railway and telegraph traffic. . . . A similar development in the Post Office has taken place.

'6. The Expenditure on Public Instruction has been increased by over 37 per cent. The number of schools has risen from 29 to 51, and the number of pupils from 5,366 to 11,304.

'7. The increase in the Judicial receipts shows that the people have learnt to take advantage of the Courts, especially as regards registration of deeds.

'8. Large sums of money have been expended of late years on Irrigation, *i.e.* on reproductive works. 1700 kilometres of agricultural roads, 2512 kilometres of drains, 3054 kilometres of canals, and 575 kilometres of basin-bank have been constructed in the Provinces.

'9. The number of men called out on *Corvée* has been reduced from 281,000 to 11,000 men.

'10. Imports have increased by over £E2,600,000; while, notwithstanding the enormous fall in the price of cotton and sugar, there has been only a slight falling off in the value of the exports.

'11. The tonnage of the Port of Alexandria has increased from 1,250,000 to 2,270,000.

'12. The amount of bonds outstanding on the Market in 1881 was £98,376,660, Sterling. In 1897 it was £98,035,780, Sterling — notwithstanding £13,219,000, Sterling, of fresh debt raised to cover extraordinary expenditure, and £3,400,000, Sterling, increase of capital due to conversion. The interest charge in 1881 was £E4,235,921. In 1897 it was £E3,908,684. [It is now £3,872,239, Sterling.]

'13. The Market price of the 5 per cent. Privileged Debt in 1881 was £96¼. In 1897 the Market price of the same Debt converted into 3½ per cent. was £102.

'The 4 per cent. Unified Debt was £71¾ in 1881, and at £106½ in 1897.

'14. The amount of Debt per head of population was, in 1881, £14, 8s. 9d. It is to-day (1897) £10, os. 2d.'

Debt of Egypt

On 1st January 1898, the Debt of Egypt stood as follows:

	£ Sterling.
Guaranteed Debt	8,558,100
Privileged Debt	29,393,580
Unified Debt	55,971,960
Domains Debt	3,508,800
Daïra Sanieh Debt	6,431,500
	103,863,940
less, Bonds held by the Public Debt Commission	5,828,160
Balance (Debt of Egypt)	98,035,780

On the 31st December 1898, the total amount of debt was £103,372,180, of which £7,047,580 was held by the Commissioners of the Debt, thus leaving £96,324,600 in the hands of the public.

Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, remarks 'that the capital amount of debt in the hands of the public reached its highest figure in 1891. It then stood at £105,609,100. This was immediately after the conversion of the preference

stock, which naturally added to the capital of the debt. Since that time the Debt has been reduced by £9,284,500. It now stands at only £1,363,920 above the figure of 1884, which was the year previous to the issue of the Guaranteed Loan of £9,424,000.'

Revenue and Expenditure

The Revenue and Expenditure of Egypt reach, respectively, an annual figure of about 10½ millions: and the equilibrium of the Budget is adjusted within comparatively narrow limits. As the result of increased production, the Revenue has steadily and notably advanced during the last four years; and there has always been, since 1889, an actual Surplus—ranging between half-a-million and a million—in the general financial results year by year. Consequently, retrenchment in Expenditure has been considerably relaxed.

Annual Surplus

The following figures include Ordinary and Extraordinary Receipts:

Year	*Revenue* £E.	*Expenditure* £E.	*Surplus* £E.
1894	10,444,650	9,995,641	449,009
1895	10,698,023	9,637,900	1,060,123
1896	11,015,702	10,540,502	475,200
1897	11,442,937	10,752,776	690,161
1898	11,348,000	10,864,000	484,000
1899[1]	10,600,000	10,560,000	40,000

On the Expenditure side, for 1898, a sum of £E742,000, paid into the General Reserve Fund, is included. In the Estimate for 1899, the Expenditure side includes (1) a sum of £E265,000, being the economies resulting from the conversion of the Privileged Debt; and (2) a sum of £E416,000, being the estimated amount which will, at the end of the year, be paid to the General Reserve Fund administered by the Commissioners of the Debt. Increase of Revenue in 1898 occurred under all the principal heads of account.

The Financial Situation (1899)

The main facts of the Financial situation are thus summarized by Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899:

1. The accounts for 1898 show a surplus of £E484,000.
2. The accumulated economies resulting from the partial

[1] Estimated.

conversion of the Debt in 1890 amounted, on the 31st December 1898, to £E3,218,000.

3. A sum of £E3,893,000 stands to the credit of the General Reserve Fund, of which £E2,616,000 is pledged for the execution of various works.

4. At the close of last year, the Special Reserve Fund showed a deficit balance of £E92,439.

5. After deducting a sum of £7,047,580, which is held by the Commissioners of the Public Debt, the outstanding capital of the Funded Debt of Egypt amounts to £96,324,600. There is no floating debt.

6. The estimates for 1899 show a surplus of Revenue over Expenditure of £E40,000.

7. The Sudan Budget shows a deficit of £E332,000, which is charged to the Egyptian Treasury.

Cost of Internationalism

Lord Cromer goes on to remark:

'Any summary of the financial situation would, however, be incomplete if something were not said of the loss which is imposed on the Egyptian Treasury, and therefore on the taxpayers of Egypt, by reason of the continuance of the present financial system. In addition to the sums which go annually to swell the Conversion Economies Fund and the Reserve Fund, it is to be observed that a large economy might certainly be effected by the conversion of the Unified Debt.

'The following figures give an approximate estimate of the annual charge which is unnecessarily borne by the Egyptian Treasury:—

Conversion economies . . .	£E336,000
Interest on Conversion Fund . .	107,000
Surplus paid to Reserve Fund . .	526,000[1]
Interest on Reserve Fund . . .	145,000
Approximate annual economy on conversion of Unified Debt . . .	470,000
Total	£E1,584,000

[1] The sum actually paid to the General Reserve Fund in 1898 was £E742,000, but of this amount £E216,000 was repaid by the Commissioners of the Debt to make good the loss incurred by the recent reduction of the Land tax.

'In addition to this, it is to be remembered that a lump sum of £E4,495,000 (viz., £E3,218,000 Conversion economies, and £E1,277,000 representing the unpledged portion of the General Reserve Fund) is lying in the hands of the Commissioners of the Debt.

'I have not included in the above calculation the extra cost involved by the international character of the various administrative institutions in Egypt. Neither is any account taken of the annual loss caused by the system under which the railways are managed, and to which I shall presently allude in greater detail.

'Broadly speaking, it is no exaggeration to say that internationalism imposes an extra charge of about £1,750,000 a-year on the Egyptian Treasury.

'Had it not been for the liberal policy adopted of late years by the Commissioners of the Debt in respect to making grants from the General Reserve Fund, the present system would long since have become altogether unworkable. The powers of the Commissioners are, however, limited. They are unable to apply any effective remedy to a radically defective system.'

Since 1890, remission of taxation to the following extent has taken place:— **Remission of taxation**

Corvée	£E400,000
Land tax	574,000[1]
Professional tax	180,000
Sheep and goat tax	40,000
Weighing tax	28,000
Sundry small taxes	53,000
Total	£E1,275,000[2]

[1] In addition to this, arrears of Land tax to the extent of about £E1,000,000 have been remitted.

[2] In addition to this, the salt tax has been reduced by 40 per cent. The postal and telegraph rates have been reduced by 50 per cent. Large reductions have been made in the railway rates. The only increase of taxation has been in the tobacco duty, which has been raised from P.T. 14 to P.T. 20 per kilog. The house tax has also been imposed on European residents in Egypt.

Financial Stability

The following remarks by Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, will be read with interest:

'It would be difficult to exaggerate the ruin which would have overtaken, not only the population of Egypt, but all who are interested in Egyptian affairs, if the régime of the pre-reforming days had been allowed to continue in existence but a few years longer. It so happened that the mal-administration of the past reached its zenith shortly before a great fall took place in the price of all agricultural produce. Improvements in the system of irrigation, by which the increased quantity produced has in some degree mitigated the effects of the fall in price; the appreciable fiscal relief, of which the details are given above; and, generally, the substitution of a civilized, in the place of an oppressive and semi-barbarous, administrative policy, have conjointly enabled Egypt to bear the strain. I have no hesitation in saying that, but for these changes, the Egyptian Treasury would before now have been hopelessly insolvent, and that the condition of the people would have been in all respects deplorable. It is as well to call attention to this point, for it is natural that, as time passes by, not only should the recollection of the old régime fade away, but that even well-informed Egyptians should fail to recognize fully that, but for the reforms of recent years, the sufferings of the people in the present would assuredly have been far greater than anything which they experienced in the past. A Government conducted on principles such as those which prevailed when I first became acquainted with Egyptian affairs, some twenty-two years ago, would, apart from other defects, have been wholly incapable of coping with the economic crisis produced by the fall of prices during the last few years.'

Sources of Revenue

The bulk of the Revenue[1] is derived from the Land Tax,

[1] Direct Taxes amount to over 5 millions. Indirect taxes sometimes exceed 3 millions. All Imports (except tobacco) pay 8 per cent.; and Exports pay 1 per cent. Foreigners pay Land Tax, Inhabited House Duty, Customs, Octroi; and, now that the tax on carriages, horses, &c., has been abolished, their last remaining fiscal privilege disappears. The principal Revenue-producing Administrations are the Railways, Telegraphs, and Post Office, with receipts approximating to 2 millions in the aggregate. By the sale of the Khedivial Mail Steamers to

which brings in over 4½ millions, annually. The other principal sources of Revenue are the duties from tobacco and the Customs. The receipts from Railways, Telegraphs, Justice, Port of Alexandria, and Miscellaneous Services, also provide a considerable Revenue.

Distribution of Revenue

The London Convention, which authorized the Guaranteed Loan of nine millions in 1885, laid down very stringent rules for the Distribution of Revenue. The Revenue of Egypt is divided between the *Caisse*, or Commissioners of the Public Debt, and the Government in the following fashion.

Certain revenues are assigned to the Service of the Debt.[1] These have a first charge on the Revenue of Egypt. A scale of Administrative charges on the non-assigned revenues is 'authorized' by the International Commissioners of the Public Debt from year to year. This Authorized Expenditure, which includes the Tribute to the Sultan and the interest on the Suez Canal shares, being unduly restricted, has never been able to meet the actual Expenditure of the Government. On the other hand, the recurring annual insufficiency for Administrative Expenditure is provided for, in a measure, by the balance which the Commissioners of the *Caisse* have always in hand, after paying the coupon, or interest on the Debt. This balance in hand is used to make up

---

an English Syndicate, this item is removed from the Revenue, without sensibly affecting it. The Administrative Services include receipts from the Mixed Tribunals, Native Tribunals, and Mehkemés, amounting to about half a million; and a similar amount is produced by Miscellaneous Receipts.

[1] The Assigned, or hypothecated, Revenues were enumerated in Art. III. of the Decree for the Unification of the Egyptian Debt, &c. (7th May, 1876). These, which have since been modified, as already explained, originally included the revenues of the four Assigned Provinces (Mudirías of Gharbia, Menufía, Behera, and Siút); octroi dues of Cairo and Alexandria; import duties of Alexandria, Suez, Damietta, Rosetta, Port Said, and El Arîch; Railways; Tobacco duties; Salt revenues; rent of Matería; sluice revenues and navigation dues on the Nile up to Wadi Halfa; bridge of Kasr-el-Nil; and contributions of the Daïra. The grand total of Revenue devoted to the Service of the Unified General Debt was then (1876) £6,475,256. This was modified by the Goschen-Joubert Decree (Art. V.) a few months later; and subsequent International arrangements have introduced other modifications.

The Revenues now hypothecated for the Service of the Debt are those derived from the four Assigned Provinces, the Railways Administration, Telegraphs, and Port of Alexandria.

the difference to the Government between the non-assigned revenues and the Authorized Expenditure;[1] and, should any Surplus remain after this initial and obligatory operation, it is divided equally between the *Caisse* and the Government.

The *Caisse*'s half-share of this Surplus is added to the General Reserve Fund. The half-share falling to the Government is never really sufficient to meet the Administrative needs of the country. The Government has therefore to fall back on its own Special Reserve Fund or to apply to the *Caisse* for grants from the General Reserve Fund.

The effect of this singular and somewhat complicated arrangement is, that, for all *un*authorized expenditure, the country (*i.e.* the taxpayers) must pay *double* the amount actually expended in administration. On the other hand, it is true that the half-share of the ultimate Surplus of the *Caisse* is devoted to the reduction of the Debt; and, now that the General Reserve Fund has reached two millions—the limit when amortization should come into operation—the *Caisse* is more disposed to give increased grants to the Government for reproductive public works. So that, if the annual Budgets continue to show buoyancy, financial equilibrium should be restored almost automatically.

Perhaps the following Table may help to elucidate this very guarded method of distributing the Revenue of Egypt:

TABLE No. 4.


Revenue of Egypt.
Assigned Revenue (*Caisse*).
Non-Assigned Revenue (*Government*).
Provides for Service of the Debt.
Fails to provide for Authorized Expenditure.
Makes up difference between non-Assigned Revenue and Authorized Expenditure.
Surplus.
Fifty Per Cent. to General Reserve Fund (*Caisse*).
Fifty Per Cent. to Egyptian Government.

[1] In the last ten years or so, the insufficiency of non-affected revenues to meet Authorized Expenditure has varied between £200,000 and £600,000, annually.

Reserve Funds

There are three separate Reserve Funds connected with the Financial Administration of the Egyptian Government. These are: (1) The Economies resulting from the partial Conversion of the Debt, which took place in 1890—a Fund which cannot be touched without the consent of the Powers;[1] (2) the General Reserve Fund, which, with the consent of the *Caisse de la Dette*, can be applied to certain specified objects; and (3) the Special Reserve Fund, which is at the unfettered disposal of the Egyptian Government.

General Reserve Fund

The present state of the General Reserve Fund is outlined in Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899 as follows:—

On the 31st December, 1898, the sum standing to the credit of the General Reserve Fund, the stocks in which the greater part of the money is invested being valued at current prices, was £E3,893,000. Of this amount £E2,616,000 was pledged for the execution of various works in course of progress, thus leaving an unpledged balance of £E1,277,000.

A programme of Public Works Expenditure has been made out for the five years from 1899 to 1903, both inclusive. It is as follows:—

Irrigation	£E1,100,000
Drainage	798,000
Railways (rolling-stock, renewal of permanent way, and improvement of Port of Alexandria) . . .	1,330,000
Miscellaneous (schools, prisons, &c.) .	272,000
Total . .	£E3,500,000

[1] As already mentioned, the value of these Stocks, on 31st December 1898, amounted to £E3,218,000, showing an increase, during the year, of £E451,000. Commenting on these figures, Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, remarks:—

'As I have pointed out on previous occasions, the system under which these savings are annually invested in Egyptian stocks virtually acts as a sinking fund, but one of a very expensive and objectionable nature. The large purchases made annually by the Commissioners of the Debt naturally tend to keep up an artificial price. As time goes on, and the accumulations become annually larger, the evils of the present system will, of course, be intensified. The operation of the sinking fund will, in fact, tend more and more to nullify its own effect.

'The present system is, indeed, from a financial point of view, quite indefensible. There are only two sound methods of dealing with this money. One is to

It is proposed that £E2,750,000 of this money should be taken from the General Reserve Fund, and that the balance of £E750,000 should be charged to the ordinary expenditure account of the Egyptian Government. The Commissioners of the Debt have granted £E550,000 for expenditure during the current year, and have also agreed to provide in subsequent years a further sum of £E720,000 for expenditure on the railways. The grants for irrigation, drainage and miscellaneous expenditure will be considered at the close of each year, with reference to the existing financial situation.

Special Reserve Fund

The present state of the Special Reserve Fund is outlined in Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899 as follows:—

On the 31st December 1897, the Special Reserve Fund showed an actual deficit of £E310,416. Further expenditure, amounting to £E260,431, had been authorized but not actually incurred at that date: so that the deficit balance was £E570,847.

The following statement shows the operations during 1898:—

Receipts.		Expenditure.	
	£E		£E
Payment of the British Government	778,832	Deficit on 31st December, 1897	310,416
Share in the Surplus	831,616	Excess of Administrative Expenditure	347,591
Miscellaneous	91,538	Commutation of pensions	7,450
		Sudan	550,378
		Miscellaneous	7,918
			1,223,753
		Surplus	478,233
Total	1,701,986	Total	1,701,986

spend it on the development of the country. The other is to pay off debt at par by drawings in the usual manner. Unfortunately, the adoption of either of these measures is impossible without the consent of the Powers.'

In addition to the above sum, the Commissioners of the *Caisse* hold also the unpledged portion of the General Reserve Fund (£E1,277,000)—or, altogether, £E4,495,000 lying idle in their hands.

Further expenditure, to the amount of £E570,672, principally on account of the Sudan, had been already authorized in 1898, but had not been actually incurred when the accounts were closed. The real state of the Fund at the end of 1898 was, therefore, a deficit of (£E570,672—£E478,233) £E92,439.

Taxation

The amount of direct taxation per head of population is, roughly, ten shillings. There is considerable inequality in the incidence of taxation:[1] but the Egyptian Government are making efforts to remove these inconsistencies, particularly in regard to the re-assessment of the Land Tax. 'The desirability of an equitable redistribution of the Land Tax,' says Mr Gorst, in his *Note* on the Budget for 1899, 'has long been recognised. The existing assessment, which was made before the British Occupation, was originally very defective. Large public works have since been constructed which have made great changes in the relative value of different areas. The construction of the Aswán reservoir, which will revolutionize the cultivation of many parts of the country, renders it imperative that this important work should be taken in hand without delay. A Cadastral Survey of the country—which is an indispensable preliminary to an equitable re-assessment—was begun some years ago; and it may be hoped that it will be finished in six or seven years.' The Government wish to get the people settled on the land, and to give them a clear and definite record of rights.

Tax-collection

The taxes are collected in a fashion very different to that in the old days of the *kurbash*. There is an accountant in every village or two villages. The Land Tax is paid to him, in instalments, falling due as the principal crops are harvested. This is done with the object of enabling the Felláhin to pay their taxes when they can best afford the money.

Indebtedness of the Felláhin

But, as a matter of fact, the Felláhin are a very ignorant and improvident class. They are apt to indulge in *Fantasia*

[1] 'It is not unusual,' says Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1896, 'to find land rented at £7 to £8 an acre paying 18 piastres an acre (feddan), whilst in the immediate neighbourhood land rented at from £2 to £3 an acre is paying as much as 164 piastres.' One Piastre = 2½d.

and other extravagances, on slight provocation: so that they frequently have to borrow money, as in olden days, from the usurers. With the object of relieving the indebtedness of the Felláhin and of bringing down the exorbitant rates of interest in certain neighbourhoods,[1] the Government, rather than to establish a Land Bank, against which there are strong political and economical objections, voted £10,000, as an experiment, in making advances of £10 and under to petty landowners. The success of this scheme has encouraged the Egyptian Crédit Foncier to take up the business as a private speculation, on equitable terms: although the maximum amount of its advances (£100) is far too high to benefit only the poorer classes of Egyptian cultivators.[2]

Expenditure

When Egypt was subjected to the severe Limit of Expenditure, under which she still partially suffers, the country was fighting against bankruptcy. Retrenchment was the order of the day: but retrenchment amounting to restraint, in reproductive expenditure, has been very harmful to the development of her natural resources. All the spending Departments have been handicapped by the want of funds. Moreover, under the anomalous conditions which imposed a heavy tax, as I have already explained, on excess over Authorized Expenditure, amounting to cent. per cent., the Administration naturally turned its attention to relief from taxation rather than to the increased applica-

[1] Where Levantine and Greek usurers would be asking 40 per cent., the Government stepped in and offered money at 6 per cent., thereby reducing the rate to, say, 12 per cent.

[2] This objection has since been met, as Lord Cromer explains, in his *Report* for 1899:—

'A further tentative step has now been taken in the direction of dealing with this question. The newly-created National Bank is about to make advances of small sums up to £20 at 9 per cent. interest. Further, the Bank offers advances up to £100, at the same rate of interest, to those who wish to pay off their old debts; repayment to the Bank will be made in five yearly instalments due in October of each year, that is to say, at the time the cotton crop is gathered. All such advances will be reported to the Government, who will instruct the tax-collectors to enter them on the "Wirdes," [or, Schedules of Land Tax] and effect the recoveries with the taxes. . . .

'The experiment will, for the present, be tried in one district only. Should it prove successful, the Bank will be prepared to extend its operations.'

tion of capital which imposed heavy fiscal burdens. Under the improved state of the national finances, however, Egypt now enjoys a freedom in Administrative Expenditure which, together with the aid of British capital, enables her to contemplate with assurance the ultimate development of the utmost resources of the country.

The actual out-of-pocket Expenditure for administering Egypt and the Sudan amounts only to about £E3,750,000. The method by which Lord Cromer arrives at this figure is too elaborate for me to quote here: but it may be seen in his *Report* for 1899 (page 12).

Prospective Expenditure

The Ministries of Finance and Public Works have prepared a programme of Extraordinary Expenditure for the coming five years, amounting in the aggregate to 3½ millions, the details of which I have given under the head of 'General Reserve Fund' (*ante* p. 205). Extraordinary Expenditure in the Sudan is, at present, an unknown factor; but for the next five years Ordinary Expenditure will be reduced to a minimum, so as not to bear too heavily on the Egyptian taxpayer. Moreover, in 1903, the Egyptian Treasury will have to meet the payment of an annuity of about £E160,000 for the Reservoir works. 'This,' Mr Gorst explains, in his *Note* on the Budget for 1899, 'will be an addition to the Administrative Expenditure and will, therefore, under existing arrangements, necessitate an increase of Revenue of £E320,000 to balance the excess Expenditure.[1] This eventuality may, however, be contemplated with equanimity, in view of the growth of Revenue which the increasing prosperity of the country, and also the action of the Reservoir works themselves when finished, may be expected to produce.'

Finally, unless untoward events precipitate a Political Solution, the year 1905 will be the *annus mirabilis* in the Financial history of Egypt: since the leading International engagements fall in or are subject to re-adjustment at or before that date.

[1] Owing to the method of distributing the Revenue, as shown by me on page 204.

(*b*) *Public Instruction*

Education bears the aspect of all things temporal in Egypt: it is both National and International. The former has undergone little or no change since the twelfth century. The latter was introduced by Mohammed Ali, in his attempt to mould Egyptian institutions on European models. The first reaches the mass of the people. The second innoculates the body politic. As a race, Egyptians are still enshrouded in the darkness of the Middle Ages. As a nationality, they are awakening from the hypnotism of Islam. And as individuals, freed from the thraldom of despotism, they enjoy many of the privileges and advantages of European civilization.

Historical Retrospect[1] From the foundation of El Azhar, in the tenth century, up to the second decade of the nineteenth century, this great seat of Mohammedan learning was the centre of religious and secular instruction in Egypt. Even at the present day its influence is conspicuous in the Educational system and agencies of the country. The University-Mosque, with responsible sheikhs presiding over the four Orthodox sects, and with a Principal who, at one time, in the days of Egypt's ascendancy, came to be regarded as the Sheikh El-Islam, was for centuries a *foyer* of the Faith in the East. And although, nowadays, the University has lost its power, through the general decadence of Mohammedanism, it has nevertheless conserved its inherent principles, as a product of Medievalism, and is capable of sheltering many thousands of pupils, students, professors, doctors, and non-descripts within its walls.

After the massacre of the Mamluks, in 1811, Mohammed Ali began to introduce the European system of Education into Egypt—not with any object of raising the masses from the ignorance in which they were steeped, but with the sole intention of creating capable officers for his army and navy and competent officials for the State Administrations. His initial efforts were in the direction of training the teachers—

[1] *L'Instruction Publique en Egypte*, par Yacoub Artin Pacha, *passim*.

young Caucasian Mamluks, virtually slaves, and the sons of his officials and officers, who were sent in considerable numbers to Europe (chiefly to France and Italy) and who, on their return, were drafted into the service of the State in various capacities. This process of training lasted from 1816 to 1824, during which period Government Schools were created to give elementary instruction in the natural and exact sciences. Between 1824 and 1839, sixteen Technical or Higher-grade Schools were founded; and the number of pupils reached eight or nine thousand, all of whom received gratuitous instruction, board and lodging. In 1836, a Ministry of Public Instruction was created.

The Primary and Secondary Schools were organized on the model of French Lycées. Pupils were instructed in the Korán, Arabic caligraphy, languages (Arabic, Turkish, and French), and the elements of mathematics, history, geography, &c.

From the year 1836, this system of Education, which hitherto had been imposed exclusively on non-Egyptians, was extended to the Felláhin: and, in order to obtain pupils for his schools, or grist for his scholastic mills, Mohammed Ali had recourse to coercion—amounting to a conscription. Pupils, thus impressed, were bribed or paid to remain in the schools.

Prior to 1836, the Educational agencies of the country were purely military, under the Minister of War; but after that year of reform, and up to the end of the despot's reign, a Minister of Public Instruction and a Superior Council supervised Education. The Professors were provided by El Azhar, or came from Milan, Paris, and London. Moreover, an Egyptian School was founded at Paris, with forty pupils, including several Princes.

Ibrahim, during his brief Regency, encouraged his officials and the leading Egyptian families to send their sons abroad, at an early age, in order to obtain the advantages of a European education. Abbas I. was reactionary in this as in other respects. Said, his successor, paid little attention

to education, establishing and suppressing schools with charming inconsistency. And Ismail was as enterprising in Education as he was in everything that helped to introduce European methods and models into the Civil, Military, and Administrative Departments of the State: but being anxious, as was his wont, to achieve immediate results, his success was not very great.

When Ismail became Pasha of Egypt in 1863, he re-established or revived the schools that had been so neglected during the two previous reigns, and he created others. Thus, there was a Primary and a Secondary or Preparatory School, a Military College, a Polytechnic School, and a School of Medicine. Directors and Professors were imported from France; whilst natives who had been educated in that country completed the teaching staff. Moreover, Ismail established in 1867 a new Egyptian School at Paris, under a French military Director, to which he sent many promising pupils.

Ismail, besides making liberal donations, constituted a Wakf, the revenue of which helped to endow Education; and he nominated a special Committee, to reorganize Public Instruction. The Military Schools were placed under the Minister of War; and the Civil Schools, as the others were called, were retained under the Minister of Public Instruction, who, in Ismail's reign, was usually the Director of the Wakfs. Dor Bey, a Swiss, was made Inspector-General of Education: and to him Egypt owes the genesis in reform of most of her Educational Institutions.

Primary schools, on European models, were established in the chief centres of population, where, in addition to the usual subjects, English also was taught. Under Ismail, (or Dor Bey,) other Educational agencies were founded: namely —a School of Law, two Normal Schools, the École des Arts et Métiers, and a School of Languages.

The financial and political embarrassments of Egypt necessarily handicapped or arrested all these Educational influences; and although Ismail's successor, Taufik, took a special interest in Public Instruction, it was not until the

year 1885 that the 'intellectual awakening' of Egypt, as Artin Pasha styles it, showed any sensible results from the introduction of these comprehensive reforms.

There have been three distinct phases, or stages, in Egyptian Public Instruction: the first, in which pupils were forced into the schools; the second, in which pupils were paid or bribed to attend; and the third, dating from the British Occupation, in which parents in increasing numbers paid the fees for their children's education. It is not so many years ago that more than half the pupils received gratuitous education[1]: whereas in 1898 as many as 86 per cent. of those attending Government Schools were actually paying-pupils. The fees in all Government Schools are very low.

General Considerations

Under the Anglo-Egyptian Administration, Education has made great strides, reaching, in 1897-1898, when important administrative reforms were introduced, a degree of efficiency very creditable to all concerned. The Egyptians are being educated to understand that they have rights, secured by Law; and, under the easier and happier conditions that now prevail, they take an increasing interest in the advantages of Education, especially in the higher grades, which qualify for lucrative appointments. But to Education, for itself, they are profoundly indifferent. With the exception of the Director-General of Education, Yakub Artin Pasha, whose zeal and high qualifications are well known, probably none of the Egyptian Ministers and Under-Secretaries regard Education (except academically) as the principal means of creating a body of efficient public servants.

The general tendency of Public Instruction is to educate the official caste which Mohammed Ali called into existence. This professional or middle class, under the favourable circumstances due to the recognition of Justice and to more peaceful times, is impressed by the benefits derived from Education: but those who fail to obtain employment under Government are apt to use their superficial knowledge,

[1] In 1879, only 5 per cent. were paying-pupils.

like the disaffected Babus of India, for seditious and other mischievous ends.

According to the recent census (1897), 91·2 per cent. of the male, and 99·4 per cent. of the female, population of Egypt are classed as illiterate: that is to say, they are unable to read and write. But, excluding children under seven years of age and the Bedwin population, the proportion of illiterates (male and female) is 88 per cent. of the total population. The small balance of 12 per cent. able to read and write include over 11,000 pupils in the Government schools—an increase of 9000 within the last 10 years—and pupils of the still more numerous non-Government schools, besides the adult population.

Pupils have a free choice as to which of the two European languages they select for the medium of instruction in Government schools. Their parents enjoy entire liberty of action in this respect: and their choice, which has to be stated in writing, has followed very closely on their interpretation of the political situation, which governs it to the extent of determining their vote for the English or French prospect of domination. Thus, at the time of the British Occupation, French was the European language taught in Government schools, and English was wholly neglected; but, during the present decade, the percentage of English pupils has steadily increased, and the percentage of French pupils has steadily decreased: so that now the relative proportion is almost reversed. The notable change in 1897-1898, during the Sudan Campaign, speaks for itself. On the other hand, the percentages in the Secondary Schools are still in favour of the French, who also maintain a fair average in the Technical Schools and Professional Colleges: thereby indicating that, in Higher Education, the French language still holds its ground.[1]

[1] Considering the liberality of France, who for many years gave free education to a number of young Egyptians, and considering also that the British tenure of Egypt has only within the last two or three years shown any signs of permanency,

Choice of Language as the medium for Instruction

In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer gives statistics, in regard to the choice of language as the medium for Instruction, which are most suggestive. As a commentary on the British Occupation, the figures afford an accurate index to the native mind.

Lord Cromer prefaces his remarks by stating, that the policy adopted by the Anglo-Egyptian Administration in this matter 'may be briefly described as that of linguistic free trade;' and he adds: 'No attempt has been made to discourage instruction in French. The number both of French teachers and of Egyptians employed to teach the French language in the Government schools has been more than doubled since 1881. For many years, although the proportion of pupils learning French, respectively to those learning English, was gradually undergoing a change, no diminution in the aggregate attendance at the French classes occurred. On the other hand, English has been placed on the same footing as French. Equal facilities have been provided in both cases. Every parent has been requested to state in writing whether he wished his son to learn French or English. He has been left entirely free to decide this question for himself. As time went on and the demand for teaching in English grew, the facilities for instruction in that language were naturally increased.'

The results obtained under this system may be briefly stated. The Table overpage shows the number of pupils learning English and French, respectively, in the Government schools, for each year during the last decade :—

---

to the native mind, it is surprising that the difference is no greater. But the predominance of French pupils in Secondary Schools sufficiently characterizes the lead which France has so long held in Educational matters. Whilst French, too, still lingers as the official language in most of the Departments of the Administration, it is, if I mistake not, being gradually displaced by English in this and in other directions. Indeed, I observed during my second visit to Egypt, after an absence of less than a year, increased evidence of the diffusion of English, particularly in public notices, &c.

A scheme has now been launched, to establish (for natives and residents in Alexandria, the Delta, and Cairo) English Schools of a strictly undenominational character. Funds for an endowment are being raised.

Year.	Numbers.		Percentage.	
	English.	French.	English.	French.
1889 . .	1,063	2,994	26	74
1890 . .	1,747	3,199	35	65
1891 . .	2,032	2,852	42	58
1892 . .	2,237	2,864	44	56
1893 . .	2,434	2,585	48	52
1894 . .	2,669	3,748	42[1]	58
1895 . .	2,655	3,417	44	56
1896 . .	2,800	3,363	45	55
1897 . .	3,058	3,150	49	51
1898 . .	3,859	1,881	67[2]	33

My remarks in regard to the choice of language in Higher Education are borne out by the following Table :—

Class of School or College.	Years.	Numbers.		Percentage.	
		English.	French.	English.	French.
Primary Schools . .	1889	689	2,133	24	76
,, ,, . .	1898	3,389	1,337	72	28
Secondary Schools .	1889	169	488	26	74
,, ,, .	1898	210	305	41	59
Technical Schools and College of Agriculture .	1889	144	161	47	53
,, ,, .	1898	156	132	54	46
Professional Colleges .	1889	61	212	22	78
,, ,, .	1898	104	107	49	51
Total . .	1889	1,063	2,994	26	74
,, . .	1898	3,859	1,881	67	33

[1] This decline is attributed to the acute wave of Anglophobia which swept the country during Riaz Pasha's Ministry in 1894.

[2] Reservoir scheme floated, and Sudan reconquered, in 1898.

General Results are summarized by Lord Cromer in the following passages :— General Results

'It will be seen :—

'1. That there has been a large aggregate increase in the attendance at the primary schools, and that it is more especially at these schools that the proportion of those learning English has undergone a great change ;

'2. That there has been some diminution in the aggregate number of pupils in the secondary schools, and that, although the percentage of those learning English has risen from 26 to 41, the majority of the pupils in these schools still prefer to be taught in French ;

'3. That in the technical schools, where the aggregate numbers remain about the same, the proportion of those learning English has slightly increased ; and

'4. That in the professional schools, where the aggregate attendance has remained nearly constant, the proportion of those learning English has risen from 22 per cent. to 49 per cent.

'The demand from all parts of the country for trained native teachers in English is far in excess of the supply annually afforded by the three existing training colleges. . . . The impossibility of obtaining any very quick results is more obvious in this than perhaps in any other of the subjects which, taken together, constitute the work of Egyptian regeneration. Nevertheless, the facts which I have adduced above, in a very summarized form, are, I venture to think, a sufficient proof that the steady and continuous labour of the officers of the Education Department are at length beginning to yield some solid results. The success of the technical schools, the reorganization of the School of Medicine, and the encouraging commencements which have been made in the direction both of female education and of raising the general intellectual standard in the country by improving the village schools, are all satisfactory features in the present educational outlook. But the point which perhaps more than any other deserves notice is that evidence is forthcoming of the capability of the Egyptian schools and

colleges to turn out a number of young men who will be able to take a useful and honourable, albeit sometimes humble, part in the administration of their own country. It would be unduly optimistic to suppose that, for many years to come, the educational system can attain any higher ideal than this.'

During the last three or four years, the Education Department has concentrated more of its attention on the Kuttabs under Government inspection and on Primary Schools; whilst the syllabus of Secondary Schools has been considerably lightened, and the course of study reduced to three years. The Government are endeavouring to increase the number of Primary Schools, and, above all, to educate the girls, whose subsequent influence on family life and morals should be beneficial to the State. Thus, girls in the Kuttabs under Government inspection receive a double capitation grant: but more money is required, in order to give full effect to the system of grants-in-aid, which has worked so well in India and elsewhere.

Administration

The shifts and expedients to which the Education Department is put, in order to establish an equilibrium between competing forces, is extraordinary—at least, it would be extraordinary anywhere but in Egypt, where normal conditions are rather the exception. Care has to be taken not to wound native susceptibilities, especially on the score of religion, and to give due weight to the prescriptive rights of France in the Education of the country. In particular, though appearances may be saved by having Native, French, and English interests represented in the Administrative branches, matters have to be so arranged, that the balance of votes rests on the European side. In the lower grades of Education, Moslem influence and the sterility of Mohammedan habits of thought and methods of teaching have to be overcome without stirring up fanatical opposition. In the higher grades, it is essential to secure the balance of European influence and methods of teaching.

In fact, the religious element is most important in all Educational reforms; and it is very difficult to deal with.

Thus, the Principal of El Azhar, who happened to be sitting on the same Committee as the British Secretary-General, opposed the introduction of a text-book on Logic because he considered the Korán a better guide—as if logic had any religion!

In the direction of Education, the British Secretary-General and Inspector-General has now practically a free hand, in the control both of the Office and of Government Schools and Colleges. Fortunately, the Under-Secretary of State, who is nominally the Director-General of Education, is an Armenian gentleman of wide sympathies and liberal views, wholly in accord with the British Control and with European standards. On the other hand, the Minister of Public Instruction, who has to sign all important documents, is somewhat reactionary. But being on the Superior Council, which has a European majority, and being also salaried only in respect of his portfolio for Public Works—which in the East means 'no pay, no work'—his concurrence can at all times be procured, since, in effect, his position is merely honorary. The British Secretary-General is, thus, in a position to check any arbitrary interference with the Educational system of the country, due to a change of Ministers (which was a feature prior to 1895), and to secure continuity of policy.

I now propose to pass in review the Educational Institutions of Egypt under Government control and supervision.

§ *Government Institutions*

Budgets

The Ministry of Public Instruction has three Budgets, connoting in a measure the three stages of Educational development in Egypt, to which I have referred. There is, first, the annual Government grant for Public Instruction, which is being steadily increased, though not so rapidly as the Educational authorities would wish. There is, secondly, the Special Fund derived from the Management of Estates which Ismail constituted into a Wakf,[1] and

[1] These estates, the Wadi Tumailat, comprise about 22,000 acres of land retroceded to the Egyptian Government by the Suez Canal Company, on the

to which he made other donations. And lastly, there is the annual subsidy[1] paid by the Wakfs Administration in support of their Primary Schools in Cairo which the Government took over in 1889. The Government Grant has been increased (1899) by two items, to which I shall presently refer.

In 1897 and 1898, the Expenditure on behalf of the Administration (*Personnel*) amounted to nearly £E88,000; and Various Expenses exceeded £E17,000. School fees in 1897 reached £E65,000. The number of scholars in 1897 was 11,304; and of teachers, 650. The *net* annual Expenditure of the Ministry of Public Instruction may be taken, roughly, at between £E90,000 and £E100,000, and the *gross* Expenditure at over £E150,000.

Central Administration

From the Table (No. 5) which illustrates this subsection, it will be seen that the British Secretary-General occupies a commanding position in the Educational Institutions of Egypt. Mr Douglas Dunlop, who fills that post so honourably and so judiciously, is the first Englishman (or Scotsman, to be more precise) who has held responsible office in the Ministry of Public Instruction; and it may be said with truth, that the permanence and right direction of Educational reforms have coincided more or less with the date of his appointment. He and Yakub Artin Pasha are the leading spirits in this Department of State.

It is not so much the lack of funds that cripples the development of Education in Egypt, though more money is undoubtedly required to provide an adequate and efficient body of Inspectors, to increase the grants-in-aid to the Kuttabs under Government inspection, and for other objects. What Egypt principally needs is a more efficient teach-

---

arbitration of Napoleon III. in 1867. About 8000 acres are under cultivation, the remaining land being at present water-logged. The annual income of this Fund is, I believe, over £20,000.

[1] This subsidy was originally £E4100, apart from certain additions. In the present year (1899) it has been increased by a further contribution of £2700 per annum. The money will be spent on making the Wakfs Schools a model for imitation by the Provincial Kuttabs. The 55 Kuttabs represent an attendance of 2923 pupils, of whom 442 are girls.

TABLE No. 5.

THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF EGYPT



[1] Touch with the other Educational agencies in the country is maintained through the Board of Examiners, who grant Primary and Secondary Certificates for Governmen appointments, etc.

[2] The English Vice-Principals of the School of Medicine and of the Polytechnic School practically rule over those bodies.

ing staff for Secondary Education and for the Professional Schools and Colleges. The Normal Schools are turning out competent teachers for Primary Education; but Secondary Education professors have to be sought in Europe or selected from the élite of the native teachers in the Primary Schools. National Education therefore runs the risk of becoming too Europeanized.

Board of Examiners

In the Board of Examiners, which grants Primary and Secondary Certificates, not only to the pupils and students of Government Schools, but also to others who present themselves for examination, the European element is supreme. The written papers of these examinations are brought in sealed envelopes to the British Secretary-General, who numbers them before submitting them to the Board. At least two, and sometimes three examiners (English, French, and Egyptian), sitting together, have to read each paper. Thus, favouritism is obviated.

Management of Estates

The management of the Wadi Tumailat estates is under Native Administration. That is equivalent to saying, that the Administration is bad and ruinous. But, as money is lacking to spend on its reform, and as business of that character is obviously not a province of Government, it is hoped that an opportunity may be found to realize this property.

Khedivial Library

The Khedivial Library has an annual grant of £E2000. The Wakfs Administration contributes £E500; and the balance is derived from landed property. The Commissioners of the Debt have voted £E50,000 for a new building, the foundations of which are now being laid, as a museum of Arab Art[1] and a library of Arab Literature. The Khedivial

[1] 'Under the direction of M. Herz Bey, about £E10,400 was spent on the preservation of Arab monuments during the year 1898. One-half of this amount was provided by the Wakfs Administration, the remainder being taken from the special grant of £E20,000 made some little while ago by the Commissioners of the Debt for expenditure of this nature. Four mosques were taken in hand, the most important being El-Mardani and Kait Bey, on which £E2000 and £E1800 were respectively expended. A sum of £E500 was spent in buying out some of the small shops and buildings which surround and disfigure many of the monuments. £E800 was spent on restoring the old city walls. In June 1898 a letter was addressed to the Coptic Patriarch stating that if his community would find a

Library, under the able direction of a German orientalist, Dr Moritz, is the finest Library in the East. It was founded by Ismail, to house the splendid Koráns rescued from the mosques, which now form the basis and perhaps the most interesting feature of the collection of Arab literature. The Library, which is used principally by Europeans, contains also some valuable Arabic and Turkish MSS., and a miscellaneous collection of books dealing with Egypt, Africa, and the East.

Observatory

The Observatory, under an Egyptian Director, is in a ruinous state. Funds are needed to put the instruments in order, to begin with.

Inspectorate

The principal Inspector of Schools, Mr Elliot, was formerly the Director of the Khedivía Training College. There is also a French Inspector, four Egyptian Inspectors, and three or four subordinates. But the Inspectorate is in need of competent recruits, to aid the British Inspector-General in this important branch of Educational supervision, which still depends, in too great a measure, on extraneous co-operation.

Curriculum

There is now a graduated system of teaching, beginning in the Kuttabs under Government control, and passing through Primary and Secondary Schools, up to the Professional Schools and Colleges. Primary Certificates admit to the two Technical Schools and the School of Agriculture. Secondary Certificates admit to the Colleges,—the School of Law and the School of Medicine, etc. In the curriculum of Government Schools, every effort is make to counteract the tendency towards cramming and memorising, which are the fundamental defects of Mohammedan national education; whilst increasing attention is paid to discipline, deportment, and physical culture,—drill being regularly taught and English games encouraged. The new methods introduced, in

---

sum of £E2000 for the restoration and repair of Coptic monuments, the Government would provide an equal amount. No reply has yet been received to this communication. The want of interest shown by the Coptic Community generally, in the preservation of their ancient monuments, is greatly to be regretted.'—(Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899).

1887, into the teaching of Arabic, etc., do not make an inordinate tax on the memory: but they do appeal to the reasoning faculties. And in regard to foreign languages (French and English), the new methods introduced in 1889 use these *media* as vehicles of instruction rather than as the essential means of acquiring a knowledge of the sciences.

Pupils enter the Primary Schools between the ages of seven and ten, and cannot remain beyond fourteen. The four years' curriculum of both the French and the English courses of study are the same. After taking the Primary Certificate, pupils enter Secondary Schools. Those who cannot pass the examination are sent back, or are recommended to embrace a commercial career. Pupils entering the Secondary Schools must be over eleven years of age; and they must leave when they are nineteen. The Secondary Education course is for three years. The Scholastic year is for nine months, but is interrupted by Ramadan and numerous fêtes.

In the Primary Schools, the first year is devoted to reading and writing in Arabic; in the second year, a foreign language is taken up, together with object-lessons and geography in Arabic; in the third year, object-lessons and instruction in geography are given in a European language; and in the fourth year, history is taught in Arabic, in order that pupils may perfect their composition and style in the vernacular. At the end of the Primary course, about three-fourths of the boys are able to read, to write, and to speak a foreign language more or less correctly and fluently.

In the Secondary Schools, less time is given to Arabic, in which pupils with Primary Certificates should be fairly proficient, and more time is devoted to foreign languages.

Syllabus

The Syllabus of the Primary course of study is as follows:—the Korán, and Principles of Islamism; the Arabic language; Arabic caligraphy; Arithmetic; Geometry and Mensuration; the English language; the French language; English caligraphy; Object-lessons; Geography; History; Drawing (freehand and geometrical); and the Turkish language.

The Syllabus of the Secondary course of study is as follows :—the Arabic language ; Arabic caligraphy ; Arithmetic ; Geometry ; Algebra ; the English language—(*a*) as the principal European language studied by pupils in English classes, or (*b*) as the supplementary European language studied by pupils in French classes ; the French language, with the same distinctions ; English caligraphy : Geography and Physiography; History; Physics; Chemistry; Natural Science (Botany, Physiology, Zoology, Hygiene) ; Drawing ; and the Turkish language.

Certificates

As all Lower-grade appointments in the Civil Service require a Primary, and all Higher-grade appointments a Secondary, Certificate, the Schools not under Government control (Coptic, European Voluntary Schools, etc.) send up their pupils, on the same terms as pupils of the Government Schools, to be examined by the Board of Examiners. The Education Department thus keeps in touch with the Educational systems of these bodies.

The Decree of 4th December, 1891, recognises the validity of Primary and Secondary Certificates for posts under Government. Primary Certificates admit also to Secondary Schools, the École des Arts et Métiers, and the Agricultural College. Secondary Certificates admit to the Polytechnic School, to the School of Medicine, and the School of Law. Moreover, Egyptian Secondary Certificates are now recognised in England, France, and Switzerland on liberal terms.

The system of granting Primary and Secondary Certificates is producing excellent results. There is a steady increase in the number of successful candidates at the examinations. But the demand on the part of the State Administrations, as well as of the Higher schools, for young Egyptians who possess either the Primary or Secondary Education Certificates, is, as Lord Cromer remarked in 1897, far in excess of the supply.

Kuttabs

Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1898, states that, during the last three or four years, the Government have formulated a definite policy for dealing with the vernacular schools

throughout Egypt. A set of regulations for the application of the grant-in-aid system to indigenous vernacular schools has been published. The principle therein affirmed is, that monthly inspection by officers of the Public Instruction Department shall be a condition to grants-in-aid. Furthermore, the system is based on entire abstinence from interference with religious instruction; and is thus equally applicable to schools professing the Mohammedan, Coptic, Jewish, or other faith. The subjects of examination are strictly limited to reading, writing, and arithmetic. As already noted, special encouragement is given to female rudimentary instruction, in which an appreciable advance has been made.[1] The grant to each Kuttab is calculated on the average attendance: the annual subvention varying between two shillings and three shillings for each boy, and double the amount for each girl. Finally, the Inspectors of Kuttabs are chosen as far as possible from El Azhar or from some other Mosque-School; all tuition is given in Arabic; and the teaching of any foreign language is rigorously excluded.

'The object which it is now sought to obtain,' Lord

[1] 'No girl has as yet presented herself for the primary certificate examination, but there is good reason to hope and believe that in two or three years' time some girls will be amongst the successful candidates at this examination. In at least two of the State Administrations in Egypt—the Sanitary Department and the Department of Public Instruction—there are openings for women as members of the Civil Service. One of the purposes fulfilled by the higher primary school for girls is to prepare them for the professional schools which provide a special training for the vocations of nursing, midwifery, and teaching. In the regulations for the training school for nurses and midwives, attended last December by eighteen students, it is laid down as one of the conditions of admission that applicants should possess the primary education certificate, or some certificate recognised as its equivalent. As soon as the pupils in the two higher primary schools for girls have reached the stage of the primary education certificate, a training college for women teachers will be opened, and this certificate will be made the necessary passport for admission. No Egyptian woman has yet received a professional training for the vocation of teacher. It is obvious that, in a country where custom demands the seclusion of women, schools for girls can enjoy no large measure of popularity or prosperity, nor can the growing practice of extending to girls the benefits of private tuition in their homes be carried on to any great extent, until women are trained for the profession of teaching.'—(Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899, p. 44.)

Cromer explains, in his *Report* for 1899, 'in dealing with these schools, is not to train up a number of youths who will eventually become candidates for Government employment, but to raise the general level of education amongst the mass of the population.'

In order to promote reforms in the Kuttabs, the Government have increased (1899) the annual subvention from £E700 to £E1000—a sum which, 'of course, is wholly insufficient to make any serious impression on the mass of ignorance prevalent in the country. It is, however, on financial as on other grounds, both necessary and desirable to proceed tentatively in this matter.' Early in 1898, there were only 56 Government Kuttabs, or Lower-grade Primary Schools under Sheikhs, out of the nine or ten thousand that exist in the country—with an attendance of about 180,000 pupils. But in the course of the year (1898) as many as 305 Kuttabs applied for grants-in-aid: with the result that pecuniary assistance was awarded in the case of 110 schools.

Primary Schools

There are 38 Primary, or Higher-grade, Schools under Egyptian headmasters. Speaking only of the Primary Schools at Cairo, which I visited in December 1896, I may say, that I was impressed by their excellent organization. 'The discipline, particularly on the English side, was very good: the classes were orderly, and the schoolrooms clean and airy. The pupils, who appeared to be fairly intelligent, certainly understood and spoke English very well.[1]

The boys selecting the French course are, perhaps, of better social standing, being the children or grand-children of parents brought up with French traditions. The classes being limited as far as possible to 30 pupils in each, the double teaching-staff does not necessarily imply duplication

[1] I heard lessons in dictation, English grammar, geography, etc., all of which were very elementary. As regards geography, considering how badly this subject is taught at home, I was not surprised to find that the teaching appealed too exclusively to the memory, and that the map-drawing was mechanical and ornamental. For instance, the boys in one class recognised the leading features of a mountain, drawn on the blackboard, but were unable to apply their knowledge to the extent of finding an example in the Mokattem hills, near Cairo.

of work. Of the 450 pupils, there were then only about a dozen who did not pay school-fees.

The boys receive a good meal at midday. Perfect liberty is accorded to them in regard to their religious observances—ablutions, etc. At the moment of my visit, I noticed only six lads in the court off the playground sacred to this purpose.

Primary education is given to about 100 Egyptian children, including boarders, in the Abbas Girls' School. This School, of the Higher-grade, was opened in 1895, and placed under an English schoolmistress, who pays particular attention to physical culture. Built out of fines from the Railway employés, the school contains excellent class-rooms and every convenience. Since I was in Egypt, a second higher-grade Primary School for girls has been established at Cairo; and another school of a similar kind has been created in the Fayum by the spontaneous action of a native local Committee. The attendance, at the end of 1898, in all the girls' schools under the control of the Education Department numbered 1382.

Secondary Schools

The Government has attempted to keep pace with the growing demands of the country, and good progress is being made in Higher Education: but there is still some room for improvement, especially in regard to some of the Colleges where technical subjects are taught. One fundamental reform has recently been introduced. The syllabus of Secondary Schools has been lightened, and the course reduced from 5 to 3 years. Formerly, the Syllabus was overloaded, and the standard was pitched too high; with the result that, professors, in order to satisfy the Examiners, had to cram their pupils, who in any case have a tendency to memorize: and the general intelligence of students was not, therefore, properly developed. But Artin Pasha, my cicerone, assured me that pupils were given a wide range of subjects in order to gain a thorough knowledge of a European language: because at home they speak Arabic only. In that case, perhaps, the relatively few hours devoted to the acquisition of English and French might, with greater advantage, be

restricted to a single language. At present, time is lost in acquiring a smattering of a 'subsidiary language.'

Few boys survive the Secondary course. They enter at the age of fourteen, or under; and drop off steadily year by year:[1] because parents get weary of paying fees, and want their sons to marry or settle down in life. As time goes on, the lads get overcrammed, fat, and (especially at the age of puberty) lazy into the bargain.

The classes I visited (Geography and History) certainly convinced me, that rote-learning was cultivated to a predatory extent. Since then, however, the progress in reform has been rapid.

As regards Secondary Education, Mr Douglas Dunlop writes to Lord Cromer:[2]—'The three Secondary Schools directly under the management of the Public Instruction Department—the Khedivieh School, with an attendance of 273, the Tewfikieh School, with an attendance of 170, in Cairo; and the Ras-el-Tin School, attended by 72 boys, in Alexandria—have all attained a high degree of proficiency, and can lose nothing by comparison with any European schools of similar rank.'

Certificates (1898)

At the examination in 1898 for the Primary Education Certificate (the leaving-certificate for Higher Primary Schools), 1381 candidates presented themselves. Of these,

[1] In his *Considérations sur l'Instruction en Egypte*, to which I am indebted for some of my facts, Artin Pasha publishes the following Table:

Years.	Number of Pupils in the Classes of the Secondary Schools.			
	1st year.	2nd year.	3rd year.	4th year.
1887	201	74	65	19
1888	190	128	62	56
1889	194	110	89	44
1890	241	140	93	70
1891	257	195	126	75
1892	225	170	129	80

[2] Published in Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899, p. 40.

427 were successful: namely, 300 Mohammedans, and 127 Copts.

At the examination in 1898 for the Secondary Education Certificate, 98 candidates were successful. Of these, 59 were Mohammedans, and the remainder (39) were mostly Copts. Since June, 1887, when this examination was first instituted, 670 students have obtained the Secondary Certificate.

Secondary Certificates (1887-1898)

Of these 670 students, who received Secondary Certificates, 19 have died, and 4 are returned as 'address and occupation unknown.' Of the remaining 647, as many as 206 have not yet completed their education, being distributed as follows:—

Students in the Higher Colleges of the Egyptian Government	175
„ in private Higher Colleges in Egypt . .	3
„ in other countries (France, 17; Great Britain, 7; Switzerland, 2; Austria, 1; Turkey, 1) . .	28
Total	206

There remain 441. These are accounted for in the following manner:—

Employed in the Egyptian Government Service . .	324
Privately employed	94
Unemployed	23
Total	441

The result of this analysis is, therefore, to show that, of all those who have so far obtained a Secondary Certificate, and who, having completed their studies, are available for employment, only 23 remain unemployed.

Choice of Professions

These are Lord Cromer's figures.[1] Expressed in another way—though I have not the statistics beyond 1892, in that respect—we can trace the choice of professions made by Students with Secondary Certificates.

Out of the 300 students who, between the years 1887 and 1892, obtained Secondary Certificates, no less than 110

[1] *Report* for 1899, p. 40.

entered the School of Law: because, in this popular profession, licentiates are certain of obtaining good posts under Government, some of which are lucrative. Of the remainder, 48 selected Medicine; 31, Engineering; 66, the Teaching profession; 5, Agriculture; 2 passed into the Military College; 13 entered the Government Service direct; 22 took up commerce or some other occupation on their own account; and 3 died prematurely.

Again, 155 became students in the Professional Schools and Colleges under Government; 4 entered the High Schools of Private Educational agencies; 40 went to Europe to finish their education (most of them at Government expense); 79 entered the Government Service, directly or indirectly; 11 found other employment; 6 found no employment at all; and 2 were lost sight of, apart from the 3 who died.[1]

This distribution of successful candidates in the examination for the Secondary Certificate is instructive, because it illustrates the directions in which the Scholastic mills are supplying a demand. It will be seen that the vast majority found Government employment: and it is from this class that the ranks of the public services are recruited.

Professional Schools and Colleges

Most of the Professional Schools and Colleges have had a very chequered history. They have depended largely on the ability of their Directors and Principals, and not a little on the measure of support—in particular, the financial support—extended to them. From the days of Dor Bey, who laboured so assiduously and so intelligently in the cause of Technical and Higher Education, up to the present time, these Schools and Colleges[2] have suffered from frequent changes of policy and from lack of competent professors. Not unfrequently, too, there have been intrigues which have undermined the position and influence of the Directors and Principals. There is still much to be desired in their organization and teaching. But they are making progress.

[1] *Considérations* etc., par Yacoub Artin Pacha.

[2] The Training Colleges for Teachers and the School of Agriculture are however, creations since 1880.

Technical Schools

The École des Arts et Métiers, at Bulak, was originally founded in 1875; and for some years it was regarded as a kind of Reformatory, owing to the hard labour which the students considered penal. But the dignity of labour was re-habilitated and the moral tone of the School was raised through the reforms introduced, in 1883-1885, by Guigon Bey, who practically created the School, as we now know it. Between 1888 and 1890, there was a relapse to the old methods, owing to a change in the Directorship; but since 1891, when Primary Certificates were required to admit to the School, the results achieved have been increasingly satisfactory. The present French Director (M. Meunier) and the English head of the workshops are turning out many competent men for employment in the Railways, Telegraphs, and Arsenal.[1]

There is both an English and a French side of the School, according as the pupils come from the Primary Schools. The course covers from 4 to 5 years, in which pupils are trained in the various handicrafts: but few remain on to the end. They enter at the age of 14 or over, and drop off for the reasons already assigned.

When I visited this popular School, in December 1896, there were 300 youths undergoing instruction, of whom about 200 were boarders. Although the inclusive fees amount to only £16 a year, most of the pupils were non-paying, owing to their nominations, it is said, being obtained through influence.

The École des Arts et Métiers is, however, a good practical Institution. It has an excellent foundry, smiths' and work-shops (where engines are occasionally repaired, in order to afford mechanical experience). But the Egyptian youths will not work in these departments, which require

[1] Of the 68 pupils who completed their course of training in 1898, all have obtained employment in Government or in private establishments. Thirty-four have been appointed as telegraph clerks; sixteen obtained technical posts in various State Administrations; eighteen are employed by various industrial societies, mainly by the sugar factories in Upper Egypt.

There is also a Technical School at Mansura, to which reference is made on the next page.

hard labour: they select, so far as they may, the least fatiguing work possible. Some of the furniture exhibited by them—especially the *mushrabia*—is of excellent workmanship.

There is also a Technical School at Mansura; but it is hampered by the want of suitable premises and crippled by the lack of funds to provide a properly qualified staff of teachers and foremen. Still, it is popular; and it derives a certain income from the orders sent to it by the general public.

School of Agriculture

When the School of Agriculture was first founded (1889), an attempt was made to introduce University teaching. It was not until the year 1896, when a new curriculum was adopted, that the practical side of Agriculture was adequately recognised, at the expense of theoretical teaching: with the result that an increasing number of students have since taken up the course at the School of Agriculture. This is no more than might have been expected. The Felláh, who is eager to adopt labour-saving appliances, and is open to progressive ideas, does not require a strictly scientific or theoretical training, in the sense recognised by us. Centuries of experience have produced agriculturists whose inborn aptitudes are readily trained to adopt the better methods suggested by scientific culture,—methods which, though common to all rainless regions, are differentiated in many respects to the peculiar needs of Egypt. Thus, although the School of Agriculture is now meeting with a greater measure of success than formerly was the case, I believe I am not unjustified in stating, that the annual grant of £E4000 might be laid out to greater practical advantage by creating model farms and experimental laboratories in the chief agricultural centres of Egypt. But, naturally, the Government do not wish to abandon an institution once started, so long as there are reasonable hopes of its ultimate success. The Commissioners of the *Caisse* have granted £E15,000 for the construction of a school adjoining the present site, affording more suitable premises.

Moreover, a grant of £E2000 has, in 1899, been added

to the budget of the Public Works Department, as a subvention to the recently formed Agricultural Society, the chief objects of which are the encouragement of Agriculture and the study of the numerous questions connected with the cultivation of the soil.[1]

Youths enter the School of Agriculture, with a Primary Certificate, at about the age of fourteen. Their general education is carried on concurrently with instruction in Theoretical and Practical Agriculture, the curriculum embracing Arithmetic, Arabic, English, Chemistry, Physics, and land-surveying. The course of study extends over four years, at the end of which period very few of the students take up Agriculture. The majority enter the Civil Service as clerks, etc. That is why I fail to see the value of the Institution.

When I first visited the School of Agriculture, in 1896, there were 40 students, of whom only 16 were paying the annual fees, amounting to £24, absolutely inclusive. There were then three English Professors; and the laboratories were well equipped.

About 35 acres of land, adjoining the School, are set aside for experimental farming, on the principle adopted in some of the Indian Agricultural Schools. All the work of cultivating the soil, planting, irrigating, and harvesting, is carried out by the students themselves, without the employment of any hired labour. The produce of each plot belongs to the student cultivating it, and may be sold or retained by him for his own benefit. The students have thus some material inducement to work both well and hard: it seems much more interesting and profitable than Secondary Education.

[1] In his *Note* on the Budget for 1899, Mr Gorst remarks: 'The Egyptian landowners take a very great interest in the [Agricultural] Society; and the Government is anxious to support an institution capable of rendering important services to the principal industry of the country. Besides the above-mentioned subvention, the Government has also placed at the disposal of the Society 300 acres of cultivable land for their experiments.' The Commissioners of the *Caisse* have been asked for a grant of £8000, from the General Reserve Fund, for the construction of buildings for the annual shows.

The School of Law, under the direction of M. Testoud, has acquired so high a reputation, that the men trained in it are held to be as competent as the licentiates and doctors of foreign Universities. I have already referred to the popularity, among ambitious young Egyptians, of a legal career. The course of instruction, which was reduced in 1892 to four years, covers Mohammedan Law as well as Roman and French Law. Since 1893, students leaving this School may receive, not only a Certificate of Study but also a diploma, equivalent to a Legal degree. The day is, perhaps, not far distant when the Professional Schools and Colleges may be amalgamated into a University. Colleges

The School of Law has over 100 students. Each year, the number of successful students who have completed their course is more than adequate to supply the needs of the Magistracy. Police officers also acquire in this School elementary instruction in Criminal Law and Procedure of the Courts.

The Government have granted (1899) £E2000 to the School of Law, in order to establish a section in which instruction will now be given in the English language.[1] It may be hoped that this is the first step towards the recognition of English by the Mixed Courts, in which at present the pleading is restricted to Arabic, Italian, and French, thereby involving the translation of English documentary evidence — an unfair tax on the Anglo-American community.

[1] In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer remarks: 'I have stated that English has been put on a footing of equality with French in the Government schools. Up to the present time, however, there has been one exception to this rule. The only European language now used in the School of Law is French. The result is that all pupils on the English side of the preparatory schools are practically debarred from entering the legal profession. The treatment of this question has been delayed partly for financial reasons, and partly because in a country such as Egypt, where there was so much to do in the way of reform, it was very desirable to proceed deliberately and not to endeavour to make too many changes simultaneously. The number of English-speaking pupils in the preparatory schools is now, however, so great that a further postponement would not be justifiable. Provision has, therefore, been made in the estimates for the current year for the establishment, in October next, of an English section in the School of Law.'

The School of Medicine dates as far back as 1837; and it has undergone many transformations. Most of the Principals have been Egyptian; two or three have been French. Towards 1885, the studies were reduced to bare theory and speculation. These have since been made more practical. But the School of Medicine is not popular, largely because students find difficulty in subsequently obtaining posts under the Ministry of the Interior, for which their training affords no adequate equipment.[1] Until the organizing zeal of the English Vice-Principal, who now enjoys practically a free hand, has had time and opportunity to introduce reforms, not much progress can be expected.

Polytechnic School

Much the same strictures apply also to the School of Engineering—or, as it is more commonly called, the Polytechnic School—which has never been on a satisfactory footing. The engineers from the Ministry of Public Works and the Railway Administration have never exercised an intelligent initiative. All reforms have emanated from the outside, and therefore have caused internal friction in the School. The curriculum and syllabus were subjected to considerable modification, when these were revised about fourteen years ago; and at the present day an English Vice-Principal exercises wide discretionary powers, in which there lies some hope of reform.

The Polytechnic School trains more or less competent assistants for the Irrigation engineers and for service under the Ministry of Public Works. But Egyptians have not yet proved their capacity to fill the higher posts in this

[1] Dr Cooper Perry, of Guy's Hospital, visited Egypt in 1897, and drew up a Report in which he fully explained the changes necessary in the constitution of the School, the curriculum, etc. Effect has now been given to Dr Cooper Perry's proposals; and, in his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer remarks: 'It is as yet too early to say how the new organization will work, but the immediate result of adopting the new system is that there is no longer a dearth of students. I give below the number admitted to the School since 1892. It will be observed that a notable increase took place last year:—1892, 2; 1893, 0; 1894, 4; 1895, 5; 1896, 6; 1897, 14; 1898, 21.

'In accordance with a recommendation made by Dr Cooper Perry, it has been decided to make an annual grant to the School of Medicine with a view to promoting scientific research in subjects which possess special importance to Egypt.'

Department.[1] Apart from their technical qualifications—which are a long way behind those of pupils from Cooper's Hill College—they are incapable of initiative and shun responsibility. It may, however, be noted that Egyptian Inspectors are (or were, in 1898) at the head of the Fifth Circle of Irrigation (Kena) and of the Girga Directorate (Sohag).

Training Colleges

Egypt has three Normal Schools or Training Colleges for Teachers. These are:—(1) the Normal School (or Khedivía Lycée) under an English Director; (2) the Normal School (or Taufikía Lycée) under a French Director; and (3) the Vernacular Normal School (Dar el-Olum) under an Arab Sheikh. The first was instituted in 1889; the second in 1880; and the third in 1881. The European Schools train teachers in the English and French languages and in Science (for Primary Education), the most promising of whom are sent to Europe—two or three every year—to complete their studies. The Vernacular School prepares sheikhs (between the ages of 18 and 24) who have passed through El Azhar and are studying for the work of teaching in Arabic.

In 1895, the Dar el-Olum was incorporated with the largest and most successful Primary School (Nasría) in Cairo; and it was placed under the direction of the ablest native Principal in the Education Department, the syllabus being revised with the view of making the training

[1] The Polytechnic School, according to Mr Dunlop, made in 1898 a nearer approach to efficiency than in any previous year: but satisfactory progress continues to be seriously retarded by the faulty, old-fashioned methods of instruction and an overloaded, impractical syllabus. Mr Willcocks, as presiding examiner at the Annual Examinations, reports as follows:—'We are now in the middle of the transition period between the old days of instruction in Arabic, without text-books and without competent teachers, when none but a brilliant scholar here and there learnt anything at all, and the complete instruction in English, with living text-books and teachers really capable and really desirous to impart knowledge. At such a time, the scholars who have the misfortune to be at the college can only get ordinary instruction, but as soon as the primary schools and secondary colleges begin to turn out students knowing foreign languages well, the Polytechnic School will begin to turn out engineers capable of taking their place by the side of the men who come out in such numbers from the numerous Italian Universities, and who are preferred to-day to the Egyptian engineers by all the contractors working in this country.'—Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899.

more practical and efficient. 'The Primary School (Nasría) has become,' says Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1896, 'the practising department of the training college; the legal studies have been eliminated, and the college seems no longer open to the reproach of making itself a rallying-point of political and fanatical intrigue. The success of any scheme for the improvement of the Vernacular Schools for Primary education must largely depend upon the efficiency of the professional training of the students of this college.' The young sheikhs whom I saw at the Dar el-Olum appeared to me to be as intelligent as they were dignified. After passing the examinations, they are taken on probation for two years, and then permanently employed as masters in the vernacular. They learn also a little English.

This completes my survey of the Government Schools and Colleges. But no description of the Educational Institutions of Egypt would be complete without some reference, however brief, to the numerous private Agencies which, until a few years ago, competed seriously against the Government Schools for the education—and, in particular, for the Higher Education—of the natives of Egypt.

§ *Extra-Government Agencies*

By means of the examinations for Primary and Secondary Certificates, a large number of denominational or private schools in Egypt are brought, as already noted, into touch with the Department of Public Instruction. About one-half of the candidates who have presented themselves for Examination have, so far, been educated by extra-Government agencies.

Moreover, there is a gradual increase in the number of private schools under Government inspection. In his *Report* for 1898, Lord Cromer mentions, that in one Provincial town (Sohag) a native committee recently opened a boys' school and a girls' school, in which the Syllabus prescribed by the Department of Public Instruction for Primary Schools of the Higher-grade is followed,—the girls' school being placed under an English head-mistress. Also, a Primary School of the Higher-grade was opened a few years ago at

Deirut, pupils from which met with considerable success at the examination in 1897 for the Primary Certificate. Evidence of this practical result of Government Education must be very gratifying to the authorities. Moreover, as I have already stated, even the University of El Azhar applied, in 1897, for the partial services of thirteen masters employed in the Government Schools.

National Education

What may truly be called National Education is supplied by the numerous mosque-schools, all more or less under the influence of El Azhar. In 1897, there were 9660 Kuttabs —village schools, attached to mosques—employing 14,421 teachers, whose instruction of the 181,000 pupils attending these Lower-grade Primary Schools is, for the most part, worthless.

Most mosques contain a hall for reunion or public prayer, a fountain for ablutions and another providing drinking-water, as well as a Kuttab for girls and boys. Many of the mosques are well endowed with landed or house-property, the revenues from which (called wakfs) maintain certain servitors, readers, teachers, or savants attached to them for prayer and instruction. Occasionally, a mosque may include a school for advanced students in theology, philosophy, and science, as well as a library, or, maybe, a kitchen for the poor, a hospital, a botanic garden, a hostelry for travellers and students, etc. In these National institutions, instruction is always gratuitous; and the pupils who are sufficiently meritorious receive a written authorization to teach, in their turn: not a diploma, properly so-called, but simply a 'permit to teach' (*idjaza*).[1] There are, it is scarcely necessary to add, no ordained priests in the popular theocracy of Islam.

The Wakfs

It seems proper to introduce at this point some reference to the Administration of the Wakfs, or 'property in mortmain bequeathed to the Ulema for religious and charitable uses.' The Wakfs are not, as is sometimes supposed, a religious institution, though they administer the entailed lands belonging to the mosques; and the attempt has often

[1] *L'Instruction Publique en Egypte*, par Yacoub Artin Pacha, *passim*.

been made to invest this administration with a religious aspect, in order to keep off the reforming hand of the Infidel. Although originally a kind of Court of Chancery, to which Moslems bequeathed property for administration on behalf of their descendants, in order to keep it out of the grasp of the Viceroys, the Wakfs have in past times been subject to the depredations of Egyptian rulers, who have diverted funds to their own use or boldly annexed land and house property. Since the officials were appointed by the Viceroy, they were apt to become his creatures.'

As this is now the only native Administration of any consequence, it is not surprising that the Wakfs stand in much need of reform. But it is only within the last two or three years that the Government have taken any steps in that direction. In his *Report* for 1897, Lord Cromer remarks: 'When the balance-sheet made up at the close of the year 1895 came to be examined, it was discovered that, whilst the accounts showed a large cash balance, there was in reality a deficit; deposits and other monies held in trust by the Administration had been treated as if they were revenue. . . . It has now been arranged that the Wakfs should be divided into different categories according to their nature. . . . The revenue of each category will be amalgamated. The surplus of one category will be used to cover the deficit of another. The net surplus of all the categories will form a reserve fund. Thus, the accounts will be simplified. The detection of any abuses will be facilitated. . . . Mere audit will not, of course, rectify abuses, which for a long while past have formed the subject of loud and very legitimate complaints on the part of the native population, but it is a move in the right direction.'

These reforms have met with general approval by the large majority of the natives of Egypt; and the Wakfs have in several directions liberally supported national institutions of an educational character.[1]

[1] In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer refers at some length to the efforts made by the Financial Department to introduce reforms into the Administration of the Wakfs. I quote the following remarks (pp. 48-49)—

'The Administration of the Wakfs (religious and charitable trusts) is still very

The University of El Azhar, which hitherto has devoted itself chiefly to Scholastic Theology, is still the chief seat of learning in the East. The Principal enjoys a stipend of £E1200 a year. The Professors and teachers receive no salary, though indirectly they may be remunerated in one form or another. The Students, to the number of eight or nine thousand,[1] drawn from all parts of North Africa and the East, are grouped under the four Orthodox rites or sects. Of these students, some 2000 are resident,—each nationality having its special quarter in the University. El Azhar

defective, neither is it probable that any thoroughly effectual remedies will be applied to the existing abuses until the Administration is placed, as was formerly the case, under the direct control of a responsible Minister. At the same time, some improvement has taken place since the year 1895, when the Financial Department was authorized to exercise a certain amount of interference with a view to organizing the system of accounts, and devising a plan which would render possible an effective control over the revenue and expenditure. . . .

'The Financial Department, on taking the matter in hand, naturally insisted on the theory being made to accord with the practice. After a strong opposition, which lasted for more than a year, the unification of the accounts of all the Wakfs was effected. Thus, the system was greatly simplified, and the way was paved for the exercise of some effective control over the expenditure. . . .

'On the final closing of the accounts of 1896, which took place in the course of 1897, it was discovered that there was a deficit of £E27,000. This deficit was made a first charge on the reserve fund of the Administration. . . .

'Before 1897 it was impossible to obtain any trustworthy information as to the financial position of the Wakfs. It can now be said that the main facts are known. A very patient trial should be given to the present system. If eventually it be ascertained, beyond all manner of doubt, that, under its present constitution, the Administration of the Wakfs is incapable of executing those reforms which are loudly demanded by intelligent native public opinion, the adoption of some more drastic measures will have to be considered. Some improvement is, I am glad to say, already to be noticed. The extravagant expenditure on the Central Administration has been reduced from £E68,000 in 1897 to £E63,000 in 1899. On the other hand, the amount granted to mosques has been increased from £E45,000 to £E54,000, thus enabling the situation of the Imams and other servants of the mosques, who are for the most part very poor, to be improved. The grant to schools has been increased from £E4000 to over £E7000. Lastly, the revenue of the Administration is in excess of the expenditure. The accounts for 1898 are not yet closed, but it is estimated that, after deducting special grants amounting to £E23,000, which were made in 1897 and 1898 to meet extraordinary expenditure, a real surplus of about £E13,000 will remain over to be carried to the credit of the reserve fund.'

[1] In the period of its highest ascendency, El Azhar is reputed to have held 20,000 students within its walls.

Children are taught to read and write, and to learn by heart certain portions of the Korán. They are then instructed in the elements of Islamism. Entering at the age of six or eight, most boys finish their so-called education at the age of ten or twelve. Those who pursue the higher studies—commentaries on the Korán and Sayings of the Prophet (*hadiths*), studies in Moslem Law (*tattabu*, *Sunna*), etc.—remain on until they are twenty or twenty-two years of age. Some, from love of study or love of idleness, spend all their lives in contemplating the perfection of the Prophet and all his Works, within the University walls. But those who take their degrees (*mudari* or *sheikh*, professor or doctor), so to speak, quit the University and enter the world.

When I visited El Azhar, with Mr Douglas Dunlop, we had the advantage of being escorted by the 'proctor' of the University, and the privilege of an interview with the Principal. I shall not easily forget the impression which this strange Scholastic menagerie made on my mind. Groups of pupils and students, of all ages and Moslem nationalities, were squatting on the ground, round their respective teachers and professors. The younger boys were playing, idling, eating, or scribbling on squares of tin which at one time formed receptacles for paraffin oil—an ubiquitous agent of civilization; whilst the attention of the teachers was given to anything but the supervision of their classes.[1] Only the youths appeared to be occupied, more or less, with serious study; and, of these, the Moorish students alone gave one the impression of possessing intelligence. Picturesque elements relieved the general squalor of the environment: but the confused medley of prayer and play, study and stupor, were in striking contrast, and did not create respect for this renowned seat of Mohammedan learning.

Coptic Schools. On the other hand, Coptic Education, though a long way behind that in Government Schools as regards both efficiency and discipline, is far in advance of Mohammedan pedagogics. After an interview with the Orthodox Patri-

[1] One of the teachers was hunting for parasites.

arch, I was shown over the Cairo institutions by Wahby Bey, the Director of Coptic Schools.

The principal school, adjoining the Coptic Cathedral at Cairo, accommodates 600 boys, of whom about 400 pay fees. The course of instruction in Primary Education covers four years, and includes Arabic, Coptic, Arithmetic, Geography, and a foreign language (French or English). There are about an equal number of English and French pupils. In the Secondary course, which embraces two years only, the same subjects are proceeded with, and Natural Science is taken up. The curriculum is necessarily based on that of Government Schools, in order to enable Coptic boys to qualify for the Education Certificate. But I observed considerable laxity of discipline, and noticed the insanitary state of the class-rooms. The pupils, too, appeared anxious to show off: perhaps they were only the show-pupils?

There is a large Coptic School at Alexandria. Smaller schools are found also at Cairo and in the principal towns and villages of Egypt. At Cairo there are two schools for girls—one with 150 pupils; and some attempt is being made to extend female elementary education.

The yearly average of Copts who are able to satisfy the examiners for the Primary Certificate is, I believe, about forty in number. A large proportion of the Copts are, however, educated in the Schools of the American Mission, not only in the provinces of Upper Egypt, but also at Cairo.

Foreign Schools

During the reign of Mohammed Ali, the foreign communities depended largely on the priests of their respective churches for the secular instruction of their children. But between 1840 and 1860—when English Protestant Societies entered the mission field—numerous foreign Schools and Colleges were opened, in order to meet the educational needs of the growing population. The majority of these, or certainly the most important, were French Catholic foundations, to which the children of Syrian Christians were sent in large numbers. The American Mission was established in 1854. The Jesuits did not appear until about 1880.

French is taught in all these Schools; Arabic practically

in none—if we except the elementary instruction given to Copts in the American Schools. And whilst French forms the medium of instruction in a large number of the institutions, English also is widely diffused by the American Mission. The attempt, in Ismail's reign (*circa* 1869) to establish what were called Free Schools, open to boys of all nationalities and faiths, succeeded for a time: but, of the three Schools established, under Khedivial patronage—at Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said—the Free School of Alexandria alone survived at the end of 1887. In that year, the number of pupils in the European Schools of Egypt was 22,764, of whom no less than 15,000 were Egyptians, —an immense increase during the preceding decade.[1]

It is not my intention to refer in detail to the numerous foreign Schools and Colleges. The Greek and Italian Schools confine themselves more particularly to the education of children of those nationalities. The others are more sectarian, with objects, more or less avowed, of proselytism. England has contributed very grudgingly and very sparsely to Education in Egypt: and, therefore, the movement now on foot to establish English Schools in Egypt, of a strictly undenominational character, by raising funds for an endowment,[2] should receive the support it deserves. Hitherto,

[1] In 1875, there were only about 2000 Egyptians included among the 9000 pupils in European Schools.

[2] Sir Charles Cookson, formerly H.M. Consul-General and Judge at Alexandria, wrote to the *Times*, under date 1st December 1898, a letter from which I make the following extracts:—'An admirable site in Alexandria is already secured by the liberality of a British merchant in that city, and an influential committee formed there for carrying out the plan. The schools, in accordance with the articles of association, are, as regards their practical management and curriculum, under a board of governors, to be appointed at the first general meeting of shareholders, and composed mainly of the principal British Anglo-Egyptian officials, with Lord Cromer as chairman; and the education, moral, intellectual, and physical, is to be that of the best British institutions (on the "modern" side) for training boys and men of the middle and upper classes for professions, commerce, and the public service. A considerable proportion of the capital required is already subscribed by natives and residents in Egypt, of various nationalities and creeds, who have shown their appreciation of the value of an English education, and especially one where no religious propagandism will be possible, by subscribing.' The idea of a Joint-Stock Association has, however, been abandoned in favour of an endowed establishment.

the Evangelical schools of the American Mission have been the only media of diffusing a knowledge of the English language, apart from the Government Schools. The Catholic schools have always discouraged the study of English.

American Mission

The Mission of the United Presbyterian Church of North America has met with a remarkable degree of success, particularly from the educational point of view, with which only I am here concerned. Its agencies cover a vast field, embracing the Delta and Upper Egypt (up to Aswân), with a branch at Kosseir, on the Red Sea. Schools, churches, or other agencies are established in the capitals and in the large towns of every Province. The number of schools alone exceeds 120. In 1896, there were, in the Delta, 49 schools, with 110 teachers, and 4900 pupils.

In their *Report* for 1896, it is stated that 'the number of girls' schools has increased from 25 to 35 during the year, and the number of girls in school has increased from 2579 to 3038; while the number of boys' schools has decreased by three, and the number of boys in school has decreased by 316.' One-third of the number of girls, and three-fourths of the number of boys, are in village-schools, the teachers of which are trained in the Central Schools. The remainder receive advanced education.

In the Cairo Boys' School, the religious sects from which the pupils were drawn, in 1896, are represented as follows: Copts, 326; Mohammedans, 210; Protestants, 38; and Others, 66. Of the 640 enrolled pupils, 409 paid, more or less, the fees for tuition, which are even lower than those of the Government Schools.

Conclusion

The survey I have made of the Educational institutions of Egypt must now be brought to a close. Brief and imperfect as this has been, it has doubtless exhausted the patience of the reader. But the importance of the subject, from my point of view, will, I trust, excuse the tedious details and statistics which I have been compelled to introduce, in order to illustrate and emphasize the relatively high

success of Educational reforms under the Anglo-Egyptian Administration.

(c) *Justice*

Historical Retrospect

Whilst purity of Justice and individual equality before the Law have inspired every department of the Anglo-Egyptian Administration—representing, as these do, the essential elements of Egyptian autonomy and the fundamental principle of the British Control—the administration of Justice has been hampered by the peculiar local conditions, which provide for no less than four co-ordinate jurisdictions in the country. There are Egyptian Courts and European Courts[1]: mutually exclusive factors that present inapposite conditions for the unification of jurisdiction. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Administrations of Justice and of the Interior were the very last Departments to claim our serious attention. In fact, it was not until the year 1890, when Mr (afterwards Sir John) Scott came to Egypt, that our interference in the Department of Justice—limited and restricted as this has always been—first took definite shape.

Between the years 1884 and 1889, the Native Courts having entirely failed to deal with the brigandage then prevailing in the Provinces, their jurisdiction was superseded by Special Commissions, whose brief mandates were successively renewed, and whose arbitrary and summary jurisdiction amounted to that of Courts Martial. For five years the Criminal Code of the Native Tribunals remained in abeyance, whilst these Commissions of Brigandage, under the Mudirs, or Governors of Provinces, dealt with nearly all criminal offences in a high-handed and barbarous fashion. Control being thus taken out of the hands of the Ministry of Justice and placed in those of the Ministry of the Interior, there was considerable friction between the two Departments of State, arising from antagonism to the essential principle on

[1] The Courts of Religious Law; the Native Courts; the Mixed Courts; and the Consular Courts.

which the Native Tribunals were based: the separation of the Judicial Authority from the Executive.

Mr Scott, on his appointment in 1890 as Judicial Adviser to the Khedive, at once recognised the need of Egypt to strengthen her National Tribunals; and, with his Egyptian and Indian experience to guide him, he went the right way to work.[1] Instead of making a clean sweep of everything, in the manner attempted by the Commissions of Brigandage, he strengthened the more promising elements, whilst ridding the Administration of its most glaring defects and abuses. Then, by degrees, he introduced important changes of detail and Procedure, and entirely reorganized the Native Tribunals. In particular, he extended the system of Summary Justice, instituted Administrative checks, and purged the Native Bench.

In a country like Egypt, the Administration of Justice has special difficulties to contend against, apart from the International fetters that restrict freedom of initiative. The success or failure of any system of Justice depends largely on the impartiality shown in the choice of Judges: but appointment by merit was practically unknown before the British Occupation; and, in the sphere of Justice, this guiding principle has been followed only in the current decade. In a country like Egypt, the Native Bench is peculiarly susceptible to outside influences. At the present day it has gone far to achieve emancipation: but its absolute independence of external influences cannot be confidently expected in the future, unless the higher administrative posts are retained in the hands of Europeans, whose co-operation provides the necessary backbone to the Executive, and whose presence on the Bench inspires the *morale* and *esprit de corps* of the Egyptian Judiciary. In a country like Egypt, perjury or false testimony before the Courts is of common occurrence; and the people are often afraid to give evidence. This reluctance to denounce crime and the tendency to shield criminals necessarily obstruct the development of reforms.

[1] Mr Scott was an Appeal Judge in the Mixed Tribunals from 1876 to 1882.

The reforms introduced (1890-1898) by Sir John Scott into the Administrative and Executive branches of the Judiciary have more than justified his appointment, which originally met with such strenuous opposition. On his retirement last year, he had the satisfaction of leaving Egypt, for the first time in her history, with Courts of Law that claim the respect and confidence of Europeans and Natives alike. The Native Bench has been steadily improving. The long-standing friction between the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior has been removed: and there is now more cordial co-operation between the Parquet, the Mudirs, and the Police in the detection of crime. The Parquet are no longer regarded as interlopers, but as the responsible directors of the Judiciary Police.

Categories of Crime

A study of the latest Returns shows that the diminution of crime is not confined to a few special localities, but is spread generally over the whole of Egypt. In his *Report* for 1898, Lord Cromer remarks: 'The total number of crimes committed in 1897 was 1437, as compared with 1850 in 1896—a decrease of 22 per cent. The categories of crime, which depend more especially on the general state of security, and, therefore, indicate the efficiency of the action of the Police, have diminished in still greater proportion. Robberies committed by armed gangs, commonly known as brigandage, have fallen from 51 to 17; robberies accompanied with violence or other aggravating circumstances, from 440 to 280; highway robberies, from 98 to 75. As regards the disposal of these latter categories, 25 per cent. were temporarily filed in 1897 for want of sufficient evidence, or failure to discover the perpetrators, as compared with 31 per cent. in 1896. The remainder were sent forward to the Tribunals, where there were 78 per cent. of convictions, as compared with 70 per cent. in 1896.'

In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer gives the latest statistics in these respects:—

'The total number of felonies committed in 1898 was 1342, as compared with 1866 in 1896, and 1424 in 1897.

Robberies with violence have fallen from 625 in 1895, and 618 in 1896, to 372 in 1897 and 344 in 1898. The number of felonies committed per head of population was 1 to 5132 in 1896, 1 to 6607 in 1897, and 1 to 7075 in 1898. The number of criminal cases which have remained undiscovered for want of evidence has largely decreased, whilst the number of convictions in cases sent before the Tribunals is steadily increasing, thus testifying to an improvement in the manner in which the cases are prepared by the local authorities.'

Penal and Criminal Codes

A complete revision of the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes is now being undertaken; and it is hoped that the former will be revised in the course of 1899. I may add, that extramural labour is one of the leading features of the Egyptian penitentiary system.[1]

Judicial Tariff

A new Judicial Tariff, which materially reduced legal costs, came into operation towards the end of 1897. In regard to this reform, Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, remarks:

'Far from reducing the receipts of the Tribunals, this measure has resulted in a considerable increase of revenue, the figures being £E115,000 in 1898 as against £E110,000 in 1897. The number of important cases brought before the Native Tribunals has also materially increased. These facts seem to point to the conclusion that the tendency, which previously existed amongst the Egyptians, to bring their suits, if possible, before the Mixed, in preference to the Native, Tribunals, was due to fiscal considerations rather than to any want of confidence in the Native Courts.'

Judicial Institutions

In the Table (No. 6) given overpage, I have endeavoured to exhibit the Judicial Institutions of Egypt in their relation to the Ministry of Justice, in order to illustrate the line of initiative emanating from the Central Executive, and to

[1] 'In the course of last year a law was passed allowing prisoners sentenced to imprisonment, in default of fine or costs, the privilege of substituting labour in the place of imprisonment. Up to the close of last year, 40,070 persons had claimed to work rather than be imprisoned. The operation of the new system has enabled the Department to close the prisons for "contraventions" (petty offences) both in Cairo and Alexandria.'

TABLE No. 6.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS OF EGYPT


Minister of State (Egyptian).
Judicial Adviser to H.H. The Khedive (English).
Under-Secretary of State (Egyptian).
Mehkemés [Religious Courts, dealing with personal status of Mohammedans. System: First Instance; Appeal; Execution]. (Two Arab Inspectors.)
Grand Kadi head of Mehkemés.
Grand Mufti.
Kadis in Provincial Capitals and small towns.
Public Prosecutor (English).
Bureau of Criminal Investigation (Engl. Director).
Parquet [attached to all Courts of National Tribunals. Relations with Ministry of the Interior].
Committee of Judicial Surveillance [Summary and First Instance Courts only]. (President: Judicial Adviser to H.H. The Khedive. Members: 3 Engl.; 1 Fr.; 1 Ital.)
Inspectors (2 Engl.; 3 Egyptian).
Comité du Contentieux de l'État [Departmental Representatives for Claims against the Egyptian Government]. (Four European Councillors.)
Delegation at Alexandria.
Mudirs (Egyptian.)
Police (Officers: English, 14; other European, 20; and Egyptian, 230).
Ministry of the Interior.
National Tribunals.
Forty-five Summary Courts [One-Judge System. Claims up to £100. Three years' Imprisonment.]
Seven Courts of First Instance (Seven to ten Judges in each Court).
Court of Appeal [Cairo]. (Twenty Councillors, of whom ten are Egyptians, eight British, and two Europeans.)
Upper and Lower Egypt.

indicate their relative inter-dependence. This tabular statement includes only the Egyptian Courts and Administrative branches of the Judiciary. The Consular Courts are wholly outside the Jurisdiction of the Khedivial Government; as also are the Mixed Courts. Penal Justice is still administered under the rights obtained by Consuls, according to the Capitulations; and Civil Justice is given to the Mixed Tribunals, in place of Consuls, as regards cases and claims between Mixed nationalities. I have already dealt with these International Courts, in the earlier portions of this work.

It will be seen, from a glance at the Table, that the Department of the Public Prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice has direct relations with the Ministry of the Interior; and that the Committee of Judicial Surveillance exercises supervision over the National Tribunals and the Parquet; whilst the Mehkemés on the one hand, and the Comité du Contentieux, on the other, provide for other national and international conditions. Indirect and inter-relations are indicated at the points of juncture.

The Mehkemés are Religious Courts, dealing with questions affecting the personal status of Mohammedans—such as, marriage, divorce, succession, and registration of title-deeds. Into these Courts, the corruption of which has been so notorious, the Government hesitated to introduce reforms, until their hand was forced by the ever-recurring scandals and the public complaints that made interference a necessity. In his *Report* for 1898, Lord Cromer outlines the situation as follows: "The quasi-religious character with which the Moslem public invests these Courts has hitherto precluded any attempt at reform. Ultimately, complaints became so rife that it was resolved to re-organize the procedure, to institute a rigorous system of inspection, and to make no new nominations of Judges who had not a diploma from the University of El-Azhar or from the Mussulman Law School (Dar el-Olum), and satisfied the Board of Selection as to their knowledge of Law. New regulations were therefore presented to the Council of Ministers, and became law. The chief changes are as follows:—Finality of decision is

The Mehkemés

secured by the institution of Courts of First Instance with a single Appeal; the Judgment is final and executory after Appeal. The power hitherto possessed by the parties to reopen their case after Judgment no longer exists. Judgment by default on the non-appearance of the defendant, after due citation, is introduced. Documentary evidence is allowed as proof; whereas oral evidence alone was previously admitted. Registers are obligatory, in which the citation, the substance of the claim, and the Judgment are entered. These registers are subject to periodical inspection. Execution of Judgments is effected by the ordinary Administrative authorities. The Ministry has the power of constant and rigorous inspection. The Judges (Kadis) are also subjected to the disciplinary control of a Commission presided over by the Minister of Justice.' All these excellent innovations, Lord Cromer adds, are admitted to be within the limits of Mohammedan Law; and the changes that have been introduced have been warmly welcomed by the public.[1] But reforms of procedure will be of little avail unless the *personnel* of the Courts can be improved.

The Public Prosecutor

The Procureur-Général, or Public Prosecutor, is under the immediate orders of the Ministry of Justice. He is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of crime, through his representatives (the Parquet), attached to all Courts of the National Tribunals. For this purpose alone, the Police are under his orders. Formerly, this Department worked badly with the Police and the Mudirs. The members of

[1] Nevertheless, reform appears to be as far off as ever. Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, remarks: 'Unfortunately, there is in Egypt a wide gap between the conception and the execution of reforms. At the time the Regulations were framed, I felt doubtful as to their application. I regret to say that my fears in this respect have been realized.' The Courts have, in fact, displayed a marked disinclination to depart in any way from their traditional methods of procedure; and, quite recently, appealed, with success, to the intervention of the Sultan of Turkey, as Khalifa. Lord Cromer concludes with the following pregnant passage: 'The reform of an essentially Moslem institution can most properly be undertaken by Moslems themselves. I can only again express my hope that Egyptians of position and influence will, sooner or later, take this matter in hand and insist on the adoption of measures calculated to improve the administration of these

the Parquet were young Europeans, many of whom were unfitted for life in the Provinces; and the Police objected to receiving orders from men whom they regarded as outsiders. Owing to their inexperience of local conditions and their occasional arrogance, the Parquet were for some time unable to work smoothly with the Provincial authorities. Moreover, in the Central Administration, the Public Prosecutor and his principal assistants were apt to regard themselves as a Court of Appeal, to whom questions of administration were referable, until their duties were more clearly defined and limited. In 1895, the experiment was made of appointing an Egyptian Procureur-Général, in place of a French lawyer: but two years later, after a second Native appointment had been made, the office of Public Prosecutor was given to an Englishman, who now holds it. The experiment of depending on Native talent and initiative thus proved to be premature. It is as well, however, to note that the attempt was made.

Owing to the negligence of its prime duty, complaint was frequently lodged against the Department of the Public Prosecutor, that cases brought before the Native Tribunals were too frequently entrusted to a 'substitute,' or junior member of the Parquet, and were not laid before the Courts in a manner to satisfy the requirements of Justice. All this dereliction of duty has now been checked, serious cases being always conducted by a leading member of the Parquet. The confession of a prisoner on the capital charge is no longer necessary to secure conviction.[1]

Courts. The difficulties, though considerable, are by no means insurmountable. They have been solved in other countries without in any degree infringing the well recognised principle that the Sheria is immutable. I invite the attention of Egyptian reformers to this subject. If the Mehkemehs could be placed on a really sound footing by Egyptian agents acting on the impulse afforded by a spontaneous expression of Egyptian public opinion, it would do more to convince the world of the self-governing capacity of the Egyptians than any of the somewhat irrelevant declamations I occasionally read on this subject. Every real sympathizer with Egyptian aspirations—and there are, I am glad to say, many in this category—would heartily welcome the evidence which would be afforded by the conception and execution of a reform of this nature.'

[1] The result has been that in 1898 ten capital charges were executed, as compared to five in 1897 and four in 1896.

The Parquet

At every Mudiría town and at every Governorat there is now a Director of the Parquet, who is in close touch with the Mudir on the one hand and with the Public Prosecutor at Cairo on the other. The Mudir being at the head of the Police, the work of the Parquet is greatly facilitated by his co-operation. And, as the Public Prosecutor is under the immediate orders of the Ministry of Justice, surveillance and control over all the Parquets are both direct and efficacious.

The members of the Parquet, being well versed in Law and highly efficient public servants, do know the value of evidence: whereas the Mudirs are incapable of conducting criminal investigations and prosecution. Moreover, they are not open to outside influence; and they report direct to the Ministry of Justice. Omissions and imperfections in the preparation of evidence for the prosecution are now (since the reorganization of the Parquet in 1895) becoming increasingly rare; whilst time has done much to remove the objections on the score of youth and inexperience hitherto raised against members of the Parquet.

Committee of Judicial Surveillance

A further check on the Administration of Justice is exercised through the Committee of Surveillance, composed of five European lawyers and presided over by the Judicial Adviser, under whom are five Inspectors. The powers of this Committee, which was established in 1891, as a check on the one-Judge system, have been extended to include the work of the Parquet as well as to supervise the decisions of the National Tribunals. 'The superintendence of the Committee,' Sir John Scott explains,[1] 'either by its own action or the action of its Inspectors, does not include any change in any decision, civil or penal, that has been given by any Tribunal in the country. Its sole object is, by letter and circular and oral discussion, to maintain purity and sound law.' Its purview extends over the Summary and First Instance Courts only. The Court of Appeal is not subject to its supervision, but remains the Supreme Native Tribunal of the country. Each year the judgments of the

[1] Egypt, No. 1 (1896).

Tribunals have improved; whilst the numerous Circulars issued by the Committee of Surveillance have contributed to form a body of jurisprudence of the highest value.[1]

National Tribunals

There are now established in Lower and Upper Egypt: forty-five Summary Justice Tribunals, on the one-Judge system, which hear claims up to £100, and award punishments extending to three years' imprisonment; seven Courts of First Instance, with seven to ten Judges attached to each Court; two Contravention Tribunals, *viz.* one at Cairo and one at Alexandria; and the Supreme Court of Appeal, at Cairo, in which there are twenty Councillors, ten of whom are Egyptians, eight are British, and the remaining two are Europeans. These represent and include the National Tribunals of Egypt, the Codes and Procedure of which are based on those of the Mixed, or International, Tribunals. They therefore administer a European system of law affecting the bulk of the population.[2]

The Summary Courts have been greatly improved since 1895; whilst the great increase in their number and jurisdiction has sensibly affected the central Tribunals, which, for less important cases, have automatically developed into Provincial Courts of Appeal rather than being restricted to Courts of First Instance, thus reducing the work of the Supreme Court of Appeal to the more serious cases. Suits about land are the most numerous among the cases brought before the Summary Courts, the majority of which involve trifling sums. Therefore, in order to cheapen and expedite litigation, and, above all, to secure respect for the Law by ensuring immediate judgments and prompt execution, great care is taken to appoint competent Judges, with adequate powers of jurisdiction. As the plaintiff wins in about six out of every seven cases, there does not appear to be an undue amount of vexatious litigation in Egypt.

In the Courts of First Instance, decision in cases of

[1] The 'Recueil de Jurisprudence,' established and edited by M. Sharabati, has also helped to make conflicts of jurisprudence of rarer occurrence.

[2] The Judges at the Provincial capitals and at the 45 Judicial centres are all Egyptian, the majority being Mohammedans. An exception is noted overpage, in the First Instance Tribunals.

Appeal from the Summary Courts, in all misdemeanours and suits up to £100, is final. Graver offences and higher suits are brought at the outset before the Courts of First Instance, appeal from which is carried to the Supreme Court at Cairo. The Judges of these Courts, in order to estimate the value of oral testimony, require to have a thorough acquaintance with Arabic, as well as a sound knowledge and experience of Law. The Courts of First Instance remain, therefore, mainly in Native hands.[1] Happily, the School of Law at Cairo is turning out excellent lawyers.

The number of European Judges in the Supreme Court of Appeal was increased in 1896 from seven to ten. The remaining ten Councillors are Egyptians. This strong European element increases public confidence: it should go far to remove the obstacles to the unification of jurisdiction in Egypt. If amalgamation of all the Judicial institutions of the country be ever attempted, undoubtedly the best solution will be found in strengthening and improving the National Tribunals, which, even at the present day, may be regarded as competent bodies.

Unity of Jurisdiction

In regard to this important point, and in view of the fact that the mandate of the Mixed Tribunals expires (unless it be renewed) on 31st January 1900, I cannot do better than quote the remarks of Sir John Scott, who, in a letter to *The Times* of 13th February 1899, says:

'The public is already aware that the National Tribunals, which must not be confounded with the Mixed Tribunals, of Egypt have so much improved under English guidance that they have now not only won the confidence of the natives in their disposal of all civil native disputes, but they have also shown remarkable independence in their administration of criminal justice. An important question is now looming in the distance and not very far off. Are not these National Courts of Egypt capable of doing all the judicial work of the country sufficiently well to justify the Egyptians in claiming the ordinary right of every country to administer

[1] There are two European lawyers in the Tribunal of First Instance at Cairo, and one in that of Alexandria.

justice to all who dwell within its limits? One half of the members of the national Court of Appeal are foreign judges, though named and paid by Egypt: indeed, all are English save one excellent Belgian lawyer—the Vice-President of the Court is a sound English lawyer—so that there is every guarantee for sound justice.

'Is not the time coming near when England and Egypt might together announce, as France did singlehanded about Tunis, that there is no longer any necessity for a system of international Courts?

'It would no doubt be necessary, as France did, to increase for a time the foreign element in the Judiciary; and it would be equally necessary to guarantee all respect to the religious Mahomedan tribunals, whose judges would remain as they are. But all those interested in Egypt would be glad to see the country invested with full judicial power and relieved of the *incubus* of an international Judiciary composed of English, French, German, Austrian, Italian, Russian, American, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish nominees of their respective Governments.

'Of course this will not be done in the coming year. But the very remarkable progress of the National Courts has brought this question into the range of practical politics.'

(*d*) *Interior*

'Men, not measures'

The work of reform in Egypt is nowhere surrounded by greater difficulties than in the Department of the Interior. To eradicate the corruption of centuries of misrule,[1] to create 'an order of things possessing the elements of stability and progress,' and to train Native administrators in the functions and art of government, time is needed. The new organization of the Interior is only five years old. If, as I have already indicated, we hesitated for so long a period of years before seriously attempting to reform the

[1] Before the introduction of European reforms—say, in the time of Mohammed Ali—local government in Egypt followed on the lines of the Roman organization.

system of Provincial organization and administration, it was not merely because this task was invested with exceptional risk and difficulty, but chiefly because time was required in order to study the country and to create an efficient British Inspectorate. Lord Cromer has more than once remarked, that the main principle upon which the work of reform in Egypt has been based, from the very outset, may be summed up in a single phrase: European head and Egyptian hands. 'Our task,' he explains, in his *Report* for 1896, 'is not to rule the Egyptians, but as far as possible to teach the Egyptians to rule themselves. In the re-organization of the Ministry of the Interior, this principle has been thoroughly borne in mind. European initiative suggests measures to be executed by Egyptian agency, while European supervision controls the manner in which they are executed. The first and most remarkable result has been the disappearance of friction in the conduct of the affairs of the Department. . . . Differences of opinion on every kind of subject were constantly arising between English officials and the native Minister, and between the Public Security Department and other branches of the Administration. Since the new organization came into force, I may say that my intervention in these matters has been reduced to a minimum. . . . It is hardly necessary for me to add, that this satisfactory state of affairs is only partly due to the change of system. A very large share must be laid to the credit of the two Egyptian Ministers who have presided over the Ministry of the Interior since April 1894, that is to say, Nubar Pasha and his successor, Mustafa Pasha Fehmi. Without their cordial co-operation and encouragement, aided by the tact and judgment displayed by Mr Gorst, the [late] Adviser to the Department of the Interior, a successful result could not have been attained.' In other words, 'men, not measures' are what Egypt chiefly requires to guide her in the path of regeneration.

Historical Retrospect

In 1883, we did, indeed, make an attempt to find a *deus ex machinâ*. But the experiment was a lamentable failure,

and resulted in a serious blow to British prestige. Need I add, that I refer to the mission of Mr Clifford Lloyd, who, in the course of his brief career (1883-1884), ran *amok* among Egyptian institutions, and did far more harm than good?[1] As a result of our failure to deal effectively with the Administration of the Interior, the nomination of two English Inspectors-General to take up the work of Mr Clifford Lloyd had to be withdrawn, in order to appease Nubar Pasha and to secure his continued co-operation.

The question of the organization and control of the Police, which largely was responsible for this *impasse*, formed the subject of heated controversy up to within a few years ago, when it was settled in favour of an equal division of responsibity, as between the Judiciary and the Executive, for the maintenance of order and the detection of crime. General Valentine Baker, who first undertook the task of reorganizing the Police, devoted all his energy and an undue amount of his resources to the creation of a semi-military Gendarmerie. Even after his undisciplined rabble was decimated at El Teb, in the Eastern Sudan, early in 1884, he, on his return to Egypt, reversed the reforms which Mr Clifford Lloyd had introduced during his absence, and once again organized a Gendarmerie, though on a different footing. On the death of General Valentine Baker in 1887, his men were drafted into the Regular army, as the 11th Sudanese Battalion. Between 1890-1891, the present

[1] Mr Clifford Lloyd had had no previous experience of Egypt: but, with the best intentions and misdirected zeal, he succeeded in overturning everything on which he could lay hands. At first invested with a vague commission to set the Egyptian house in order, as 'Director-General of Reforms,' he subsequently accepted the definite duties of Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior. He undermined native authority in the Provinces by dealing direct with subordinate officials; and he quarrelled with everybody, his own countrymen not excepted. His fall was due principally to the antagonism of Nubar Pasha (on the vexed question of the reorganization of the Police, etc.) who secured his recall as the essential condition of his own co-operation, which at that time was necessary to our work of reform. Mr Clifford Lloyd's most enduring monument in Egypt is his creation of two important Departments—the Prisons, and Public Health—which were instituted to meet the most urgent needs of Provincial reform. (*cf.* Milner's 'England in Egypt.')

Lord Kitchener took over the temporary control of the Police; and he and his successor were the first to introduce effective reforms. The Police were thereby placed under the orders of their own officers, who, for the purpose of maintaining order, were themselves subject to the jurisdiction of the Mamurs, whose complaints had to be made direct to the Ministry of the Interior.

§ *Central Organization*

The new Régime

The new organization of the Ministry of the Interior was not completed until November 1895. Since that date, the efforts of the English heads of Department have been directed chiefly to the perfection of details in the Administration: in a word, to making the machinery of government work smoothly and effectively. In the Provincial Administration, which affects the very foundations of social order in Egypt, the British Control is now equally distributed over all the local officials—Mudirs and Police alike. Local administration is subjected, in all its branches, to a searching and rigorous inspection by British officials, who report direct to the British Adviser at the Ministry of the Interior. The latter is therefore in a position to ensure proper attention being given to the reports of his Inspectors: so that the Administration is conducted on the sound principle of 'European head and Egyptian hands.'

Lord Cromer affirms that, in practice, the machine works smoothly. There is little or no friction with the local authorities. The Mudirs, in particular, have gained by the new conditions which regulate their position and define their prospects. Nepotism has been checked. The antecedents and qualifications of all Provincial officials have been thoroughly examined: and, whilst the services of inefficient public servants have been dispensed with, those deserving recognition have been duly rewarded. Secondary Certificates are now required of all the higher-grade assistants appointed to the governing staff of the Provinces. The result is seen in a very considerable improvement in their character and intelligence.

The present simple organization of the Department of the Interior is well adapted to the capacity of its Native agents, and provides for the all-pervading influence of the British Inspectorate. In the Table (No. 7) given overpage, I have grouped all the Departments of Administration under their respective systems of organization. It will be seen that the Local Organization (Governorats, Mudirías, and Oases) is wholly in Native hands, excepting the Commandants of Police, who are Englishmen. The Central Organization is retained exclusively in the charge of the Executive, or the three highest officials in the Ministry of the Interior, of whom the British Adviser[1] is necessarily the principal agent of the Government. Moreover, Englishmen rule in all the chief departments of the Central Administration. Finally, the Decentralized Organization embraces the regions outside Egypt Proper (Sinai, Red Sea Littoral, Kassala, the old Frontier Province, and the Territories south of Wadi Halfa), which are administered by the Military Authorities. Organization

In the Local Organization, each Mudiría is divided into Districts (Merkazes), under a Mamur Merkaz, who is invariably an Egyptian. The Merkazes are divided into villages, each under an Omdeh, or village-headman. Detachments of the Police Force are stationed in all Governorats[2] and in the chief town of each Mudiría and each Merkaz. The policing of the villages is entrusted to the village-watchmen, the Gaffirs. A number of Mudirías are placed under each English Inspector, who supervises the manner in which the local authorities discharge their duties. Thus, the units of government in the Provinces have well-defined spheres and responsible duties, under the supervision of the British Inspectorate, which emanates from the Central Executive.

The reforms introduced in 1894-1895 thoroughly over- Administration

[1] Mr Gorst, who filled that post with so great distinction and merit until the end of 1898, has now been appointed to succeed Sir Elwin Palmer, resigned, as Financial Adviser to the Khedive. He is succeeded, with somewhat changed functions, by Mr Machell.

[2] Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Damietta, and Ariche.

TABLE No. 7.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

- Minister of State (Egyptian).
- Adviser to the Department of the Interior (English).
- Under-Secretary of State (Egyptian).

LOCAL ORGANIZATION.

(*a*) *Governorats*:
Cairo—Governor (Egyptian).
,, —Commandant of Police (English).
Alexandria— Ditto.
Port Said— Ditto.
Suez—Governor (Egyptian).
Damietta— Ditto.
Ariche— Ditto.

(*b*) Thirteen *Mudirias*:
each under a Native Mudir.

(*c*) The *Oases*:
attached to respective Mudirias (Egyptian Mamurs, etc.).

DEPARTMENTS OF CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION.

(*a*) *Inspectorate*: Chief Inspector (English).
Eight Inspectors (3, English; 5, Egyptian).

(*b*) *Administrative*: Director (Egyptian).
[Questions dealt with: Secretariat; Omdehs; Sheikhs; Gaffirs; and Bedwin.]

(*c*) *Financial, and Registration*: Director (English).

(*d*) *Discipline*: Director (English).
Three Inspectors (2, English; 1, German).
[Questions dealt with: Military Matters connected with the Police Force.]

(*e*) *Stores*: Director (English).

(*f*) *Public Security*: Director (Egyptian).
[Questions dealt with: all matters connected with maintenance of Public Security; crimes, etc.]

(*g*) *Legal*: Legal Adviser (Italian).

(*h*) *Sanitary*: Director-General (English).
Three Inspectors (English).

(*i*) *Prisons*: Inspector-General (English).

(*j*) *Slave Trade*: Director (English).

(*k*) *Archives*: Director (Egyptian).

DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION.

(*a*) *The Governorat of Sudkin*:
under the Military Authorities, with a British officer as Governor.

(*b*) *The Mudirias of Nubia* (formerly the Frontier Province) *and Dongola*:
under the Military Authorities, with British officers as Governors.

(*c*) *The Egyptian Sudan* (formerly the Khalifa's Dominions):
under the Military Authorities, with British officers as Governors, etc., and the Sirdar, Lord Kitchener, as Governor-General of the Sudan.
[Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.]

Ministry of War.

hauled the Provincial Administration and placed it upon a rational basis. The position and duties of all the local functionaries—from Gaffirs up to Mudirs—were clearly defined; excuses for oppression were removed; and opportunities for illicit gain were reduced to a minimum. Local self-government was given at first to nine, and subsequently to fifteen, towns,[1] where municipalities or Town Councils (*Commissions locales*) were established, in addition to the Provincial Assemblies.[2]

The general direction of these reforms is outlined in Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1897, in the following passages:

'The first of these [measures for the prevention of crime] was the re-organization of the force of village-watchmen (Gaffirs). Formerly, these watchmen were far too numerous.[3] They received a very low rate of pay; indeed they were often not paid at all. They were not unfrequently a source of danger rather than of security to the inhabitants. Under the reformed plan the number of Gaffirs has been largely reduced. They have been carefully selected, and are sufficiently paid. There seems every reason to suppose that the Gaffirs are now becoming an efficient body of men, upon whom reliance can be placed for the maintenance of public security in the villages.' As regards a further measure—a Law regulating the position and powers of the Omdehs, or village-headmen—Lord Cromer remarks: 'Under the old régime the Omdehs possessed large powers, which they very generally abused. On the other hand, considerable responsibilities were thrown on them. They were in a very great degree responsible for the maintenance of public order,

[1] Assiut, Damanhur, Damietta, Mansura, Medinet el-Fayum, Mahallah el-Kobra, Suez, Tanta, Zagazig, Benha, Shibin el-Kom, Zifta, Beni-Suef, Minia, Kena. Five more have since been added, according to Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899.

[2] See Organic Law of Egypt, published as an Appendix (IV).

[3] Before Colonel Kitchener reduced their ranks, the Gaffirs must have numbered about 1 in 7 of the rural population. That was rather a large proportion; and, considering that the Gaffirs were unpaid, unwilling, and undisciplined, it is not surprising that they often aided and abetted acts of brigandage, or the raiding of villages, hamlets, etc., in which the Omdehs themselves were occasionally implicated. (*Author's Note.*)

and not unfrequently suffered vicarious punishment if order was not maintained. The first steps taken in the direction of administrative reform naturally tended to curtail the powers of the Omdehs. The *corvée* was abolished [1889]. Recruitment, the collection of taxes, and other similar objects were regulated. . . . The position of Omdeh has now been surrounded with sufficient attraction to render it an object of legitimate ambition to village notables. On the other hand, the Omdehs have been associated with the Police in the maintenance of public security. . . : The responsibility of Omdehs for the security of their villages has been defined: they are forced to keep a careful watch over all suspicious characters living within their jurisdiction.' And, moreover, in order to relieve the work of the Summary Tribunals, jurisdiction to try Civil cases relating to personalty, in which the sum involved does not exceed P.T. 100 (about £1), has been conferred on a certain number of Omdehs.

The Mamurs of Districts and the Mudirs of Provinces are all Mussulmans.[1] Under the new régime, these representatives of the Pashalik, or governing caste, are becoming an efficient body of public servants; and the newer men have received more adequate training for their responsible offices. They report direct to the Ministry of the Interior.

The diminution of crime throughout Egypt is the result, not of specially favourable circumstances, but, as Lord Cromer points out, 'to a solid improvement in the working of the administrative machine, and, consequently, in the state of public security.'[2]

With these few remarks on the general situation, I now pass on to review the various Departments of the Ministry of the Interior.

§ *Local Organization*

Governorats

Of the six Governorats, only Alexandria, where the European element is considerable, enjoys full Municipal

[1] There are twelve Mudirs for Lower Egypt, and fourteen for Upper Egypt.

[2] Egypt No. 1 (1898) p. 25.

freedom, so far as this can be secured under the Capitulations. The Municipality of Alexandria, composed of native and European elements, is necessarily subject to political influences; and its early history was somewhat chequered: but, of recent years — under the excellent presidency of Shakur Bey—it has shown some capacity in the direction of local self-government. Neither in Alexandria nor in the other towns, where *Commissions locales* are established, can rates and taxes be imposed, as with us, owing to the Capitulations, which would exempt foreigners from their fair share of these. For instance, water is paid for as gas, meat, and other domestic commodities are paid for.

There are English Commandants of Police at Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said; but the Governor of Cairo is an Egyptian, as also are the Governors of Suez, Damietta, and Ariche—the remaining Governorats.

Town Councils

Town Councils have been established (since 1893) in twenty of the Provincial towns.[1] These *Commissions locales*, or embryo municipalities, receive an annual grant for local expenditure. Each is composed of seven members, four of whom are popularly elected; and is presided over by the Governor of the Province (Mudir) or his wekil. A delegate of the Ministry of the Interior, who always is an Englishman, also has a seat on the Council, but no executive functions: and he reports direct to the Ministry. Meetings are held monthly, during the Session. The subjects discussed deal principally with water and irrigation, lighting, the upkeep of roads, and local improvements.

Village Communities

The limited Judicial powers conferred on the Omdehs in 1895 have been justly and temperately exercised. These powers extend to the award of 24 hours' imprisonment and to the imposition of a fine not exceeding 15 piastres (three shillings).[1] The Omdehs now feel themselves responsible for public order in their villages:

[1] Enumerated on page 263 (foot-note). Alexandria and Mansura have fuller Municipal privileges.

and, being supported by the Police, the Tribunals, and the Government, they no longer hesitate to hand over well-known criminals to the Authorities. Another result is that the Tribunals are saved the trouble of dealing with petty local disputes.

Omdehs and Sheikhs of villages, in order to be eligible, must be not less than 25 years of age, and possess at least ten acres of land, except in the hamlets and villages where the land belongs to non-residents. They are elected by the Provincial Assemblies. Their services are recognized by exemption of land-tax in respect of five acres of land; and their children are not liable to military service. In case of dereliction of duty, they are subject to the jurisdiction of the Mudiría: but they are removable only by the Ministry of the Interior.

The Gaffirs are under the orders of the Omdehs, who are personally responsible for the security of their sub-districts; and in every village there is a sheikh of the Gaffirs. The number of watchmen is fixed by the Mudiría, in consultation with the local Omdeh; and it cannot be augmented, except with the permission of the Ministry. The men are appointed by the Mamur, on the recommendation of the Omdeh. Exempted from service on the *corvée*, they receive also some slight remuneration; and their dismissal must come from the Mudiría.

The Oases The Oases are attached to the respective Mudirías, and are placed under Egyptian Mamurs. Siwa,[1] the most distant oasis, is under the jurisdiction of Damanhur.

§ *Centralized Administrations*

The only Administrations inviting special reference, under this head, are the Public Health, Public Security, Discipline,

[1] A full account of this interesting oasis, the ancient Jupiter Ammon, is given in the narrative of my journey thither, in the Spring of 1898, under the title of 'From Sphinx to Oracle' (Hurst & Blackett), which is illustrated with numerous reproductions from my own photographs, etc. Incidentally, the book deals also with the Senussi Question—of such vital importance to Egypt—Siwa being the outpost of the Senussi, whose domination over the Sahara is absolute.

Prisons, and Slave Trade Departments. The remaining Departments of the Central Administration are: the Inspectorate, Administrative, Financial and Registration, Stores, Legal, and Archives.

Public Health

The Medical and Sanitary Department was the creation of Mr Clifford Lloyd; and it made a bad start. Dr Sandwith, who was the first to be placed in charge of the Public Health Office, was so zealous in dismissing corrupt officials and so energetic in the introduction of reforms, that he roused considerable opposition amongst those who preferred the old order of things, and was eventually ousted by an 'ignoble intrigue,' as Sir Alfred Milner does not hesitate to affirm. This was in the year 1885; and, for the next five years, comparatively slight progress was made in this Department. But at the beginning of the present decade, Rogers Pasha, the Principal Medical Officer to the Egyptian Army, was appointed Director-General. Under his vigorous and enlightened initiative, the Department of Public Health has made immense strides in the direction of improving the sanitary condition of the towns, but chiefly in providing hospitals, dispensaries, and an organized and efficient Sanitary Service. Unfortunately, all these appanages of a civilized State, which had to be created practically anew, were so costly, that the overburthened Egyptian Government was not in a position, before 1895, when a period of financial ease set in, to meet any but essential expenditure. It required a cholera epidemic (1895-1896)[1] to bring home to the Authorities the absolute need of introducing wider and more stringent measures of sanitation. Five public disinfecting-stations were established; many of the mosques were put in a more sanitary state, by closing

[1] The epidemic of 1895-1896 was not nearly so severe as that of 1883. Nevertheless, in spite of the advance of science and the splendid devotion of an overworked Anglo-Egyptian staff, out of 21,000 cases fully 18,000 fell victims to the scourge. This high mortality was, however, due in a large measure to the concealment of cases. Unlike Bombay, the Egyptian authorities did not hesitate to impose segregation and other needful measures. The cholera was imported into Egypt from the Hejaz by pilgrims returning from Mecca.

the latrines, etc.;[1] an Institute of Hygiene was created, and placed in charge of a European bacteriologist; initial reforms were introduced into the Medical School, upon which the Sanitary Service relies for its supply of Medical Officers; while a large number of hospitals and dispensaries were opened in the Provinces.[2] But epidemics of cholera —since the disease is not endemic to Egypt—cannot be stamped out by such means, so long as the population is unprovided with the ordinary safeguards against the spread of

[1] Lord Cromer publishes the following, in his *Report* for 1899:

'Last year,' Sir John Rogers writes, 'I alluded to the successful attempt made to deal more extensively with the sanitation of mosques by the abolition of the open ablution basins ("medahs") and the substitution of reservoirs and taps. The provisions of the existing Mosque Law only extended to the sanitation of the mosque latrines and the prevention of the drainage of the mosque polluting the water supply. The Decree was only applicable to certain towns, and when these had been dealt with, the extension of the law to other towns had to be approved by the Council of Ministers. . . . Under the Mosque Decree, thirty mosques belonging to the Wakfs Administration, and sixty-four private mosques, have been dealt with during the year. The chief value of this Decree now is that, by its means, the passive obstruction of the Wakfs Administration can be dealt with. One hundred and eighteen cemeteries have been transferred under the Cemetery Decree. A new Decree has been published substituting boundary pillars for walls, except in special cases laid down by this Department. This largely reduces the cost of transfer of a cemetery, which is borne entirely by the community interested. The opposition to the transfer of cemeteries, which was at first very strong, is diminishing greatly of late years, and my experience is that when once the new cemetery is completed, and the initial cost paid, the village inhabitants are the first to recognize the advantage conferred on them by having a decent cemetery at a suitable distance from their habitations. This is another example of the advantage of the Government taking the initiative in a measure which certainly would never have been suggested by native opinion.'

[2] The following is from Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899:

'About 22,000 patients were treated in the Government Hospitals during the past year, being an increase of about 1500 over the figures of 1897. The receipts from paying patients show a steady tendency to increase. Last year they amounted to £E4200, as against £E2660 in 1894. Every year new dispensaries are opened in the provinces. There are now forty-six, as compared to twelve in 1891. The cost of opening a new dispensary is about £E90. The receipts from the dispensaries have risen from £E1056 in 1893 to £E2800 in 1898. About 351,000 successful vaccinations were made in the course of last year, an increase of 22,000 over 1897. . . . A new hospital was completed last year at Sohag, and new hospitals are under construction at Assiut and Chibin-el-Kom. . . . In spite of the progress which has been made, some of the provincial hospitals are, I regret to say, still in a very bad condition. They will be taken in hand gradually as funds are available.'

infection and is allowed to keep up the pilgrimage to Mecca whilst cholera lurks or prevails in the Hejaz. Quarantine measures cannot be trusted to keep out cholera, even if the Egyptian Board were more competent than it is to meet the constantly recurring outbreaks in Arabia. It is only by improving the sanitary conditions of the country—a work of time and one involving heavy expenditure—that Egypt can hope to be immune from such visitations. Meanwhile, drainage is unknown; and the great schemes for draining Cairo and Alexandria have not yet been put in hand.[1] The prospect, opened up by recent borings in the Delta, of being able to tap a pure water-supply for Lower Egypt, will, if realized, go far to remove the danger of contamination that exists at present. And for the rest, the Sanitary Inspectors (few in number, as they are) can do much, though not everything, to improve

[1] The question of providing Alexandria and Cairo with a good system of drainage has been under discussion for some time past: and, so far, the Municipality of Alexandria has shown that there is something in local self-government, as the following remarks in Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899 testify:—

'A scheme has now been prepared by the Municipality. It has received the approval of the highest technical authorities in the country, and will shortly be put up to public tender. The total cost of the work is estimated at £E500,000. A loan of this amount will be raised on the security of the Octroi receipts of the town. It is thought that an annuity of £E24,000 will suffice to pay the interest and extinguish the debt in fifty years. The Government and the Commissioners of the Debt have agreed to contribute £E10,000 a year towards the annuity. The Municipality has increased the house tax in Alexandria by 2 per cent. This measure will bring in about £E6500 net. The remainder of the annuity will be charged to the credit of £E12,000 in the Budget of the Municipality for sanitary works. The construction of the works will be spread over five years. During this period only a portion of the annuity of £E24,000 will be required. The balance, amounting to about £E90,000, will be employed in constructing an improved system of filtration for the water supply of the town. The fact that an arrangement has at last been made for the execution of this important work reflects great credit on the Municipality of Alexandria, and notably on its President, Shakur Bey.

'The Cairo Water Company has now in hand a scheme which is almost ready to be submitted to the Government. The approximate total cost is £E750,000. As soon as the Water Company's proposals are complete, they will receive careful consideration. It is to be hoped that, at no very distant date, it will be possible to commence work. I may mention that, in 1891, the Powers agreed to the administrative expenditure of the Egyptian Government being increased by half the Octroi receipts of Cairo, in order to provide for the drainage of the town. The financial difficulties of carrying out any scheme are thus materially lessened.'

the state of the towns and villages, which, if the climate were less healthy, would be hotbeds of infection.

The diminution of opthalmia, which is so widely prevalent, is only one of the many signs of a healthier state of affairs. Others may be seen in the growing appreciation by the natives of the Government hospitals, and in the decrease of fanatical opposition to the introduction of sanitary reforms, especially into the mosques. Cattle-plague and anthrax continue to visit the country; and must necessarily do so, in the absence of preventative measures against infected countries, such as Syria and Russia.[1] Diseased animals are dealt with in the Quarantine Parks at Alexandria.

Lunatic Hospital

Among the medical institutions of Egypt, none deserve greater recognition than the Lunatic Asylum and the Kasr el-Aini Hospital, both of which have been brought to a high state of efficiency by the English Medical Officers in Charge. The Lunatic Hospital, when Dr Warnock was placed in charge of it (1895), was in an incredible state of confusion. Accommodating over 400 patients, from all parts of Africa, the men and the women were herded together like animals; the cases and sometimes the sexes were not properly separated; the noise by day and by night was a pandemonium; and mechanical restraint was the common resort of the bewildered Egyptian doctors. During the few years of Dr Warnock's energetic and scientific administration, all this has been changed: and the Hospital now compares favourably with European institutions of the same kind. The percentage of deaths to the average daily number of the patients in the Asylum has fallen from 33 per cent. in 1884 to 13 per cent. in 1898. But, owing to lack of funds, and the increasing number of patients, many lunatics have to be sent away, only half-cured or fairly quiet,[2] in

[1] This question is still under discussion. Meantime, cattle-plague has recently appeared in the neighbourhood of Suákin, having been imported from Abyssinia; and Egypt is now 'infected' with foot-and-mouth disease.

[2] Some of these return, after committing crimes, for renewed treatment. A large proportion of the patients suffer from *hashish* insanities. It has been found difficult to restrict the sale of this drug, which may freely be bought in every town of Egypt. Commercial Conventions preclude a higher duty than 8 per cent.

order to make room for new arrivals. All the domestic work of the hospital, and even building, is done by the patients; the cases are classified and separated—each class having its own garden, for exercise; and there is a fairly competent staff of native doctors, warders, etc. I had many opportunities of judging of the discipline and order that now prevail.

Hospital for Infectious diseases

Close by the Lunatic Asylum, at Abbassía, there is an excellent Hospital for Infectious Diseases, established by Rogers Pasha, on the most approved modern principles and on the most liberal scale. Here paying-patients are received. It is said to be one of the best arranged hospitals to be seen anywhere; but its accommodation is very limited. A public disinfecting-station is attached to this hospital.

Kasr el-Aini Hospital

The Kasr el-Aini Hospital at Cairo was practically created, in the efficient state that has gained for it a wide and well-deserved reputation, by a brilliant surgeon, Dr Milton, whose services as Director were, I regret to add, lost last year through another 'ignoble intrigue,' of which he was the victim. When men of high professional standing like Dr Milton and Dr Sandwith are ousted from responsible positions, in which they are able to perform valuable public services, the inference is that there must be something rotten in the State of Egypt. Happily, it is not my duty to diagnose the case. The Kasr el-Aini Hospital accommodates over 400 patients. The extensive repairs and alterations, commenced in 1893, were completed in 1897. It is now a model institution of its kind.

The Police

There are two Departments in the Ministry of the Interior which deal directly with questions concerning the Police. That concerned with Discipline, to which three Inspectors (two English, and one German) are attached, is presided over by a British official, and restricts its super-

being imposed on its importation; and total prohibition is difficult to secure. The smoking of *hashish* is therefore widespread in Egypt; and it is one of the most fruitful causes of insanity. 'The uselessness of treating chronic hashish-smokers again and again,' says Dr Warnock, 'when they are allowed to revert to their vice outside, is obvious.'

vision to military matters connected with the Force; whilst the Department of Public Security, under an Egyptian Director, deals with the wider issues involving the maintenance of order and the detection of crime, thus coming into relations with the Ministry of Justice through the Parquet.[1]

I have already stated, that the institution of classes at the Khedivial School of Law for young officers of the Police has had the effect of disseminating elementary instruction regarding the Criminal Code and the Procedure of the Law Courts. The pay and position of both officers and men have been improved; and volunteer service is now said to be taking the place of conscription. The latter reform is certainly most urgent and necessary: because, up to the present, the Police have recruited from time-expired men of the Regular Army—those who have served six years with the colours, and who are either drafted into the Reserve or selected by the Ministry of the Interior for service in the Police. This process of selection results too often in a harvest of unwilling policemen—an obvious anomaly: and suggests that some amalgamation between the Reserve and the Police should be sought. Among other advances, I may mention that an Anthropometric Bureau, for the identification of criminals, has been established.

The Egyptian Police Force in 1898 numbered 5689 non-commissioned officers and men, of whom 128 were Europeans (mostly Italians and Austrians) and the remainder were Egyptians. Of the 264 commissioned officers, 230 were Egyptian, 14 were English, and 20 were Europeans of other nationalities.

Prisons

The Prisons Administration is under an English Inspector-General, who is aided by three English Inspectors. When Mr Clifford Lloyd created this Department, in 1883, the Egyptian Prisons were in a shocking insanitary state, and were conducted on a barbarous system, which included the application of torture in order to extort confession from

[1] *Cf.* Table No. 6, *ante* p. 250.

criminals. Although hampered by the lack of adequate funds, the Prisons Department has always shown a fair record of work and reform. Not only are the Provincial prisons clean and orderly, but the convict establishments at Tura and Giza are said to be models for imitation; and convict labour produces a large annual income.[1]

In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer states:

'In 1898 the Commissioners of the Debt granted £E33,000 from the General Reserve Fund for the construction of prisons. A further grant of £E26,000 has now been made, to be expended during the current year. I hope it may be found possible to allot an additional £E30,000 at the close of 1899 for expenditure in 1900. If this is done, the main difficulties connected with the question of prison accommodation will have been solved by the close of 1900. The evils attendant on overcrowding will then disappear.'

The Reformatory for Juvenile Offenders, which was recently instituted at Alexandria, has been transferred to Cairo, and is working well.

The Traffic in Slaves

The Slave Trade Department is under an English Director.

The excellent Convention of 1877 dealt a vital blow at the institution of slavery in Egypt, technically speaking: but it required the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1895 and the two Khedivial Decrees of 1896 to render it operative and effectual in the hands of those who intended to enforce its Regulations. If I allude, at some length, to the results of these negotiations, it is because the question of the Slave Trade has again become a serious one for the Government, in view of the opening up of the Sudan to the policy of Egypt: since, in my opinion, this question must necessarily undermine, for some years to come, not only the pacification

[1] The convict prison at Giza supplies blankets, linen, boots, brushes, camel-rugs, and other articles for the use of the prisoners and of the Army. Considerable quantities of stone are quarried by the Tura prisoners, the largest purchaser being the Public Works Department. Convicts are also employed on military works, road-making, etc.

of the Sudan, but also every economic and administrative measure affecting the development and government of a region which hitherto has depended so largely on slave labour and the Traffic in slaves. That, however, is a subject to which I shall refer more particularly when I come to discuss problems in the Sudan. In this place, it is only necessary that I should review the powers placed in the hands of the Anglo-Egyptian Administration for dealing with slavery as an institution.

Although the Slave Trade, as such, has been abolished, the institution of slavery still exists: and it must continue to exist, so long as domestic slaves hesitate to avail themselves of the freedom to which by law they are entitled. 'It is sometimes forgotten,' says Lord Cromer, in a recent Report,[1] 'that the advantages of the system of slavery are not wholly on the side of the masters. These latter cannot discharge their domestic servants. Custom often obliges them to maintain a large number of slaves, which have frequently been inherited, and thus imposes on them an onerous burthen of which, to my certain knowledge, many would willingly free themselves, were they able to do so.'

It is evident that, although slaves continue to be smuggled into the country, in small numbers, there is no open Traffic in Egypt. I can personally testify to one source of this supply. During my journey in the Libyan Desert, in 1898, I learnt that the innocent date-caravans from Siwa, in charge of Mojabra, who are notorious slave-traders, habitually smuggle into Egypt boys and women—but principally boys—who are introduced as their own relatives, and are either sold in the country or are shipped to Constantinople. Siwa is still a distributing-centre for slaves from Jalo, arriving from across the Sahara: and the obstacles which the Sheikhs of Siwa placed in my way, in order to prevent me from penetrating to Jarabub, were, I believe, conceived with the object of concealing the Slave Trade of Jalo (about which we have no definite information), however much they were inspired by their fanaticism as followers of the

[1] Egypt, No. 1 (1896).

Senussi Mahdi.[1] Whereas, formerly, a woman fetched £40 in the open markets of Egypt, they are now worth only about £10, owing to the risks incurred by their purchasers. Because, when domestic slaves enter a household, they soon learn that their freedom may be procured simply by claiming manumission papers: but they never apply to the Authorities until they have first obtained the promise of employment elsewhere, or have contracted marriage, with a view to bettering their position. Thus, there is no real hardship in this form of domestic slavery, as an institution, which is scarcely to be distinguished from the domestic slavery of Mayfair.[2]

Labour-traffic

What might easily become an organized labour-traffic in Egypt—little better than the Slave Trade—is the system so widely in vogue for supplying domestic servants, owing to the Slave Trade having been suppressed. The Felláhin will not send out their daughters as servants, having use for them at home; and besides, the women all marry when they are quite young. Many servants are imported from the Ægean Archipelago, from whence Greeks bring young women, whose mothers entrust them to their care, being persons well-known to them; and who are introduced as servants into the best Turkish and Egyptian families. These domestics, under their agreement, receive £2 a-month as wages, of which their agent claims his due share, towards the extinction of the debt contracted between them: and, in about two years' time, the girls thus obtain sufficient capital to enable them to return home, if they wish to do so. But, as there is no supervision over this traffic—in which not only Greeks engage—abuses occasionally occur, by which women are decoyed into disreputable establishments. Resort to the Consuls, or Consular

[1] *Cf.* 'From Sphinx to Oracle,' by Arthur Silva White. (Hurst & Blackett: 1899.) The Senussi are professional slave-traders.

[2] I heard an amusing story of a smart little Negro slave-boy. His original master disposed of him no less than four times, in rapid succession. Each time the lad escaped from his purchaser, and, having obtained a manumission-certificate, returned to his first master, to whom he was really attached. Finally, the trick was discovered; and the master was awarded two years' imprisonment.

Courts, appears to be the sole safeguard against breach of contract or personal injury, in a traffic of this kind, which might easily degenerate into one of which we have certain knowledge in Belgium and elsewhere in Europe.

The main differences between the Convention of 1895 and that of 1877, as defined by Lord Cromer, are as follows:—

Convention of 1895

'The punishments which can be awarded to the purchaser and to the vendor, according to their several degrees of culpability, have been clearly defined. Moreover—and this is a provision of considerable importance—the head of the family is rendered responsible for the acts committed by the inmates of his harím. Even if no actual complicity on his part can be proved, he may be fined if a slave is introduced into his harím, whether as the result of purchase or exchange, by any member of his family or by any of his dependents.

'Under the Convention of 1877, offences connected with slavery and the Slave Trade were tried by Court-martial. This procedure was quite justifiable at the time the Convention was framed. In 1877, no Civil Courts, in which confidence could be placed, existed in the country. Such, however, is no longer the case. . . . For the future, the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the Courts-martial in Egypt Proper will be vested in a special Tribunal composed of five Judges chosen from the Egyptian Court of Appeal. The decisions of this Tribunal will be final. The procedure to be adopted is set forth in one of the Decrees issued on 21st January [1896]. In the Red Sea (except at Suez), and in the territory subject to Egypt lying to the south of Aswán, slavery offences will, as heretofore, continue to be judged by Courts-martial. . . . In transferring to a Civil Tribunal the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the Courts-martial, it has been thought desirable to insure the presence of an European element in the constitution of the Court. It has, therefore, been provided that, of the five Judges, "two at least shall be Europeans." As a matter of fact, the Europeans will, under the present constitution of the Court of Appeal, be either of English or Belgian nationality.'

The Egyptian Government contributes £E300 a-year towards the support of a Home for Freed Women Slaves, which the British Anti-Slavery Society established at Cairo fifteen years ago, and which has rendered excellent service in providing employment as domestic servants for women who have obtained their certificates of freedom.

Repressive legislation

As it has not been thought desirable to abolish the legal status of slavery in Egypt—under which a manumitted slave-woman may not, by the Koránic law, contract a legal marriage without the consent of her former master—an additional Article was appended to the Decree of 21st January 1896, by which owners refusing such consent render themselves liable to imprisonment (six months to three years) or to the imposition of a fine (£E50 to £E300). In effect, therefore, the complete abolition of slavery may be said to have been introduced into Egypt, and to be surrounded with sufficient safeguards for enforcing as much or as little of the law as the Government shall deem expedient.

Being in the hands of European experts and Judges, it is perhaps wiser to allow them latitude in these respects, rather than to tie them down to blind and fanatical enforcement of an uncompromising Code providing for the abolition of the legal status of slavery, such as the short Indian Act of 1843. For twenty years past, Slavery as an institution has been moribund in Egypt Proper: and it will die a natural death when our Western civilization shall have been assimilated into the body politic.

So far, the new Regulations have worked fairly well. Manumission bureaux have been established in the Provinces; and many hundreds of slaves annually claim and receive certificates of freedom.[1] The prosecutions of 1894, which were mainly directed against the then President of the Legislative Council, proved to the country that the Govern-

[1] In 1897, manumission papers were granted to 450 male and 350 female slaves. The number of slaves liberated during 1898 was 334, of whom 170 were men, and 164 women. Domestic slavery in Egypt Proper may, in fact, be said to be rapidly disappearing.

ment made no distinction between persons infringing the law. The Regulations for the control of native vessels trading in the Red Sea are said to have met with little opposition on the part of the owners and captains of dhows. After the retrocession of Kassala to Egypt, the Slave Trade Department posted 100 men of the Camel Corps at that spot, in order to intercept slave-caravans passing through the country of the Beni-Amer Arabs (who have always supported the Traffic) to the Red Sea Coast near Agig, whence slaves are known to be exported to Arabia in Arab dhows.[1]

The real trouble will arise when Courts-martial in the Egyptian Sudan are set up to deal with the Slave Trade in those regions: for, unless wide discretionary powers are given to the agents of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, it will not be easy to pacify the country or to develop its natural resources.

[1] In regard to the Arabian Traffic in slaves, Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, gives the following information:

'A few cases of kidnapping occurred in Upper Egypt during the past year. The boys and girls are taken down to the Red Sea Coast, transported to Arabia, and there sold. I am glad to say that, in some instances, the children were recovered, and the guilty parties brought to justice. It is, however, very difficult to trace the individuals who perpetrate these crimes. They generally belong to the Bisharîn or Ababdeh tribes. Since the reconquest of the Dongola Province more Sudanese have found their way into the Aswân district than was formerly the case. The children become an easy prey to the numerous Arabs who are constantly on the watch for a favourable opportunity to kidnap them. There can be no doubt that the traffic in slaves is aided and abetted by the owners of boats who come over from the Arabian coast for the ostensible object of pearl-fishing. I am drawing the attention of the Governor-General of the Sudan to this point. There is also no doubt that the Rasheida tribe, who live in Italian territory, take an active part in the traffic. It is believed that about 50 to 100 slaves are imported annually into the Hejaz from the coast north of Massawa. They are principally Abyssinians, with a few eunuchs. The information on this subject in possession of the Egyptian Slave Trade Department has been communicated to the Italian authorities.

'There is no difficulty in finding a sale for slaves in Arabia. At Jidda there are twelve slave-merchants. Their names are well known. I am informed that the price of slaves is: for a male or female of 14 years old, about £16; from 14 to 20, from £20 to £25; from 20 to 30, £30. In Mecca and Medina the prices are about 50 per cent. higher. Eunuchs fetch from £80 to £100.'

§ *Decentralized Organization*

The Governorat of Suákin, the Mudirías of Nubia (formerly the Frontier Province) and of Dongola are administered by the Military Authorities. The Egyptian Sudan—formerly the Khalifa's Dominions, and now under an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium—is at present administered by the Military Authorities, with British officers as Governors, Commanders, etc. None of these districts are as yet prepared to support a purely Civil Administration: their development in that respect is a work of time. Here, in this place, their bare mention, as appertaining to the functions of Government theoretically belonging to or emanating from the Ministry of the Interior, is all that is necessary. The detailed and comprehensive survey which I shall undertake in the sections dealing exclusively with the Sudan will, I believe, go far to establish the proposition, that the group of territories lying to the south of Wadi Halfa, in the Nile Valley, may be regarded as an expansion of Egypt Proper—almost as a Colonial Possession—rather than as a mere extension of frontier. The Egyptian Sudan is, in my view, sharply dissociated, both physically and politically, from the principles that underlie the economic development and political administration of Egypt Proper: and it were as well that this distinction should be recognized at the outset.

Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

I cannot conclude this sub-section without making some reference to the Egyptian Press, if only for the reason that, in the Ministry of the Interior, there is a so-called Director of a Bureau affecting to deal with Press matters: although there is no external evidence to indicate that his position is other than ornamental.

The Egyptian Press

There are a good many journals and periodical publications produced in Egypt—fully thirty. Fifty per cent. of these are issued in the vernacular; and, of the other moiety, one-half appear in the French language. There is only one

daily newspaper published in English[1]: and this—*The Egyptian Gazette*—is partly recapitulated in French. The remainder are Greek and Italian papers.

With few exceptions, these journals are not worth the paper they are printed on, though they usually sell at one piastre, Tariff (2½d). With few exceptions, they are all anti-British, or Nationalist, or, as regards the Greek and Italian issues, more or less colourless.

The *Egyptian Gazette*, published at Alexandria, is the accredited English organ: but, from the editorial point of view, it is surpassed in merit by *Le Progrès*, which also supports the 'Maison Britannique.' The third pro-British organ is the Arabic journal, *Al-Mokattam*.

The Turkish Agency subventions *El-Moaïad*, its principal mouthpiece, and a sorry crowd of rags in the vernacular. The Palace faction supports, and not infrequently inspires, some of the most rabid prints in the country. The French faction—I had almost written, Agency—subventions the remainder of the Anglophobist journals. The British Agency—although it has the reputation of acting similarly—not only withdraws from the scurrilous newspaper campaign, but treats the Press with profound contempt. Only when personal animadversions transgress even the boundless license of the Egyptian Press, do British officials, in their individual capacity, occasionally insert a *démenti*.

Need of a Press law

France having refused, after having promised, to sanction a Press law—the need for which was too obvious, in connection with the suppression of the *Bosphore Egyptien*—matters have been allowed to take their course. That course is the sedulous circulation of the most malicious falsehoods and of the most grotesque misrepresentations concerning Great Britain and British policy in Egypt. No doubt, many of the Arabic editors believe that they are supporting Nationalist principles in opposing the continuation of the British Occupation; but the reckless diatribes in the French press, which often are reproduced in the vernacular,

[1] There is also an English weekly print, *The Sphinx*, confining itself to social news and gossip.

have no such excuse. And although it is true, that there is no public opinion, properly so called, in Egypt, nevertheless it cannot be to the advantage of British prestige and influence that the native population should be nourished on such mental garbage. In short, in the absence of a Press law, there is much need for a sound English organ, with French and Arabic supplements attached to it, which should take up an independent position—in the sense that it should be free from official patronage—and deal with Egyptian politics in a more authoritative and capable manner than that exhibited by the Anglophile journals. True, our good deeds speak for themselves: but even good deeds may be wilfully misrepresented and their motives misinterpreted. And, although it is no less true that the bulk of the population is immune from politics and wholly ignorant of the political situation, it would in many ways be better to have the masses with us rather than stolidly indifferent. Not that it is possible for the Fellâhin, with their limited horizon, their incapacity to understand our ideas of progress, and their dormant, if torpid, fanaticism against all Infidels, to be wholly on the side of the foreigner, as against their former 'Turkish' taskmasters: but, by protecting them against seditious intrigue and sowing the seed of enlightenment, we might do much to advance our mutual interests, which depend so largely on peaceful and prosperous conditions.

Egypt is a country in which a rigid Press censorship would be more than excusable, on account of the subversive foreign elements which undermine law and order and claim license at the price of freedom.

(*e*) *Public Works*

In the earlier sections of this book, I have dealt so exhaustively with the important subject of Irrigation—which bulks so largely in the Ministry of Public Works—that nothing remains to be considered here except matters of Administration and a few of the contingent Services.

Central Administration

Sir William Garstin, the Under-Secretary of State, practically controls this Department, to which he has rendered

TABLE NO. 8.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS


Minister of State (Egyptian).
Under-Secretary of State (English).
Secretary-General (French).
Administration (Six Egyptian Heads of Department).
Technical Service (Egyptian Adviser).
Survey Department (English Director).
Irrigation (Two English Inspectors-General, for Lower and Upper Egypt; and two French Heads in the Drawing and Mapping Offices).
Towns and Buildings (English Director-General).
Lower and Upper Egypt (Two English and four Egyptian Directors).
Antiquities (French Director-General).
Circles of Irrigation [Lower and Upper Egypt].
Barrages [Delta] (English Director).
The Great Reservoir Scheme (Wholly under British Direction) [to be completed in 1903].
First [Cairo] (English Inspector).
Second [Cairo] (Egyptian Inspector).
Third [Alexandria] (English Inspector).
Fourth [Minia] (English Inspector).
Fifth [Kena] (Egyptian Inspector).
Girga Directorate [Sohag] (Egyptian Inspector).

such distinguished public services. No British official has taken greater pains to educate his Native subordinates, and to recognize and advance native efficiency in the higher ranks of the Administration.

In Table No. 8, it will be seen that the Heads of Department in the Central Administration are all Egyptians; and that Native engineers and officials occupy responsible positions, as Inspectors of Circles of Irrigation, and as Directors in the Department of State Buildings, etc. In the Technical Service, too, an Egyptian succeeded in 1897 to the control formerly exercised by an Englishman, who was promoted to the post of Inspector-General of Towns and State Buildings, with satisfactory results. In the Central Executive, a Frenchman occupies the position of Secretary-General; and one of his countrymen is the Director-General of Antiquities—a Department which continues to rest more or less exclusively in French hands. Finally, the highest and most responsible offices in the Irrigation Service are necessarily held by English engineers. Major Brown, as the Inspector-General for Lower Egypt, and Mr Wilson, as Inspector-General for Upper Egypt, have rendered valuable services to Irrigation.

The total Expenditure, on the Irrigation Budget, which varies considerably from year to year, amounted in 1897 to over £900,000. At the close of that year, the *Caisse* granted £E530,000 for the construction of two weirs, or supplementary barrages, below the Great Barrage at the head of the Delta, which, it is hoped, will be completed in 1901. Towards no Department of State does the *Caisse* show greater liberality, since reproductive public works constitute a first charge on the savings of Egypt, and produce over cent. per cent. on the sums thus expended. The great Reservoir scheme will not affect the General Budget until the works are completed in 1903. Budget

Relief of the *corvée* is provided through funds contributed by the Government and by the *Caisse*.[1] Bearing in The *Corvée*

[1] In 1897, the Government granted £E139,187, and the *Caisse* contributed £E249,994.

mind that, whenever a High Flood occurs, the number of men called out on *corvée* must be enormously increased, to meet a pressing danger to the country, the following figures are interesting:

Years.	Number of Men for 100 days.	Character of Flood.
1888	58,708	Very Low.
1889	49,904	Medium.
1890	48,488	,,
1891	44,962	,,
1892	84,391	Very High.
1893	32,752	Low.
1894	49,448	High.
1895	36,982	Medium.
1896	25,794	,,
1897	11,069	Low.
1898	19,405	High.

Thus, the total for 1897 was about one-fifth of that for 1888, and about one-third of that for 1893. In his *Report* for 1897, from which these figures (with the exception of last year's) are taken, Sir William Garstin remarks that: 'The labour which has been bestowed in past years upon the strengthening of the Nile banks and the repairs to the Nile culverts, has undoubtedly largely assisted the attainment of the satisfactory results recorded for 1897. Better arrangements for the checking of the numbers, and for preventing men from being called out to guard portions of the banks which are safe from danger, have now been made. The Mudirs and the Inspectors of Irrigation have worked cordially together to attain this end, and I hope that even the low figures given for 1897 may be gradually reduced.'[1] Unfortunately, the Flood of last year (1898) was high, and raised the total number of men called out.

[1] Report on the Administration of the Irrigation Department for 1897: Cairo, 1898.

The Technical Service

The Government Arsenal, under an English engineer, is now entirely self-supporting. In 1897 the value of the work executed was over £E21,000. The Government steamers are kept in repair by the Arsenal, which also turns out work for all the Departments—from a scavenger's cart to a shell for the Artillery. In the important duty of inspecting and licensing engines, which often are placed in charge of ignorant natives, the Department has hitherto met with scant success, owing to the obstructive action of the Mixed Courts.[1]

Drawing and Mapping Offices

The Drawing and Mapping Offices, under two French *chefs du bureau* in the Inspectorate-General of Irrigation, produce work that compares favourably with that of European cartographers. This Department has hitherto received a grant of from £E3000 to £E4000 per annum to meet all the expenses of surveying and production. The hydraulic maps are very satisfactory; and the offices are well managed; but the triangulation survey of the Delta has proceeded rather slowly. The Drawing and Mapping Offices have now been amalgamated with the new Survey Department under an English Director.

Survey Department

Lord Cromer mentions, in his *Report* for 1899, that all the different Survey Services—viz., the Revenue Survey, the Topographical Survey, the Geological Survey, and the Drawing and Mapping Offices of the Public Works Ministry—have been united into one Department and placed under the direction of Captain Lyons, R.E. This is an admirable reform, the need for which I had previously emphasized: and I conclude that the Survey Department is officially attached to the Ministry of Public Works.[2]

[1] 'The law regulating the licensing and examination of engines in Egypt is in a most unsatisfactory state. The Law Courts, when an engine proprietor is brought before them for infringing rules which affect the public safety, fine him, as a maximum, 10 piastres (2s.), and refuse to stop his engine from working. Proceedings are consequently at a deadlock. A Commission is now sitting to revise this Law. It is to be hoped that the Mixed Courts will agree to some changes. Accidents constantly occur from the bursting of steam-engines: until the Law is amended, the Public Works Department is powerless to stop their occurrence.'—(Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899, p. 30.)

[2] Since the Geological Survey derived its budget from the Ministry of Public Works, and the Cadastral Survey (for Revenue purposes) was conducted by the Ministry of Finance.

The Geological Survey, under Captain Lyons, was originally undertaken to serve the Government as a guide in granting concessions; and has, from the first, been intimately connected with the Ministry of Public Works in such operations as boring for water, testing building-materials, preparing a complete set of Standard Weights and Measures, etc. Each of the Surveys has, in fact, been initiated for some specific and urgent object, and has depended on a capricious budget. The result is, that the Geological Survey —having only a three years' grant—has been very much handicapped.[1] By Midsummer 1899, a Reconnaissance Survey, with Geological data, will, nevertheless, be completed for the whole of Egypt Proper (up to Wadi Halfa), including the Oases. A Geological Museum is now being built to house the numerous specimens, samples of building-stones, etc.

As no Egyptians could be found to undertake surveying in the desert, all Captain Lyons' assistants have been young Englishmen, whose work, considering the difficulties and drawbacks, has been very satisfactory.

The work of this Department will now be more uniform and more closely supervised than formerly was possible. The different staffs being interchangeable and under one common head, economies will be introduced and overlapping avoided. It may even be hoped that some day money will be found for the measurement of a base-line in the Delta.

Public Buildings

Great inconvenience is experienced throughout Egypt owing to the want of suitable public buildings. As Lord Cromer remarks, in his *Report* for 1899: 'It is impossible to meet the ever increasing demands of the various Departments in this connection. At the same time, year by year, some improvement takes place.' Thus, during 1898, £E75,000 was spent on the new Law Courts in Cairo,

[1] Undue expedition had to be made. The surveyors were compelled to construct a topographical map before being able to plot their own data; and they had to be trained in this work, whilst at the same time having no inducement to remain in the Service, as the employment was not permanent. These disadvantages, and the restricted periods during which work can be carried on in the desert, interposed serious obstacles. But, happily, Captain Lyons is a man of indomitable energy and fertile resource.

and on prisons, hospitals, district offices, and other public buildings. By the end of 1899, it is expected that the Law Courts will be completed, as well as the new Quarantine buildings at Tor, for the construction of which a sum of £E40,000 is available.

(*f*) *Foreign Affairs*

It is hardly necessary to state that the Foreign Affairs of Egypt are the special concern of her Majesty's Government. The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs acts simply as the medium of intercourse between Foreign Diplomatic representatives at the Court of the Khedive and the Government of Egypt, and as intermediary between that Government and foreign Powers. For all practical purposes, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a bureau of the British Agency. At the same time, although Lord Cromer may have instructed the Egyptian Minister in the terms of an identic despatch, he himself is visited by a copy of it, which he receives in his capacity of Consul-General. Such little touches of humour go far to brighten the political situation in Egypt.

Sir Alfred Milner has pointed out,[1] that the prosperity of Egypt in the old days advanced in inverse ratio to the number of Blue books published on Egypt. The extreme brevity of my reference to the Department of Foreign Affairs may equally be regarded as a sign of its effective Administration. There can be only one head in the direction of Foreign Policy.

(*g*) *War*

Organization

The organization of the War Office is wholly English. All the high Administrative offices and the contingent Commands are held by British officers in the Egyptian Army. In no other Department does the British Control enjoy the same absolute freedom. The Sirdar is supreme: though he is liable to receive general instructions from her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General. His Highness the

[1] In 'England in Egypt,' to which work I am indebted for the basis of my historical retrospect between the years 1882 and 1892.

TABLE No. 9.

MINISTRY OF WAR, AND MILITARY ADMINISTRATIONS


Minister of War (Egyptian).
Sub-Minister of War (Egyptian).
The Sirdar (English).
Military Intelligence (English Director).
Head-Quarter Staff of the Egyptian Army (Under an English Adjutant-General, with Senior Native Officers as Heads of the Arabic and Recruiting Sub-divisions).
Military and Civil Administration of the Sudan [Anglo-Egyptian Condominium] (Under English Governor-General and Commanders, etc.; Mudirs of Provinces; Civil Staff; and Civil Financial Secretary).
Medical Corps (English).
Director of Supplies (English).
Financial Secretary (English).
Director of Stores (English).

Khedive is the Titular Head of the Army, or Commander-in-Chief. The Sirdar is the Executive Commander-in-Chief; and, as such, he controls the entire Organization and Administration. The Adjutant-General is the second in command.

Administration

The Head-Quarter Staff of the Egyptian Army is under an English Adjutant-General, with Senior Native Officers as Heads of the Arabic and Recruiting Sub-divisions. The Director of Military Intelligence deals direct with the Sirdar, and has relations also with the Adjutant-General. Under his cognisance come also the semi-military Administrations of Sinai and the old Frontier Province.[1] For purposes of Administration, the reconquered country is divided into the Provinces of Dongola, Berber, Sennar, Kassala, Khartum, Fashoda, and the Governorat of Suákin, over which the Sirdar, as Governor-General of the Sudan, exercises supreme control. The Egyptian Army is now quartered almost entirely in the Sudan.

Table

In Table No. 9, I have indicated the composition of the War Office and the principal Departmental Agencies of the Head-Quarter Staff, etc. The Sudan and the Army organization are now so interwoven, and the future requirements of the reconquered Provinces are so obscure, that it would be premature at the present transition-stage to attempt to give any definite details.

Establishment (European)

There are, at present, 132 British officers and 47 British warrant and non-commissioned officers on the permanent establishment of the Egyptian Army. The War Office also employs 20 Europeans as engineers, of whom 13 are British, 4 Italians, 2 Austrians, and 1 Greek. One Englishman is employed as a schoolmaster; and there are two French clerks and one Italian.

Budget

The Finance Department of the War Office divides its Budget under three heads: (1) the Ordinary Budget, which may be taken at under £E500,000; (2) the Military Ex-

[1] Before the recent Campaign, the purely Civil Administration extended to Esneh only. The Frontier Province, for military purposes, remains at present under the Sirdar. Sinai is as before. It would be rash to speculate as to what the eventual organization will be.

penditure of Suákin, amounting to about £E84,000; and (3) the Military Expenditure of the Sudan,—a variable quantity. In regard to the last-mentioned Budget, the system adopted is to debit the Sudan with the extra military expenditure, over and above the normal figure, due to the re-occupation of the country. The total increase in the War Office Budget for 1899 is estimated at about £E36,000. The Army (including the Army of Occupation) costs about £E806,000.

Details in regard to the Sudan Budget will be given in Part IX, Section iv, of this work, dealing with the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The total Sudan deficit, which will have to be borne by the Egyptian Treasury, is estimated at about £E332,000 for the year 1899.

Historical Retrospect

The task of organizing the Egyptian Army, on its disbandment at the end of 1882, was entrusted to Sir Evelyn Wood, who, with a handful of British officers to co-operate with him, demonstrated, in a marvellously short space of time, that the Felláhin were capable of being turned into good soldiers. The Egyptian army, which hitherto had been a by-word for cowardice and ineptitude, made such progress during the brief period intervening between its reorganization and the Nile Campaign of 1884, that it was entrusted with the responsibility of guarding the long line of communications to Korti and with garrison and transport duties. Its fighting qualities were, however, never tested until, in 1885—when the British troops were withdrawn from Dongola and a Frontier Field Force, under Sir Francis Grenfell, the new Sirdar, was organized to replace them—Egyptians and British troops fought side by side in the severe action at Ginnis. Having on that occasion given proof of its capacity to stand up against Dervish onslaughts, the defence of the frontier, which was then fixed at Wadi Halfa, was entrusted entirely to the Egyptian army, which had been powerfully recruited in its best fighting elements by the organization of several Sudanese battalions. Two years later, the last detachment of British troops, which had been held in reserve at Aswán, was withdrawn.

Shortly afterwards, in the Summer of 1889, the Egyptian Force on the southern frontier of Egypt, having sustained an almost constant guerilla warfare with the Dervishes operating from Sarras, and thereby having obtained the necessary training and self-confidence, was enabled to meet the serious invasion of Egypt led by the redoubtable Dervish emir, Wad el-Nejumi, who, in that year, penetrated into Egypt Proper at the head of many thousands of his daring and fanatical followers. General Grenfell, with strong reinforcements, having hurried to the relief of the Frontier Force, the Anglo-Egyptian army threw itself across the line of the Dervish advance: and, at the battle of Toski, dealt a crushing blow, resulting in the annihilation of the enemy, in the death of their principal leaders, and in the destruction of the Dervish power as a menace to Egypt from the south. In the Eastern Sudan, the investment of Suákin was relieved and Osman Digna's power broken up by the victory obtained over the Dervishes at Afafit, in 1891, which enabled the Suákin garrison to re-occupy Tokar, the only available base for the enemy's operations in that region. In both these decisive engagements, the Felláhin battalions, under their English leaders, showed steadiness under fire; while the Sudanese regiments displayed those splendid fighting qualities for which they are distinguished.

In April 1892, Sir Francis Grenfell was succeeded in his command by the present Sirdar, Lord Kitchener. General Kitchener, as he was at that time, had had ten years' experience of the Egyptian army: and probably no man better knew its capacities and limitations as a fighting-force. Through his vigorous administration, aided by an ever-increasing number of British officers, whose experience of the country and of their individual commands was invaluable, the Egyptian army developed, under the new regimental system and more encouraging conditions, a discipline and an efficiency which have since proved capable of meeting the severest tests. In the Sudan Campaign of 1896, the Egyptian army was not too severely tried; but in the later phases of the Campaign, especially in the final

dash on Omdurman, it responded to every call on its endurance, fire-discipline, and pluck. Thus, in the short space of sixteen years, the Egyptian army has been converted from a mere rabble into a well organized and highly efficient fighting-force through the energy and devotion of its British officers and drill-sergeants.[1]

The Egyptian Army

The Egyptian army now numbers over 20,000 men of all arms. Indeed, in the absence of statistics—which recently have been withheld—one might venture to estimate its numbers at 25,000, officers and men. There are 12 Felláhin battalions of infantry, and not less than 9 Sudanese regiments. The cavalry, artillery, and camel corps are also recruited from the Felláhin, who, in the aggregate, must number fully 14,000 men of all arms. The Sudanese battalions have been powerfully recruited from the ranks of the Dervishes, who swarmed into the Anglo-Egyptian camps after every victory, and of whom fully 700 took part in the attack on Omdurman. So that, in estimating the Egyptian army at 25,000 men, I am probably well within the mark.

Officers

Four of the Felláhin battalions are entirely officered by Natives; the remainder have British commanders and officers. Egyptian officers are also given the independent commands and exclusive charge of half the camel-corps companies and half the cavalry squadrons; the other moiety being officered by Englishmen. All the Sudanese battalions are commanded by British officers. One-half of the officers of these Black regiments are men promoted from the ranks.

[1] In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer makes the following remarks on the Egyptian army:

'The military events of the past year must have removed whatever doubts heretofore prevailed as to the value of the Egyptian army as a thoroughly efficient fighting machine. Those events are so well known that it is unnecessary for me to dwell on them. Where all did so well, as in the recent campaign, I almost hesitate to draw special attention to the achievements of any one portion of the Anglo-Egyptian force. At the same time, I cannot refrain from alluding to the change of front executed in the face of the enemy by Colonel Macdonald's brigade at the battle of Omdurman. This movement has justly elicited the admiration of competent authorities. It could only have been accomplished successfully by highly trained and well-disciplined troops. I doubt if the annals of war contain a more striking instance of the advantages to be derived from constant exercise in the barrack-yard and on the drill-ground.'

The Sudanese can rise to the position of adjutant-major (intermediate between major and captain), which confers the rank of field-officer and entails the duties of adjutant; and, although technically illiterate, they make smart officers. Egyptians from the Military School can rise to the rank of Colonel; and many of them, especially the younger men, become excellent officers and administrators. They are recruited principally from the Turkish, Kurdish, and Circassian families of Egyptian middle-class society.

British officers join the Egyptian army with the rank of bimbashi (major). As the medium of intercourse with their Native subordinates is Arabic—the words of command being given in Turkish—the first duty of an Anglo-Egyptian officer is to acquire a knowledge of that difficult language.[1] Promotions and staff-appointments are made by selection. No doubt, there is a certain amount of grumbling among Egyptian officers, who are passed over by young subalterns fresh from England: but, in view of the serious issues at stake—until, in short, the Khalifa had been 'smashed'—it was not safe to venture further in the experiment of placing responsible commands in the hands of Natives, who hitherto had been found somewhat deficient in self-reliance and lacking in initiative.

Brigade Commands

In the recent Campaign, the British and Egyptian units of the three arms (cavalry, artillery, infantry) were brigaded together for active service in the field. The two Divisions of infantry were organized in six brigades, each of four battalions; and the cavalry and artillery of both armies were placed under the direct orders of the Sirdar, as the General Officer in Command. The Camel Corps and the 13 gunboats were also under British commanders.

Thus, all arms were harmoniously combined, and worked without friction, although British troops were under the command of the Egyptian Sirdar.

[1] Official correspondence between English officers is, of course, carried on in English; but, between them and the Native officers or non-commissioned officers, Arabic is employed. Orders are given out both in English and Arabic. The senior Native officer is responsible to his British Commander, or Bey, for the interior economy of the corps.

Recruitment

Conscription, under the Recruiting Law,[1] is always going on. The Felláhin conscripts are taken as they are required: *e.g.*, during one year recruits of, say, 19 years of age, and during another year those of 21 years of age, are selected. But whilst conscription is universal, the relatively small numbers required admit of judicious selection being made; and there are also many exemptions: *e.g.*, those physically unfit, only-sons of widows, Bedwins, and large numbers of Arabs descended from those families specially exempted in Mohammed Alí's time, who have not amalgamated with the Felláhin population.

The Sudanese regiments are recruited from all parts of the Sudan—volunteers and conscripts; more particularly, from the pure Negro tribes of the Upper Nile—the Shillúk and the Dinka, who are born warriors.

The terms of service for Felláhin are six years with the colours, and six years in the Reserve or in the Police; but for the Sudanese, the period of service is indefinite. No doubt, this is a great tax on the manhood of Egypt: but, in order to reduce the period of military service, it would be necessary to double the staff, so as to give recruits an adequate amount of drill and training, against which there are financial as well as inherent objections. Until the Sudan is thoroughly pacified, Egypt has need of an efficient army.

The Felláhin recruits are strong and well set up. The Sudanese are lanky, with narrow shoulders and weak chests, but very wiry and active. The former are quicker at their drill than the latter, and even take a delight in it. But at Aswán I saw a Sudanese regiment, which had been only nine months in the ranks, go through their skirmishing drill with remarkable precision and smartness.

§ *Army of Occupation*

Although the Army of Occupation is entirely independent of the Anglo-Egyptian Administration, its presence in the country does undoubtedly set free large numbers of the Egyptian Army which otherwise would be employed on

[1] Recruiting Law of 26 March 1885, modified by the Law of 12 June 1889.

garrison duty. Moreover, Egypt contributes about £85,000 a-year for its maintenance. This, under normal conditions, supports an establishment of about 5,000 men — three regiments at Cairo, two at Alexandria; Artillery, Engineers, Army Ordnance and Service Corps, etc. Of recent years, more cavalry have been introduced.

There is a strong garrison at Alexandria; but the greater number of British troops are stationed in or near Cairo, where they hold the principal strategic positions.[1]

The Officer Commanding the Army of Occupation has his Head Quarters and Staff at Cairo; and he maintains direct relations with the British War Office. He and the Officer Commanding the Alexandria Garrison have the rank of Major-General.

(*h*) *Trade and Commerce*

The increasing prosperity of Egypt may be accurately gauged by an examination of the Statistical Returns which I append to this sub-section.

Historical Retrospect

The Department of Customs has had many difficulties to contend against: but, under the able administration of Caillard Pasha, an Englishman, many of these obstacles have been removed. France, Russia, and Denmark have, however, not yet signed or adhered to the Commercial Convention which Egypt has negotiated with other countries; and are consequently under the old Capitulations and Regulations (Turkish), which are of no practical use to the Egyptian Administration, as they do not permit of any punishment in cases of fraud against the Customs.

Of all the reforms instituted by Mr Caillard, the first and most comprehensive of which was the entire reorganization of the Administration in 1880, none have had a more direct and immediate effect on the increase of Revenue than the Convention concluded with Greece, in 1884, regulating the

[1] Namely, in the Citadel, at the Nile Bridge, and at Abbassia. In 1898, there were two regiments at Cairo (one at the Citadel, one at the Nile Bridge barracks); while, out at Abbassia, there were one battalion of infantry, Lancers, and Artillery. The Alexandria Garrison then comprised only one battalion of infantry, a detachment of Artillery, and details.

introduction of Greek tobacco, and the abolition in 1890 of the old *raftieh* system, under which Turkey escaped the duties on imports. These three reforms have largely contributed to the growth of Customs' Revenue, apart from the normal expansion of Egypt's foreign commerce. Furthermore, Mr Caillard has the merit of having raised the Tobacco revenues from £E120,000 to over £E1,000,000.

The enormous increase of the receipts derived from tobacco is more particularly due to the measures instituted in 1890, which provided for the suppression of the native culture of the leaf, the increase of the import-duty from 14 to 20 piastres per kilogram (or 1s. 10d. per lb.), and the establishment of a monopoly for the importation of Turkish and Persian tombac. The Tobacco revenues in 1898 amounted to £E1,081,000. The export of cigarettes (chiefly to Germany, the best customer, and to Great Britain) reached over two hundred millions in 1897—a figure that was attained in 1898 by Cairo exporters alone. The culture of tobacco is prohibited in Egypt.[1]

As a natural corollary to the increased duties on tobacco, the Coast Guard Service had to be reformed and strengthened, between 1881 and 1884, and particularly in 1890. Cruisers watch the maritime frontiers; and a dromedary corps patrols the deserts, whence also a good deal of *hashish* is smuggled into the country—particularly from the Libyan Coast.

As regards the Convention with Turkey, whose trade with Egypt now equals that of France, the Egyptian Treasury at once gained a revenue exceeding £E60,000. Formerly, exports destined for Egypt paid duty to the Ottoman Treasury on leaving the Empire; and Egyptian products consigned to Turkey paid duty to the Egyptian Treasury on leaving the Suzerain country. But, as Turkish products imported into Egypt were much more important than Egyptian products exported to Turkey, the Egyptian Treasury was the loser by this *raftieh* system. Turkish goods on entering Egypt now pay import duty in common with that imposed on the goods of other foreign countries.

[1] By the Decree of 25th June 1890.

Trade Returns

The Tables illustrating this sub-section—which, for convenience' sake, I append together—have been compiled or abstracted from Egyptian Government Reports. In order to secure uniformity, for purposes of comparison, I have taken the year 1897 (with one immaterial exception) as the latest, because for that year I possessed the necessary data. With these Tables before him, the reader will have no difficulty in arriving at a true general conception of Egypt's foreign commerce. Here, consequently, I may confine myself to comments on its characteristic features.

Value and Volume of Trade

The increasing value and volume of Egypt's foreign Commerce may be seen in Table I. The excess of Exports, which is subject, year by year, to the ordinary fluctuations of demand and supply, but particularly to the falling prices (*v.* Table VII) obtained for her staple products—cotton and sugar—is not necessarily a sign of increased prosperity. The depreciation of values, both on account of exports and imports, has been enormous; but it has been met and overcome by the steady advance of agricultural development, under which the population has increased its area and methods of production and its capacity for purchasing foreign goods. Formerly, an undue amount—fully one-half—of the exports went to satisfy foreign creditors and to meet the interest on the Debt; but at the present day Egypt enjoys a direct return in respect of fully two-thirds of her exports. The growth and character of the imports indicate an augmented purchasing-capacity, on the part of the agricultural population, derived from surplus resources, dating from about the year 1890.[1]

[1] The increase of Imports in 1897 was due chiefly to Textiles, in which Great Britain so largely shares. British goods formed 33 per cent. of the total Imports in 1897, as compared with 31 per cent. in 1896. But the decrease in 1897 of the volume of Egyptian Trade was due to the falling-off in the value of her Exports, as a result of the low prices that prevailed.

The new National Bank, under British direction, which enjoys the right of note issue, should materially aid the development of commerce. The Bank has been granted the privilege of issuing promissory notes payable on demand. These notes are not legal tender: but they are received in payment of Government dues. Following are their values: P.T.50; £E1; £E5; £E10; £E50; and £E100.

Egypt's best customer: the United Kingdom

The principal Classes of Imports and Exports may be seen in Table II, which illustrates the dominant share of Great Britain in the foreign commerce of Egypt. But, whilst this dominant share is still maintained, the proportionate share in the volume of Trade has notably decreased: a fact which goes far to prove that, apart from keener competition, Great Britain does not use her position in Egypt to monopolise foreign Commerce. In the years immediately preceding the British Occupation, the United Kingdom monopolised the Trade of Egypt (Imports and Exports combined) to the extent of 57 per cent. of her foreign Commerce; and in the year 1891, this proportion had fallen to 54 per cent.[1] It is now no more than 42 per cent., or about five times that of France. We still take about one-half of the Exports of Egypt, and supply her with over one-third of her Imports: a proportion that has been maintained for many years past.

Our exports to Egypt have increased from £E2,536,000 in 1889 to £3,976,000 in 1898. But all countries trading with Egypt have shared equally in the advantages, whilst several have acquired a much greater proportionate share, derived from the financial and economical prosperity of the country.

The value of the jute sacks imported in 1898 was nearly £E40,000 greater than in 1897. These sacks are now imported almost entirely from India direct, whereas a few years ago Great Britain sent from one-quarter to one-third of the whole.

Participation of other Countries

The general conditions of Egyptian Commerce, and the extent to which foreign countries participate, may be seen in Table III. After Great Britain, the principal customers of Egypt are France, Turkey, Russia,[2] Austria-Hungary, and the United States of America. The trade of Belgium and of Germany is, however, undergoing very rapid expansion, as may be seen partially in Table VIII. In 1890, Belgian Imports amounted to only £115,000; in 1897, these were

[1] *Cf.* Milner's 'England in Egypt,' p. 263.

[2] There was a considerable increase in the value of exports to Russia in 1897, owing to the fact that the quantity of cotton consigned to that country was nearly half as much again as in the year 1896.

worth £513,000. In 1890, Imports from Germany were a mere trifle—£65,000; but in 1897, these accounted for no less than £307,000. The principal Belgian Imports are iron and steel manufactures, machinery, china, and porcelain. The chief German Imports are iron and steel manufactures, machinery, textiles, haberdashery, china, and porcelain. Formerly, those branches of trade, or most of them, were almost monopolised by Great Britain.[1] Belgian and German machinery undersells the higher-class goods manufactured in England, because price rather than quality is the principal concern of the Felláhin; and the Egyptian Railways show no greater discrimination in many of their contracts.

Depreciation of Values

In cotton and sugar, the staple products of Egypt, larger yields and growing exports have had to contend against falling prices, to an extent which, but for the extension and improvement of the Irrigation system, would have seriously crippled the State Revenues. This condition of affairs is illustrated in Table VII. Although the cotton crop has doubled and the sugar crop has nearly trebled since 1882, the average price per kantar[2] has fallen to an alarming extent. The increased yield now hardly compensates for the fall in value, because, as the supply of Egyptian cotton and sugar enlarges, prices become so low that the export is constantly checked.[3]

Competition

There has been a considerable increase in the importation of flour, chiefly from France and Russia. The average annual importation of this article from 1881 to 1892 did not exceed 5,000,000 kilog. In 1896 (when there was an abnormal demand) it had risen to 70,000,000 kilog.; but

[1] In 1897, the total value of Textiles imported into Egypt was £3,614,853, of which £2,288,330 fell to the share of the United Kingdom. In the same year, the total value of Metals and Metal Goods imported was £1,157,098, of which England's share was £474,301. The figures in 1896 were—Textiles: £3,148,750 (U.K., £1,952,704); Metals and Metal Goods: £1,150,258 (U.K., £392,424). The figures for 1898 are given, in Egyptian currency, in Table II.

[2] 1 kantar = 98¾ lbs.

[3] Thus, in 1897, there was a reduction of £1,066,910 in the value of Exports to Great Britain, owing to the low price of cotton, of which England took only about the same quantity as in the previous year.

in the following year there was a decrease. French flour, supported by bounties, has to a great extent supplanted the native article: and many mills in Egypt have in consequence been closed. *En revanche*, Egypt is greatly improving her export-trade in fruit and vegetables, which, although it may not rival that of Algeria, has risen from £E34,000 in 1889 to £E70,000 in 1897. Moreover, certain articles of Egyptian manufacture (*e.g.*, butter, soap, refined sugar, and alcohol) are now competing with foreign products.

Ninety per cent. of the sporting-guns imported into Egypt in 1897 were of Belgian manufacture; while only 5 per cent. were of British origin. These cheap[1] and well-finished guns, whatever their quality may be, meet the modest demand of the Felláhin and Bedwin; and they find a ready sale because many of them bear trade-marks[2] designedly intended to make the purchaser believe he is buying an English-made gun, the reputation of which is widespread. But our own manufacturers are too high and mighty to compete in this line.

Trade-marks

'During the last few years,' Lord Cromer comments, in his *Report* for 1898, 'some important decisions have been obtained from the Mixed Tribunals regarding the fraudulent imitation of trade-marks, concerning which no special law exists in Egypt. A good deal of discussion has from time to time taken place as to the desirability of passing a special law. Apart, however, from the peculiar difficulties which beset every attempt at general legislation in Egypt, I think it is now almost universally held by those who have paid attention to this subject in Egypt, that such legislation is on the whole unnecessary, and perhaps even undesirable. Owing to the judicial decisions to which I have alluded above, protection can now be obtained without difficulty by the manufacturers or owners of articles bearing special trade-marks.[3]

[1] Prices vary between 11 francs and 45 francs.

[2] Such as 'London,' 'Damas, London,' and even 'Birmingham, London.'

[3] The imports chiefly imitated are bottled beer (British and German), French cognac, Italian liqueurs, cutlery, patent medicines, many 'proprietary' articles, manufactured tobacco, and, indeed, most articles bearing well-known trade-marks.

. . . A registry of trade-marks is now established at the Tribunals.'

Commercial Travellers

A few leading and well-known British firms send out their agents to study the Egyptian markets. These are, no doubt, first-rate men; but they travel expensively, and do business only on a large scale. German travellers, on the other hand, and even French, are ubiquitous. These enterprising agents travel cheaply, and study native wants and peculiarities very closely; moreover, they are very accommodating, and take no end of trouble to give satisfaction in small orders. Competition being keen, prices leave a very narrow margin of profit. English goods being expensive, and English manufacturers stiff and unbending—even indifferent—German and Belgian agents are everywhere underselling them. This is particularly noticeable in the supply of engines,[1] pumps, etc., the demand for which has greatly decreased since the extension and improvement in the Irrigation system. But in Egypt, as elsewhere, the lack of enterprise on the part of British manufacturers has been the same: it is only in higher-priced goods that they hold their own, for the most part.

Chambers of Commerce

A British Chamber of Commerce was established at Alexandria in 1896. French, Austrian, and Italian Chambers have been in existence for some time. The British Chamber, though a late arrival, has already justified its existence; but, if it is to promote British trade with Egypt, it will require substantial support on the part of those manufacturers at home whose interests it endeavours to advance. The French Chamber enjoys a Government subvention and has a large non-resident membership; but the British Chamber is crippled for the want of funds.[2]

Customs' Revenue

The Customs' Duties are one per cent. *ad valorem* on all Exports, and eight per cent. *ad valorem* on all Imports,

[1] Belgian and French engines are sold at a price which is incompatible with the use of the best materials: but they come within the purchasing-power of the Fellâhin proprietors; and, being neatly finished, they sell very readily. Life is cheap in Egypt.

[2] *Cf.* Egypt, No. 2197 (Annual Series) 1897.

excluding tobacco, which, as already mentioned, is subject to a uniform tax of 20 Piastres (four shillings) per kilog.,[1] irrespective of its value. The cost of collection of the Customs' Revenue is in the proportion of 3·62 of the gross receipts. The progressive growth of the gross Revenue of this Department may be seen in Table V. The Reports published (in French) by the Directorate General are comprehensive, accurate, and uniform,—in contrast to those issued by some of the Departments of State, which too often fail in these respects.

Port of Alexandria

Table IV. illustrates the relative share of the Egyptian sea-ports in the Foreign Commerce of the country. Fully ninety-three per cent. of this Trade passes through Alexandria. A Return of all Shipping entered and cleared at the Port of Alexandria, in 1897, is given in Table VI.

The proportion of British tonnage was 47 per cent. in 1896, as compared with 43 per cent. in 1895. The proportion of British tonnage in 1897 amounted to 49 per cent. of the total steam-tonnage,—there being no British sailing vessels.

The total number of vessels which entered the Port of Alexandria in 1897 was 2203 (of which 657 were British), as against 2132 in 1896; and the total tonnage amounted to 2,267,120 tons (1,034,019 tons being British), as against 2,123,951 tons in the previous year. During this period, British steamers showed an increase of 59 vessels and 99,569 tons. In 1898, 43½ per cent. of the total number of steamers were British.

Compulsory pilotage is now imposed; and an increasing number of steamers enter the harbour by night. The gross receipts of the Port were £E137,000, in 1895; £E141,000, in 1896; and £E150,000, in 1897. In 1898, the *net* receipts were about £E8000 in excess of the previous year (the gross receipts not being stated). But the number of berths available for loading and discharging cargo no longer suffice for the accommodation of the rapidly increasing

[1] s. 10d. per lb., or about one-half the English duty on tobacco.

traffic. Permanent extension of the quays will eventually become necessary.

In regard to this question, Lord Cromer makes the following statement in his *Report* for 1899 :—

'The want of quay accommodation, and the imperfect arrangements which have heretofore existed for unloading ships, have recently formed the subject of very legitimate complaint on the part of the mercantile community of Alexandria. As in the case of the railways, the development of the port has not kept pace with the growing prosperity of the country. A project has been drawn up for the enlargement of the port, but the estimated cost, which is from £E500,000 to £E700,000, is, for the time being, prohibitive. In order, therefore, to provide for the most pressing needs, it has been decided to spend £E80,000 from the General Reserve Fund on increasing the width of a portion of the mole from 20 to 90 metres, thus giving a larger amount of storage-room for coal, and on erecting machinery for the more rapid discharge of colliers. These vessels are now only able to discharge at the rate of 400 tons a-day. With the new machinery it is calculated that they will be able to discharge at the rate of 1000 tons in 12 or 14 hours. These improvements will lead to an economy in the number of berths now allotted to colliers, and will thus increase the space available for general shipping. But the relief afforded will be insufficient to meet the ever-increasing demands for port accommodation. It is to be hoped that, at no very distant date, it will be possible to deal more effectively with this important subject.'

Khedivial Steam Packets

Alexandria has more than ever become a British port since the sale of the Khedivial Steamships to an English Syndicate, who are now constructing a graving-dock—the only one between Malta and Bombay. These Postal Packets ply between Alexandria, Constantinople, Syria, and Red Sea ports.

For many years past, the revenue derived from these Government steamers had been steadily declining.[1] For that reason,

[1] In 1890, the gross receipts amounted to £E140,000. In 1897, these were only £E78,000.

and because the Government had not sufficient capital to purchase new steamers, or even to execute necessary repairs, the whole concern was sold in 1897 to an English Company for £E150,000. An important part of this arrangement, and one that influenced the Government, was that the Company should construct, within four years, a dock 600 feet long, 60 feet broad, and 26 feet deep. Thus, the Port of Alexandria and International commerce will be benefited; and although the State Revenue will be reduced by about £E80,000 annually, this loss will be compensated by a similar reduction on the Expenditure side of the account.

In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer remarks:

Investment of foreign capital

'For some years, after the Occupation of Egypt, but little British capital came into the country. This was in some measure due to want of confidence in the political future. In the meanwhile, foreign capitalists sought with some eagerness for Egyptian investments, and often with success.

'A sudden and complete change has now taken place. A very marked disposition has recently been shown to direct the tide of British capital towards Egypt. The tendency is to be welcomed, but inasmuch as in most cases the compliance, and in some cases the assistance, of the Government is invoked, a grave responsibility rests on the latter to avoid encouraging any unsound, ill-considered, or purely speculative projects. Whilst the influx of British capital into Egypt may do a great deal of good, if it is directed into healthy and really profitable channels, it may, on the other hand, do much harm both to the country, to Egyptian credit, and to the *bonâ fide* investors themselves, if the contrary is the case.'

Thus, Lord Cromer characterizes one project, in its present aspect, as 'distinctly unsound.' He says: 'During the last few years, several proposals have been made to the Egyptian Government with a view to establishing cotton manufactories in Egypt. At present, I need hardly say, Egyptian cotton goes to Europe—mostly to Manchester—paying a 1 per cent. export duty, and is re-imported in the form of yarn and piece-goods, which pay an 8 per cent.

ad valorem import duty. There can be no sort of reason why the Government should oppose any proposal which involves placing the home-made on precisely the same footing as the imported goods. On the other hand, it would, for obvious reasons, be detrimental to both English and Egyptian interests to afford any encouragement to the growth of a protected cotton industry in Egypt. This is what the proposals so far made involve. Whether the industry can thrive without protection is a point on which I am not qualified to express an opinion.'

British capital is now freely entering Egypt. It has not only provided the means for carrying out the great Reservoir scheme,[1] but it is also invested in large sugar estates in Upper Egypt, in the Khedivial Steam Packets, and other ventures. Our material interests in Egypt have consequently been enhanced.

It is not possible to discover the extent to which British and French capital, or foreign capital generally, is invested in the country. French capital has been confidently introduced, because, in spite of the Chauvinists, Frenchmen have recognized the permanent character of the existing situation. But now that a start has been made, and every year signalizes the consolidation of British interests in Egypt, it cannot be doubted that British capital, which does not hesitate to plunge into adventurous schemes in all parts of the world, will take advantage of the safe and remunerative openings provided by the healthy development of Egyptian resources.

Investment of native capital

This revival of public confidence has had another remarkable development. Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, further remarks: 'Simultaneously with the influx of British capital into Egypt, to which I have alluded above, a somewhat remarkable change has taken place in native public opinion. Heretofore, native capitalists have, with some rare exceptions, invested their money almost exclusively in land. Recently, however, a strong disposition

[1] The actual amount of British capital involved in this scheme is, I believe, not more than about two millions sterling, because the Department of Public Works will provide the remainder out of its available funds.

has been shown to seek for investments in industrial and commercial undertakings. The change is on every ground to be welcomed, and the tendency may be encouraged by the Government stipulating, in respect to all such undertakings as are in any degree under its control, that a certain proportion of the share capital should, in all future cases, be reserved for the local market.'

This tendency exists notably in respect to all commercial projects brought forward under British auspices: with the result that the Government are called upon to exercise 'great caution, with a view to avoiding any semblance of encouragement to enterprises of a doubtful or highly speculative character.'

Limited Liability Companies

The present condition of the law in Egypt renders it somewhat difficult to avoid the appearance of conveying approval on the part of the Government to commercial or industrial enterprises. Lord Cromer, who discusses this matter at some length, in his *Report* for 1899, says:

'The very great practical difficulty in the way of enacting any law which shall be binding on all the inhabitants of Egypt, whether European or native, has up to the present time prevented any attempt being made to bring the Egyptian practice in connection with this matter more into harmony than is at present the case with that of countries in Europe. But the subject is now under consideration, and I may add that the difficulties which beset its treatment are not, I think, altogether insurmountable. In the meanwhile, it cannot be too clearly understood by investors both in Egypt and in Europe that the mere fact of a prospectus appearing with the phrase 'Authorized by Khedivial Decree' or similar words printed on it merely signifies that certain formalities prescribed by the law of Egypt have been fulfilled. The use of this expression does not necessarily imply that the Khedivial Government, or its British advisers, assume any responsibility whatsoever for the absolute accuracy of the facts stated in the prospectus. Still less does it imply that the proposal laid before the public is one which will receive pecuniary support, or even encouragement, from the Government.'

§ *Statistical Tables*

The following Tables illustrate the foregoing sub-section on the Trade and Commerce of Egypt :—

TABLE I. COMPARATIVE TOTALS of the Value of IMPORTS and EXPORTS (Merchandise and Specie) for the ten Years ending 1897, showing EXCESS OF EXPORTS.

YEARS.	EXPORTS.			IMPORTS.			Excess of Exports.
	TOTAL.	Merchandise.	Specie.	TOTAL.	Merchandise.	Specie.	
	£E	£E	£E	£E	£E	£E	£E
1897	*14,690,699*	*12,321,220*	*2,369,479*	*13,525,394*	*10,603,672*	*2,921,722*	*1,165,305*
1896	15,058,268	13,232,198	1,826,160	13,549,029	9,828,604	3,720,425	1,509,239
1895	14,954,640	12,632,450	2,322,190	12,709,198	8,389,933	4,319,265	2,245,442
1894	13,709,131	11,892,875	1,816,256	11,261,792	9,266,116	1,995,676	2,447,339
1893	16,306,839	12,789,687	3,517,152	11,665,409	8,718,735	2,946,674	4,641,430
1892	15,389,792	13,341,318	2,048,474	12,917,874	9,091,481	3,826,393	2,471,918
1891	*15,402,588*	*13,878,638*	*1,523,950*	*12,026,251*	*9,201,390*	*2,824,861*	*3,376,337*
1890	*13,961,541*	*11,876,086*	*2,085,455*	*11,052,758*	*8,081,297*	*2,971,461*	*2,908,783*
1889	*13,916,895*	*11,953,196*	*1,963,699*	*8,921,379*	*7,020,961*	*1,900,418*	*4,995,516*
1888	*13,061,113*	*10,418,213*	*2,642,900*	*9,777,299*	*7,738,343*	*2,038,956*	*3,283,814*

TABLE II. PRINCIPAL CLASSES OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, showing Total Values of Merchandise (including Tobacco) and the relative share of the UNITED KINGDOM (including British Mediterranean Possessions) for the Year 1898.

CATEGORY OR CLASS.	IMPORTS.		EXPORTS.	
	Aggregate Value.	United Kingdom and Brit. Med. Possns.	Aggregate Value.	United Kingdom and Brit. Med. Possns.
Cereals, Vegetables, Flour, etc.	1,273,212	70,979	2,422,448	1,724,708
Wood (for building) and Coal [Exports—woodwork, etc.]	1,485,423	659,336	21,845	1,910
Textiles	3,289,172	2,016,505	8,512,868	3,719,272
Metals and Metal Goods	1,416,750	740,926	13,977	2,765
Other Articles	3,346,594	488,266	825,120	85,125
GRAND TOTALS £E	10,811,151	3,976,012	11,796,258	5,533,780

TABLE III. VALUE of MERCHANDISE imported, exported, in transit, and re-exported during the Years 1896-1897, with COUNTRIES of ORIGIN or DESTINATION.

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OR DESTINATION.		TOTAL.	Imports.		In Transit. (a)	Exports.	Re-exportation (a)
			Merchandise	Tobacco.			
		£E	£E	£E	£E	£E	£E
United Kingdom	1897	10,144,601	3,536,425	3,040	597,429	5,932,078	75,629
	1896	10,663,025	3,053,854	1,976	556,403	6,972,681	78,111
Brit. Medn. Possns.	1897	135,992	114,518	5,343	58	8,407	7,666
	1896	123,084	103,005	6,046	61	8,926	5,046
Brit. Possns. in Far East	1897	587,422	496,572	216	480	64,248	25,906
	1896	618,500	523,444	224	335	68,674	25,803
Germany	1897	807,901	299,551	91	...	418,600	89,659
	1896	683,882	281,756	70	69	325,928	76,059
U.S. America	1897	1,097,323	118,072	1,542	...	970,620	7,089
	1896	1,013,285	78,156	1,341	...	927,874	5,914
Austria-Hungary	1897	1,248,469	752,433	5,016	701	459,208	31,111
	1896	1,341,117	697,108	4,776	433	610,931	27,869
Belgium	1897	533,996	500,282	333	...	27,624	5,757
	1896	488,740	457,823	225	75	25,972	4,645
China and Far East	1897	136,509	99,295	7	45	26,258	10,904
	1896	96,708	78,109	15	333	12,619	5,632
Spain	1897	277,249	2,488	6	...	274,217	538
	1896	297,463	1,865	12	...	295,472	114
France	1897	2,343,272	1,205,917	272	926	1,116,708	19,449
	1896	2,517,415	1,291,932	188	822	1,208,799	15,674
French Medn. Possns.	1897	34,319	31,198	7	...	2,662	452
	1896	40,728	32,375	...	...	7,179	1,174
Greece	1897	128,132	37,678	52,058	61	21,414	16,921
	1896	102,713	44,968	38,885	185	15,326	3,349
Italy	1897	846,550	417,129	713	210	417,676	10,822
	1896	717,704	332,468	704	139	370,905	13,488
Morocco	1897	49,543	49,541	2	...	...	...
	1896	30,840	30,321	...	...	341	178
Persia	1897	38,495	29,127	6,586	1,330	1,442	...
	1896	64,647	52,6[illegible]	6,275	1,219	4,449	65
Russia	1897	2,114,574	378,4[illegible]	...	2,478	1,732,913	721
	1896	1,845,215	371,1[illegible]	...	525	1,473,080	448
Switzerland	1897	434,972	27,3[illegible]	729	...	403,090	3,781
	1896	488,002	19,98[illegible]	658	...	463,475	3,883
Turkey	1897	2,450,475	1,534,535	445,207	1,906	362,481	106,346
	1896	2,472,707	1,538,972	449,842	3,594	385,561	94,738
Other Countries	1897	561,872	451,549	350	114	81,574	28,285
	1896	424,323	327,153	271	89	53,916	42,894
GRAND TOTALS	1897	23,971,666	10,082,154	521,518	605,738	12,321,220	441,036
	1896	24,030,098	9,317,096	511,508	564,302	13,232,108	405,084

(a) Including tobacco, tombac, and cigars.

TABLE IV. GATEWAYS OF COMMERCE. Relative share of SEA-PORTS in the Foreign Commerce of Egypt, during the Years 1896-1897.

CUSTOM-HOUSES.		TOTAL.	Imports.		In Transit. (a)	Exports.	Re-exportation. (a)
			Merchandise.	Tobacco.			
		£E	£E	£E	£E	£E	£E
Alexandria . .	1897	21,662,815	8,775,360	506,362	4,802	12,085,892	290,399
	1896	21,789,543	8,017,060	495,164	5,063	13,045,760	226,496
Port Said. . . .	1897	1,200,883	573,833	7,351	594,362	12,442	12,895
	1896	1,128,339	541,825	7,440	554,162	10,878	14,034
Suez	1897	918,895	631,112	1,472	6,574	142,069	137,668
	1896	911,087	654,931	1,953	5,077	84,726	164,400
Damietta . . .	1897	160,590	92,858	6,333	...	61,325	74
	1896	181,508	94,673	6,951	...	79,730	154
El-Kosseir . .	1897	20,836	3,625	...	...	17,211	...
	1896	14,210	5,304	...	...	8,906	...
El-Arich . . .	1897	7,647	5,366	...	...	2,281	...
	1896	5,411	3,303	...	...	2,108	...
GRAND TOTALS.	1897	23,971,666	10,082,154	521,518	605,738	12,321,220	441,036
	1896	24,030,098	9,317,096	511,508	564,302	13,232,108	405,084

(a) Including tobacco, tombac, and cigars.

TABLE V. GROWTH OF CUSTOMS' REVENUE during the Years 1882-1898.

DUTIES.	YEARS.								
	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890
Imports } Exports } . . .	516,199	651,953	651,578	708,346	628,078	647,899	622,423	585,471	651,736
Tobacco	108,421	106,162	147,130	212,267	304,474	289,050	332,516	441,443	727,787
TOTALS, £E	624,620	758,095	798,708	920,613	932,552	936,949	959,939	1,026,914	1,379,524
	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	
Imports } Exports } . . .	808,772	815,156	756,522	824,843	770,467	889,553	934,633	959,000	
Tobacco	828,757	655,297	788,660	932,749	968,575	1,006,526	1,044,780	1,081,000	
TOTALS, £E	1,637,529	1,470,453	1,545,182	1,757,592	1,739,042	1,896,079	1,979,413	2,040,000	

TABLE VI. RETURN of all Shipping at the Port of Alexandria during the Year 1897.

ENTERED.

NATIONALITY.	STEAM.		SAILING.		TOTAL.	
	Number of Vessels.	Tons.	Number of Vessels.	Tons.	Number of Vessels.	Tons.
British	657	1,034,019	...	...	657	1,034,019
French	139	280,359	...	...	139	280,359
Austro-Hungarian	135	241,173	5	1,079	140	242,252
Italian	111	198,699	9	5,388	120	204,087
Russian	83	179,049	...	...	83	179,049
Ottoman	35	20,141	742	106,315	777	126,456
Greek	84	60,064	100	22,102	184	82,166
German	35	61,369	...	...	35	61,369
Swedish	19	33,365	...	...	19	33,365
Roumanian	16	10,575	1	66	17	10,641
Belgian	4	4,321	...	...	4	4,321
Danish	2	2,975	...	...	2	2,975
Samiote	...	...	21	2,918	21	2,918
Dutch	1	2,035	...	...	1	2,035
Montenegrin	...	...	3	799	3	799
Bulgarian	...	...	1	309	1	309
Total	1,321	2,128,144	882	138,976	2,203	2,267,120
,, for the year preceding	1,302	1,999,815	830	124,136	2,132	2,123,951

CLEARED.

NATIONALITY.	STEAM.		SAILING.		TOTAL.	
	Number of Vessels.	Tons.	Number of Vessels.	Tons.	Number of Vessels.	Tons.
British	663	1,046,886	...	...	663	1,046,886
French	139	278,333	...	...	139	278,333
Austro-Hungarian	136	242,842	5	1,079	141	243,921
Italian	114	203,515	5	3,412	119	206,927
Russian	86	185,572	...	...	86	185,572
Ottoman	31	18,175	683	93,529	714	111,704
Greek	88	63,955	96	21,494	184	85,449
German	35	59,946	...	...	35	59,946
Swedish	17	29,317	...	...	17	10,641
Roumanian	16	10,575	1	66	17	29,317
Belgian	4	4,321	...	...	4	4,321
Danish	2	2,975	...	...	2	2,975
Samiote	...	...	18	2,126	18	2,126
Dutch	1	2,035	...	...	1	2,035
Montenegrin	...	...	2	374	2	374
Bulgarian	...	...	1	309	1	309
Total	1,332	2,148,447	811	122,389	2,143	2,270,836
,, for the year preceding	1,286	1,972,852	819	121,832	2,105	2,094,684

TABLE VII. CUSTOMS: COTTON AND SUGAR CROPS, showing increasing Exports counteracted by falling Prices. (1 Kantar = 98¼ lbs.)

YEAR.	COTTON CROP.		SUGAR CROP.	
	Kantars.	Average Price £E.	Kantars.	Average Price £E.
1882	2,846,237	3·207	26,687,322	0·021
1883	2,293,537	3·181	21,850,642	0·018
1884	2,871,500	2·983	24,701,953	0·015
1885	3,629,000	2·690	44,659,420	0·013
1886	2,872,426	2·606	38,251,160	0·012
1887	2,996,485	2·737	44,627,342	0·011
1888	2,722,954	2·821	42,355,647	0·013
1889	3,237,558	2·967	32,949,206	0·015
1890	4,159,405	2·706	26,879,612	0·013
1891	4,765,341	2·346	46,683,831	0·012
1892	5,220,510	1·934	55,248,742	0·013
1893	5,033,235	2·118	55,113,243	0·014
1894	4,619,233	1·685	56,394,235	0·011
1895	5,256,128	2·001	55,145,775	0·008
1896	5,173,000	2·149	73,597,218	0·010
1897	5,684,000	1·734	72,918,250	0·008

TABLE VIII. VALUE of IMPORTS from BELGIUM and GERMANY during the Years 1890-1897.

YEAR.	ANNUAL VALUE of IMPORTS (in £, Sterling).	
	BELGIUM.	GERMANY.
1890	115,594	65,735
1891	262,599	154,411
1892	367,945	184,354
1893	236,320	192,998
1894	384,581	236,715
1895	348,120	221,800
1896	469,499	288,872
1897	513,131	307,133

VII

THE SUEZ CANAL

International Interests in the Highway between East and West

i POLITICS

ii COMMERCE



VII

THE SUEZ CANAL

i POLITICS

Treaty-obligations inoperative

MY principal object in this Section is to outline the International Situation, in so far as this affects the free use of the Suez Canal, in time of peace and of war, by the ships of all nations, subject to the conditions that provide for the exercise of British Control as the Tutelary Power in Egypt. In effect, so long as the British Occupation lasts, International interests must technically be compromised by the *status quo*. Thus, the Convention between the Powers respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed and ratified at Constantinople in 1888, remains a dead-letter. Its provisions can only become operative through the restoration of the *status quo ante*, although in principle it forms a precedent to which in practice Great Britain may be called upon to adhere.

Attitude of the Powers

Considering that the apparent object of our Occupation of Egypt is to secure control—euphemistically called freedom of transit—over the Suez Canal, in presumptive or technical violation of Article XII. of the Convention of 1888;[1] and considering that the Powers of Europe having interests or Colonial Possessions in the Far East cannot view with indifference the dominant position of Great Britain in Egypt: it follows that, upon the attitude of these Powers towards

[1] Article XII. reads as follows: 'The High Contracting Parties, by application of the principle of equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which forms one of the bases of the present Treaty, agree that none of them shall endeavour to obtain with respect to the Canal territorial or commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey as the territorial Power are reserved.' The British Occupation was, of course, antecedent to this Convention.

the question of neutralizing or otherwise regulating the situation regarding this great highway of International intercourse must depend the ultimate solution of the Egyptian Question. Because apart from the Suez Canal problem there would be no Egyptian Question, properly so called: since the solution of the one involves the settlement of the other.

It may be said at once, in general terms, that—with the exception of our ancient ally, Italy—the attitude of the Powers towards this vital question, as evidenced by the Suez Canal Commission (Paris) in 1885, cannot readily be reconciled with the attitude of her Majesty's Government: but, at the same time, accomplished facts have to be reckoned with. Any alteration of the *status quo* involves a compromise or a violation: that is to say, the Powers must either compromise their interests, in order to implement the Convention of 1888, and thereby secure the conventional recognition of their Treaty-rights in regard to the Suez Canal, or the Tutelary Power must continue to violate[1] the principle of equality as regards the free use of the Canal and the principle of neutrality as regards territorial immunity by her Occupation of Egypt, which, of course, preceded the Convention of 1888.

Control of the Canal

But, for my part, I cannot see how any conventional regulations can be expected to stand the test of war, when self-denying ordinances are apt to be overruled by *force majeure*. Command of the Sea necessarily involves the Control of the Canal, as such, however greatly you restrict or extend the 'sea-approaches,' however rigidly you enforce the recognition of neutral zones, and however generously you interpret acts of hostility and rights of war.

Nevertheless, since recognition of a general principle is not without its value, as a deterrent to war, it may be desirable if, in this place, I attempt to define the points of initial divergence and eventual agreement between the

[1] Subject to the general reservation made by the British Delegates to the Suez Canal Commission, 1885 (*v.* p. 338).

maritime Powers of Europe in regard to the freedom of transit and the inviolability of rights in the Suez Canal.

(*a*) *Historical Retrospect*

Creators of the Canal

The Suez Canal, like the Barrage, was French in conception and execution. But like the Barrage, too, its practical utility was derived from the sacrifices of Egypt and the action or enforced support of Great Britain. It is customary in France to speak of the Suez Canal as the sole creation of French genius, in spite of British opposition, and to regard it as an inviolate stronghold of French influence, because it is and always has been a French Administration. This view is, however, subject to material qualifications.

I have already sketched, in outline, the early history of the Canal. Projected in 1854 by M. de Lesseps, who in that year gave definite shape to the plans of his countryman, M. Linant de Bellefonds, and obtained the formal consent of the Viceroy (Said Pasha), the Suez Canal scheme was the logical outcome of the labours of Baldwin and Waghorn —two Englishmen—in the development of the Overland Route.

Attitude of England

Because Lord Palmerston disapproved of this scheme, on the ground that it would create an Egyptian Question, the analogy that we had always opposed it is too closely pressed by our French critics, and is in direct contradiction to the following testimony by M. Linant de Bellefonds :—

'In 1840,' this able engineer writes, 'England and the East India Company wished for a canal. In 1841 I signed a contract to that effect with the Peninsular and Oriental Company ; and in 1842 the Indian Government accepted my project with enthusiasm.'[1]

The scheme was, in principle, opposed by Lord Palmerston, and on sufficient grounds, as events have proved : but this opposition was never pushed to extremes, owing to the independence of Egypt, which Palmerston himself had done so much to secure, and to the friendship he cultivated with the French Empire.

[1] 'Egypt in the Nineteenth Century,' by D. A. Cameron, page 236.

Saved from failure

The original object of the Suez Canal was to serve sailing vessels only.[1] As M. de Lesseps himself asserted, 'ordinary steamers, not men-of-war or mail-packets, could not afford to go to India under steam because of the great quantity of coal required.' Mr Cameron, from whom I quote,[2] goes on to remark: 'Even at the present time it would take a fast clipper ship the better part of a month to beat up from Perim to Suez, because of the narrowness of the Red Sea. This difficulty was overcome by the invention of the compound engine for steamers, which saved nearly half the fuel, and enabled them to utilize the Canal. In the opinion of Sir John Stokes, had the canal been opened in 1862 it would have been a financial failure, because the ships of that day could not have used it. Only the invention of the compound engine gave it a chance of success. Yet another factor must be mentioned—the extraordinary growth of our mercantile steam marine, owing to this invention before the canal was opened. Nevertheless, the enterprise was bankrupt. In 1871-72 its twenty-pound shares had fallen to seven, and no dividends could be paid. Then it was that England came to the rescue by persuading the Powers at the Constantinople Conference to allow the Company a surtax of 40 per cent. on the tolls. Combine these separate strokes of good luck derived from England, add the sixteen millions received from Ismail, and we see why the Suez Canal became a success.'

Concessions

The provisional Act of Concession of 1854 authorized the formation of a Company, under the direction of M. de Lesseps, to be named the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez*, the director of which was always to be named by the Egyptian Government and chosen as far as possible from the shareholders most interested in the enterprise. The authoritative Concession of 1856 confirmed the previous Act and defined its scope, powers, obligations, etc. The definitive Convention of 1866, between the Viceroy of

[1] M. de Lesseps, when trying to raise money in England, stated: 'It is not your steamers that I am wooing, but your fleet of sailing ships now going round the Cape.'—Cameron's 'Egypt in the Nineteenth Century,' page 241.

[2] *Ibid.*

Egypt and the Suez Canal Company, amalgamated and confirmed, *exceptis excipiendis*, all previous instruments,[1] and was sanctioned by the Imperial Firman of 19th March 1866.

The only provisions in this cumulative Convention to which attention need be drawn are the following: Convention of 1866

Article 8 admitted the liability of the Egyptian Government to pay to the Company, before the close of 1869, sums of money which in the aggregate amounted to over one hundred million francs, and of which eighty-four million francs were due under the inequitable Award of Napoleon III. in 1864. Article 9 placed the Maritime Canal and all its 'dependencies' under the Egyptian Police. Article 10 reserved the right of the Government to occupy strategic positions. Article 11 made provisions for the Administrative Services of the Government. Article 15 declared that, in default of renewal, the Concession to the Company shall terminate ninety-nine years after the opening of the canal.[2] Article 16 declared the chartered Company to be Egyptian, in origin, and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of Egypt; but in its financial constitution and corporate capacity it remained, under a special Convention, subject to French Law regulating Joint-Stock Companies. Under this Article, provision is specifically made concerning litigation, misdemeanours, etc.

Excavation work was commenced in 1859; and the Canal was opened for traffic in 1869, in the reign of Ismail, who entertained his European guests with princely hospitality. Inauguration of the Canal

In obtaining his Concessions from Said Pasha, M. de Lesseps asserted that his scheme would make Egypt Its political significance

[1] These included, in addition to the above-mentioned: (1) the Decree of 1856—abrogated by Art. 1 of the Convention of 1866—regarding Fellâhîn Labour, (2) the Convention of 18th March 1863, retroceding a section of the Sweet-water Canal, (3) the Convention of 20th March 1863, regulating the financial participation of Egypt, and (4) the Convention of 30th January 1866, regarding the sale of the Wadi Tumailat, etc.—Egypt, No. 23 (1883).

[2] Article 16 of the Act of Concession of 1866 provides that, ninety-nine years after the opening of the Canal, the Egyptian Government shall enter into possession, after indemnifying the Company for fixtures, *matériel*, etc., according to agreement or arbitration. But in case of renewal, the Company, under its fresh Concession, shall pay certain Royalties to the Government.

independent of England, and that the Canal would be built with French capital. In opening the Canal to the commerce of the world, Ismail declared that he had united Africa to Europe. In his answer to the Academy speech of M. de Lesseps, M. Renan averred: 'The isthmus cut becomes a strait, a battlefield. A single Bosporus has hitherto sufficed for the troubles of the world: you have created a second and much more important one. In case of naval war, it would be of supreme interest: the point for the occupation of which the whole world would struggle to be first. You have marked the field of the great battles of the future.'[1]

Lord Palmerston, foreseeing this end, abstained from encouraging it. Lord Beaconsfield, recognizing accomplished facts, obtained for Great Britain, by the purchase of the Suez Canal Shares belonging to Ismail (£4,000,000), a material interest in the Canal Administration. And finally, Lord Cromer, by his steadfast action and consistent policy, has raised permanent guarantees in Egypt which postulate our future domination over the Highway between East and West.

France, by persisting in her great engineering work, brought about the British Occupation, as a natural sequence. France, by refusing to act with us in 1882, left us alone to bear the responsibility. France, by blindly obstructing the work of reform, has riveted the bonds which bind Egypt to England. *Sic vos non vobis.*

(*b*) *International Negotiations*

The British Occupation 1882

That M. de Lesseps regarded the Suez Canal as a family concern, may be seen in the attitude he assumed towards us when, in 1882, the British Admiral was instructed to occupy the Canal in order to protect it against the Arábists, who threatened to destroy it. The great Frenchman telegraphed to Arábi: 'Jamais les Anglais n'y pénétreront, jamais, jamais;' and further insisted: 'Make no attempt to intercept *my* canal. I am there. Not a single English

[1] Cameron's *Egypt* etc., p. 236.

soldier shall disembark without being accompanied by a French soldier. *I* answer for everything.' To which Arábi replied: 'Sincere thanks. Assurances consolatory, but not sufficient under the existing circumstances. The defence of Egypt requires the temporary destruction of the Canal.'[1]

A Conference of Ambassadors was held at Constantinople (June-August 1882), much against the Sultan's wish, with reference to the proposed intervention of Turkey and to temporary measures for the protection of the Canal. But it led to nothing.[2] An abortive Conference: 1882

Four months later, Lord Granville, on behalf of her Majesty's Government, addressed an important Circular Despatch to the British Ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and St Petersburg. The following is an excerpt:— British Circular: 1883

'*Foreign Office, January* 3, 1883.—One result of recent occurrences has been to call special attention to the Suez Canal, firstly, on account of the danger with which it was threatened during the first brief success of the insurrection; secondly, in consequence of its occupation by the British forces in the name of the Khedive, and their use of it as a base of the operations carried on in his Highness' behalf, and in support of his authority; and thirdly, because of the attitude assumed by the Direction and officers of the Canal Company at a critical period of the campaign.

'As regards the first two of these points, her Majesty's Government believe that the free and unimpeded navigation of the Canal at all times, and its freedom from obstruction or damage by acts of war, are matters of importance to all nations. It has been generally admitted that the measures taken by them for protecting the navigation and the use of the Canal on behalf of the territorial Ruler, for the purpose of restoring his authority, were in no way infringements of this general principle.

[1] Cameron's *Egypt* etc., p. 244.

[2] Lord Granville, however, consented that the final Protocol might declare: 'that an amicable understanding exists between the European Cabinets that no definite settlement of the Egyptian Question is to take place except with the "communication" or "consultation" [not "co-operation"] of all the Powers.'—Prof. Holland's 'European Concert in the Eastern Question.'

'But to put upon a clearer footing the position of the Canal for the future, and to provide against possible dangers, they are of opinion that an agreement to the following effect might with advantage be come to between the Great Powers, to which other nations would subsequently be invited to accede :—

'1. That the Canal should be free for the passage of all ships, in any circumstances.

'2. That in time of war a limitation of time as to ships of war of a belligerent remaining in the Canal should be fixed, and no troops or munitions of war should be disembarked in the Canal.

'3. That no hostilities should take place in the Canal or its approaches, or elsewhere in the territorial waters of Egypt, even in the event of Turkey being one of the belligerents.

'4. That neither of the two immediately foregoing conditions shall apply to measures which may be necessary for the defence of Egypt.

'5. That any Power whose vessels of war happen to do any damage to the Canal should be bound to bear the cost of its immediate repair.

'6. That Egypt should take all measures within its power to enforce the conditions imposed on the transit of belligerent vessels through the Canal in time of war.

'7. That no fortifications should be erected on the Canal or in its vicinity.

'8. That nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to abridge or affect the territorial rights of the Government of Egypt further than is therein expressly provided.'[1]

Attitude of France

The attitude of France, on the general situation, may be gauged by the following extract from a despatch addressed (17th Jany. 1885) by M. Waddington to Earl Granville:

'The re-establishment of financial and administrative order in Egypt is not the only question which the Powers are necessarily anxious to settle at the present time. There are others, of an equally urgent character, which affect their interests in the highest degree. The Government of the

[1] Egypt. No. 19 (1885).

Republic, trusting to the sentiments of justice and of friendly feeling which have always animated the Queen's Government, count upon their consent to enter upon the examination of these questions at the earliest possible moment. Amongst them, and of primary importance, is the establishment of a definitive arrangement to guarantee the free passage of the Suez Canal at all times to all the Powers. The examination of this great European problem might be undertaken at once, by means of a Conference or otherwise, without awaiting the issue of the proposed inquiry into the financial situation.'[1]

Declaration of London: 1885

After preliminary negotiations,[2] a Declaration was issued at London, on 17th March 1885, containing these passages:—

'Whereas the Powers have agreed to recognize the urgent necessity for negotiating with the object of sanctioning, by a Conventional Act, the establishment of a definitive regulation destined to guarantee at all times, and for all Powers, the freedom of the Suez Canal: It has been agreed between the seven Governments above named that a Commission composed of Delegates named by the said Governments shall meet at Paris on the 30th March, to prepare and draw up this Act, taking for its basis the Circular of the Government of her Britannic Majesty of the 3rd January 1883. A Delegate of his Highness the Khedive shall sit on the Commission, with a consultative voice. The draft drawn up by the Commission shall be submitted to the said Governments, who will then take measures to obtain the accession of the other Powers. The Undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, furnished with the necessary powers, declare by these presents that their respective Governments mutually engage to observe the foregoing stipulations.'

[1] Egypt. No. 19 (1885).

[2] During these negotiations, M. Waddington, the French Ambassador at London, remarked to Lord Granville that 'the Canal was a French undertaking': and received the reply, that 'the Canal was supported principally by British commerce, and that the proposals for the Commission originated with her Majesty's Government.'

Suez Canal Commission 1885

The Suez Canal Commission accordingly met at Paris on 30th March 1885, with M. Billot, Minister Plenipotentiary, in the Chair. Great Britain was represented by Sir Julian Pauncefote, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, Controller-General of the National Debt Office. The other Powers and Governments represented by their respective Delegates were—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey, and Egypt. Both Great Britain and France tabled Draft Treaties, the latter not being content with the acceptance of the British Circular as a sufficient basis for discussion. A sub-Commission was appointed, and reported to the Full Commission, which held its last Sitting on 13th June 1885.

Draft Treaty 1885

Without attempting to do justice to the debates, on points of form as well as of matter, the final Draft Treaty submitted by the Delegates may be accepted as a sufficient indication of the views of the Governments represented on the Commission.

This Draft Treaty, together with the parallel Observations which reserve and place on record the divergent or qualificative views of some of the Commissioners, was as follows :—

Draft Treaty.	*Observations.*
The Governments of being desirous of establishing by a Conventional Act a definite system destined to guarantee at all times and for all the Powers the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal, and thus to complete the system under which the navigation of this Canal has been placed by the Firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, dated the	

Draft Treaty.

22nd February 1866 (2 Zilkadé 1282), which sanctioned the Concessions of His Highness the Khedive, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles :—

ARTICLE I

The Suez Maritime Canal shall be for ever free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal in time of war as in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the Fresh-water Canal is indispensable to the Maritime

Observations.

Draft Treaty. *Observations*

Canal, take note of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive towards the Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the Fresh-water Canal.

They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security of this Canal and its branches, the working of which shall not be exposed to any attempt at obstruction.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect the plant, establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime Canal and of the Fresh-water Canal.

ARTICLE IV

No fortification shall be erected which may serve for an offensive operation against the Maritime Canal on a point commanding or threatening it.

No point commanding or threatening its course or entrance shall be occupied by a military force.

ARTICLE V

The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war

This Article is accepted by the German, Austro-Hun-

Draft Treaty.	*Observations.*
as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I. of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object the direct preparation of an operation of war, shall be committed in the Canal, or in its approaches, or in the ports of access, or in the territorial waters of Egypt, even though the Sublime Porte should be one of the belligerent Powers.	garian, Spanish, French, Netherlands, Russian, and Turkish Delegates, under reserve that the extent of the territorial waters of Egypt shall be hereafter defined by an arrangement between the Powers.
Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in provisions in the Canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the regulations in force, and without any other stoppage than that resulting from the exigencies of the service. Their stay at Port Saïd and in the roadstead at Suez shall not exceed twenty-four hours, except in the case of distress. In such case they shall be	The British and Italian Delegates accept it under reserve that the words, 'or its approaches, or in the ports of access, or in the territorial waters of Egypt,' be replaced by the following: 'and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from these ports.'

Draft Treaty.	*Observations.*
bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing from a port of access of a belligerent ship and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.	
ARTICLE VI Vessels shall not disembark or embark either troops, munitions, or materials of war in the Canal and its ports of access.	The British Delegates propose that this Article be amended in the following manner :— 'In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark or embark within the Canal either troops, munitions, or materials of war.' The Italian Delegates accede to this amendment, maintaining, however, after the words, 'within the Canal," the words, 'and its ports of access.'
ARTICLE VII Prizes shall be subjected in all respects to the same rules as the vessels of war of belligerents.	
ARTICLE VIII The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes). Nevertheless, they may	

Draft Treaty.

station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed two for each Power.

This right shall not be exercised by belligerents.

ARTICLE IX

A Commission composed of the Representatives in Egypt of , with whom shall be associated a Delegate of the Egyptian Government, with consultative voice, shall sit under the presidency of a special Turkish Delegate. In order to provide for the duty of protecting the Canal, it shall come to an arrangement with the proper authorities for insuring its free use; it shall supervise, within the limits of its powers, the application of the clauses of the present Treaty, and shall inform the Powers of the measures which it shall consider necessary to insure their execution.

Observations.

The British Delegates propose to substitute the following text:—

'The Representatives in Egypt of the Powers Signatory of the present Treaty shall watch over its execution, and inform their respective Governments, without delay, of every violation, or danger of violation, of its provisions which may arise.

In case of war or of internal troubles, or other events threatening the safety or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of one of their number to proceed to the necessary verifications. They shall inform their respective Governments of the proposals which may appear to them advisable to insure the protection and the free use of the Canal.'

The Italian Delegates agree to this amendment.

Draft Treaty.	*Observations.*
ARTICLE X	
The Egyptian Government shall take, within the limits of their powers, resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty. In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at their disposal, they shall call upon the Sublime Porte, who shall concert with the other Powers Signatory of the Declaration of London of the 17th March 1885, with a view to decide by common accord the measures to be taken to respond to this appeal. The provisions of Articles IV, V, VI, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which shall be taken in virtue of the present Article.	The British Delegates only accept this article subject to the omission of the words, 'and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty,' and to the acceptance of their amendment to Article IX.
ARTICLE XI	
Similarly the provisions of Article IV, V, VI, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty,	The British Delegates only accept this Article on condition that the following words be omitted :— 1. 'In the name of His Imperial Majesty,' and 2. 'By their own forces.'

Draft Treaty.

and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take in order to insure by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order.

In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan or His Highness the Khedive should find it necessary to avail themselves of the exceptions for which the present Article provides, notice thereof shall be given to the Powers Signatory of the Declaration of London.

ARTICLE XII

The measures to be taken in the cases provided for by Articles X and XI of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal.

In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications is prohibited.

ARTICLE XIII

The High Contracting Parties, by application of the principle of equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which forms one of the bases of the present Treaty, agree

Observations.

Draft Treaty.	*Observations.*
that none of them shall endeavour to obtain, with respect to the Canal, territorial or commercial advantages, or privileges in any international arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey as the territorial Power are reserved.	
ARTICLE XIV With the exception of the obligation expressly provided by the clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and the rights and immunities of His Highness the Khedive, resulting from the Firmans, are in no way affected.	
ARTICLE XV The High Contracting Parties agree that the engagements which result from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the term of the Acts of Concession of the Universal Suez Canal Company.	
ARTICLE XVI The provisions of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the sanitary measures in force in Egypt.	The British Delegates, being without instructions, are unable to accept this Article.

Draft Treaty.	*Observations.*
ARTICLE XVII	
The High Contracting Parties undertake to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the States which have not signed it, and to invite them to accede to it.	

On minor points, not without significance, some additional observations may be permitted.

The Sublime Porte made the following Declaration, through Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador at London, on 30th March 1885 :—

Turkish reserves

'The Sublime Porte maintains its reservations respecting Lord Granville's despatch of the 3rd January 1883, and understands that an insertion will be made in the Conventional Act of the International Commission assembled in Paris for the settlement of the Suez Canal, to the effect that the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan shall have full right to take the necessary measures for the defence of Egypt, whether against a belligerent State, or in Egypt itself in case of internal disorders.' The Porte, moreover, made a general reserve on the final reading of the Draft Treaty.

British Note

On 3rd April 1885, Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador at Paris, embodied the views of her Majesty's Government in a *Note Verbale*, which he sent in to the French Government, containing the following passages :—

'The proposals in the Circular of 1883 are entirely based on the principle of an arrangement whereby the Signatory Powers agree to commit no act which will interfere with the free navigation of the Canal, the Territorial Power being bound by the same engagement subject only to its sovereign right of self-defence, the reservation of which has been made by the Sultan a condition of his

consent to the scheme. The proposals in the French draft appear on the contrary to be based on the principle of active interference in the control of the Canal by means of an International Commission and of armed vessels. Moreover, they impose upon the Signatory Powers the obligations of an international guarantee, as well as that of deciding what measures shall be taken in case of the inability of the Khedive to provide for the defence of the country and the enforcement of the proposed Treaty. It appears to her Majesty's Government that these proposals do not tend to the completion of an arrangement upon the bases of the Circular of 1883, but are rather the embodiment of a new project based upon an opposite principle.'

French Note

Whereupon, the French Government issued, two days later, a *Note Verbale*, in which the following passages occur :—

'It is true that the English draft contemplates only an agreement by which the Powers should bind themselves to commit no act which could impede the free navigation of the Canal, while the French draft adds thereto enforcement, by admitting that the Signatory Powers may intervene in order to insure that the arrangement agreed upon shall be respected. But it cannot be said that in contemplating an intervention such as this, in certain cases and under given conditions, the French Government act on a principle contrary to that of England, the only subject under discussion being the measures calculated to prevent the infringement of the Regulations which shall have been agreed to. Moreover, none of the proposed stipulations can be considered as affecting the rights of the Sovereign Power of Egypt, which have been reserved, with the exception of the servitude to which it has consented from the very commencement for the sake of securing the freedom of the Suez Canal.'

'Neutrality'

Lord Granville specially cautioned the British Delegates to avoid the use of the word 'neutrality,' as applied to the Canal, and to adhere to the term 'freedom' or 'free navigation,' as used in the British Circular and Declaration. But,

in reply, the Delegates remarked: 'there is no ground to apprehend any inconvenience from the use which may have occasionally been made by the Delegates of the word "neutrality," inasmuch as there has been a common accord from the first that the term, as applied to the Canal, had reference only to the neutrality which attaches by international law to the territorial waters of a neutral State, in which a right of innocent passage for belligerent vessels exists, but no right to commit any act of hostility.'

Territorial Waters

Questioned by the Italian Ambassador as to the proposal to fix the limits of the territorial waters of Egypt, Lord Granville replied that 'her Majesty's Government doubted the expediency . . . and thought that the matter should be reserved for negotiation between the Powers. I said,' Lord Granville adds, 'the object to be obtained was to secure Egypt from attack in consequence of her forming part of the Ottoman dominions, but that in the present unsettled state of affairs as regards the Red Sea Coast it would be difficult to decide the limit between the jurisdiction of Egypt and the territory over which the Porte claimed authority.'[1]

Surveillance

An attempt was made to set up an analogy between the Suez Canal and the Danube, in order to justify the appointment of an International Commission to supervise the Treaty-obligations. But against this unnecessary innovation the British Delegates raised objections, on the ground that the foreign Representatives in Egypt would of necessity, in the discharge of their official duties, watch over the observance of the Treaty, and report to their Governments any danger of its infraction.

The English Argument

At one of the Sittings, Sir Julian Pauncefote disposed of this question in an admirable speech, from which the following passages are taken:

'The Danube is a great waterway passing through several

[1] Earl Granville to Sir J. S. Lumley—Egypt, No. 19 (1885) p. 55. All these extracts are, in fact, taken from the above Blue Book, which contains the Correspondence respecting the Commission, together with the Protocols and Procès-Verbaux.

States, and one whose material conditions presented, at the time the Commission of the Danube was established, great obstacles to navigation. It was necessary to carry out important works to clear the bed of the river. The ships which navigated it were obliged to submit in succession to the Regulations of each of the Riverain States. It was necessary to create a new system applicable to the whole course of the river, to elaborate uniform Regulations for navigation and to fix a tariff, to have immense works carried out, and to employ a numerous staff for the management of the navigation. An International Commission was then indispensable to effect these various objects, and to exercise a control over the new organization. What analogy can there be between such a state of things and the question which occupies us: namely, to secure freedom of transit through the Suez Canal? The Canal passes through the territory of a single State. It belongs to a private Company, which is governed by the Concessions and the laws of the territorial Power, a Company which has carried out all the works connected with the Canal at its own cost, and which directs the navigation by means of its own regulations and by the aid of a large staff. In all these respects, there is no difference between the Suez Canal Company and the Company of a railway traversing Egypt. Why, then, should the Powers desire to interfere in the affairs of the Company? Since the opening of the Canal, no difficulty has arisen either with merchant-ships or vessels of war. Everything has proceeded with perfect regularity. It has been sufficient to carry out the Company's Regulations. The interference of an International Commission in the navigation of the Canal will be not only useless, but injurious in many respects; and it is remarkable that Great Britain, whose interests in this question preponderate (since her trade represents about 80 per cent. of the Canal traffic,) claims no other guarantees, as the present ones seem to her to be sufficient. It is said that in case of war it would be important to have an International Commission on the spot. Shall this Commission then sit with arms folded, until some Power threatens to violate the

Treaty? When this menace really exists, it will be time for the Powers to consult as to what they should do. It is possible that, in such a case, some international measures of protection would have to be taken, but the idea of a Commission has never occurred to the British Government, and it has not been proposed in the bases of the Circular. Basis No. 6 intrusts to the territorial Power alone the task of enforcing the Treaty. The French proposal is in complete opposition to this stipulation: and the Sub-Commission is well aware that the acceptance of this basis of the Circular is one of the formal conditions of the agreement to be arrived at.'

Sir Charles Rivers Wilson supported the declarations of his colleague; and, further, pointed out that, by the institution of a Commission, three authorities would be brought face to face in the Canal: (1) the Egyptian Government, as Territorial Power; (2) The Company, in virtue of its Concessions; and (3) The International Commission, by virtue of the Treaty.

The point in dispute was, however, met in a conciliatory spirit by the British Delegates, who agreed to the compromise noted under Article IX. of the Draft Treaty (*q.v.*). Compromise

Sufficient has now been said, to illustrate the views of the various Delegates, which, it cannot be doubted, were, and are to-day, the views of their respective Governments. France, throughout the discussions and negotiations, endeavoured to internationalize the Canal. Great Britain, on the other hand, whilst freely admitting 'that the Canal should be free for the passage of all ships in any circumstances,' sought safeguards for the independence and territorial rights of Egypt, of which she was and is still the guardian.

In order that there should be no misunderstanding in regard to the views of her Majesty's Government, the British Commissioners drafted a definitive Treaty 'to insure the free use of the Suez Canal, such as would be accepted by the Delegates of Great Britain.' In submitting this Draft to the Commission, Sir Julian Pauncefote, on behalf of her Majesty's Government, made the following reservation: British Draft Treaty: 1885

British reservation

'The Delegates of Great Britain, in presenting this text of the Treaty as the definitive system destined to guarantee the free use of the Suez Canal, consider it their duty to formulate a general reservation as to the application of its provisions in so far as they would not be compatible with this situation (namely, the present transitory and exceptional condition of Egypt), and might fetter the liberty of action of their Government during the Occupation of Egypt by the forces of her Britannic Majesty.'[1]

If this Draft Treaty, drawn up by the British Commissioners, is compared with the Convention of 1888, it will be seen that all the essential points in the former have been given effect to in the latter, which also includes some of the reservations made by other Governments.

Convention of 1888

The definitive, but inoperative, Convention between Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, and Turkey, respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, was signed at Constantinople on the 29th October 1888; and Ratifications were deposited at Constantinople on 22nd December 1888.

The text of this important document is as follows:—

(Translation).

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India; His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of Spain, and in his name the Queen Regent of the Kingdom; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, etc.; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans; wishing to establish, by a Conventional Act, a definite system destined to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal, and thus to complete the system under which the naviga-

[1] Egypt, No. 19 (1885) p. 305.

tion of this Canal has been placed by the Firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, dated the 22nd February 1866 (2 Zilkadé, 1282), and sanctioning the Concessions of His Highness the Khedive, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :—

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable Sir William Arthur White, her Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary ;

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, M. Joseph de Radowitz, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary ;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary, M. Henri, Baron de Calice, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary ;

His Majesty the King of Spain, and in his name the Queen Regent of the Kingdom, Don Miguel Florez y Garcia, his Chargé d'Affaires ;

The President of the French Republic, M. Gustave Louis Lannes, Count de Montebello, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of France ;

His Majesty the King of Italy, M. Albert, Baron Blanc, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary ;

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, etc., M. Gustave Keun, his Chargé d'Affaires ;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, M. Alexandre de Nélidow, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary ;

His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, Mehemmed Saïd Pasha, his Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles :—

ARTICLE I

The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the Fresh-Water Canal is indispensable to the Maritime Canal, take note of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive towards the Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the Fresh-Water Canal; which engagements are stipulated in a Convention bearing date the 18th March 1863, containing an *exposé* and four Articles.

They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security of that Canal and its branches, the working of which shall not be exposed to any attempt at obstruction.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect the plant, establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime Canal and of the Fresh-Water Canal.

ARTICLE IV

The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I. of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.

Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the Canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in accordance with the Regulations in

force, and without any other intermission than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

Their stay at Port Saïd and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed twenty-four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.

ARTICLE V

In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor embark within the Canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked or disembarked at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1000 men, with a corresponding amount of war material.

ARTICLE VI

Prizes shall be subjected, in all respects, to the same rules as the vessels of war of belligerents.

ARTICLE VII

The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes).

Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port Saïd and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed two for each Power.

This right shall not be exercised by belligerents.

ARTICLE VIII

The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution. In case of any event threatening the security or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three of their number under the presidency of their Doyen, in order to proceed to the necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Government of the danger which they may have perceived, in order that that Government may take proper steps to insure the protection and the free

use of the Canal. Under any circumstances, they shall meet once a year to take note of the due execution of the Treaty.

The last-mentioned meetings shall take place under the presidency of a Special Commissioner nominated for that purpose by the Imperial Ottoman Government. A Commissioner of the Khedive may also take part in the meeting, and may preside over it in case of the absence of the Ottoman Commissioner.

They shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation.

ARTICLE IX

The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty.

In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at its disposal, it shall call upon the Imperial Ottoman Government, which shall take the necessary measures to respond to such appeal; shall give notice thereof to the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London of the 17th March 1885; and shall, if necessary, concert with them on the subject.

The provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which shall be taken in virtue of the present Article.

ARTICLE X

Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order.

In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His High-

ness the Khedive, should find it necessary to avail themselves of the exceptions for which this Article provides, the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London shall be notified thereof by the Imperial Ottoman Government.

It is likewise understood that the provisions of the four Articles aforesaid shall in no case occasion any obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman Government may think it necessary to take in order to insure by its own forces the defence of its other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea.

ARTICLE XI

The measures which shall be taken in the cases provided for by Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal. In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the provisions of Article VIII is prohibited.

ARTICLE XII

The High Contracting Parties, by application of the principle of equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which forms one of the bases of the present Treaty, agree that none of them shall endeavour to obtain with respect to the Canal territorial or commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey as the territorial Power are reserved.

ARTICLE XIII

With the exception of the obligations expressly provided by the clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and the rights and immunities of His Highness the Khedive, resulting from the Firmans, are in no way affected.

ARTICLE XIV

The High Contracting Parties agree that the engagements resulting from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the Acts of Concession of the Universal Suez Canal Company.

ARTICLE XV

The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the sanitary measures in force in Egypt.

ARTICLE XVI

The High Contracting Parties undertake to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the States which have not signed it, inviting them to accede to it.

ARTICLE XVII

The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Constantinople within the space of one month, or sooner if possible.

In faith of which the representative Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty, and have affixed to it the seal of their arms.

Done at Constantinople, the 29th day of the month of October, in the year 1888.

(L.S.)	W. A. WHITE.
(L.S.)	RADOWITZ.
(L.S.)	CALICE.
(L.S.)	MIGUEL FLOREZ Y GARCIA.
(L.S.)	G. DE MONTEBELLO.
(L.S.)	A. BLANC.
(L.S.)	GUS. KEUN.
(L.S.)	NÉLIDOW.
(L.S.)	M. SAÏD.

The foregoing Treaty meets most, if not all, of the objections raised at Paris in 1885, and gives effect to the reserves made by the Delegates to the Suez Canal Commission. It may also be regarded as subject to the general reservation, in effect if not in fact, made on that occasion by the British Delegates, on behalf of her Majesty's Government.

Status

Under existing circumstances, it would appear to be impossible either to 'internationalize' or to 'neutralize' the Canal, in the sense claimed by the advocates of these specious policies. But you can emancipate it, to the extent attempted by the above Treaty, from the International

Law that applies to territorial waters and treat it as the 'open sea,' subject to vested interests and sovereign rights under Concessions, Firmans, Treaties, etc. The emancipation of the Suez Canal cannot materially affect the Mistress of the Seas ; nor can the sterilization of its inherent capacity for defence greatly matter to a mobile navy capable of exercising Command over the sea-approaches.

Whether or not the Suez Canal would be used in time of war is a moot point. Many risks have to be incurred in wartime, as a choice of evils. The fact, however, remains, that the Canal could be blocked for a long time simply by sinking two ships, laden with cement, one on top of the other. Moreover, it would be an easy matter to wreck the Canal with explosives. War-risks

The Treaty of 1888 expressly provides against such acts, and prohibits the right of blockade : but Conventions do not cover war-risks. Indeed, an 'accident' similar to that which wrecked the U.S. ship *Maine* might possibly occur even in the Suez Canal.

ii COMMERCE

(*a*) *Statistical Returns*

From the *Report* for 1897,[1] addressed to her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the British Suez Canal Directors, the following statistics have been taken :

The net tonnage for 1897 shows a decrease of 660,910 tons as compared with that of the previous year, and of 549,010 tons as compared with that of 1895. Tonnage

The amount of Canal dues has fallen proportionately from 79,569,994 fr. in 1896 to 72,830,545 fr. in 1897, being a decrease of 6,739,449 fr. Dues

The number of vessels which passed through the Canal was 3434 in 1895 ; 3409 in 1896 ; and 2986 in 1897 : of which 2318 in 1895, 2162 in 1896, and 1905 in 1897 Traffic

[1] Parl. Papers : Commercial—No. 4 (1898).

carried the British flag. The tonnage (as well as the number of British vessels) has decreased, having fallen from 6,062,587 in 1895 and 5,817,768 in 1896 to 5,319,136, tons, in 1897. But during the same period, the tonnage of German vessels has increased from 693,645 in 1895 to 806,279 in 1896 and to 858,685, tons, in 1897.

Percentages — The percentage of British vessels and their tonnage in 1897 was 63·8 and 68, respectively, as against 63·4 and 68 per cent. in 1896. There has been a slight increase in the percentage of German, French, Dutch, and Norwegian vessels.

Merchant vessels — Of 2,155 merchant-vessels and vessels in ballast, of a net tonnage of 5,481,913 tons, passing through the Canal, 1,609, of a net tonnage of 4,349,993 tons, were British, being 74 per cent. of the number and nearly 80 per cent. of the tonnage; 231, or 10·6 per cent., were German vessels, whose tonnage was 9·8 per cent. of the whole; France, Holland, and Norway together furnishing a total of 9·7 per cent. of the vessels and 7·1 per cent. of the tonnage of the carrying-trade to the East through the Suez Canal.

War-ships — Of the 78 warships and transports that passed through the Canal in 1897, 42 were British, 8 were Italian, 8 were Dutch, and 6 were French.

Duration of Passage — The mean duration of passage for all vessels navigating the Canal shows a decrease from 18 hours 38 minutes in 1896 to 17 hours 44 minutes in 1897. In 1897 the percentage of vessels navigating by night was 95 per cent., as against 94 per cent. in 1896.

Draught of Water — The maximum draught allowed for vessels passing through the Canal is 25 feet 7 inches; and 391 vessels, drawing more than 24 feet 7 inches, used the Canal, as compared with 360 in 1896, 228 in 1895, and 172 in 1894, representing a percentage of 5·1 in 1894, 6·7 in 1895, 10·6 in 1896, and 12·1 in 1897.

Troops — There was a very considerable decrease in 1897 in the number of troops carried through the Canal, owing chiefly to the cessation of French and Italian military operations in Madagascar and Abyssinia, respectively. The Returns

show 92,639 military passengers in 1897 as against 198,520 in 1896.

In the year 1870, 26,758 passengers were carried through the Canal; in 1880 the number had risen to 98,900, in 1890 to 161,352, and in 1897 to 191,224. Passengers

I append a General Annual Return of Shipping and Tonnage that passed through the Suez Canal from its inaugural Year to the end of 1897, together with the Transit Receipts :— Fluctuation of Shipping and Tonnage

Year.	Number of Vessels.	Gross Tonnage.	Transit Receipts.	Mean Net Tonnage per Vessel.
			Fr.	
1869	10	10,557	54,460	657
1870	486	654,915	5,159,327	898
1871	765	1,142,200	8,993,732	995
1872	1,082	1,744,481	16,407,591	1,071
1873	1,173	2,085,072	22,897,319	1,166
1874	1,264	2,423,672	24,859,383	1,290
1875	1,494	2,940,708	28,886,302	1,345
1876	1,457	3,072,107	29,974,998	1,439
1877	1,663	3,418,949	32,774,344	1,416
1878	1,593	3,291,535	31,098,229	1,425
1879	1,477	3,236,942	29,686,060	1,532
1880	2,026	4,344,519	39,840,487	1,509
1881	2,727	5,794,491	51,274,352	1,517
1882	3,198	7,122,125	60,545,882	1,586
1883	3,307	8,051,307	65,847,812	1,746
1884	3,284	8,319,967	62,378,115	1,787
1885	3,624	8,985,411	62,207,439	1,748
1886	3,100	8,183,313	56,527,390	1,860
1887	3,137	8,430,043	57,862,370	1,881
1888	3,440	9,437,957	64,832,273	1,930
1889	3,425	9,605,745	66,167,579	1,951
1890	3,389	9,749,129	66,984,000	2,033
1891	4,207	12,217,986	83,422,101	2,067
1892	3,559	10,866,401	74,452,436	2,166
1893	3,341	10,753,798	70,667,361	2,292
1894	3,352	11,283,854	73,776,827	2,398
1895	3,434	11,833,637	78,103,717	2,460
1896	3,409	12,039,858	79,569,994	2,511
1897	2,986	11,123,403	72,830,545	2,645

(*b*) *The Suez Canal Administration*

Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, and Holland are represented on the Board of Directors of the Suez Canal Company, sitting at Paris. The local Administration is centralized at Ismaïlia, which is practically a French town, with some 7,000 inhabitants.[1] All the officials are of French nationality.

Report for 1898

The Report presented to the Annual Meeting held at Paris on 27th June 1898, under the presidency of Prince d'Arenberg, showed that the total Receipts for 1897 were over 6½ million francs less than those for 1896: but a Surplus of 39,315,000 francs was announced. The Reserve Fund amounted to over 2½ million francs above the Statutory amount; and a dividend of 90 francs was declared. The continued decline in the Shipping and tonnage using the Canal was attributed to commercial depression. The so-called Defence Committee again denounced the London programme for the reduction of the rates, pointing out that the dividend had fallen from 105½ fr. in 1891 to 90 fr. in 1897, after drawing on the Reserve Fund. The Chairman stated that the widening of the Canal was being carried out, and that the Receipts for 1898 showed an upward tendency.

(*c*) *Addendum*

Comparative Growth of Foreign Trade

The following Return, published by the Board of Trade in 1898, forms an instructive corollary to the arrested development of the Suez Canal Traffic during the present decade. It shows the total Imports and Exports of the principal European Countries and of the United States for each of the Years 1891, 1894, and 1897.

[1] In 1882 the population of Ismaïlia was 3364. In 1897 it was 6886.

§ *Imports*

COUNTRIES.	1891.	1894.	1897.
	£	£	£
France	237,532,000	191,796,000	205,500,000
German Zollverein and German Empire (*a*)	228,540,000	210,250,000	249,575,000
Belgium	124,785,000	108,123,000	123,633,000
Holland (*b*)	111,260,000	120,603,000	140,329,000
Russia (*b*)	37,934,000	55,957,000	58,981,000[1]
Austria-Hungary (*b*)	51,143,000	58,333,000	62,938,000
Denmark	18,590,000	19,387,000	21,330,000[1]
Sweden (*b*)	20,470,000	19,510,000	19,906,000[1]
Norway	12,390,000	11,444,000	13,345,000[1]
Spain	36,054,000	31,185,000	32,306,000[1]
Portugal	11,243,000	10,818,000	11,392,000[2]
United States (*c*)	176,024,000	136,457,000	159,319,000
United Kingdom	435,441,000	408,345,000	451,029,000

Note.—SPECIAL IMPORTS ARE IMPORTS FOR HOME CONSUMPTION.

§ *Exports*

COUNTRIES.	1891.	1894.	1897.
	£	£	£
France	189,220,000	164,984,000	192,124,000
German Zollverein and German Empire (*a*)	176,980,000	162,995,000	197,785,000
Belgium	113,880,000	96,982,000	113,491,000
Holland (*b*) (*d*)	94,786,000	92,709,000	123,255,000
Russia (*b*)	70,739,000	66,875,000	68,993,000[1]
Austria-Hungary (*b*)	65,559,000	66,290,000	63,854,000
Denmark	13,835,000	14,648,000	15,771,000[1]
Sweden (*b*)	17,943,000	16,590,000	18,905,000[1]
Norway	7,243,000	7,333,000	8,209,000[1]
Spain	36,455,000	26,772,000	35,337,000[1]
Portugal	7,163,000	8,176,000	8,443,000[2]
United States (*c*)	184,267,000	185,863,000	218,957,000
United Kingdom	309,114,000	273,786,000	294,174,000

Note.—SPECIAL EXPORTS ARE EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCE.

(*a*) Exclusive of Transit Trade, the value of which has not been computed since 1890. (*b*) Special Trade. (*c*) Years ended 30th June.

(*d*) The produce of the Dutch Colonies is included under the head of Domestic Produce in Holland.

[1] These figures relate to the year 1896, the latest year for which the information has been received. [2] Provisional figures, subject to rectification.

VIII

REGENERATION OF EGYPT

A British Guarantee in Theory and in Practice

i NEED AND SUCCESS OF THE SINGLE CONTROL

ii A FINANCIAL PROPOSAL

VIII

REGENERATION OF EGYPT

i NEED AND SUCCESS OF THE SINGLE CONTROL

THE Regeneration of Egypt is one of the most notable monuments of the century. That an Oriental country, corrupted by centuries of misgovernment, should, in spite of foreign dissensions and depredations, rise superior to the conditions which arrested its development, is a fact that can be explained only in one way. The master-builder of Modern Egypt, Lord Cromer, concludes his *Report* for 1898 in these words:

'As each successive year of the British Occupation of Egypt passes by, two facts acquire an ever increasing degree of prominence. The first is that the present régime, which has now lasted for fifteen years, has conferred, and is still conferring, the utmost benefit on the Egyptians and on all who are concerned in the welfare of Egypt. The second is that, whatever be the defects of that régime—and it cannot be doubted that, whether the matter be regarded from the English or from the Egyptian point of view, it possesses certain defects—the circumstances are such as to render it impossible to substitute any preferable system of government in its place. A satisfactory solution is certainly not to be found in any premature movement in the direction of more effective Egyptian autonomy, or in internationalizing the Egyptian Government, or, lastly, in any combination of either of these two systems. The need of Egypt

'For the present, what Egypt most requires, and for many years to come will require, is an honest, just, and orderly Administration, and the establishment of the supremacy of the law in the widest sense of the term, on so firm a footing

as to render practically impossible any return to that personal system of government which, twenty years ago, was well nigh the ruin of the country, as it has been that of so many Oriental States. It is conceivable that, at some future time, the Egyptian question may pass from the administrative into the political stage, and that a moment will arrive when the method of government may be discussed with advantage to all the interests, whether foreign or native, which are concerned. For the present, however, that moment would appear to be distant.'

and the necessity

This sanguine forecast should, however, apart from official optimism, be qualified by an *a posteriori* argument. The reconquest of the Egyptian Sudan, and the establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in those regions, render it practically impossible for the Tutelary Power to relax her hold on Egypt, so long as the situation in the Delta is a menace to the stability of Native institutions and to the tranquillity of the Nile Valley. It required no prophet to foresee this end, which was obvious from the first.[1] And it demands no elaborate argument to establish the premise, that the stability of Egyptian institutions depends on the continuance, for an indefinite period, of the Control which since 1882 has been so wisely exercised by Great Britain.

From fetters to freedom

Under International Control, Egypt was weighted with multiple fetters that prevented her moving hand or foot without the unanimous consent of the Powers. Under the Dual Control, the guardians of law and order pulled different ways, but made some progress towards their destination. Whilst now, under the Single Control, Egypt enjoys comparative freedom, even though she be handcuffed to the *Pax Britannica*.

[1] Shortly after the announcement of the advance to Dongola, I wrote an article on 'The Coming Struggle on the Nile' for the *North American Review*. Published in September 1896, it outlined the situation in such a manner that, if issued to-day, it would not be found incomplete or inaccurate. Indeed, events were so easy to forecast, except the rapid advance and unvarying success of the Sirdar, that it is impossible to believe her Majesty's Government could have been ignorant of the effect of their intervention. As to its cause, that also was shown to be other than the ostensible one.

British pledges

Can Egypt 'stand alone'? That, after all, is the proviso which qualifies all our pledges to Europe; although, as I have already shown, the earnest attempt to redeem them was frustrated by the action of France in upsetting the Drummond-Wolff Convention and has ever since been negatived by her blind opposition. That those pledges have been honourably recognised, in spirit, is proved by the continuance of Europe's tacit mandate, which has never been seriously challenged. That they have not been redeemed, in the letter, is due, in general, to the force of circumstances, and, in particular, to the ignorance in which we entered on our task. The Regeneration of Egypt has been a colossal work of reform.

Can Egypt stand alone?

Can Egypt stand alone? The evidence I have brought together in the sections dealing with the Anglo-Egyptian Administration is in itself sufficient to answer that question in the negative. The extent to which Egyptian institutions require alien support, the measure of British initiative, supervision, and control, are there shown to embrace and permeate every Department of State. Take away these props, eliminate these braces, and the Egyptian edifice, which to-day is a monument that compels the admiration of the world, would, in the words of the master-builder, 'tumble down like a child's house-of-cards.'[1]

No

Egypt cannot stand alone. This is the verdict of every official in the country, and of every impartial critic who visits the country. It is the verdict, too, of the French. All concur in the belief, all share in the conviction, that Egypt would quickly relapse into anarchy if foreign support were prematurely withdrawn. But with a difference:

The French faith

The French believe that a return to the Dual Control, if not to Internationalism, would equally safeguard the stability of Egypt, and would more adequately represent the interests of Europe (meaning France). But is that the opinion of Europe? No such view has been advanced; nor could it for a moment be upheld, in view of the glaring proofs to the contrary, of which I have given many examples.

[1] 'Memoir of Sir Samuel Baker,' p. 363.

Neutralization

Others believe that some form of neutralization might be imposed on Egypt, to the exclusion of British Control. But how, under this specious guise, are you to provide for stability? How are you to guarantee integrity? It is a contradiction in terms. Even the neutralization of Belgium requires an army to safeguard it, and the good-will of Europe to guarantee it. Egypt would require a navy, and much else besides.

The British *raj*

French Control, according to the measure of its exercise, would inevitably lead to denationalization. Multiple Control would lead, as it has always led, to demoralization. Egypt requires that genius for compromise, that marvellous power of adapting means to an end, that singleness of purpose, strenuous and sustained effort, and strict integrity, which characterize the rulers of India. The Anglo-Egyptian Administration is based on the Anglo-Indian *raj*.

Why withdraw it?

The need of the Single Control has been demonstrated by its success. Not only Egypt herself, but every country having dealings with Egypt, has benefited by this financial and political stability. Why, therefore, withdraw it?

Because France wishes it? That is the only argument—if it be an argument—that appears to prevail in the field of diplomacy: and, considering the extent to which French capital is involved, it is extremely doubtful whether France, as a nation, would, under circumstances that did not challenge her national honour, be prepared to push this argument to its logical sequence.

Because Egypt wishes it? If by Egypt you mean the so-called Nationalists, these, apart from their august Patron, are a negligible quantity. No doubt the Khedive and the Palace party wish it. The masses of the people—the tax-payers, the petty landowners—and the best elements of Egyptian society infinitely prefer their assured position, little as they may understand the cause of it, to the grinding tyranny of Turkish taskmasters. If the voice of Egypt could find utterance, her cry would be: 'Away with *all* Infidels! but we beseech thee, O Lord! to dispense Justice and Water in due measure.'

Because England wishes it? If England — if her Majesty's Government—really wished to retire from Egypt, then assuredly no more inconsistent and compromising step could have been taken than to initiate the reconquest of the Sudan.[1] Our African frontiers now march with those of Egypt in the Nile Valley: and it is difficult to say where, throughout this vast area, English rule begins and where it ends. To most people it appears to begin and end in the *Pax Britannica.*

Our masked Protectorate

This childish make-believe deceives nobody—least of all, our French rivals; and it has all the disadvantages, to Egypt as well as to ourselves, that in truth it would possess if there were any reality in it. Under this sham Protectorate, Egypt is overweighted with burdens and cannot adequately be protected against exactions. Under a recognized Protectorate this would be changed, to the advantage of all concerned. Great Britain would have a free hand to carry out reforms which now are checked by foreign obstruction. Egypt would be free to develop her great natural resources and to dispose of her own savings, without either compromising the interests of others or endangering her own financial credit. A great burden would be raised from the shoulders of the Executive Government, and an unjust tax on the economical development of Egypt would be for ever removed. An immense saving would result to the Egyptian Exchequer, not to speak of fresh economies and reduction of interest[2]; commercial enterprise would be stimulated, and foreign capital pour into the country; the reactionary elements of the situation would die a natural death, having nothing to nourish them; the governing classes would more openly and cordially co-operate with the Executive, and many Adminis-

[1] The argument that, because we were responsible for the evacuation of the Sudan, we were morally bound to restore it to Egypt, might have received some credit, had we, at the same time, made any serious attempt to rid the country of her foreign blackmailers—Egypt's worst enemies. The argument that makes for the indefinite extension of the British Occupation of Egypt, makes also for a permanent Occupation of the country, now that the Sudan has been thrown open to our joint policies. 'Rights of conquest' apply equally to Egypt (1882) and to the Sudan (1898).

[2] *Vide ante*, p. 200.

trative checks might then be abolished: with the result that Egypt would enjoy renewed and assured prosperity, the purity of Justice would be safeguarded against political intrigue, and the amalgamation of the Judicial systems would become possible. Finally, the policy of Egypt, instead of tossing and drifting on the troubled sea of Doubt, might be shaped to nobler ends than the payment of the Coupon and the pacification of foreign freebooters. In sober truth, this would be the inevitable result of a *de jure* recognition of the *de facto* situation. But, in the words of Lord Palmerston, which I have already quoted: 'Very few public men in England follow up Foreign Affairs sufficiently to see the consequences of events that have NOT happened.'

It is admitted on all sides that the equivocal situation of Great Britain in Egypt is derogatory to ourselves and unsatisfactory to others. At the same time it does not prevent, it only checks and retards, the great work of reform: it causes us to do, in a roundabout and un-English fashion, things that were better and more effectively accomplished in the light of day. Justice, to hold the scales even, should be blindfolded, not gagged. Reforms, admitted in principle, should not be called upon to pay *bakhshish* for their practical application. The work of all would be lightened, the self-respect of all would be increased, by the recognition of accomplished facts. Great Britain does exercise a *de facto* Protectorate over Egypt: and all the verbiage in the vocabularies of apologists, all the shams in the repertory of humbugs, cannot disguise it. Only the British electorate is hoodwinked.

The Policy of Drift

That fatal policy of Drift, which has led us into so many African disasters, left us stranded in Egypt, like Moses in the bulrushes. It is feared that the same opportunist policy will continue to inspire the statesmen of Downing Street. We are marking time in Egypt, until we can screw up courage to advance to meet our destiny. What that destiny is, I have endeavoured to demonstrate: the Mistress of the Seas, in the time to come, as in times past, must dominate and control the highway between West and East.

When is a Protectorate not a Protectorate?

Domination cannot be secured apart from its responsibility. Control cannot be exercised with fettered powers. But in the New Diplomacy an instrument has been forged to serve the ends of a degenerate race: the subterfuge of Language. A Protectorate is no longer a Protectorate unless you call it so. Thus, the word Protectorate was not expressly used in the Treaty of 17th December 1885, which established an actual French Protectorate over Madagascar; nor was it employed in the Treaty of 12th May 1881, when France assumed a Protectorate over Tunis. Therefore, the word Protectorate is a word to be banned. But the actual Protectorate is no less a fact on that account: rather, it is a fact the more readily recognized because it does not challenge opposition nor technically infringe Treaties.

When it is otherwise styled:

Consequently, in any future arrangement with Egypt, it may be necessary to call a spade an agricultural instrument. The agricultural instrument which, in my opinion, is destined to turn the soil of Egypt into a British Protectorate, *sub rosâ*, is a financial expedient which I now venture to introduce and advocate with the confidence born of the support it has received from the high officials in Egypt whom I have consulted on the subject.

As, for instance

In a word: neither French obstruction nor the Khedive's hostility are the worst evils that beset Egypt. All that is wanted is that her Majesty's Government should take up a resolute attitude, confess that we cannot fix a date for evacuation, and throw off the International fetters. If Great Britain were to guarantee the Debt of Egypt, International interference would cease. The Capitulations would remain, and with them the International position, unless we negotiated successfully for their abolition or boldly declared a Protectorate. Egypt is so marvellously rich, so capable of development, that there would be no financial risk in guaranteeing her Debt, because such guarantee would involve and imply a free hand, amounting to a Protectorate.

What would Parliament say?

Would Parliament endorse such a Policy? It is because I have grave misgivings on that score, that the present work has been undertaken. Since this book was planned,

in its present form, now over two years ago, public opinion in England has undergone a considerable change in regard to Egypt, which has lightened my task: but I still believe that Parliament is in need of the arguments which it has been my object to supply, in order to justify a step which, in my opinion, is as serious as it is inevitable.

1905 In or before the year 1905, this question must be settled one way or another. Failing a Protectorate, which would be preferable, the proposal I am about to explain appears to be the best way out of the Egyptian labyrinth. At least it is practical, by meeting the circumstances of the case, whilst at the same time preparing the ground for an issue which we cannot abandon unless we give up all thoughts of empire and all claims to maritime supremacy.

ii A FINANCIAL PROPOSAL

Since Finance is at the root of all things Egyptian, a financial settlement would amount almost to a political solution. But not quite. The suzerainty of Turkey would remain, with all its consequences.

Financial Law of Egypt

The Powers are all and severally, under existing Conventions, bound to observe the Financial Law of Egypt, which also has received due recognition, in so far as that was necessary, on the part of the Sultan. The Financial Law of Egypt, in all its bearings, has been analysed in the earlier sections of this work. Here I have simply to deal with its application to the question at issue.

Obligations

Any alteration in the Financial Law would, no doubt, require the assent of the Great Powers who subscribed to the Law of Liquidation (1880) and to the Convention of London (1885), because it would affect the Debt of Egypt, a portion of which is guaranteed by the Powers, and the relations of Egypt to her creditors. It might also require the assent of the fourteen Governments holding Capitulations with the Suzerain Power, in so far as it affected the civil rights and political status of foreigners resident in Egypt. But these legal issues, if challenged, can only be decided by the Tribunals of Egypt—by the Mixed Tribunals, if they are

then in existence, or by the National Tribunals (Court of Appeal). It is scarcely necessary to add that, in view of the law-suit brought against the Egyptian Government in regard to the appropriation of money from the General Reserve Fund to the expenses of the Dongola Expedition, any such Appeal to the Mixed Tribunals would be treated by the Court, under its present constitution and through the powers which it claims to exercise, in a similar fashion. But the mandate of the Mixed Tribunals expires in February 1900, unless in the meantime the Egyptian Government obtain adequate guarantees for the unfettered exercise of their sovereign rights. Considering also the Judgment given by the Mixed Court of First Instance on 9th December 1884, and the successful opposition of the Powers, regarding the suspension of the Sinking Fund, on the recommendation of Lord Northbrook, together with the scheme under which Great Britain offered to guarantee a new Loan of £5,000,000, at 3½ per cent., etc., it would seem that any fresh proposals of the kind might meet with the same fate—rejection.

Decrees

In the Preamble of the Decree for the Unification of the Egyptian Debt (7th May 1876) it is provided that—

'Whereas, in order to make it possible for the Treasury and the Daïra Sanieh[1] to satisfy these different debts, and to better secure for the future the interests of the creditors by a measure in conformity with the public exigencies, it has been found opportune and useful to unify all these debts by establishing one General Debt, bearing interest at the rate of 7 per cent., and redeemable within sixty-five years'—that is to say, in or before 1940.

Article XVIII. of the Goschen-Joubert Decree (18th November 1876) declares that—

'The Commission of the Public Debt is permanent until the entire Debt is redeemed.'

Restrictions

Finally, the Egyptian Government engages, under Article XXXVII. of the Law of Liquidation, to contract no new

[1] The provisions of this Decree as to the Daïra are abrogated by the Decree of 18th November 1876 (Texts No. xiv.) and the Law of Liquidation (Arts. 40-62). Moreover, by the new arrangement to which I have elsewhere referred, the Daïra Sanieh Debt will be extinguished in 1905.

Loan without the assent of the *Caisse*.[1] Moreover, under the Sultan's Firmans, a similar restriction is provided for.

These International conditions are very stringent. At the time they were imposed, Egypt was tottering on the brink of bankruptcy, after a 'carnival of extravagance' and financial riot. But at the present day the financial position and the credit of Egypt are both assured and sound. Still, International engagements can only be rescinded by International agreement. The mandate of the *Caisse* is concurrent with the life of the Debt, which is extinguishable in or before 1940.

The *Caisse* It is true that the objects stated in the Preamble of the Decree constituting the *Caisse*[2] have already been fulfilled, and that, therefore, the existence of this *imperium in imperio* is an anachronism; but, in view of its political significance, the Powers would be justified, according to the strict letter of the law, in upholding Article XVIII of the Goschen-Joubert Decree: 'The Commission of the Public Debt is permanent until the entire Debt is redeemed.'

The way out In order, therefore, to guarantee the Debt of Egypt, it would be necessary for Great Britain to redeem the entire Debt and to raise a fresh Loan without a *Caisse de la Dette*. The Decree of 7th May 1876, which I have quoted (*supra*), merely states that the Debt is 'redeemable *within* sixty-five years.' But here another engagement interferes with any such action being taken before the year 1905.

In the year 1890, during the discussions and negotiations concerning the conversion of a portion of the Debt, we undertook not again to convert certain portions of the Debt or to pay them off for a period of fifteen years.[3] But in

[1] 'Aucun nouvel emprunt, de quelque nature que ce soit, ne pourra être émis par notre Gouvernement, que sur l'avis conforme de la Commission de la Dette. Il sera loisible toutefois à notre Ministre des Finances de se procurer des avances, en compte courant, dans la limite maxima de £E2,000,000.' (Art. XXXVII., Law of Liquidation, 17th July 1880).

[2] See Appendix III., page 453.

[3] Article 6 of the Khedivial Decree of 6th June, 1890, relating to the Conversion of the Privileged Debt, states:

"La nouvelle Dette Privilégiée, la nouvelle Dette Domaniale et la nouvelle Dette Daïra Sanieh ne pourront être remboursées avant l'expiration d'une période de quinze années, sous reserve, pour les Dettes Domaniale et Daïra Sanieh, des dispositions édictées par les articles 7, 8 et 9 du présent Décret."

Other or contingent obligations were incurred under the Law of Liquidation

1905—when also the Daïra Sanieh Debt will be redeemed —there will be no International engagements that would prevent us from adopting the course I have suggested. France would, no doubt, object; but the other Powers, whose financial interests would be amply secured under a British guarantee, might, under favourable political circumstances, be prepared to acquiesce in a solution which benefited them financially without actually compromising their political interests in a greater degree than at present. On financial grounds alone, it is obviously absurd to pay four per cent. for a Debt which now stands at over 108. No other country would be so quixotic. A British security on a 3½ per cent. Debt would be ample.

It should not be beyond the power of Diplomacy to arrange such a settlement and to compromise with the Sultan as regards his shred-bare Suzerain rights. As between England and France, the Debt of Egypt is held in about equal proportions; and Egypt herself is investing nearly all her savings in her own stock,—over three millions having been devoted to buying up her debts at a premium of 8 per cent. instead of paying them off at par.

The responsibility

To say that the position is radically wrong—unfair to Egypt and crippling to the Tutelary Power—is only to affirm a paradox which characterises the situation. Should we, then, in the interests of Egypt and in satisfaction of our legitimate aspirations, undertake the responsibility of guaranteeing the entire Debt, with all its consequences? That is the question which concerns us in this place.

In the opinion of the experts, there would be no financial risk in such an undertaking, provided we were allowed a free hand in the Administration. No financial risk whatever: on the contrary, a sound investment.

Questions at issue

The legal question can be decided only by the Judicial authorities. The political issue is a matter for compromise.

(1880); under the Decrees of 27 July 1885, 30 April 1888, 26 October 1878; by the Conventions of 31 October 1878 and 14 April 1880; in interviews between the Egyptian Government and MM. Rothschild, etc. But these, though pertinent to the question, do not affect my present contention.

But there is, in the general situation, and in this solution of it, a simplicity which meets many of the objections that would attach to a formal Protectorate: in particular, it does not technically violate any of the Treaties and Conventions that bind Egypt hand and foot and allow her pockets to be picked. It would not wholly satisfy us—nothing but a recognized Protectorate can do that. It would not satisfy France—nothing but complete evacuation would do that. It would not satisfy the Sultan—nothing, perhaps, but *bakhshish* can do that.[1] But it would meet the requirements of the case, under which, in five years' time, a new and more equitable arrangement must be made, if Egypt is to meet her liabilities and fulfil her responsibilities in the Sudan.[2]

If we guaranteed the Debt, many of the abuses arising from the Capitulations, which hamper internal reforms, and under which Europeans can resist complying with essential regulations, would be swept away. Apart from special Conventions with Egypt, the Capitulations pure and simple with Turkey would remain; and these, being too slight to affect our position, would eventually be surrendered, as in Tunis, because Europeans would prefer to avail themselves of Egyptian institutions.

Alternatives

The only other alternative to the declaration of a British Protectorate would be for Egypt herself, by some ingenious financial expedient—of which, in the Aswán scheme, we had a notable example—to pledge all the resources of the country (the unhypothecated revenues of which would alone suffice to cover the Capital Sum), under the

[1] On the other hand, a high authority informs me that, in his belief, no financial consideration would induce the Sultan to waive his sovereign rights, owing to his prestige as Khalifa, which would suffer thereby. It is certainly true that the Sultan can find money, when he wants it,—as in the Greek Campaign, when four millions were spent, the origin of which was obscure. Still, I have great faith in *bakhshish*.

[2] I have it, on the authority of the French Member of the *Caisse*, that, although Egypt has six millions (in round figures) for Administrative purposes, this will not suffice for administering the Sudan also. It remains to be seen whether Administrative needs will be admitted as Authorized Expenditure, the chance of which seems very doubtful.

guarantee of the Protectoral Power, which of course would find the ready money: and so arrive at the same end by a more circuitous and thoroughly Egyptian way. This method would not, I believe, technically involve a Loan, strictly so called—a little financial jugglery would settle that—and it would meet the legitimate objections of the Sultan.[1]

But, in spite of all this ingenious sophistry, which provides a way out for a courageous policy, the opinion in Egypt is that we shall *drift*. We shall drift, and gather ever-increasing onus on the way, until, to break through it all, we shall, as in times past, be called upon to make greater sacrifices and greater efforts than ever before. But why not Drift?

This opinion is not without some foundation. The Egyptian Government can always puddle along, in its own peculiar way. For all essential purposes money can be found, somehow. The administration of the Sudan will be a military one, for some time to come. The money-spending Departments can mark time a little longer, until the clouds roll by. There is no reason, in short, why we should not go on as we are going. There is only a remote possibility of the financial situation forcing a solution of the Egyptian Problem. This appears to be the official view in Egypt, *faute de mieux*.[2]

It is perhaps too sanguine and unreasonable to look for

[1] Compare with this, Sir Samuel Baker's Scheme, published in his *Memoir* (Macmillan). 'If,' he wrote, in January 1885, 'the European Powers should insist upon a joint-guarantee for a loan of ten millions to Egypt, we shall be checkmated. I have written direct to Gladstone, suggesting an *immediate* alliance with Egypt, through special treaty with the Sultan, by which England shall engage to defend Egypt from all danger, internal and external, guaranteeing the integrity of the country as a portion of the Ottoman Empire: this alliance to be permanent. The British Military Occupation to be *sine die*, as the Protecting Power. The British Government to guarantee a loan. . . . If he will boldly do that, he will save our influence.'

[2] As an illustration of the timidity of the British Government, I may state that it took two years to obtain their consent to the financial arrangements under the Aswán scheme, the publication of which filled Egypt with joy and even evoked the cordial congratulations of the Khedive, who, under circumstances I am not at liberty to mention, possessed the power, for forty-eight hours, to raise the opposition of the *Caisse*, had he been disposed to do so.

statesmen in England who are wise enough and courageous enough to forestall events of such far-reaching consequences: but my belief is, that if her Majesty's Government were to adopt a policy more in conformity with English ideas of justice and honour than the peddling, tinkering policy we have hitherto pursued in Egypt, the British electorate would support them, if only on the wave of enthusiasm that has carried us to Khartum, and enable them to regularize and consolidate Anglo-Egyptian rule throughout the Nile Valley.

Because of the wrath to come

The need of the Single Control has been demonstrated. Control that is fettered is no control; and unfettered control can be obtained only by throwing off the International top-hamper. But whether we choose to walk in fetters or as free men, our course is the same. It is pointed out by the finger of Destiny. Some day we must establish a British Protectorate over Egypt: and if the reader should still have any doubt on that point, I think it will be removed by the considerations advanced in the concluding sections of this book.

The theoretical British guarantee for the Regeneration of Egypt remains to be implemented in practice.

IX

THE SITUATION IN THE SUDAN

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM

i THE NATIVE RACES

ii HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

iii THE TITLE-DEEDS OF THE NILE VALLEY

iv THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM

IX

THE SITUATION IN THE SUDAN

Limitations

TO adequately present all the factors, physical and political, which affect or control the situation in the Sudan would require a volume in itself. The extremely meagre and generalized survey I have taken of the Nile Basin, in order to establish its geographical unity and to illustrate its means of communication, must suffice as a framework for my political studies. Only in regard to the inhabitants of the Nile Valley and to salient events in its history, do I feel justified in adding some additional details, in order that my examination of the political situation may not be lacking in essential elements.

The task of the Future

For many years to come the task of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium must be confined to the pacification of the Sudan, the reorganization of the tribes under a military administration, and the institution of a system of Justice and Government which shall have for its object the restoration of law and order and the recognition of the first principles of civilization. Until this initial work has been successfully accomplished, it would be premature to discuss, although we may faintly outline, the prospects of economic development. Good Government cannot be raised on the ruins of anarchy until the *débris* has been cleared away and solid foundations have been laid for 'an order of things possessing the elements of stability and progress.' Trade and Commerce cannot replace slavery and robbery until social order and Justice have been established in a region that has never known either. Respect for the Law cannot be gained until the new-comers inspire their subjects with the necessity and the advantage of conforming to it. And, finally, commercial development has no chance of success until the question of

Slavery and slave-labour, upon which hitherto it has depended, has been definitely defined and adequately dealt with, although commercial enterprise of a kind may in the meantime find many openings.

Exploration must precede Exploitation; the fertilization of capital must prepare the ground for rich returns. Legitimate commerce must supplant illicit traffic: and the prime essential of legitimate commerce is the existence of institutions that inspire or compel it to renounce illicit gains. All this has to be created, *ab ovo*. Even the very population is wanting, established on the soil in sufficient numbers, to provide a revenue for the Government and the means of developing the resources of the Sudan.

i THE NATIVE RACES

After the Deluge

In the 'Development of Africa,' the first edition of which was published nine years ago, I stated, with reference to the loss of the Sudan: 'As for Egypt—whose dominion before its downfall was gradually creeping south—at the present day she has absolutely no hold whatever upon the Sudan, though a stronger Power behind her, Great Britain, is endeavouring to save some of the *flotsam* and *jetsam* from the wreck. The Sudan is a closed book to us; but when it is re-opened, there should be stirring incidents chronicled in its pages.'

Ohrwalder, and Slatin, and Wingate have told us much: but the book that has been opened has yet to be read. The Sudan has been depopulated. Carnage and despotism have ruled for fourteen years. The bloody tale has yet to be told in all its revolting details. We know little as yet of what has happened in the heart of the Egyptian Sudan, except that it has suffered and bled.

And so of the population: judging from the conditions before the Downfall, we may hazard a few general remarks on its probable distribution to-day. Of Dongola and the Nile up to Meroë and Sennar we have, however, more precise information; and the same may be said of countries bordering on Uganda.

(*a*) *Distribution of the Population*

Climatic zones

The distribution of the populations of Africa is regulated by the systems of climate, which determine also the conditions of tribal occupations. This law is illustrated very forcibly in the Nile Valley, where the latitude of El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, represents the equatorial or median line. North of this zone, there is a scanty rainfall; south of it, the rainfall is plentiful. Thus, the camel-owning tribes in the north, and the cattle-owning tribes in the south, find their occupations and their mode of life determined for them by Nature.[1] In the north, the country is a desert, and the people are nomads, principally Arabs; in the south, the Negro race begins and becomes the more homogeneous as the Equator is approached. Northwards, the Mohammedan religion is professed; southwards, the Pagans prevail. In Darfur the races are mixed: and there we find iron-working Negroids. In Kordofan the cattle-owning Arabs are the dominant race: and they have pushed their 'sphere of influence' right up to the Abyssinian highlands, occupying, until recently, the fertile districts of Sennar and Meroë. To the south, the cattle-owning Negroids have been left in almost undisturbed possession. This, broadly speaking, is the general distribution of races.

The path of anarchy

As regards numbers, the Baggara, being the dominant people, will, no doubt, have increased under the ruthless rule of the Khalifa. The Shilluk Negroes, who formerly occupied one of the most populous regions in Central Africa, have probably been reduced in number, owing to their proximity to the Baggara and their impressment in the Dervish ranks. The Dinka—another fine race of Negroes—having been left in comparative peace, will probably have increased their numbers: they are a sedentary people, possessing no horses or camels,[2] and are quite able to defend their country

[1] *Cf.* Wingate's 'Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan,' p. 8.

[2] All the districts on both sides of the White Nile, between Dar Nuba and Abyssinia, and between the Bahr el-Ghazal and Khartum, are, broadly speaking, infested with the *tsétsé* fly during the rainy season, which drives the cattle-owners northwards.

against Dervish incursionists. On the other hand, the Shukrié and the Jaälin have been almost exterminated. It is estimated that the former population of the Sudan has been reduced by fully 60 per cent.

Sedentaries The mixture of races in the northern regions is necessarily very marked, owing to invasions and incursions. Thus, the indigenous Nubians, or Negroes, have been displaced by Arabs, Turks, and others: and the intermixture of races is very complex. But most of the agriculturists of Kordofan, Darfur, and Sennar are of the Nuba race, professing Mohammedanism and practising paganism. In the chief towns and villages—particularly in Berber, Khartum, and Sennar—every Eastern nationality commingled in former times.

Slave-traders From this distribution, it will readily be understood how, in the past, the bandit Baggara were the most active agents of the Slave Trade, drawing their supplies from the south and forwarding slaves to Khartum, which was the principal distributing-centre. The interruption of that traffic by Gordon was, in fact, one of the chief exciting causes of the Mahdist rising.

Borderlanders We have seen what admirable soldiers the Upper Nile Negroes make; but the best military material is, undoubtedly, found in the watershed-country between the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Congo basins: between Makráka and Dar Fertit, where the A-Zandé tribes occupy an intermediate ethnological position.[1] These light-coloured warriors are not Negroes: their relationship belongs, rather, to the Galla and Somáli. More vigorous, both mentally and physically, than their Negro neighbours, they have also attained a relatively higher stage of culture. Their occupations are chiefly hunting and agriculture. Their states are well organized; and, in spite of tribal feuds, they are an united nationality, speaking a common language. Great judgment will be required on the part of the English and French

[1] In 1877, some 1500 Zandé of Makráka were found sufficient to keep under control fully 11,000 of the indigenous tribes. Gordon and Emin placed great confidence in them. The Zandé are also the dominant race in the Upper Ubangi basin.

Commissioners who may be called upon to delimit this borderland region, unless the conventional basin of the Congo be accepted as an arbitrary frontier.[1] The A-Zandé, or (as the Arabs call them) Niam-Niam, are warriors and cannibals; as also are their neighbours, the Monbuttu, a light-coloured race, who have reached an even higher relative degree of civilization and are said to number 1,500,000.

(*b*) *Tribal Characteristics*

Ethiopian tribes

Two distinct peoples occupy the source-region of the Nile —Ethiopia in its extended sense: the sedentary agriculturists, and the wandering herdsmen. The latter are of lighter colour, of nobler attributes, and in most cases the dominant race. The Waganda are in many respects the most prominent of these tribes: and they form the basis of the population in Uganda.[2] Then there are the Wahuma, a shepherd clan, who keep strictly apart from their neighbours, and consequently do not assimilate with them: although the royal family of Uganda are of Wahuma descent.

Both the Waganda and Wanyoro are warlike, and are well equipped. They carry spears and shields into battle, and occasionally bows and arrows; many also possess muskets. Their feudal strength is due to the military organization under which they are trained: for every efficient man is a warrior. Practically, all the peoples within

[1] In an admirable article, running through three monthly numbers of the *Scottish Geographical Magazine* (1899), Mr Capenny gives full and exclusive information in regard to the Upper Ubangi Basin, etc., to which reference should be made. I quote the following paragraph, to illustrate the connection between the Nile and Congo basins:—'Formerly the lines of communication between the Mbomu basin and the Bahr el-Ghazal passed mainly through Dem Bekir, Dem Guju, and Dem Zubeir, to Wau and Meshra-er-Rek. From Dem Zubeir the caravan highways led by way of Gondu through Shakka and Dara to the Nile at Khartum and Dongola. The caravan highway between Dar Banda and Dar Fur was that reported by Browne and Barth. But there is also a caravan highway from Dar Banda through Dar Runga and Wadai to Benghazi. According to De la Kéthulle, Arab caravaniers come annually in the dry season to Yangu in Dar Banda. From Yangu to Kuka, in Dar Runga, this caravan highway passes through Mereke, Dombago, Yanguru, Sabanga, Momba, Wundu, and Mbele or Bele.'

[2] In Usoga, as in Uganda, all are Waganda. In Unyoro, Toru, Koki, etc., all speak Kinyoro and have Wahuma chiefs. In Karagwe there are various mixed tribes from the Nile. Masai-speaking tribes border on Usoga, in the east. To he north of Usoga and east of Unyoro the tribes are also mixed.

the source-region of the Nile are allied in race and language.

Upper Nile Negroes

The Shilluk are undoubtedly pure Negroes. Their warlike character has obtained for them an evil reputation: but it must be remembered that they have only defended their homes against the Egyptian spoiler and the slave-trader. A branch of the Shilluk, the Jur, and the Luri resemble them in every respect; while the numerous tribes of the Dinka, though disunited, are allied by blood. The Nuer, another warlike people, resemble the Shilluk and Dinka. The Bari are primitive and inaccessible, but are said to be intelligent. The Shuli and Madi, on the other hand, though standing in blood-relationship to the Bari, are a vigorous agricultural people, who, in the past, very readily submitted to the Egyptian domination.

The Upper Nile territories were at one time among the most densely populated regions of Africa; but they have been devastated by constant slave-raids: in consequence of which, the shepherd people have, as a rule, for protective purposes, larger villages than the agricultural. Raiding for cattle has been the leading motive of all native military undertakings in Africa: and, in the Nile territories, the slave-traders have in this way robbed the shepherds in order to pay the agriculturists, besides securing for themselves the usual complement of victims. In the industrial arts, and particularly in the working of iron, the Upper Nile Negroes take high rank among the natives of Africa. Their family life, though differing in few respects from that of other Negroes, has, however, been profoundly affected by the depredations of the slave-traders.

Of the ten million inhabitants of the Egyptian Sudan, before the Mahdist revolt, the Negroes of the Upper Nile were said to compose seven millions.

The Baggara

The tribes and numerous clans of the Baggara are the finest race and greatest scoundrels in the Sudan. But for them, the Khalifa could not have exercised his despotic rule for so long a period of time. But for them, the insurrection might have been crushed. And but for them, the fugitive

Khalifa might now be regarded as a negligible quantity. Cattle owners and raiders, slave owners and traders, they are the scourge of the Egyptian Sudan. Under their leader, the so-called Khalifa, they still threaten the Egyptian position between Abba Island, the birthplace of the Dervish cause, and the uplands of Kordofan, where probably they will receive their *coup de grâce*.

Desert Nomads

Of the camel-owning Arab tribes north of Khartum, the principal are the Hadendoa, Amarar, Bisharin, and Ababdeh, in the eastern desert, and the Kabbabish in the western desert, in regard to which a few remarks may be offered.[1] The tribes north of Aswán form a group apart, familiar to tourists.

The Arab, Bija, and Nuba races which inhabit this portion of the Nile Valley, between Khartum and Aswán, fall under three groups—the Hamitic, the Semitic, and the Nuba. The Ababdeh, the Bisharin, and probably also the Kabbabish, belong to the Hamitic group; and they form part of the Bija or To-Bedawiet-speaking race of which the Hadendoa and the Amarar of the Eastern Sudan are also members.

The Ababdeh are found between Aswán and the Red Sea, south of the old Kena-Kosseir road, where they have lived since Roman times. They are the recognised guides of caravans through the Nubian desert and up the river to Khartum and Sennar. Their character for faithlessness and duplicity is notorious.

The Bisharin are found in the western portion of the Suákin-Berber road and between Abu Hamed and the Rea Sea. Purer in blood than the Ababdeh, and speaking To-Bedawiet more exclusively, they are essentially nomadic. As active trade-carriers, they are celebrated for their breed of camels.

The Kabbabish form probably the largest Arab tribe in the Sudan, extending westwards from the province of Dongola, and southwards to the confines of Darfur, where formerly

[1] *Cf.* Sir Charles Wilson's 'Tribes of the Nile Valley, north of Khartum. (Journal, Anthrop. Inst., vol. xvii., p. 3.)

they were known to be in touch with the Baggara slave-traders, when they monopolised the transport north of Kordofan. They speak pure Arabic: but their origin, though doubtful, is usually ascribed to Berber descent.

The Amarar and Hadendoa are well-known Bija tribes in the neighbourhood of Suákin.

Riverain tribes

There have been so many displacements, massacres, and migrations among the riverain tribes during the Reign of Terror, that we must await official reports before any reliable information in regard to them can be given. Thus, the important Jaälin tribe—which never was reconciled to Egyptian rule, and was the first to rise in revolt against the Khartum government—has been practically wiped out by the heavy hand of the Khalifa.

ii HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

Landmarks

It is not my intention, since it would not serve my immediate purpose, to sketch the history of the Sudan—important as its study undoubtedly is for the proper understanding of the problems that now confront the Anglo-Egyptian Administration. My object will be sufficiently served if I simply indicate salient landmarks, which define the situation in regard to Egypt and establish her claims to the resumption of sovereign rights.

(*a*) *Occupation of the Sudan*

Mohammed Ali's conquest

I have already referred to Mohammed Ali's conquest of the Sudan, which was undertaken for the purpose of recruiting his army from Negroes of the Upper Nile, and was partly inspired by the reputed wealth of Sennar, where gold was said to exist in large quantities. Ismail's expedition in 1820 easily dispersed the Mamluks, some of whom escaped to Darfur, while others reached the Red Sea; and this, his ostensible, object having been achieved, he continued his march towards Sennar, where he was joined by his brother, Ibrahim. Uniting their forces, they advanced into Dar Fazokl, on the upper waters of the Blue Nile.

When the news of the massacre of Ismail and his officers by the Meg, or ruler, of Shendy reached Kordofan, Ahmed Bey, the Defterdar, who, in the words of Colonel Stewart,[1] 'had wrested that province from the Darfur Sultan,' marched with his army against Shendy. In the general massacre that ensued, the Meg himself escaped towards Abyssinia. The Defterdar, after again defeating the rebels near Khartum, and advancing up the Blue Nile to the neighbourhood of Abu Haraz, then returned to Kordofan.

In 1826, Khurshid Pasha, the renowned and really honest Governor of the Sudan, led expeditions up the White Nile against the Dinka of Fashoda as well as into Dar Tagala, in Kordofan. Towards the end of 1834, after a brief visit to Egypt, Khurshid went to the Abyssinian frontier in order to repel a threatened attack on Sennar, where some rebels were in open revolt. The Abyssinians were defeated; and their leader was taken and impaled. In 1836, the Abyssinians, after attacking the Kalabat province, retreated into their mountain-fastnesses.

Khurshid was replaced in 1837 by Ahmed Pasha, during whose Governorship Mohammed Ali visited the goldfields of Dar Fazokl.

In 1841 a rebellion was quelled at Kassala; and the Sudan was divided into seven Mudirías.[2] A succession of effete Governors followed.

When, in 1856, Said Pasha, the Viceroy, visited the Sudan, his Highness was only restrained from evacuating the country by the prayers of the sheikhs and notables, who declared that 'inevitable anarchy would result from such a measure.' The Viceroy therefore instituted (or, rather, ordered) many reforms, such as—prohibiting the collection of taxes by soldiers and arranging that these should be paid through the sheikhs, reducing taxation on irrigation, providing for the collection of imposts after the harvest, and

Said Pasha

[1] Lieutenant-Colonel D. H. Stewart, in his *Report on the Sudan*—Egypt, No. 11 (1883)—from which also I take most of the ensuing particulars in this sub-section.

[2] Fazokl, Sennar, Khartum, Taka (Kassala), Berber, Dongola, Kordofan.

arranging for an Assembly of Notables to meet once a year. Musa Pasha, in 1862, reorganized the system under which taxes were then collected.

Military mutiny

In 1865 a mutiny broke out in Taka (Kassala), owing to the Negro troops being in arrear of their pay. It was suppressed by Jaafer Pasha Mazhar, with the aid of troops which he brought from Egypt and took to Taka, *viâ* Suákin: and the Negro soldiers were sent to Egypt. Jaafer Pasha then went on to Khartum; and was appointed Governor-General. In the following year, he made a tour of inspection in the Sudan; and, on returning to Khartum, he asked to have the Negro troops sent back.

Massawa and Suákin

In the same year (1866) Massawa and Suákin were placed under Egyptian rule, by arrangement with the Sultan of Turkey.

Bahr el-Ghazal

In 1870, an expedition under Helale, a native of Darfur, was sent into the Bahr el-Ghazal to seize the copper-mines at Hofrat-en-Nahas (= copper-mine), and thereby gave rise to the idea of conquering the country.[1]

Equatorial Province

Between 1869 and 1873, Sir Samuel Baker commanded an Egyptian Expedition[2] to the Upper Nile, the object of which was defined in his Firman as follows: '(1) to subdue to our [*i.e.* the Khedivial] authority the countries situated to the south of Gondokoro, (2) to suppress the Slave Trade, (3) to introduce a system of regular commerce, (4) to open to navigation the great Lakes of the Equator, and (5) to establish a chain of military stations and commercial depôts, distant at intervals of three days' march, throughout Central Africa, accepting Gondokoro as a base of operations.' Absolute and supreme authority over all the countries of the Nile basin, south of Gondokoro, was conferred on him by this Firman. Baker did not, of course, succeed in suppressing the Slave Trade; but his territorial annexations

[1] W. G. Browne (1792-1796), during his three years' captivity in Darfur, first heard of these mines.

[2] Sir Samuel Baker was the first Englishman to fill a high post in the service of the Khedive. He was given the rank of Major-General of the Ottoman Empire with the title of Pasha.

between Gondokoro and the Equator, and the fortified posts that he established along the line of least resistance, opened up a practicable path for the introduction of an Egyptian Administration. He annexed Unyoro to Egypt, establishing a fortified station at Masindi, and 'occupied' the Shuli country, etc.

Red Sea Littoral

Senhit, on the northern border of Abyssinia, was annexed to Egypt[1] in 1870 by a German named Munzinger. Senhit, although paying tribute to Abyssinia, was practically independent, under its own sheikhs, and was said to enjoy French protection. Munzinger Bey was then made Governor of the Red Sea Provinces; but, five years later, in attempting a similar annexation to the south of Massawa, he was assassinated.

Darfur

In 1874, Colonel Gordon was appointed Governor-General of the Equatorial Province, in succession to Sir Samuel Baker. In the following year, Zibehr Pasha, with his slave-soldiers (Bazingers) and Danágla, entered on his conquest of Darfur, under the orders of Ismaïl Pasha Eyub, the Governor-General of the Sudan, who assisted him with troops, rifles, etc.

Harar

In 1875, also, Rauf Pasha conquered Harar and annexed vast territories to Egypt.

Abyssinia

Owing to frontier quarrels, war was declared against Abyssinia in 1876; but the Egyptians were defeated. The Abyssinians took a very large number of prisoners, including Hassan Pasha, the son of the Khedive.

Gordon

In 1877, Colonel Gordon was appointed Governor-General of the Sudan, including Harar and the Equatorial Province. Most of his time was spent in rapidly traversing the countries under his rule and scourging the slave-traders. He suppressed Harun's rebellion in the Darfur Province, and Suliman's rising in the Bahr el-Ghazal.[2]

Mohammed Ahmed

In 1880 Rauf Pasha became Governor-General; and in the following year Mohammed Ahmed declared his divine mission and raised the banner of revolt.

[1] The Egyptian annexation was not recognised by Abyssinia, and was not implemented beyond the limits of the citadel at Keren.

[2] Suliman, son of Zibehr, was taken by Gessi Pasha and shot. Hence the blood-feud between Zibehr and Gordon.

The Egyptian Sudan

At the outbreak of the insurrection, the Egyptian Sudan covered an enormous area, the extent and the boundaries of which were defined by Colonel Stewart, in 1883, as follows:—'Its length from north to south, or from Aswán to the Equator, is some 24 degrees, or about 1650 miles. Its width from Massawa (about 40° East) to the western limit of the Darfur Province (about 22½° East) is from 1200 to 1400 miles. Beginning near Berenike, on the Red Sea Coast, the Sudan boundary follows the 24th parallel to some indefinite point in the Libyan Desert: say, the 28th meridian of longitude. Thence it follows a south-westerly direction till it meets the north-western corner of the Province of Darfur, in about the 23rd meridian of longitude. From that point it trends almost due South till about the 11th or 12th parallel; and then following a south-easterly direction, through Monbuttu and the Albert Nyanza, till it strikes the entrance of the Victoria Nyanza.[1] From this point it trends north-east, and, including the Province of Harar,[2] reaches the Indian Ocean about Cape Guardafui; and thence follows the coast-line back to Berenike.'

Egyptian garrisons

These somewhat vague boundaries may be supplemented by the recapitulation of the Egyptian garrisons, towards the close of 1882, when the Mahdist revolt had taken a firm hold of Kordofan, Darfur (or Dar Fur, 'the land of the Fur,' as it should more correctly be written), Dar Fertit, and Sennar. The Egyptian garrisons between Aswán and Khartum were—Korosko, Wadi Halfa, Dongola, Debba, Berber, Omdurman, and El-Fun. The Egyptian garrisons between the Nile and the western limits of Darfur were—El-Kaua, El-Obeid, Bara, Et Towaish, Darra, Foga, Om Shanga, El-Fasher, Kebkebia, and Kolkol. The Egyptian garrisons between the Nile and the Red Sea were—Abu Haraz, Sennar, Karkoj, Gos Rejeb, Kassala, Gera, Suk-Abu-Sin, Matama, Senhit, Amadib, Massawa, Sinkat, Tokar, Suákin.

[1] Roughly speaking, the Congo-Nile watershed.

[2] Colonel Stewart adds the following rider: 'I have thought it best to include the Province of Harar within the boundaries of the Sudan, as not alone is Harar under the Sudan Government, but, also, so little is known about the intervening country, that it is impossible to say where one province should begin and the other end.'

The Egyptian garrisons on the Gulf of Aden were—Zeila and Berbera, with Harar in the interior. The Egyptian garrisons south of Khartum, besides El-Kaua, were—Fashoda, Shambé, Bohr, Lado, Dufli, Wadelai, and Fauvera, on the river; and, in the interior, there were garrisons at Meshra-er-Rek, Dem Suliman, Wau, Kurshukali, Jur Ghattas, Rumbek, Ayak, Madi, Kabayendi, and Makráka. These garrisons are designated in order to establish the limits of Egyptian sovereignty and to indicate the localities under Egyptian occupation at the time of the Mahdist insurrection,[1] the need of which will be seen later on.

Flotsam and jetsam

We have only to compare this list with the position in 1891, in order to indicate the area of the Sudan that was dominated by the Dervishes. The Egyptian garrisons, in February 1891, were—Aswán, Korosko, Wadi Halfa, Sarras, and a post in the Nubian Desert; Suákin, and Tokar. These were all that were left of the long list I have given, and included two posts (Sarras and Tokar) which in 1888 were in Dervish hands.

(*b*) *The Reign of Terror*

The Downfall

The story of the Reign of Terror is soon told. A fanatical Dongolawi rouses a slave-driven and oppressed population to take up arms against Egyptian taxgatherers and Pashas. The Dervish hordes, augmenting with every success against their former masters, inflict a crushing defeat on Hicks' ill-fated army, and invest the Egyptian garrisons. The 'only Englishman' is entrusted with the mission of retiring those garrisons: but, deserted by his Government, he is hemmed in at Khartum. The 'only General' is sent to relieve him. A forlorn hope of British soldiers is led the longest and the hardest way round to its goal, along the line of greatest resistance: but struggles manfully and heroically against heavy odds, until—it really is 'too late'! Khartum succumbs: and English chivalry loses its noblest representative.

And after

The curtain fell on the darkest scene in Darkest Africa.

[1] See Map in Wingate's 'Mahdiism' etc., page 32, and succeeding maps. There were 40,000 Egyptian troops in the Sudan at the outbreak of the rebellion.

For fourteen years it hid from us the Reign of Terror, save for the disclosures by the fugitive captives of the Khalifa. Egypt, during that period, defended her frontiers against guerilla attacks, and defeated the last despairing effort of the Dervishes to invade the Delta. Egypt's last Governor in the Sudan, Emin, 'the Faithful,' held the Equatorial Province—Hat el-Istiva—until relieved of his responsibilities by our 'only Explorer.' On the frontiers and in the borderlands of the Egyptian Sudan, European Powers made pacific, honorific, and specific annexations of territory. And in the principal Native State of that part of Africa—Abyssinia—European Powers intrigued against the powers that be and the powers that well may be. But of these events and the results I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

The Reign of Terror was brought to a close by the Power which was partly responsible for its inauguration.

(*c*) *Re-conquest of the Sudan*

Motives

The re-conquest of the Sudan is the rehabilitation of the Tutelary Power. It is *not* a theatrical revenge for a hero's death. Rather, it is the answer to French Chauvinism and Gallic aggression which was registered at Fashoda.

Belated sympathy for Italian reverses in Abyssinia did not inspire the unexpected fiat of the British Government to advance towards Dongola, nor could Egyptian arms have saved the situation after Adua. No quickened sense of duty towards the Sudanese hurried British battalions up to the walls of Omdurman. It was a race for Fashoda, or what Fashoda implied in the scheme of French annexationists.

I need not detain the reader by establishing this proposition, since I have already done this in the *North American Review* for September 1896: and the truth is no longer hid from us. But it is a matter of historical importance that this point should be noted, on account of its bearing on the question of domination in the Nile Valley.

Counter-moves

France, who for years carefully nourished an underhand scheme of unfriendly action towards Great Britain in the Upper Nile—France, who openly concerted with the Negús

for the overthrow of Italian supremacy in Abyssinia, and supplied arms to a savage State for use against a European adversary—France, who secretly coquetted with the Khalifa[1] in order to check the Anglo-Egyptian advance—France, the friend of Liberty, became the Apostle of License: and, as such, she was no friend to Egypt or to civilization. That is another point which should be borne in mind.

The Dongola Campaign: 1896

'I have reason to believe,' said the able correspondent of *The Times*, telegraphing from Cairo on 12th March 1896, 'that the Egyptian troops are to advance at once up the Nile to occupy Dongola.' That was the first intimation the public received of the approaching re-conquest of the Sudan. It took both Egypt and England by surprise.

The first step was to despatch Egyptian troops, with their English leaders, to the front. These troops had to confront phenomenal obstacles—storms and floods, and an outbreak of cholera—and to build up their communications by rail and river, until (on 7th June) they were rewarded by the victory over the Dervishes, on a battlefield selected by the latter, at Ferkeh. Egyptian troops and Egyptian gunboats then advanced steadily southwards, brushing aside such resistance as was offered at Hafir and Dongola town; and, by the end of September, Egyptian rule was re-established in the Province of Dongola, with feelers and outposts extending beyond Merawi. Thus, the winter of 1896-1897 was passed, undisturbed by the enemy.

The Desert Campaign: 1897

The extended and open front of the Egyptian army imperatively called for fresh guarantees against a Dervish invasion. The important strategic position of Abu Hamed was then held by the enemy, to dislodge whom was the objective of the 1897 Campaign. The railway was boldly launched into the Nubian Desert; the rail-head crept rapidly and surely towards the Dervish post, until within striking distance of Abu Hamed: when the river-column, by a forced march, through difficult country, delivered an attack on 7th August. Abu Hamed was taken by the Egyptian army under Major-General (now Sir Archibald) Hunter, with trifling loss: and the effect of this victory caused the precipitate evacuation

[1] *Cf.* an unsigned article in the *Contemporary Review* for December 1897.

of Berber. The Dervishes withdrew: the Egyptians—not to lose so favourable an opening—advanced. Berber, the key to the Sudan, was promptly re-occupied. The railway was hastened forward; reinforcements were detrained, before the close of the year, at a short distance from Berber: and the Anglo-Egyptian Authorities gathered force for the last heat.

The Fall of the Dervish Dominion: 1898

British troops were called up. In this final struggle nothing could be risked. An Egyptian reverse would have redoubled the task on the accomplishment of which, having deliberately accepted it, we had pledged our honour.

Mahmud, the Dervish emir, and that ubiquitous rascal Osman Digna, with their united forces, were marching on Berber. They, however, held up at the confluence of the Atbara, and comfortably intrenched themselves in a *zariba*. Here the Sirdar came out to have a look at them. The Dervish force numbered about 19,000 men. The Anglo-Egyptian army was composed of 13,000 men. The odds were good enough for the Sirdar: and he went for them. Under the demoralization created by some sharp artillery practice, the Anglo-Egyptians stormed the *zariba*, killed three-fourths of the defenders, and chased the remainder away. This victory, which cost over 500 men in killed and wounded, broke the Dervish power for offence and seriously damaged the Khalifa's prestige.

With reinforcements, bringing his army up to 22,000 men, including some picked British regiments, the Sirdar then advanced slowly up the river. It was a pilgrimage to the Mahdi's tomb, in sight of which Cross and Crescent combined to overthrow the false prophet. This sanguinary and decisive engagement took place on 2nd September 1898. The Khalifa was put to flight; his forces were scattered and ridden down.[1] On the same evening, the Sirdar entered Omdurman, and released the European captives.

Subsequently, the British and Egyptian flags were hoisted together at Khartum; and divine service was celebrated at the spot where Gordon fell.

[1] Of the 40,000 Dervishes who received the Sirdar outside Omdurman, fully one-half were accounted for in killed and wounded. Our loss was less than at the Atbara.

Nemesis, in the person of Slatin Pasha, pursued the Khalifa, but failed to round off the victory by his capture. Before the end of the year, the Dervishes had been cleared out of the Eastern Desert also.

The Egyptian Sudan was reconquered.

Anglo-Egyptian Condominium

In January 1899, an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was proclaimed over the territories evacuated by Egypt in consequence of the Dervish insurrection, in the reclamation of which Great Britain had materially shared.

The 'little bill'

A distinguished Italian military writer, General Luchino Dal Verme, recently published an interesting brochure on the Overthrow of the Mahdists, from which I excerpt the following Table, giving the particulars of every action fought against the Dervishes by the Anglo-Egyptian and the Italian forces between December 1885 and September 1898. This, together with the affair settled by Colonel Lewis in the Eastern Sudan, in December 1898, constitutes the 'little bill' for the reconquest of the Sudan.[1]

Day.	Month.	Year.	Action.	Commander.	Forces.	Dervishes.	Killed.	Wounded.
30	December	1885	Ginnis ...	Gen. Stephenson	4,000	6,000	7	34
17	January ...	1888	Handub ...	Col. Kitchener	500	2,500	10	22
20	December	1888	Gimmeiza	Gen. Grenfell	4,000	2,000	6	46
2	July ...	1889	Argin ...	Col. Wodehouse	2,440	4,500	20	52
3	August ...	1889	Toski ...	Gen. Grenfell	4,200	3,300	25	140
25	June ...	1890	Agordat ...	Capt. Fara ...	300	800	10	20
19	February	1891	Tokar ...	Col. Holled Smith	2,000	7,000	12	46
16	June ..	1892	Serobeti ...	Capt. Hidalgo	300	600	14	22
21	December	1893	Agordat ...	Col. Arimondi	2,180	9,000	102	125
17	July ...	1894	Kassala ...	Gen. Baratieri	2,600	2,600	28	40
2	April ...	1896	Mt. Mokram	Col. Stevani ...	3,097	5,000	127	281
3	April ...	1896	Tukruf ...	Col. Stevani ...	2,693			
7	June ...	1896	Ferkeh ...	Gen. Kitchener	6,000	3,500	22	86
23	September	1896	Dongola ...	Gen. Kitchener	6,000	3,000	2	8
7	August ...	1897	Abu Hamed	Gen. Hunter ...	3,500	700	23	64
8	April ...	1898	Atbara ...	Gen. Kitchener	13,000	19,000	82	478
2	September	1898	Omdurman	Gen. Kitchener	22,000	40,000	46	342

[1] Commenting on this Table, General Dal Verme writes:—

'The figures which indicate the number of the Dervish forces can only be approximately accurate. Those which refer to the forces sent against them are, however, precise, because based upon official reports. The English certainly

But, although the Sudan has been reconquered, it has not yet been pacified.

Cost of the Sudan Campaign

As regards the cost of the Sudan Campaign, from the spring of 1896, when it was decided to move forward from Wadi Halfa to Dongola, up to the present time, Lord Cromer publishes the following Table in his *Report* for 1899:

	Railways.	Telegraphs.	Gun-boats.	Military Expenditure.	Total.
	£E	£E	£E	£E	£E
Dongola Campaign ...	181,851	8,299	65,869	469,622	725,641
Subsequent military operations, ...	699,521	13,526	89,065	526,601	1,328,713
Khartum Railway extension	300,000	...	...	...	300,000
Total ...	1,181,372	21,825	154,934	996,223	2,354,354

iii THE TITLE-DEEDS OF THE NILE VALLEY

My object in this section is to bring together, and subsequently to analyse, all the title-deeds or other documents which define or in any way restrict the exercise of sovereign and territorial rights within the Basin of the Nile. The discussion of such a subject must obviously be unattractive to the general reader; but, it is scarcely necessary to add that, in its bearing on the domination of the Nile Valley, the matter is of prime importance. Legitimate claims to the exercise of territorial rights can only be substantiated by documentary evidence, little as, in the last resort, such evidence may be held to affect national issues which override treaties concluded under circumstances that have ceased to exist. This functional development of Treaty-rights is the cause of constant friction between the High Contracting Parties, owing to their divergence of view being inspired by conflicting in-

swept away Mahdism, and the applause of the civilized world is theirs. But the Italian soldiers fully did their duty. On six occasions they were opposed to superior numbers of Dervishes—except at the taking of Kassala, when the forces were nearly equal—and on six occasions they were victorious.'

terests. But recognition of the fundamental principle, which, *sui generis*, underlies every International compact, must be noted in order to be understood and should be mutually acknowledged in order to be binding. In view, therefore, of any subsequent disputes arising from the course of recent events, I propose to supply the *data* upon which the discussions must necessarily be based.

(*a*) *Historical Synopsis*

In Sir Edward Hertslet's valuable work, 'The Map of Africa by Treaty' (Second and Revised Edition),[1] these documents have been published in an authoritative form, accompanied by Notes which aid the reader to understand and apply them. From his *Notes on the Boundaries of Egypt*, I make the following excerpts :—

Firmans, etc.

On the 15th July 1840, a Convention was concluded between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey for the Pacification of the Levant, by which it was agreed that the administration of the Pashalik of Egypt should be granted to Mohammed Ali and his descendants. The principal provisions under this Convention are given in an Appendix (II) at the end of the present volume.

On the 13th February 1841, a Firman was addressed by the Sultan, Abdul Medjed, to Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, in which the boundaries of Egypt were thus defined—

'I grant unto thee the Government of Egypt within its ancient boundaries, such as they are to be found in the map which is sent unto thee by my Grand Vizier now in office, with a seal affixed to it.'

This map was not published with the Firman, nor is a copy of it now forthcoming. But in the *Pro-Memorid* which accompanied a Note addressed by Fakhri Pasha, then Egyptian Minister of Justice, to M. de Martino, the Italian Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, in July 1881, it was stated: that, in the Firman of 13th February 1841, the frontiers of the Egyptian territory on the West Coast of the

[1] This work, in three vols., was published in 1896.

Red Sea were limited to the Bay of Roway, in 21° 05′ *N. lat.* (about the latitude of Jidda).

On the same day (13th February 1841) another Firman was issued by the Sultan, conferring upon Mohammed Ali the government of the Provinces of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan, and Sennar, with their Dependencies beyond the limits of Egypt[1]; but the boundaries of these Provinces were not defined.

Massawa, Suákin, etc.

In May 1865, a Firman was issued by the Sultan, Abdul Aziz, assigning to Ismail Pasha, then Viceroy of Egypt, the administration of the ports of Massawa and Suákin, in conjunction with the Mudiría of Taka. And in another Firman from the Sultan, dated 27th May 1866, modifying the Order of Succession and granting further privileges to the Viceroy, it was stated—

'I have determined that, henceforth, the Government of Egypt, with the territories which are annexed to it, and its Dependencies, with the Kaïmakamates of Suákin and Massawa, shall be transmitted to the eldest of thy male children, and in the same manner to the eldest sons of thy successors.'[2]

In 1870 an Egyptian Governor was appointed over the Coast from Suez to Cape Guardafui.

In the *Pro-Memoriâ* which accompanied the Note from

[1] *Cf.* Anglo-German Agreement of 15th November 1893, Art. IV: 'The territories to the west of the boundary line traced in the present Agreement, and in the preceding above-quoted Agreements, shall fall within the British sphere of influence, those to the east of the line shall fall within the German sphere of interest. It is, however, agreed that the influence of Germany in respect to her relations with Great Britain shall not extend eastwards beyond the basin of the River Shari, and that Darfur, Kordofan, Bahr el-Ghazal, as defined in the map published in October 1891 by Justus Perthes, shall be excluded from her influence, even if affluents of the Shari shall be found to lie within them.'

Cf. also the Anglo-French Agreement of 21st March 1899 (p. 420).

[2] On 7th September 1877, an Agreement was entered into between the British and Egyptian Governments, by which the former engaged to recognise the jurisdiction of the Khedive, under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte, over the Somáli Coast as far as Ras Hafun, on certain specific conditions: but these conditions have not been fulfilled. Article II of this Agreement provided for the non-cession of Somáli Territory to any Foreign Power; and Article V provided for the Sultan's assurance to that effect—but this has never been given: and the Agreement is therefore inoperative.

Fakhri Pasha to the Italian Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, of July 1881, already referred to, it was said that this Firman comprised all the West Coast of the Red Sea, from the Bay of Roway as far as the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb.

On the 8th June, 1873, another Firman was issued by Sultan Abdul Aziz to the Khedive of Egypt, in which it was stated that the Egyptian Succession extended to 'the Khediviate of Egypt and its Dependencies, with the Kaïmakamates of Suákin and Massawa and their Dependencies:' thus confirming the Firman of 27th May 1866.

On 2nd August 1879, a Firman was issued by the Sultan Abdul Hamid II. to the Khedive of Egypt (Taufik Pasha), confirming the privileges which had already been granted to his Highness and to former Viceroys, and conceding others 'within the ancient limits and comprising the territories annexed thereto.' Non-cession of Khedivial rights

In this Firman (as I have elsewhere mentioned) it was declared that the Khedive could not, under any pretext or motive whatsoever, hand over to others, either wholly or in part, any of the privileges granted to Egypt, and entrusted to him, and which were an emanation of the prerogatives inherent to the Sovereign power; nor any part of the territory. In an official Note addressed on the same day by Sawas Pasha to her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, it was explained that this passage in the Firman only related to the rights, privileges, and prerogatives which had been previously and personally granted to the Khedive of Egypt.

On 30th November 1881, a Khedivial Decree was issued constituting the Eastern Sudan—comprising the Mudiría of Taka (Kassala), the Governorships of Suákin and of Massawa, Senhit, and Kalabat, with their Dependencies—a separate Governorship, independent of the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan, the Governorship of the Coast of the Red Sea being attached thereto. Eastern Sudan

On 2nd December 1883, the Commander of H.M.S. 'Ranger' informed the Governor-General of the Eastern

Sudan that he had received information that her Majesty's Government had decided to maintain Egyptian Authority at Suákin, Massawa, and the Red Sea Ports.

Suákin

On 6th February 1884, the British Government announced its intention of protecting Suákin.

Abandonment of Somáli Coast

In May 1884, it was decided that the Egyptian Authorities and troops should be withdrawn from Harar; to be followed by the retirement of the Egyptians from the whole of the Coast which they had theretofore occupied from the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb to Ras Hafun, including the ports of Tajura, Zeila, and Berbera.

Fall of Khartum

Khartum was captured by the Mahdi on 26th January 1885.

Evacuation of Dongola

Dongola was evacuated by Egypt on 5th July 1885.

Gulf of Aden

The Porte had exercised, for a considerable period, rights of sovereignty over the territory between Bab el-Mandeb and Zeila, which, though never formally admitted by the British Government, had not been practically disputed. But the claims of the Sultan to sovereignty over the Somáli tribes

Somáli Coast

between Zeila and Ras Hafun (Meduddu) had been repeatedly denied by her Majesty's Government; and the Porte had never accepted the condition under which her Majesty's Government were prepared to admit their sovereignty under the Convention of 7th September 1877, between the British Government and the Khedive.[1]

The abandonment of the Somáli Coast by the Egyptian Government put an end to the Convention of 7th September 1877, by which the jurisdiction of Egypt over this Coast was conditionally recognised by Great Britain; but which had never been carried into effect in consequence of the Sultan having failed to comply with the condition contained in Article V.

Evacuation of the Sudan

In July 1884, the Egyptian Government determined to withdraw from the Sudan, under stress of *force majeure*: and orders were sent to evacuate Kassala, Senhit, Amadib, Kalabat, and Kirri.[2]

[1] *Vide ante*, footnote to p. 388.

[2] *Vide ante*, Colonel Stewart's Boundaries, and the list of Egyptian garrisons, p. 380.

France and Tajura

On 21st September 1884, a Treaty was concluded between France and Tajura, for the cession to France of the territory of the Sultan of Tajura from Ras Ali to Gubbed Kharab; and on the 14th December, of the same year, certain further cessions of territory were made by the Sultan of Tajura to France.[1]

Italy and Massawa

On 3rd February 1885, the Italians occupied Massawa, and issued a Proclamation to the population, the opening paragraph of which stated: 'The Italian Government, in accord with the English and Egyptian, and without doubt also with the Abyssinian, have ordered me [Rear-Admiral Caimi] to take possession of the Fort of Massawa this day, and to hoist the Italian flag by the side of the Egyptian.' A Proclamation to the same effect was issued by the King of Italy on 10th February 1885.

Italy and the Danakil Coast

On the 9th December 1888, a Treaty was concluded between the King of Italy and the Sultan of Aussa, Head of the Danakil, by which the Sultan recognised the whole of the Danakil Coast from Amfila to Ras Damara (opposite Perim Is.) as an Italian Possession.[2]

Anglo-French Boundary: Gulf of Tajura and Somáli Coast

On the $\frac{2nd}{9th}$ February 1888, an Exchange of Notes took place between the British and French Governments, with regard to their respective rights in the Gulf of Tajura and on the Somáli Coast. The following provisions of this arrangement may be noted:

(1) The Protectorates exercised, or to be exercised, by Great Britain and France shall be separated by a straight line starting from a point on the coast opposite to the wells of Hadu and passing through the said wells to Abassuen;

[1] Namely, territory comprised between Adaeli and Ambado. The Treaty of 21st September 1884 was officially notified to the British Government on 11th February 1885. The remaining French Treaties on that Coast are—(1) Convention between France and the Danakil for the cession of Obok, etc., 11th March 1862; (2) Treaty of friendship with the Sultan of Gubbed, 9th April 1884; and (3) Act signed by the Sultan of Tajura for the cession of Ras Ali, Sagallo, and Gubbed Kharab, 18th October 1884.

[2] The Italian right of sovereignty is recognised in Article III. Article V recognises the Italian Protectorate over all the Sultan's States and Dependencies. Article XII cedes Gambo Kona, as a commercial depôt, for victualling caravans to or from Assab.

from Abassuen the line shall follow the caravan road as far as Bia-Kabuba, and from this latter point it shall follow the caravan road from Zeila to Harar, passing through Gildessa.

(2) Her Britannic Majesty's Government recognise the Protectorate of France over the Coasts of the Gulf of Tajura, etc. The Government of the French Republic recognise the Protectorate of Great Britain over the Coast to the east of the above line, as far as Bender Siyada,[1] etc.

(3) Reciprocal self-denying ordinances are exchanged.

Harar (4) The two Governments engage not to endeavour to annex Harar, nor to place it under their Protectorate; but do not renounce their rights to oppose third parties.[2]

(5) The road from Zeila to Harar to be open to the commerce of both nations, as well as to that of the natives.

(6) The two Governments engage to take all necessary steps to prevent the Slave Trade and the importation of gunpowder and arms in the territories subject to their authority.[3]

On the same day (9th February 1888) the Marquis of Salisbury despatched a Note to M. Waddington, reserving, and himself agreeing to respect, the suzerain rights of the Sultan.

French Protectorate (Tajura) By this Agreement, the British Government not only recognised the Protectorate of France over the Coasts of the Gulf of Tajura, but also a French Protectorate in the Mussa Islands—over which the British flag had been hoisted in December 1884—and in the islet of Bab.

British Protectorate (Somáli Coast) By the same Agreement, France equally recognised the Protectorate of Great Britain over the Somáli Coast. On the 20th July 1887, a Notification was issued to the Powers, in pursuance of the *General Act* of the Conference of Berlin (26th February 1885),[4] that the Somáli Coast, from Ras

[1] The present easterly limit of British Somáliland.

[2] Harar is now occupied by Abyssinia—a Native State, and not a 'Power' within the meaning of the Treaty.

[3] Gunpowder and arms were imported by the French authorities at Jibuti and sent in large quantities to Abyssinia, during the recent Italian Campaign.

[4] 'Art. XXXIV. Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the Coasts of the African Continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the

Jibuti to Bender Siyada, had been placed under British Protection. No objection was raised.

On the 13th December 1889, an Order in Council was passed in which, Section III (1), it was stated that, subject to certain provisions, it should apply 'to the places and territories for the time being comprised in the Protectorate of the Somáli Coast,' etc. But this Order, providing for British jurisdiction, has not yet been put into operation.

Italian Sphere (Eritrea)

On the 15th April 1891, a Protocol was signed between the British and Italian Governments, recognising the fact that the Italian sphere of influence inland commenced at Ras Kasar, on the western shore of the Red Sea, and extended to the Blue Nile. This Protocol delimited, in principle, the highlands of Abyssinia, then held to be within the Italian sphere. Article II conceded the right of Italy to occupy Kassala temporarily, in case of military necessity, but reserved Egyptian rights over the said territory. The detailed provisions of this Protocol, together with Mr (now Sir) Rennell Rodd's Treaty of 1897, will be given in the next sub-section, in discussing the Abyssinian frontier.

Egyptian boundaries confirmed

On 22nd March 1892, a new Firman of Investiture was addressed by the Sultan to his Highness the Khedive (Abbas Hilmi), in which the boundaries of Egypt were thus alluded to:—

'In consequence of the decree of Providence, the Khedive Taufik Pasha being deceased, the Khediviate of Egypt, within its ancient limits, as indicated in the Imperial Firman, dated 13th February 1841, as also on the [apocryphal] map annexed to the said Firman, and the territories annexed in conformity with the Imperial Firman, dated May 1865, has been conferred on you, in virtue of my Imperial Iradé.'

Sinaï Peninsula

It was further explained, in a telegram addressed by the Grand Vizier to the Khedive, on 8th April 1892, that the Sinaï Peninsula—that is to say, the Territory bounded to the

Power which assumes a Protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notification thereof, addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own.'

east by a line running in a south-easterly direction from a point a short distance to the east of El-Arish to the head of the Gulf of Akaba—was to be continued to be administered by Egypt. The fort of Akaba lies to the east of this line.

Basin of the Upper Nile

On the 12th May 1894, an Agreement was entered into between the British Government and the Congo Free State respecting East and Central Africa, to which Notes were added declaring that the claims of Turkey and Egypt in the Basin of the Upper Nile were not ignored.

On 18th June 1894, a British Protectorate over Uganda was notified, and was published in the 'London Gazette' on the following day.

These and the ensuing International negotiations, together with the definitive Agreement with France published at the moment of writing (28th March 1899), will be examined in detail in the analysis that follows.

The entire Basin of the Nile being delimited, in principle, we are now in a position to definitely define the Treaty-rights of Egypt and her neighbours.

(*b*) *Analysis of Treaty-rights*

Egypt Proper

The 'ancient boundaries of Egypt,' as set forth in the Firmans of the Suzerain, have never been accurately defined: but, in regard to Egypt Proper, these have not been the subject of dispute. Apart from the Palestine frontier, which was indicated in the telegram supplementing an omission in the Firman of Investiture of 22nd March 1892 (*vide supra*, p. 393), the northern and eastern frontiers march with the sea-coasts. In the west, however, the Libyan Desert is a No-man's Land, in which frontiers are lost in a sea of sand.

Tripoli frontier

The frontier between Egypt and Tripoli, on all published maps, including the general Map of Africa in Sir Edward Hertslet's authoritative work, is shown to include Jarabub, the sanctuary and fortress of the Senussi: and doubtless that was the 'ancient boundary.' But it is not the frontier which is recognised by the Egyptian Government, nor the frontier which would be acceptable to the Senussi Mahdi, who exercises in that part of Africa, not excluding Barka,

an influence and a power transcending and technically infringing the sovereign rights of Turkey.

As a result of my visit to the Oasis of Siwa in 1898, I am able to define the frontier which is tacitly recognised by the Egyptian Government and by the Senussi sheikhs, respectively. Starting from a point located at half-a-day's journey, or ten miles, to the west of Siwa town, the frontier extends northwards to the Gulf of Solum, leaving the port of Jerjub in Egyptian territory and Jarabub in the Turkish Vilayet of Tripoli. The caravan road from Siwa to Jerjub, which the Siwans regard as their natural port, would necessarily remain in Egyptian territory.[1]

§ *The Libyan Desert*

An Egyptian sphere

South of the oasis of Siwa, one enters the heart of the Libyan Desert, which, in accordance with our recent Agreement with France, is left, in principle, within the Egyptian sphere of influence.

Boundaries

This region of the Sahara, in which desert conditions are more pronounced than in any other part of the world, has no natural boundaries. But although its physical limits are undefined, its conventional boundaries are politically recognised. Tripoli and Barka in the north, Fezzan in the west, the ancient boundary of Egypt in the east, the highlands between Tibesti and Ennedi and the open desert in the south,—these may be said to delimit the Libyan Desert on all sides, from the political point of view.

The Senussi *foyer*

In the heart of this enclave of pitiless Desert lies a group of oases usually passing under the name of Kufra. At one of these inaccessible oases (Joffa), the Senussi Mahdi has established himself. From this centre, which is connected by *étapes*, or oases situated at one-day's journey apart, extending between Wadai and Barka, the Sheikh el-Senussi

[1] The Oasis of Siwa belongs to Egypt, who is represented by a Mamur. It is attached to the Mudiria of Damanhur. But, practically, the Siwans enjoy Home Rule, under their own sheikhs, although they pay taxes to the Khedivial Government. For one hundred miles to the west of the Delta, Egyptian Authority is represented chiefly by the Coast Guard Service.

exercises dominant control over vast areas of the Sahara. The principal Senussi settlements in the borderlands of the Libyan Desert (apart from Kufra and Barka) are Aujila, Fezzan, Tibesti, Borku, Wanyanga, and Ennedi.

Tripoli and the Senussi Question

This powerful Mohammedan Sect, numbering several millions of adherents, is destined to play an important rôle in the history of North Africa and of Islam; but, having dealt with the subject so fully in a recently published work,[1] I desire in this place simply to record its significance, without attempting to explain its bearing on the pacification of the Sudan. One thing is, however, certain, and to that I must allude: Any European Power attempting to occupy Tripoli would inevitably find itself in opposition to the Senussi, whose base of communications is now established at Bengazi. Should any attempt be made to cut off their supplies of arms and ammunition, which freely enter at this port, under the averted eyes of Turkish officials, such an attempt would in itself be sufficient to rouse the Senussi to revolt, the consequences of which would injuriously affect every State holding territory in North Africa. It would be in the highest degree unwise, on the part of Italy or of France, to take any steps to change the *status quo* in Tripoli, which, anomalous as it may be, is fraught with serious issues to Egypt. The settlement of Tripoli involves the solution of the Senussi Question, which at present is dormant, though big with fate.

Tripoli and Italy

The Anglo-French Declaration of 21st March 1899 has been misread in Italy to imply the recognition, in principle, of Tripoli as a French sphere of influence. Tripoli, being a Turkish vilayet, cannot fall within the sphere of a European Power, the Sultan himself being a Signatory of the Berlin Act of 1885. Clause 1 of this Anglo-French Agreement, containing the usual self-denying ordinances, is specifically restricted to 'the line of frontier defined in the following paragraph'—that is to say, "*south* of the fifteenth parallel. If, as our Italian friends assume, it applied to the regions delimited in Clause 3—that is to say, *north* of the fifteenth

[1] 'From Sphinx to Oracle': Hurst & Blackett, 1899.

parallel—and therefore threw open Tripoli to the exclusive policy of France, the acceptance of such an interpretation would reciprocally exclude France from acquiring 'territory or political influence' in the Libyan Desert or in Egypt Proper. As a matter of fact, the delimited zones in Clause 3, by 'starting' from the southern frontier of Fezzan, the true *Hinterland* of Tripoli—namely, 'from the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the sixteenth degree of east longitude'—and running south-east and south to the frontier of Darfur, impliedly excludes Tripoli from delimitations, even in principle, that concern third parties: or, in other words, the Ottoman Empire.

The effect of this Declaration is to leave the Libyan Desert within the Egyptian sphere, and to respect the *status quo* in Tripoli. The Protest of the Porte (28th March 1899), based on the extravagant claims in Said Pasha's despatch of 1890, is therefore invalidated.

§ *Abyssinia, etc.*

The boundaries of Abyssinia are very unsettled, owing to the withdrawal of the bogus Protectorate of Italy: but it is possible, even at this stage, to define them with a tolerable degree of certainty. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the matter is of considerable importance, although the urgency is not great, in view of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium having been definitely established.

Political Situation

Abyssinia is the most important Native State in that part of Africa; and, since it lies within the hydrographical basin of the Nile, its political relations with Egypt deeply concern the Tutelary Power. Its foreign relations, although in the capable hands of a Menelik, are, unhappily, subject to a deep-seated intrigue on the part of two Powers whose object for many years past has been to set up a counterpoise against British domination in the Nile Valley. The disaster of Adua, the enforced withdrawal of Italian claims, and a succession of European missions courting the friendship of the Negús Nagasti (King of Kings) of Ethiopia, have combined to nourish the arrogance of the Abyssinians, whose claims to territorial

expansion, as set forth in Menelik's Circular of 1891, and as interpreted by Count Leontieff's so-called appointment to the Equatorial Province, are a sufficient indication that the reconquest of the Sudan and the settlement of the Fashoda difficulty were matters of urgency and importance to Egypt.

Historical landmarks

This pseudo-Christian State has a dense population of hardy mountaineers, composed of diverse ethnical elements. Originally peopled from Arabia, and converted to a primitive form of Christianity in the fourth century, the northern regions remain Arabic in type, whilst in Southern Abyssinia and Shoa the basis of the population is Negroid. Explorers and missionaries made the country known to Europe over a century ago; and the Indian Government despatched a mission to Shoa in 1841: but, apart from the events that led up to the British Campaign of 1867-1868—when Theodore, the bandit King, committed suicide, and Johannis proclaimed himself Negús—our relations with Abyssinia have been very slight. Sir William Hewett in 1884 and Sir Gerald Portal in 1887 were despatched thither on special missions, in connection with the pacification of the Sudan[1]; but her Majesty's Government left Abyssinia severely alone until, in 1897, Mr Rennell Rodd headed an important mission, the object of which was to negotiate a treaty of friendship with Menelik and to secure the neutrality of the Negús during the Anglo-Egyptian Campaign against the Dervishes.

In 1867-1868 we conquered the northern province of Tigré, but evacuated it when the main object of the Expedition had been accomplished. In 1889, on the death of Johannis, in the action against the Dervishes at Matama, Menelik, then independent King of Shoa, took advantage of the anarchy that prevailed and proclaimed himself Negús. The famous Ucciali Treaty, which dates from that period, was definitely denounced in 1893 by Menelik; and the fighting in 1895 and 1896 resulted in the final overthrow of

[1] Admiral Hewett went to make arrangements with King John in regard to the withdrawal of Egyptian garrisons, including Kassala. Portal's unsuccessful mission was to procure peace for the Italians.

Italian pretensions. The French, Russian, Italian, Turkish, Dervish, and British, Missions were the principal incidents of 1897.

Since his accession, Menelik has been occupied in consolidating his rule over Abyssinia. He has succeeded in crushing the Gallas and in bringing the turbulent Rases into subjection. The Mohammed Ali of his country, he is a wealthy monopolist and an autocrat; nourishing schemes of civilization and progress, of which he is the sole native advocate, he welcomes the emissaries of Europe; astute, and mistrustful of European intrigues, he plays off one Power against the other: but he never loses sight of the dominant position of Great Britain, nor neglects to safeguard the independence of his own country. Queen Taitu—his consort, who had previously been favoured by four husbands—is his wisest counsellor; and many Europeans reside at his Court, which at present is fixed at Addis Ábbaba—an encampment situated at the foot of the Entotto hills. Having no issue, succession to the throne will, as is in any case the mode in Abyssinia, fall to the strongest Ras.[1]

Menelik

Succession

In place of the free-booting rabble of former days, Menelik has created a standing army of over 70,000 men, under the independent commands of their feudal lords. Each Ras (general) can account for from five to forty thousand men. Behind this standing army, a sort of militia, numbering 140,000 men, can be raised in a few months. But the patriotism of the Abyssinians would, in case of national danger, draw every able-bodied man—Gallas, slaves, and others—into the ranks. Thus, some 200,000 men met

Armed strength

[1] There are no less than forty Rases, or governors, and princelings who can set up some pretensions to the throne. Ras Mangasha Tekkem, Governor of Amhara, though not of the royal family, is perhaps the leading Ras. And there is another Ras Mangasha, a natural son of King Johannis, who is and always has been in revolt; but, since Italy refused to support his claims, his opposition is not serious. Ras Makunan, a son of Menelik's sister, is a famous General. Ras Alúla is dead. Ras Mikhaël is a son-in-law of the Negús. And there are numerous kings and sultans recognising Menelik's sovereignty. Under no previous ruler has Abyssinia been more united. Menelik himself is very popular: and it is his policy to retain the affection of his subjects as well as the adherence of petty chiefs.

the invasion of Italy; and, of this number, fully three-fourths were armed with rifles. In spite of absence of discipline, cartridges without powder, and weapons of every description, the Abyssinians, in their own mountains, are a formidable foe. Their tactics are to overwhelm and crush the enemy by sheer superiority of numbers; but in the plains they would be quite unable to stand up against a disciplined force, such as the Sirdar could lead against them: and this fact is well known to Menelik, who, after Fashoda, abandoned the wild scheme of advancing his frontiers to the White Nile, though he still hopes to make good his pretensions in Kedaref and Kalabat.[1]

Internal progress

The fairy stories told in France of the progress made in the civilization of Abyssinia must be taken *cum grano.* The French and Russian emissaries have certainly inoculated the country with the spirit of progress: but the effect lies all on the surface. Railways, telegraphs, telephones, and Posts have been introduced or projected. There is a French *Directeur des Postes Ethiopiennes*, with Post Offices at Addis Ábbaba and Harar. Artistic postage-stamps, made in France, bear the portrait of Menelik. And there is a mail about once a week to Jibuti, whence a Company, under the concession to M. Ilg—Menelik's Foreign Adviser—hope to complete the railway now being constructed to Harar and beyond. But whilst the French Government pay all the expenses, and Menelik takes all the receipts, of the *Postes Ethiopiennes*, the telegraph-wires are used chiefly by the monkeys, for gymnastic performances; and Menelik himself sadly mistrusts the iron road as the surest introduction of the mailed fist. Not desiring a port on the Red Sea, which could always be bombarded and taken by the navies of

[1] It is said that the famous Bonchamps mission failed through the jealousy of the French Resident, M. Lagarde. This mission was to have acted in co-operation with an Abyssinian army of 30,000 men. Its object was to take possession of the right bank of the Nile, and join hands with the French Expedition under Marchand at Fashoda. France, Abyssinia, and the Khalifa were at one time in collusion, more or less, to filch the Upper Nile from Egypt: but the success of Sir Rennell Rodd in diplomacy and of the Sirdar in the field of action entirely defeated this scheme.

Europe, Menelik has been anxious to secure, what he has now obtained, a depôt through which he can draw *matériel* of all kind free from the vexatious imposts of the Italian Protectorate.

Harar

Thus, Harar,[1] which was conquered by Menelik in 1887, has been converted from the *res nullius* of the Anglo-French Convention into an Abyssinian 'port,' or trading-post with Europe — principally with France, through Jibuti.[2]

Communications

The caravan road to Khartum passes through Matama (Kalabat) and Suk-Abu-Sin (Kedaref) to Abu Haraz, and along the left-bank of the Blue Nile: hence the importance of these regions to Egypt. Hence also the recent visit (March 1899) of the Sirdar to Kedaref. Caravan routes also lead from Khartum and Abu Haraz to Gos Rejeb, on the Atbara. The whole of this region is commanded by Kassala.

Boundaries

With this slight introduction, we may now examine the boundaries of Abyssinia, in the hope of reaching a satisfactory settlement.

Great Britain, Ethiopia, and Egypt

A Treaty between Great Britain, Ethiopia, and Egypt was signed at Adua on 3rd June 1884. This treaty was negotiated with King Johannis by Admiral Sir William Hewett, representing her Majesty the Queen, and Mason Bey, Governor of Massawa, representing the Khedive. The principle it set up is the reason of my quoting it.

Article I provided for the free transit of all goods through Massawa to and from Abyssinia. Article II restored Bogos to Ethiopia.[3] Article III provided for the withdrawal of the garrisons of Kassala, Amadib, and Senhit. Article VI was as follows:—

'His Majesty the Negúsa Negust agrees to refer all differences with his Highness the Khedive, which may arise

[1] Harar, occupied by Egypt between 1874 and 1884, was given up on the advice of Great Britain. Menelik has placed it under the rule of his nephew, Ras Makunan. The Hararis are a mixture of Galla and R'hotta.

[2] The railway under construction to Harar (186 miles) is projected to Addis Abbaba (470 miles). The import and export trade, combined, of Jibuti is worth about 25 million francs per annum.

[3] Bogos was handed over to Abyssinia on 12th Sept. 1884.

after the signing of this Treaty,[1] to her Britannic Majesty for settlement.'

This amounts to the recognition, in principle, of the Tutelary Power in Egypt.

Italy and Abyssinia

The Treaties between Italy and Abyssinia having been terminated by the recent war, the Convention signed at Addis Ábbaba on 26th October 1896, between Major Nerazzini, on behalf of Italy, and King Menelik, replaces them, until a definitive Treaty has been signed. Negotiations are proceeding favourably: and it is probable that the Mareb-Belesa-Muna line will be accepted as the permanent frontier between Eritrea and Abyssinia. The territory to the north would remain in the possession of Itály; and, in the event of this proposed frontier being accepted, Italy would undertake not to cede the fertile provinces of Serae and Oculé-Kusai to any State but Abyssinia in the event of the withdrawal of Italy from the high-plateau.

Egypt and Italy

On 25th June 1895, an Agreement was signed between the Egyptian and Italian Governments for regulating the dependence of the semi-nomadic tribes and for defining their respective frontiers between the Khor Baraka and the Red Sea. Sir Herbert (now Lord) Kitchener, the Sirdar, represented Egypt.

Article I defined the boundary-line as follows:

'In the district between the Red Sea and the Baraka, the frontier-line between Egypt and Eritrea shall follow a line which, starting from Ras Kasar [the northern limit of Eritrea], joins the principal branch of the Karora, about two kiloms. from the Coast, and follows the course of the Karora up to a point marked "Karora" on the map. The frontier then follows the watershed between the torrents Aïet and Merib on the north, and the torrents Falkat and Sela on the south, up to a point on the plateau of Hagar-Nush, to be fixed by the delineators; and from the point so fixed shall proceed to join the Bárka at a point which is also left to the delineators to establish, following a clearly

[1] Ratified by her Majesty on 4th July 1884, and by the Khedive on 25th September 1884.

determined natural line. From the Baraka, the line of frontier goes straight to the intersection of the 17th parallel, north, with the 37th meridian east of Greenwich.'

Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

From this point, southwards, the frontiers between Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan remain to be fixed. But, pending a definitive treaty, the frontier-lines defined in the Protocols between Great Britain and Italy of 24th March 1891, and of 15th April 1891, respectively, outline the conventional boundaries. These Protocols were completed by the Agreement of 5th May, 1894, defining the boundaries of the British and Italian spheres of influence in the regions of the Gulf of Aden and Somáliland.

The frontiers therein defined may be accepted as a provisional and rough delimitation of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan towards Abyssinia; and, as such, they may be given here.

(Juba to Blue Nile)

The first Clause of the Anglo-Italian Protocol of 24th March, 1891, gives the line of demarcation between the British and Italian spheres, from the River Juba to the Blue Nile:—

'The line of demarcation in Eastern Africa between the spheres of influence respectively reserved to Great Britain and Italy shall follow from the sea [Indian Ocean] the mid-channel (*thalweg*) of the River Juba up to latitude 6° north, Kismayu with its territory on the right bank of the river thus remaining to England. The line shall then follow the 6th parallel of north latitude up to the meridian 35° east of Greenwich, which it will follow up to the Blue Nile.'

(Blue Nile to Ras Kasar)

The Anglo-Italian Protocol of 15th April, 1891, completed and defined this boundary-line up to Ras Kasar. The first Clause of this Protocol reads as follows:—

'The sphere of influence reserved to Italy is bounded on the north and on the west by a line drawn from Ras Kasar[1] on the Red Sea to the point of intersection of the 17th parallel north with the 37th meridian east of Greenwich. The line, having followed that meridian to 16° 30′ north

[1] *Cf. supra*, p. 402: Agreement between Italy and Egypt, modifying the frontier between Ras Kasar and the Khor Baraka.

latitude, is drawn from that point in a straight line to Sabderat, leaving that village to the east. From that village the line is drawn southward to a point on the Gash twenty English miles above Kassala, and rejoins the Atbara at the point indicated as being a ford on the map of Werner Munzinger '*Original-Karte von Nord Abessinien und den Ländern am Mareb, Barca, und Anseba*, del. 1864' (Gotha: Justus Perthes), and situated at 14° 52′ north latitude. The line then ascends the Atbara to the confluence of the Khor Kakamot (Hahamot), whence it follows a westerly direction till it meets the Khor Lemsen, which it descends to its confluence with the Rahad. Finally, the line, having followed the Rahad for the short distance between the confluence of the Khor Lemsen and the intersection of 35° east longitude, Greenwich, identifies itself in a southerly direction with that meridian, until it meets the Blue Nile, saving ulterior amendments of detail, according to the hydrographic and orographic conditions of the country.'

Undelimited frontier towards Abyssinia

Italy, having withdrawn her so-called Protectorate over Abyssinia, leaves this frontier-line, accepted in principle by Great Britain, to be re-delimited, as between Great Britain and Abyssinia, from the western frontier of Eritrea to the northern frontier of Italian Somáliland, both of which frontiers were outlined between Italy and Abyssinia in 1896. This undelimited frontier lies between a point on the Upper Atbara and a point on the Juba rivers.

Somáliland

For the same reason, the boundary of British Somáliland in the south now meets the northern frontier of Italian Somáliland at the point of intersection defined in the Anglo-Italian Protocol of 5th May 1894 and in the Treaty (Annex 3) between Great Britain and Ethiopia of 1897.[1] This is explained in the following paragraphs, dealing with the inland boundaries of British Somáliland.

The Agreement between Great Britain and Italy of 5th May, 1894, defined their respective spheres of influence in Somáliland, etc. To the east of the point of intersection

[1] That is to say, the intersection of 47° east of Greenwich with the 8th parallel of north latitude.

above noted, the frontier-line between British and Italian Somáliland runs, in accordance with the first Clause of the Agreement, 'from the 48th degree of longitude east of Greenwich to the intersection of the 9th degree of north latitude with the 49th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, and [then] follows that meridian of longitude to the Sea'—*i.e.*, the Gulf of Aden.

Annex No. 3 to the Treaty negotiated by Mr Rodd with Ethiopia[1] modified the Anglo-French boundary of $\frac{2nd}{9th}$ February 1888, and the Anglo-Italian boundary of 5th May 1894—already alluded to—and delimited the southern boundary of British Somáliland in such a manner as to leave the Isa Habrawal country within the Abyssinian sphere.[2] It is not clear, what return Great Britain received for this concession: but possibly some secret understanding was arrived at.

The Treaty itself contains six Articles. Article I gives full liberty to the subjects of or persons protected by each of the Contracting Parties 'to come and go and engage in commerce in the territories of the other,' but forbids 'armed

Great Britain and Abyssinia 1897

[1] Signed by the Emperor Menelik II., and by her Majesty's Envoy, at Addis Ábbaba, 14th May 1897. Ratified by the Queen, 28th July 1897. Acknowledged by Menelik, 8th December 1897—amounting to exchange of ratifications.

[2] Mr Rodd's version is as follows:—

MR RODD to RAS MAKUNAN: *Harar, June* 4, 1897.

'Peace be unto you.

'After friendly discussion with your Excellency, I have understood that His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia will recognize as frontier of the British Protectorate on the Somáli Coast the line which, starting from the sea at the point fixed in the Agreement between Great Britain and France on the 9th February 1888, opposite the wells of Hádu, follows the caravan-road, described in that Agreement, through Abbassuen till it reaches the hill of Somadu. From this point on the road the line is traced by the Saw mountains and the hill of Egu to Moga Medir; from Moga Medir it is traced by Eylinta Kaddo to Arran Arrhe, near the intersection of latitude 44° east of Greenwich with longitude 9° north. From this point a straight line is drawn to the intersection of 47° east of Greenwich with 8° north. From here the line will follow the frontier laid down in the Anglo-Italian Protocol of the 5th May 1894, until it reaches the sea.

'The tribes occupying either side of the line shall have the right to use the grazing-grounds on the other side, but during their migrations it is understood that they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial authority. Free access to the nearest wells is equally reserved to the tribes occupying either side of the line. . . .'

bands from either side to cross the frontier of the other on any pretext whatever without previous authorization from the competent authorities.' Article II deals with the Somáli frontiers in the sense already referred to. Article III states that 'the caravan route between Zeila and Harar by way of Gildessa shall remain open throughout its whole extent to the commerce of both nations.' Article IV concedes to Great Britain the usual 'favoured nation' treatment; but 'on the other hand, all material destined exclusively for the service of the Ethiopian State shall, on application from his Majesty the Emperor, be allowed to pass through the port of Zeila into Ethiopia free of duty.' Under Article V, 'the transit of fire-arms and ammunition destined for his Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia through the territories depending on her Britannic Majesty is authorized, subject to the conditions prescribed by the General Act of the Brussels Conference' of 1890. Finally, under Article VI, his Majesty, etc., etc., 'engages himself towards the Government of her Britannic Majesty to do all in his power to prevent the passage through his dominions of arms and ammunition to the Mahdists, whom he declares to be the enemies of his Empire.'

Uncovered risks

It will thus be seen that his Majesty the King of Kings, etc., etc., receives a good deal more than he concedes. Indeed, he concedes practically nothing under this treaty, which for all present purposes may be regarded as strangely ineffective, unless some secret—though why secret?—understanding exists in regard to the undelimited frontier, already indicated, or to the political situation. To assume that we can take what we want, now that we are established at Khartum, and Italy is confined to the Benadir Coast, is not to remove the danger of conflicts with Abyssinia, but rather to court it. I therefore presume that Mr Rodd's diplomacy was more successful than the public have any idea of. The Treaty itself gives no hint of this: but rather suggests a difficulty that proved insuperable. It is scarcely necessary to add that, with France and Russia firmly intrenched in Abyssinia, the situation is by no means reassur-

ing; and, until a definitive frontier is fixed, our relations with Menelik must necessarily be at the mercy of intrigues and misunderstandings. Abyssinia is, in fact, the one weak and critical point in our settlement of pending questions concerning the pacification and delimitation of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

§ *Equatorial Regions*

The following reference to the boundaries of the British sphere of influence on the East Coast of Africa was made in a despatch addressed by the Marquis of Salisbury to the late Sir Gerald Portal, her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General, on 22nd March 1892:[1]

Territories of British East Africa

'The boundaries of the British sphere north of the German sphere on the East Coast of Africa are defined in the 1st Article of the Anglo-German Agreement of the 1st July 1890, and in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of the 24th March 1891.

'There are three distinct divisions of the territory comprised in the British sphere of influence on the East Coast of Africa—

'1. The dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar leased to the British East Africa Company, extending from Wanga to Kipini, with an inland frontier 10 miles from the Coast, and including the islands of Lamu, Patta, and Manda.[2]

'2. The Territory administered by the Company under its Charter (3rd September 1888).

'3. The Territory not at present administered by the Company.'

The limits of the Territory leased by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the British East Africa Company are described in the Note written by Acting Consul-General Holmwood to the Sultan on the 3rd December 1886.[3] The Note refers, in addition, to ports north of the Juba.

[1] Africa, No. 4 (1892). Quoted in Sir Edward Hertslet's 'Map of Africa by Treaty,' p. 170, whose 'Notes' are also embodied with the reference in question.

[2] Under Concessions dated 24th May 1887; 9th October 1888; 4th March 1890; and 5th March 1891.

[3] This Agreement, or exchange of Notes, is published in Hertslet's 'Map of Africa by Treaty,' p. 754 *seq.*

The second division, or Territory administered by the Company, under its Charter, 'includes territory held by the Company under Grants, Concessions, Agreements, or Treaties, in accordance with Clause 1 of the Charter, subject to the provisions of Clause 3, which stipulates that no power shall be exercised under such Grants, Concessions, Agreements, or Treaties until copies shall have been furnished to the Secretary of State, and he shall have signified his approval, absolutely or conditionally. The claims of the Company are recorded in letters and Treaties, all of which have received the formal approval of the Secretary of State. Under the 2nd Clause of the Charter, the Company is authorized and empowered to extend its territory from time to time, but such extension is subject to the approval of the Secretary of State and to the conditions of the 3rd Clause.'

The third division, or Territory not then (1892) administered by the Company, 'comprises all territory not included in the other two divisions. This is liable to diminution in proportion to the extension of the Company's administration.'

To the changes that have taken place since the above despatch was written, I shall refer subsequently.

Uganda[1] On the 20th August 1891, the British East Africa Company announced its determination to withdraw from Uganda, which was definitely confirmed on the 17th May 1892.

On the 3rd March 1892, a Treaty was concluded by Captain Lugard, on behalf of the British East Africa Company, with Mwanga, King of Uganda, by which the Company agreed to afford protection to the Kingdom of Uganda, and the King acknowledged the suzerainty of the Company.[2] But this Treaty was not ratified.

On the 29th May 1893, Mwanga entered into a Provisional Agreement with Sir Gerald Portal, H.B.M. Commissioner, in which it was recorded that the British East Africa Company had definitely withdrawn from Uganda,

[1] *Cf.* Sir Edward Hertslet's 'Map of Africa by Treaty,' p. 172.

[2] Africa, No. 1 (1893) p. 25.

and that, pending the decision of her Majesty's Government on the whole question of Uganda, Mwanga had bound himself to certain specified conditions, and entered into certain engagements, with the object of securing British protection, assistance, and guidance. One of these engagements was that he would make no treaties or agreements of any kind with any European, of whatever nationality, without the consent and approval of her Majesty's Representative.[1] This Treaty was ratified.[2]

A British Protectorate was proclaimed over Uganda on the 18th June 1894. The following Notification, issued from the Foreign Office on that date, was published in the 'London Gazette' for 19th June 1894:

'It is hereby notified, for public information, that under and by virtue of the Agreement concluded on the 29th May 1893, between the late Sir G. Portal and Mwanga, King of Uganda, the country of that ruler is placed under the Protectorate of her Majesty the Queen.

'This Protectorate comprises the Territory known as Uganda proper, bounded by the territories known as Usoga, Unyoro, Ankoli, and Koki.'

The boundaries of the Protectorate were, however, subsequently extended. The following Notification, published in the 'London Gazette,' was issued from the Foreign Office on 30th June 1896:

'The territory of Unyoro, together with that part of the British sphere of influence lying to the west of Uganda and Unyoro which has not hitherto been included in the Uganda Protectorate, is placed within the limits of that Protectorate, which includes, also, Usoga and the other territories to the east under the administration of her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General for the Protectorate.'

British East Africa (Protectorate)

On 15th June 1895, a Notification was issued from the Foreign Office, and published in the 'London Gazette' of 18th June 1895, to the following effect:

[1] Africa. No. 2 (1894) p. 18.

[2] Namely by Col. Colville's Treaty with Mwanga, 27th August 1894. Approved by H.M.G. 4th January 1895.

'It is hereby notified for public information that the territories in East Africa under the influence of Great Britain, lying between the Protectorate of Uganda and the Coast, and between the river Juba and the northern frontier of the German sphere, not being already under British protection, are placed under the Protectorate of her Britannic Majesty.'

The boundaries of British East Africa were consequently defined, in the above documents, on all sides except towards the Nile Valley, the frontiers of which marched with the conventional limits of the Congo basin.

Upper Nile Territories

The position in regard to the Upper Nile Territories was outlined in the following Explanatory Despatch,[1] dated 23rd May 1894, from the Earl of Kimberley to Mr Hardinge:—

'When her Majesty's Government decided upon assuming the Protectorate of Uganda, it became incumbent on them to consider the position of Great Britain as regards that part of the British sphere described in the Anglo-German Agreement [1st July 1890] as the western watershed of the Nile.[2] It was understood that in 1890 arrangements were made between the Administrator of the Congo Free State and the late Sir W. Mackinnon, under which the East Africa Company agreed to waive in favour of the Free State any powers which it might acquire in the territories so described as a Chartered Company administering in the British sphere with the sanction of the Crown. The documents recording whatever arrangements may have been concluded were not officially communicated to, nor sanctioned by, her Majesty's Government, and obviously could not have validity without that sanction. The Free State Administration, however, appears to have considered that, in virtue of these arrangements, it was justified in sending exploring parties into the territory affected by them. The expeditions are believed to have travelled over a considerable portion of the territory, and it appears that their leaders made treaties and established posts.

[1] Published as a Parliamentary Paper—Africa, No. 4 (1894).

[2] Art. I, § 3 (British sphere)—'To the west by the Congo Free State, and by the western watershed of the basin of the Upper Nile.'

'Her Majesty's Minister at Brussels was, from time to time, directed to point out that, though her Majesty's Government had no accurate information as to the destination and proceedings of these expeditions, the territory thus explored was well known to be included in the British sphere of influence.

'Her Majesty's Government, in examining this situation in connection with the Protectorate of Uganda, desired, in order to put an end to all controversy as to these proceedings, to arrive at an arrangement which would be satisfactory to both parties. They could not fail to recognize the sacrifices which had been made in endeavouring to open up the country by his Majesty the King of the Belgians, whose efforts to promote the civilization of Africa have commanded their warm sympathy.

'On approaching his Majesty, they found him fully disposed to enter into an arrangement which, while enabling him to continue the work he had commenced, would record his recognition of the position of Great Britain in her sphere, and of such claims as Egypt, and, through her, Turkey, may have to the Equatorial Provinces[1] whose administration was abandoned owing to the evacuation of the Sudan.

'I enclose copy of an Agreement[2] by which His Majesty, having recognized, on behalf of the Congo State, the British sphere of influence as laid down in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, received from Great Britain leases of the territory specified in the Agreement under certain conditions.

'Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that, under the Agreement, this portion of the British sphere will be administered in a spirit in full accordance with the requirements of civilization, and of the Acts of Berlin [1885] and Brussels [1890].

[1] These claims were reserved under an exchange of Notes (Brussels, 12th May 1894) between Sir F. Plunkett and M. van Eetvelde, in which the assurance is recorded 'that the Parties to the Agreement do not ignore the claims of Turkey and Egypt in the basin of the Upper Nile.'

[2] Agreement of 12th May 1894—Treaty Series No. 15 (1894)—to which reference is made overpage.

'The Agreement also effects certain frontier rectifications with the Congo Free State, which remove causes of possible local friction, and adds to the delimitations already concluded, with Italy on the north[1] and Germany on the south, delimitation between the British sphere and the conterminous Power on the west.

'Finally, Article III provides for the lease to Great Britain of a port at the northern end of Lake Tanganyika.[2] As the southern end of the lake is within the British sphere in Central Africa, this concession will materially facilitate communication between the two British spheres. In order to secure access to this port, the lease has been obtained of a road passing through the Free State Territory, connecting Lake Albert Edward, the eastern shore of which is in the British sphere, with the leased port. The navigation of Lake Tanganyika being declared to be free by the IInd Article of the Act of Berlin of 1885, this arrangement secures to British trade uninterrupted communication, the value of which is completed by the guarantees as to freedom of transit recorded in the IVth Article of the Berlin Act and the VIIIth Article of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890.'

Anglo-Congolese Agreement 1894

The Agreement between Great Britain and King Leopold II., as Sovereign of the Congo Independent State, signed at Brussels on 12th May 1894, was a very complicated document[3]; and, no sooner was it published than both Germany and France protested against its validity.

In Article I (*a*) it was agreed 'that the sphere of influence of the Independent Congo State shall be limited to the north of the German sphere in East Africa by a frontier following the 30th meridian east of Greenwich up to its intersection by the watershed between the Nile and the Congo, and thence following the watershed in a northerly and north-westerly direction.' The effect of this Article was to leave the whole

[1] Protocol of 24th March 1891, and Agreement of 5th May 1894, already referred to (*supra*, p. 403, *seq.*).

[2] This Article was withdrawn by a Declaration, signed 22nd June 1894, between Great Britain and the Congo State (*infra*, p. 414).

[3] It was explained in all its bearings in an elaborate article which I wrote for the *Nineteenth Century* and which was published, with a map, in July 1894.

of the Bahr el-Ghazal in the British sphere, together with the Upper Nile east of the 30th meridian.

Under Article II these territories were divided up into three distinct areas or categories: (1) the Bahr el-Ghazal, between the tenth parallel on the north, the Nile-Congo watershed in the south, the 25th meridian in the west, and the 30th meridian in the east; (2) the Nile Valley, between the left-bank (*thalweg*) of the river and the 30th meridian, limited on the north by the 10th parallel and in the south by the Nile-Congo watershed; and (3) the intervening zone in the south, between the 30th meridian and the Nile watershed, which amounted merely to a rectification of the boundary of the Congo basin.

A lease of these territories was granted to the King, under Article II, 'to be by him occupied and administered on the conditions and for the period of time hereafter laid down'—that is to say: the lease is to 'remain in force during the reign of His Majesty Leopold II., Sovereign of the Independent Congo State. Nevertheless,' the Agreement goes on to state, 'at the expiration of His Majesty's reign, it shall remain fully in force *as far as concerns all the portion of the territories above mentioned situated to the west of the 30th meridian east of Greenwich*, as well as a strip of 25 kilometres in breadth, to be delimitated by common consent, stretching from the watershed between the Nile and the Congo up to the western shore of Lake Albert, and including the port of Mahagi. This extended lease shall be continued so long as the Congo territories as an Independent State or as a Belgian Colony remain under the sovereignty of His Majesty and His Majesty's successors.'

Renunciation by the Congo Free State

The italicised passage in the above paragraph is, however, affected by the Boundary Agreement between France and the Congo State of 14th August 1894. Under Article IV., 'the Free State binds herself to renounce all occupation, and to exercise in the future no political influence west or north of a line thus determined:—Longitude 30° east of Greenwich, starting from its intersection of the watershed

of the Congo and Nile basins, up to the point where it meets the parallel 5° 30′, and then along that parallel to the Nile.' The effect of this arrangement is to throw the whole of the Bahr el-Ghazal and the Nile Valley north of 5° 30′ outside the sphere of influence of the Congo State —a region which, by the recent Anglo-French Agreement (21st March 1899), is left within the British sphere. There remains, therefore, to the Congo State the third and a portion of the second categories of territory specified above (p. 413), under the conditions mentioned—or, in other words, a triangular zone between the Nile and the 30th meridian down to about the latitude of Lado (or, 5° 30′). On the death of its Sovereign, the Congo State will retain only the 25 kilometre zone giving access to Lake Albert at Mahagi.

Withdrawal of Article III

Under Article III the Congo State granted to Great Britain a lease of territory between Lakes Tanganyika and Albert Edward. But this Article was withdrawn by a Declaration, signed 22nd June 1894,[1] in consequence of the protest of Germany. As a matter of fact, Article III infringed the repeated declarations of neutrality by the Congo State, the Treaty between that State and Germany in 1884, the Berlin Act of 1885, and the Anglo-German Convention of 1890. Article VIII of the latter Convention already provided for the free transit of goods, etc., between Tanganyika and the Anglo-German boundary.

France and the Congo State

France protested against the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of the 12th May 1894, on the grounds of (1) her pre-emptive rights of 1884, which, as residuary legatee, involve the power of veto, (2) the Berlin Act of 1885—in particular, the clauses referring to the neutrality of the Congo State and its declared boundaries, (3) the Treaty of 1831, which declared Belgium to be a perpetually neutral State, and (4) Turkish Firmans and Egyptian rights in the basin of the Upper Nile. Her protest was recognized, and given effect to, as already stated, by Article IV of the Boundary Agreement (14th August

[1] Declaration between Great Britain and the Congo State—Africa, No. 5 (1894), p. 5; and Treaty Series, No. 20 (1894).

1894) between France and the Congo State, the first Article of which defined a common frontier.[1]

In consequence of the Treaty signed at Brussels on 9th January 1895,[2] by which the Congo Free State was ceded to Belgium, the Belgian Government entered into an Arrangement with France respecting the French right of pre-emption over the Territories of the Congo State. Under this Arrangement (which was signed at Paris on 5th February 1895, but which, I believe, has not yet been approved by the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, to whom it was submitted on the 13th February 1895), the Belgian Government recognized, in Article I, 'a right of preference to France over its Congolese Possessions in case of alienation of the same for a consideration, either in whole or in part,' etc.

Net Results

The cumulative effect of these International arrangements is to give the Congo State access to the Upper Nile, between Mahagi (on Lake Albert) and Lado, under a lease which runs during the reign of King Leopold, as Sovereign of that State, and which thereafter lapses, except as regards the 25 kilometre zone at Mahagi. The remainder of the affected area is left absolutely within the British sphere.

Lado was occupied by Commandant Henry, on behalf of the Congo State, on 16th July 1898; and Rejaf was occupied by Commandant Chaltin on or before 16th June 1898.

The so-called pre-emptive rights of France over the Territories of the Congo State would not, I imagine, be recognized by the Signatories of the Berlin Act of 1885; neither would the exercise of such rights be compatible with the Declarations exchanged between the Belgian

[1] 'Art. I. The frontier between the Congo Free State and the colony of French Congo, after following the *thalweg* of the Ubangi up to the confluence of the Mbomu and of Welle, shall be constituted as follows:—(1) The *thalweg* of the Mbomu up to its source. (2) A straight line joining the watershed between the Congo and Nile basins. From this point the frontier of the Free State is constituted by the said watershed up to its intersection with longitude 30° East of Greenwich.'

[2] This Treaty was submitted to the Belgian Chamber of Deputies for approval, 13th February 1895; but, up to the present, it has not, I believe, been formally approved. A Declaration of Neutrality was submitted at the same time.

Government and the International Association of the Congo (23rd February 1885).[1] Subsequent African Conferences have enlarged and extended the powers of the Congo State, which has grown quite out of its original constitution; and it is therefore extremely difficult to determine its inherent rights: but neutrality is the very essence of its being.

Recent British Expeditions

A British Expedition under Colonel Macdonald penetrated (1898) northwards of Uganda towards the Abyssinian frontier, from its base at Mount Elgon; but, owing to a mutiny among the Sudanese troops, the Expedition came to an untimely end.[2] The original object of the Expedition was to explore the country between the Juba and the Sobat, towards the old Anglo-Italian frontier, and to establish stations on the Upper Nile. 'There were rumours at the time,' Lord Salisbury remarked, in the House of Lords, on 20th March 1899, 'of designs on the Upper Nile which experience did not altogether falsify; and these made us anxious to establish our military power at some station on the Upper Nile.' To that extent, a large detachment, or independent expedition, under Major Martyr, succeeded. Major (now Colonel) Martyr hoisted the British flag at Wadelai on 7th September 1898; established posts at several places on the right-bank of the Nile; and joined hands with the Congolese troops at Bora, where he learnt that the Dervishes in the neighbourhood, against whom he had set out, had dispersed. He then went as far north as Bedden, where, according to the latest reports (March 1899), he was stopped by the *sudd*.

According to Dr Donaldson Smith, who visited Lake Rudolf in 1895, and penetrated 100 miles to the north,

[1] 'The International Association of the Congo declares by these presents that, by treaties concluded with the legitimate Sovereigns in the basin of the Congo and its tributaries, vast territories have been ceded to it with all the rights of sovereignty, with a view to the creation of a *free and independent State*.' (Declaration of the Association).

[2] The Rudolf column, under Captain Austin, although unable to reach the 6th parallel, covered a tract of country up to the Anglo-Italian boundary by a treaty made with the Donjiro, whose territory extends north of the 6th degree.

the highland country to the north and north-east of this Lake is very fertile and of great commercial value.[1] In his opinion, 'a line from Imé, on the Shebeli river, to a point immediately below Bonga, in Kaffa, will mark the southern limit of any country to which the Emperor Menelik can lay claim.'

§ *Bahr el-Ghazal and Darfur*

Firman of 1841

As already mentioned (*supra*, p. 388), the Sultan's Firman of 13th February, 1841, conferred on Mohammed Ali 'the Government of the Provinces of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan, and Sennar, with their Dependencies beyond the limits of Egypt.'

Exclusion of Germany

Under the Boundary Agreement between Great Britain and Germany of 15th November 1893, which drew the conterminous frontier between the Gulf of Guinea and Lake Tsad, it was agreed by the Contracting Parties, in Article IV, that 'the territories to the west of the boundary-line traced in the present Agreement, and in the preceding above-quoted Agreements,[2] shall fall within the British sphere of influence; those to the east of the line shall fall within the German sphere of influence. It is, however, agreed that the influence of Germany in respect to her relations with Great Britain shall not extend eastwards beyond the basin of the River Shari,[3] and that Darfur, Kordofan, and Bahr el-Ghazal, as defined in the map published in October 1891, by Justus Perthes, shall be excluded from her influence, even if affluents of the Shari shall be found to lie within them.'

France and Germany

The conterminous frontier between the German Kamerun and the French Ubangi (the southern portion of which

[1] This is the country of the Galla, in which Abyssinian raiding-parties are far too enterprising. Probably it is rich in minerals; but it is practically unexplored. The late Captain Bottego, an Italian, was the first to make known the region in question.

[2] Namely the Anglo-German Agreements of $\frac{29 \text{ April}}{7 \text{ May}}$ 1885; $\frac{1 \text{ July}}{2 \text{ Aug.}}$ 1886; 1st July 1890; and 14th April 1893.

[3] The River Shari flows into Lake Tsad,—an inland drainage-area.

was arranged as early as 1885) was finally delimited in 1894 by the Boundary Protocol of 4th February. On the 15th March 1894, a Convention was concluded at Berlin between the German and French Governments which confirmed that Protocol.

The French Sphere in Central Africa

France, having definitely arranged her frontier with the Congo Free State, by the Boundary Agreement of 14th August 1894,[1] and having, in her Convention with Great Britain of the 14th June 1898, adjusted and defined the territorial and other interests of the two nations in the region of the Niger, was left with a vast but vague sphere of influence, the boundaries of which towards the Central Sudan were necessarily undefined. Whilst recognizing, in principle, the reserved rights of Egypt in the Provinces of the Sudan formerly under Egyptian rule, she, nevertheless, repudiated the title of the Tutelary Power to implement those rights by the Campaign of re-conquest then in progress, in so far as such re-occupation should, directly or indirectly, benefit Great Britain. On the assumption that two wrongs make a right—that she would be merely imitating the action of Great Britain in Unyoro, etc., by herself occupying territory on the Upper Nile that formerly belonged to Egypt — France despatched three Expeditions from the Congo with the object of establishing stations in the Bahr el-Ghazal and of planting the French flag at Fashoda.[2]

Rival Claims

In this she ignored the fact, that her relations with Egypt were not of the intimate, reciprocal and responsible

[1] Already quoted—*supra*, pp. 413-414.

[2] The three Expeditions sent out by France were direct challenges to British pretensions in the Nile Valley. The first was despatched immediately after the Anglo-German Convention (1890). The second—a large military expedition under Colonel Monteil—was sent out after the Anglo-Congolese Convention (1894): and the French Chambers enthusiastically granted the funds. The third was the Marchand Mission, proper. Both Monteil and Liotard were instructed to advance into the Bahr el-Ghazal, towards Fashoda, where Prince Henry and Company were to join hands from Abyssinia. Marchand was instructed to hold Fashoda against all comers. On British representations being made, Monteil was recalled; but Liotard proceeded to invade the Bahr el-Ghazal. Hence Sir Edward Grey's warning in the House of Commons.—(*Cf.* an article by 'Diplomaticus' in the *Fortnightly Review* for December 1898.)

kind enjoyed by Great Britain. In principle, and so far as treaty-engagements were concerned, France may be said to have had an equal title to re-conquer for Egypt and herself —but not for herself alone—territories in the Sudan that had been evacuated in consequence of the Mahdist insurrection. But, in practice, this was impossible. The Anglo-Egyptian army alone represented the sovereign rights of Egypt, and alone overthrew the Dervish dominion. Whatever arrangements ensued on the re-conquest of the Sudan, concerned Great Britain and Egypt, mutually. Neither the consent of France nor the concurrence of Europe were necessary, except in regard to financial liability, in order to justify or to authorize the Anglo-Egyptian Administration in their campaign of re-conquest, in which the sovereign rights of Egypt were alone involved.

Consequently, her Majesty's Government intimated, in the plainest terms, that any attempt on the part of France to steal a march upon Egypt would be regarded as 'an unfriendly act.'[1] Fashoda

In spite of this open and repeated warning,[2] the French expeditions operating in the Bahr el-Ghazal established stations there[3]; and, eventually, Major Marchand reached the Nile at Fashoda, where he hoisted the French flag.

The Sirdar, shortly after the fall of Omdurman, himself visited Fashoda, which he found to be temporarily occupied

[1] In his *Treatise on International Law* (1895), W. E. Hall states (p. 135):—'The understanding that a territory is within a sphere of influence *warns off* friendly Powers: it constitutes no barrier to covert hostility.'

[2] Anglo-German Agreement (July 1890); Anglo-Italian Agreement (Mch. 1891); Anglo-Congolese Agreement (May 1894); Sir E. Grey's Statement (Mch. 1895) and Mr Curzon's Statement (April 1896) in the House of Commons; and numerous official representations to the French Government direct (Egypt, Nos. 2 and 3, 1898).

[3] The French posts said to have been established in the Bahr el-Ghazal were—Tambura, Kodjalé, Diabéré, 'Poste des Rapides,' and Meshra-er-Rek—the 'port' or landing-place for the upper waters—besides one at a village 50 miles further downstream. Liotard crossed the Congo-Nile frontier, and occupied Tambura in February 1896. Fashoda was occupied by Marchand before the fall of Omdurman. 'But for the arrival of the British flotilla, Marchand's escort would have been destroyed by the Dervishes': (Lord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson).

by 130 men under Major Marchand, who refused to withdraw or to haul down his flag, pending instructions from his Government. The Sirdar formally protested; and, having established posts at Fashoda and Sobat, he returned to Khartum, whence he reported to the Anglo-Egyptian Authorities.

Diplomatic representations and negotiations followed: and an Agreement was arrived at in March 1899. This Agreement was embodied in a Joint Declaration, which took the form of an addition to the IVth Article [1] of the Anglo-French Convention of the 14th June 1898, regulating the boundaries between the British and French Colonies, possessions, and spheres of influence to the west and east of the Niger.

Anglo-French Agreement: 1899

The Anglo-French Declaration of 21st March 1899 is of sufficient importance to print *in extenso*:—

The Undersigned, duly authorized by their Governments, have signed the following Declaration:—

The IVth Article of the Convention of the 14th June, 1898, shall be completed by the following provisions, which shall be considered as forming an integral part of it:

1. Her Britannic Majesty's Government engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the west of the line of frontier defined in the following paragraph, and the Government of the French Republic engages not to

[1] The IV Article, after completing and defining the northern frontier of Nigeria, concludes as follows: 'The Government of the French Republic recognizes, as falling within the British sphere, the territory to the east of the Niger, comprised within the above-mentioned line, the Anglo-German frontier [which it joins on the southern shores of Lake Tsad, 35' east of Kuka], and the sea. The Government of her Britannic Majesty recognizes, as falling within the French sphere, the northern, eastern, and southern shores of Lake Tsad, which are comprised between the point of intersection of the 14th degree of north latitude with the western shore of the lake and the point of incidence on the shore of the lake of the frontier determined by the Franco-German Convention of the 15th March 1894,'—or, in more direct language, the shores of Lake Tsad outside the British and German spheres. *Cf.*, also, *Egypt, Nos.* 2 *and* 3 (1898)—'Correspondence with the French Government respecting the Valley of the Upper Nile.' The whole Agreement was ratified on 13th June 1899.

acquire either territory or political influence to the east of the same line.

2. The line of frontier shall start from the point where the boundary between the Congo Free State and French territory meets the water-parting between the watershed of the Nile and that of the Congo and its affluents. It shall follow in principle that water-parting up to its intersection with the 11th parallel of north latitude. From this point it shall be drawn as far as the 15th parallel in such manner as to separate, in principle, the Kingdom of Wadai from what constituted in 1882 the Province of Darfur; but it shall in no case be so drawn as to pass to the west beyond the 21st degree of longitude east of Greenwich (18° 40′ east of Paris), or to the east beyond the 23rd degree of longitude east of Greenwich (20° 40′ east of Paris).

3. It is understood, in principle, that to the north of the 15th parallel the French zone shall be limited to the north-east and east by a line which shall start from the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich (13° 40′ east of Paris), shall run thence to the south-east until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich (21° 40′ east of Paris), and shall then follow the 24th degree until it meets, to the north of the 15th parallel of latitude, the frontier of Darfur as it shall eventually be fixed.

4. The two Governments engage to appoint Commissioners who shall be charged to delimit on the spot a frontier-line in accordance with the indications given in paragraph 2 of this Declaration. The result of their work shall be submitted for the approbation of their respective Governments.

It is agreed that the provisions of Article IX of the Convention of the 14th June, 1898, shall apply equally to the territories situated to the south of the 14° 20′ parallel of north latitude, and to the north of the 5th parallel of north latitude, between the 14° 20′ meridian of longitude

east of Greenwich (12th degree east of Paris) and the course of the Upper Nile.

Done at London, the 21st March 1899.

(L.S.) SALISBURY.
(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.

Results Under the 2nd Clause of this Agreement, the entire basin of the Bahr el-Ghazal and Bahr el-Arab, including Dar Fertit, and the Province of Darfur[1] are thrown outside the sphere of influence of France.

Under the 3rd Clause, the boundary-line unites the frontier of Fezzan, in the Turkish vilayet of Tripoli, with the frontier of the Province of Darfur 'as it shall eventually be fixed,' in the sense already explained by me,[2] leaving the Libyan Desert within the Anglo-Egyptian sphere, and abandoning the highland regions of Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, and the Sultanate of Wadai to the French sphere.[3]

The concluding paragraph has reference to equality of

[1] The limits of the Province of Darfur in 1882 were roughly indicated in Colonel Stewart's *Report* [Egypt, No. 11 (1883) page 6]: 'Beginning near Berenike on the Red Sea Coast, the Sudan boundary follows the 24th parallel to some indefinite point in the Libyan Dessert, say the 28th parallel [*sic*] of longitude. Thence it follows a south-westerly direction till it meets *the north-western corner of the Province of Darfur, in about the 23rd parallel of longitude. From that point it trends almost due south till about the 11th or 12th parallel* [of latitude], *and then following a south-easterly direction . . .*' etc. The 'north-western corner of Darfur' was, I believe, in the Mahamid country, near the intersection of the 22nd meridian with the 15th parallel.

As regards Dar Fertit, this Frontier Province was officially recognized in 1873, when Zibehr paid £15,000 a-year to the Khedive for the Governorship of Dar Fertit and Shaka. It was, of course, a slave-trade preserve. Zibehr conquered Darfur in 1874. Gessi overthrew Suliman, his son, in 1879. In 1883, Lupton claimed a surplus for Dar Fertit of about £60,000 per annum. Dar Fertit is a valuable Province, which, for three centuries, has been under the hereditary rule of its Zandé chiefs. Dr Junker estimated the population at 1,500,000, of whom 500,000 were Zandé. (*Cf.* an article by J. T. Wills in the *Fortnightly Review* for December 1898.)

In the *Scottish Geographical Magazine* for February 1899, *et seq.*, there is a very elaborate article on 'The Khedivic Possessions in the Basin of the Upper Ubangi,' which students of this subject will find valuable. The author endeavours to ascertain the former limits of Egyptian Possessions in that region.

[2] *Supra*, p. 397.

[3] All these regions are inhabited by independent tribes under the influence of the Senussi Mahdi. Wadai has a population of nearly three millions. The Senussi Sultan Yusef is reported (1899) to be dead.

treatment 'in all matters of river-navigation, of commerce, and of Tariff and fiscal treatment and taxes of all kinds,' as between the subjects or citizens and 'protected persons' of both nations, for a period of not less than thirty years, within an area which, roughly speaking, constitutes the Central Sudan. This free-trade area, as it may be called, unites the basin of the Tsad with the basin of the Nile, the French Ubangi with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, under reciprocal but unfettered fiscal conditions. It is, however, specially to be noted, that no provision is made for a so-called French 'port on the Nile'—similar to the two 'pieces of land' on the Niger which, under Article VIII of the Convention of 1898, were to be 'granted on lease to the Government of the French Republic, for the objects and on the conditions specified.'[1]

Integrity of the Nile Valley

It will thus be seen that, in her Agreement with France, Great Britain obtained all that she ever claimed, on behalf of herself and Egypt: in a word, recognition of the unity and integrity of the Nile Valley. 'I have no hesitation in saying that, in every detail and in all respects, Lord Salisbury's Agreement is a masterly document, which, unlike so many African treaties, covers every reasonable risk and infringes no vested interests or International engagements. It completes the long series of Agreements, etc., by which the entire Nile Valley, except towards Abyssinia, is delimitated or recognized as an Anglo-Egyptian sphere of influence, subject only to certain well-known reservations as regards political status. It is the last, but not the least, of the Title-deeds to the Nile Valley under which the identity of British and Egyptian interests is clearly signalized.

iv THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM

Anglo-Egyptian Agreement: 19th January 1899

On the 19th January 1899, an Agreement was signed between her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of his Highness the Khedive of Egypt,

[1] Clause 4 of the *Form of Lease* states: 'A portion of the land so leased, which shall not exceed 10 hectares in extent, shall be used exclusively for the purposes of the landing, storage, and transhipment of goods, and for such purposes as may be considered subsidiary thereto,' etc. (Treaty Series, No. 15, 1899.)

relative to the future Administration of the Sudan,[1] the text of which was published in the *Journal Officiel* of the same date.

This Agreement—which I publish *in extenso* as an Appendix (V)—provides for an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan, under conditions and within limits that are duly specified.

Limits In Article I, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is defined as including 'all the territories, south of the 22nd parallel of latitude, which: (1) have never been evacuated by Egyptian troops since the year 1882; or (2) which, having before the late rebellion in the Sudan been administered by the Government of his Highness the Khedive, were temporarily lost to Egypt,[2] and have been reconquered by her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government, acting in concert; or (3) which may hereafter be reconquered by the two Governments acting in concert.'[3]

Flags Article II states that 'the British and Egyptian flags shall be used together, both on land and water, throughout the Sudan, except in the town of Suákin, in which locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be used.'

One-man rule Article III notifies that 'the supreme military and civil command in the Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the "Governor-General of the Sudan"'; and it mentions the manner of his appointment.

Martial Law Article IX states: 'Until, and save so far as it shall be otherwise determined, by Proclamation, the Sudan, with the exception of the town of Suákin, shall be and remain under martial law.'

For the provisions under the remaining Articles, the reader is referred to Appendix V.

Inauguration The British and Egyptian flags were hoisted together at

[1] The third clause of the Preamble sets forth: 'And whereas it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to her Britannic Majesty's Government, *by right of conquest*, to share in the present settlement and future working and development of the said system of administration and legislation'; etc. The italics are mine.

[2] *Cf.*, *supra*, p. 380.

[3] *Vide* 1st foot-note on p. 425.

(among other places) Khartum, the seat of government, and at Wadi Halfa, the northern limit.[1] A Khedivial Decree, of 19th January 1899, appointed the Sirdar, Lord Kitchener of Khartum, Governor-General of the Sudan.

The Governor-General

Lord Kitchener of Khartum is not only Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, which now is quartered almost entirely in the Sudan, but he is also Governor-General of the reconquered country, which, for purposes of administration, is divided into the Provinces of Dongola, Berber, Sennar, Kassala, Khartum, and Fashoda.[2] Suákin has been placed, by the Agreement of 10th July 1899, under the general *régime*.

Administration

The Sudan and the Army organization are so interwoven, and the future requirements of the Sudan are so obscure, that it would be premature at the present stage to discuss details. In general terms, it may be said that the Military and Civil Administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan will repose in the hands of the British Governor-General and Commanders, aided by the Mudirs of Provinces, a Civil Financial Secretary, and a Civil Staff. The old Frontier Province will, for the present, remain also under the Sirdar, for military purposes.[3]

Budget

The Accounts for 1898 show the following results :—

Revenue	£E 35,000
Expenditure . . .	235,000
Deficit . . .	200,000

The net charge on the Egyptian Treasury was £E13,000 less than was anticipated. The estimated Revenue of the Sudan for 1899 is £E51,500, of which £E26,500 is expected from Land and Date taxes and £E12,000 is put down to Suákin. The estimated Expenditure for 1899 is £E383,272, under the main heads of account which in-

[1] The northern limit of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is an east-and-west line drawn nine miles north of Wadi Halfa. The southern limit may be fixed, conventionally, at the tenth parallel of North Latitude (say Fashoda).

[2] This approximates, as far as it goes, to the arrangement in Gordon's time (1879).

[3] *Vide ante*, p. 289, *et seq.*

dicate Departments of the Administration.[1] It will therefore be seen, that the Sudan deficit for 1899, which will have to be borne by the Egyptian Treasury, is estimated at £E331,772. But such estimates are, at present, merely experimental, in the absence of practical experience.

'The Sirdar alone'

This gives a general idea of the Administration. Its more precise character was outlined in the speech to the assembled Sudanese Sheikhs and Notables made by Lord Cromer, on 5th January 1899, at Omdurman, the importance of which justifies the following extracts.[2] In the course of his remarks, Lord Cromer said :—

'I am glad to meet you all here to-day in order to congratulate you on having been freed from the tyranny of Dervish rule by the military skill of the Sirdar and his officers and the gallantry of the British and Egyptian troops. You see both the British and the Egyptian flags floating over this house. This is an indication that, for the future, you will be governed by the Queen of England

[1] The following estimated Expenditure is published in Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899:

Central Administration	£E 4,710
Finance	8,020
Justice	1,760
Medical and Sanitary	2,976
Education	1,984
Field allowances	2,237
Buildings	5,000
Post Office	3,000
Telegraphs	4,500
Administration (including Police)	75,113
Railways	50,000
Military	197,455
Suákin	26,517
Total	383,272

In a Reuter telegram (dated Cairo, 24 January 1899) giving a forecast of the Sudan Budget for 1899, the expenses of the Provinces of Dongola, Berber, and Kassala, were estimated each at £E12,426; Sennar and Fashoda, each at £E8,354; and Khartum, at £E21,127. According to this arrangement and estimate, the Central Administration of the Provinces claimed £E18,032, to include 6 Governors, 12 Inspectors, and 52 other officials; the Districts, £E21,100. A detachment (about 250 men) of a British regiment was stationed at Khartum during the Winter months.

[2] Extracts from a Reuter Telegram, dated Cairo, 5th January 1899.

and the Khedive of Egypt. The sole representative in the Sudan of both the British and Egyptian Governments will be the Sirdar, in whom both the Queen and the Khedive have the fullest confidence. No attempt will be made to govern the country from Cairo, still less from London. You must look to the Sirdar alone for justice and good government: and I do not doubt that you will have no cause for disappointment.

'The Queen and her Christian subjects are devotedly attached to their own religion, but they also know how to respect the religion of others. The Queen rules over a larger number of Moslem subjects than any Sovereign in the world, and these live contented under her beneficent rule. Their religion and religious customs are strictly respected. You may feel sure that the same principle will be adopted in the Sudan. There will be no interference whatever in your religion.'

At this point, one of the Sheikhs present asked whether this engagement included the application of the Mohammedan Sacred Law.

Lord Cromer replied in the affirmative, which evidently caused great satisfaction.[1] Continuing his speech, his lordship said:—

'I am aware that many abuses occurred under the old Egyptian *régime* in the Sudan. No Law Courts worthy of the name existed, taxes were heavy in amount, and illegal exactions in excess of taxes were of frequent occurrence. You need be under no fear that these abuses will be repeated. You doubtless have heard that the Egyptian Government of the present day is animated by a very different spirit from that existing in former times. I trust before long it will be possible for the Sirdar to institute some simple Law Courts in which equal justice will be dis-

[1] In his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer remarks:—

'I take this opportunity of mentioning that the promise which I made to the assembled Notables on the occasion of my recent visit to Omdurman, to the effect that the Sacred Law of Islam would be treated with respect, does not in any way tie the hands of the Government in dealing with this matter. The Sheria is applied in Egypt, but slavery, if not dead, is moribund.'

tributed to all, rich and poor alike. You will, of course, have to pay taxes, but they will be moderate in amount and fixed according to ancient custom, which is very similar in all Moslem countries. You may feel sure that, when once you have paid the amounts legally due, no further irregular exactions will be made. A few English officers will be resident in each district in order to ensure strict compliance with these principles.

'You must not, however, expect the Government to do everything for you, but must also bestir yourselves. I trust you who are men of influence will use that influence in the cause of order and tranquillity, and especially that you will encourage those with whom you are brought in contact to resume the cultivation of their fields, which now can be carried on without fear of molestation. I hope before I come here again that it will be possible for the Sirdar to have allowed you to return to your old homes in the town of Khartum, which before long will be greatly improved.

'I beg you to remember these words which I have spoken and to repeat them to your countrymen. You may feel assured that they truly represent the principles whereby the Sirdar in the future will be guided in the administration of the Sudan.'

Lord Cromer's address was listened to with great attention by the Sheikhs, who frequently gave expression to their approval. It is a sufficient indication of the spirit in which Great Britain undertakes her responsible task in the Sudan and of the paternal character of the new *régime*. The Mixed Tribunals of Egypt are to have no jurisdiction either in the reconquered territories or at Suákin.[1] 'The Sirdar alone' is the administrative formula.

[1] Sir John Scott, in a letter to *The Times*, dated 20th January 1899, points out the original limits of the Mixed Tribunals. These, he states, 'were fixed at the opening of those Tribunals by Decree; and Aswán was settled as the furthest northern limit of their jurisdiction. This Decree was promulgated, and became law; it was never the subject of protest by the Powers who founded the Courts, and was followed in one decision of the Court of Appeal of the Mixed Tribunals. As these Tribunals have only three centres—Alexandria, Cairo, and Mansura: all in Lower Egypt—it is impossible to give them jurisdiction beyond Egypt Proper: and the reservation is excellent.'

A new Judicial system must be created before the country can be entered by Europeans.

Gordon Memorial College

At the invitation and on the proposal of Lord Kitchener, the British public subscribed in a few months the sum of £100,000, and more, for the institution at Khartum of a British College, as a 'pledge that the memory of Gordon is still alive among us, and that his aspirations are at length to be realized. . . . Our system,' says the Sirdar, its founder, in his identic letter to the newspapers, 'would need to be gradually built up. We should begin by teaching the sons of the leading men, the heads of villages and the heads of districts. . . . The teaching, in its early stages, would be devoted to purely elementary subjects, such as reading, writing, geography, and the English language. Later, and after these preliminary stages had been passed, a more advanced course would be instituted, including a training in technical subjects, specially adapted to the requirements of those who inhabit the Valley of the Upper Nile. The principal teachers in the College would be British, and the supervision of the arrangements would be vested in the Governor-General of the Sudan. I need not add that there would be no interference with the religion of the people.'[1] The system of teaching will follow on the lines of the Higher Primary Schools at Aswán and Wadi Halfa. Arabic will be the basis of instruction.

Missionary enterprise

All the Foreign Missions which formerly were engaged in missionary enterprise in the Sudan have made proposals to renew or extend their work: but it is understood that these projects have not met with much encouragement. Their time has not yet come. In the extremely delicate task of pacifying the Sudan, missionaries might do more harm than good, unless their propaganda were wholly abandoned.

The Slave Trade

For some time to come, the greatest tact and forbearance will be necessary, in order to avoid the risk of stirring up religious fanaticism or racial antipathy. British promises to Sudanese tribes have been broken or evaded so often in the past, that it will take some time to restore confidence in the pledged word which elsewhere is held equivalent to our bond.

[1] The 'Gordon Memorial Institute' would, in my opinion, have been a more appropriate name. But this by the way.

In particular, the greatest circumspection will be required in all matters affecting the institution of slavery and in all measures dealing with the slave-traders. Even Gordon, the scourge of the slavers, knew how to be tolerant on occasions; and Baker, who first took up this task of Sisyphus, only afterwards came to recognise the fact, that the extirpation of the Slave Trade must be a gradual, organic process. In a word, since slavery is indigenous, you must find some means to replace what you destroy, before you begin to undermine the foundations of social order in the Sudan. The zealous Abolitionists of England must be content to leave their cause in the hands of English officers and gentlemen, whose knowledge of local conditions and whose responsibilities to the State render them the best judges of what is possible and what is not, pending a new order of things which shall make the buying and selling of human beings not only illegal but also without profit. Until that time comes, the ordinary police-measures and the semi-military Administration should be sufficient and strong enough to supervise and control domestic slavery in the Sudan; whilst the Anglo-Egyptian Government can be trusted to wage a holy war against the professional slave-hunters, as against all other disturbers of law and order.[1]

[1] Lord Cromer, in his *Report* for 1899, refers at some length to the question of slavery. The following passages occur among his remarks:

'With the reconquest of the Sudan, a new chapter in the history of anti-slavery operations begins. It has at last been found possible to strike a decisive blow at the main prop which holds up the institution of slavery. So long as slave-raiders were free to roam about those provinces in Central Africa from which the slaves have heretofore been principally drawn, it was hopeless to expect that the supply could altogether be cut off. Means would always be found for transporting captured slaves to their ultimate destinations. These provinces have now fallen under the influence of an European Power, and, moreover, of that Power which, more than any other, has been distinguished for the zeal and interest which it has displayed in the anti-slavery cause. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this achievement in connection with the effect which must ultimately be produced on slavery as an institution. What has heretofore been the chief recruiting ground for slaves is now closed to the slave-raider. I do not say that slave-hunting operations will now no longer be possible, nor that all channels for the transport of slaves from the centre of Africa to the coast will be closed. Such, unfortunately, is not the case. Other provinces are still open to the slave-raider. It is well-known that an active Trade in Slaves exists between Wadai and the

Article XI of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 distinctly states that 'the importation of slaves into the Sudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited: Provision shall be made by Proclamation for the enforcement of this Regulation.' And Article XII upholds the Brussels Act of 1890 in regard to the importation, sale, and manufacture of fire-arms and munitions, etc.

During the Dervish rule, the Slave Trade flourished throughout the Sudan. Major (now Colonel Sir Reginald) Wingate, in his standard work on *Mahdiism*, stated (1890): 'The main collecting depôts, in addition to Omdurman, are Kalabat, Beni Shangul, and El Fasher, where there are large slave-markets. Those collected at Kalabat are for the most part Abyssinians; while those at El Fasher [Darfur] are generally captured in the raids made on the surrounding tribes. Beni Shangul is the collecting-station for Dar Bertat, Roseres, and Dar Fazokl. From these three stations slaves are sent in gangs to all parts of the Sudan. The principal Slave market is, of course, in Omdurman.' (p. 478.)

All this systematized slave-trading and organized slave-raiding will be summarily suppressed by the Anglo-Egyptian Government. And that, after all, is what most people associate with the Slave Trade, apart from the iniquitous export Traffic,[1] which is its worst feature, and which can now

coast lying between Tripoli and Alexandria. The Trade is fostered by the followers of Sheikh Senussi. At the same time, having regard to the blow which has now been struck, and to the further fact that the whole, or the greater part, of Africa appears to be gradually falling within the sphere of influence of some one or other European Power, it is not too much to say that, for the first time in the history of anti-slavery operations, there seems to be some real prospect of final and complete success. Time will, without doubt, be required; but it is permissible to hope that, under the influences now at work, the next generation will see the almost entire extinction of the institution of slavery. Although there is every reason to hope and believe that the Slave Trade in the Sudan is a thing of the past, domestic slavery will probably continue to exist for some while to come. . . . Lord Kitchener is obviously in a far stronger position for dealing with this question than was the case with General Gordon fifteen years ago. It is, however, one of great difficulty, and will require very careful treatment. I am not at present prepared to discuss it. All I can say is that the importance of the subject is fully recognized, but that any hasty or premature action is much to be deprecated.'

[1] Slaves were taken to the Red Sea ports, where Arab merchants purchased them, in exchange for lead, fulminate, etc., and shipped them to Arabia.

be stopped at the sources of supply—so far as any organized Traffic is concerned. Fashoda offers a valuable post for observation in these respects.[1]

With the entire basin of the Nile under a united, if not yet uniform system of, Government, with railways and communications growing up under a strong Administration, it will in time be possible to deal effectively and comprehensively with the question of slavery and the Slave Trade. The timid attempts, at evasion rather than at repression, made in British East Africa are, perhaps, not very reassuring to those who hold—and justly hold—that Great Britain is shirking her mission of giving freedom to all who claim the protection of her flag: but our tinkering policy at Zanzibar is not likely to commend itself to the Sirdar, who is strong enough to carry through what in his judgment he may consider opportune and right, if only as the founder of a College dedicated to the memory of Gordon and pledged to uphold Gordon's aspirations.

Communications

Colonel Stewart, in the concluding Remarks on Slavery, in his *Report* on the Sudan,[2] stated: 'When all, however, is done that can be done, I look with more hope on the opening up of the country, and in the extension of legitimate trade, to bring slavery to an end than on the most stringent Treaties that can be devised; and I am convinced no instrument will be more effective in bringing about this result than a railway bringing Khartum within an easy distance of the Sea.' That, too, is the opinion of all experts: rapid and easy communications, but, above all, legitimate commerce. *The Slave Trade in itself does not pay. All slave-routes are*

[1] Fashoda was one of the best, if not the best, of the strategic points from which the Slave Trade of the Upper Nile could be held in check; but the Egyptian Governors at that station too often connived at the Traffic, thus rendering abortive many of Baker's efforts at its suppression. Gordon, therefore, established at Sobat, a short distance above Fashoda, a station to fulfil the functions of the latter.

[2] *Cf.* Colonel Stewart's Remarks on Slavery, in his *Report*: Egypt, No. 11 (1883) page 23, *seq.* He states the principal slave-routes to be: '(1) Obeid-Dongola; (2) Omshanga-Dongola; (3) Kubbé-Assiut; (4) Khartum-Debba; (5) Obeid-Debba; (6) Kassala-Suákin-Massawa; (7) Wadai-Murzuk-Tripoli; (8) Berber-Suákin; (9) Berber-Korosko.'

trade-routes in Africa[1]; but railways are pioneers of legitimate commerce.

The railway from Egypt Proper to Khartum is advancing at the rate of 200 yards daily; and it is expected to reach the metropolis of the Sudan in November 1899. A railway from Khartum to the Red Sea Coast—probably viâ Abu Haraz, Kedaref, and Kassala—is projected. The first section (to Abu Haraz) may be built in 1900, so as to tap the rich grain-supplies of Kedaref. And, as regards the proposed extension southwards to Uganda, it cannot be doubted that, should the necessity arise, such a railway would be built, in order to connect the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with British East Africa.[2] By the beginning of 1900, there will be one continuous line of rail—although, unfortunately, with a break of gauge at Luxor—between Khartum and Alexandria: and that, after all, is the prime essential. Once the *sudd* is broken up, a clear passage can easily be maintained (as it was in Gordon's time), by which river-communication will be possible throughout the year, as far south as Lado-Dufli (Fola rapids).[3] Over one-third of the railway through British East Africa—Mombasa (Kilindini) to the Victoria Nyanza—is already built; and its completion is promised in three years' time. But between Uganda and, say, Lado, on the White Nile, only a railway can bridge the interrupted communications.[4]

[1] *Cf.* 'The Development of Africa' (Chapter VI—'The Traffic in Slaves') in which this fundamental principle is established by me.

[2] In the meantime, and for some years to come, the free waterway between Khartum and Fashoda, open at all seasons, will suffice. When British rule is consolidated, a railway may become a necessity. In that case, the proposed Cape-to-Cairo railway would be a valuable connecting link; and, should Germany co-operate, and build also a tributary line to the East Coast, it might even pay the immense cost of construction, at some distant date. At present, however, commercial intercourse between British East Africa and British Central Africa is sufficiently served by the natural communications, in the path of which there are no obstructive fiscal barriers, in view of Art. VIII of the Anglo-German Convention of 1890 and Arts. II and IV of the Berlin Act of 1885, which make adequate provision for exemption of dues and freedom of transit. (*Cf.*, *supra*, p. 412 *seq.*)

[3] *Cf.* the section dealing with the River Nile, *supra*, pp. 7-12.

[4] As regards communications between Lado and Fashoda, Lord Cromer's *Report* for 1899 contains the following information:—

'Exploration beyond the point where the Sobat effects its junction with the

Commercial Development

It were premature to speak of commercial development until political and administrative stability afford an adequate guarantee for the investment of capital. British capital, which fought shy even of Egypt, is now clamouring at the gates of the Sudan. That is the way of British capital. 'The Sirdar alone' has attracted it.

Nile is greatly impeded by the dense tangled mass of vegetation known by the name of the "sudd." The sudd is encountered as far down-stream as Abba Island, but it never impedes the main channel of the river below the junction of the Sobat. . . .

'Immediately after the occupation of Fashoda, last September, a gun-boat was sent up the Bahr-el-Ghazal to within a short distance of Meshra-er-Rek. Almost the entire journey was made through a vast marsh, though there are occasional patches of dry land. A second reconnaissance, made six weeks later, showed the Bahr-el-Ghazal channel to be completely blocked by the sudd from a point 15 miles north of the junction of the Bahr-el-Arab.

'The gun-boats failed to penetrate up the Bahr-el-Jebel, which is the main branch of the White Nile. It was blocked by sudd almost at its mouth. Natives report that the block extends for a long distance, and that open water is only reached a few miles north of Shambeh. A reconnaissance up the Bahr-el-Zeraf proved more successful. The gun-boats reached, though with difficulty, a point some 195 miles from its mouth (approximately, latitude 70° 35'), whence the trees of the White Nile (Bahr-el-Jebel) could be observed some 8 to 10 miles distant. The work of cutting through the mass of sudd separating the two rivers would have been a most laborious operation, necessitating special appliances. A subsequent reconnaissance showed the navigation of the Bahr-el-Zeraf to have become much more difficult, owing to the fall of the river. . . .

'A reconnaissance up the Sobat showed this river to be a good navigable stream. At a distance of 212 miles from its junction with the White Nile it becomes two rivers, that flowing from the east being called the Adura (and in its upper reaches the Baro), whilst the southern river, shown on the maps as the Juba River, is locally known as the Pibor. Reconnaissances were made up the Adura for a distance of 30 miles. According to native report, it is navigable for a considerable distance further. This was the route taken by the Marchand Mission on its return journey. A reconnaissance was also made up the Pibor for a distance of 75 miles, at which point further navigation became impossible. The general character of the country between Fort Sobat to within 10 miles of the junction of the Sobat, Adura, and Pibor Rivers may be described as an immense alluvial plain, swampy near the river banks, with flat grass-land beyond stretching to the horizon. Not a sign of a hillock is to be seen anywhere. The landscape is, however, varied by extensive woods, which come down to the water's edge where the banks are firm. The current is about 2½ miles an hour. The depth is over 20 feet throughout. The width of the river is from 150 to 200 yards. A fortified post has been established at Nasser (a former Egyptian station), some 180 miles up the Sobat from its mouth, and 30 miles down-stream of the junction of the Pibor with the Adura.'

The Sudan will absorb oceans of capital; and in time, under a stable Government, some return may be yielded. But the Egyptian Sudan is not a second India. It is a desert.

Darfur formerly had some trade with the Sudan—a trade in ivory and slaves—but in itself it possesses nothing to create an export-trade. The Bahr el-Ghazal is rich in natural resources; but it is a very unhealthy region. Kordofan is a wilderness. Sennar, and the valleys of the Blue and White Niles, although malarious and unhealthy, offer certain attractions to capitalists; but south of Sennar, there can be no question of commercial development for some time to come.[1]

Although the trade of the Egyptian Sudan was estimated in 1883 at £2,000,000, it was nearly all illicit gain. The Sudan always cost Egypt money—fully £200,000 a-year—except for a brief period during Gordon's Governor-Generalship, when the Sudan Budget was made to balance somehow, on paper. Dongola was the only Province that really paid its way, even under Ismail's corrupt *régime*. The so-called Island of Argo and certain districts south of the Cataract region are fertile and valuable; and the Province, once populated and irrigated, should yield a rich return.

A Tropical Dependency

The fundamental fact, which never should be forgotten, is, that the Egyptian Sudan is Egypt's India—a Tropical

[1] The 'Equatorial Province,' which falls within the sphere of British East Africa, is, on the other hand, a valuable region. The eastern districts yield ivory, ostrich feathers, oil, etc. The western districts yield ivory, indiarubber, palm-oil, skins, etc. Formerly, all the trade of the Equatorial Province was a Government monopoly. The total trade of the whole of Central Africa is not worth 17 millions Sterling, even on the most liberal estimate. The trade of the Egyptian Sudan formerly comprised the following products—gum, ivory, ostrich feathers, tamarind, senna, hides, gutta-percha, honey, *dhura* (a kind of millet), salt (local trade and currency), rhinoceros horns, indigo (small quantity), musk, palm-oil, and a vegetable fat used in scents. This list is taken from the *Report* (p. 22) of the late Colonel Stewart, who added: 'All the districts south of Khartum, *between the Niles*, and also about Karkoj and Kedaref [in Dar Sennar], are celebrated for their corn-growing capacity, and may be said to be the granary of the Sudan.' This is true to-day: and, doubtless, a railway from Khartum to Kedaref (a district claimed by Menelik, but one to which the Egyptian Government has prior and better rights) will be the result. The fertile country of Meroë Island, between the Atbara and Blue Nile, will thus be opened up.

Dependency. It is a colony of exploitation rather than of settlement: because Egyptians themselves do not thrive in the Sudan, in which they are no more at home than we ourselves are in Egypt, or than are the people of *Northern* France in Algeria. Economically speaking, the Sudan, in relation to Egypt, is subject also to much the same reservations and restrictions, *mutatis mutandis*, as those which differentiate and separate Northern from Southern Queensland. The Sudan, but sparsely inhabited by natural and semi-civilized peoples, is to Egypt merely a field for political expansion and commercial enterprise. At best, it is a colony of exploitation, in which a moderate amount of capital may be usefully employed.

In the wake of the British Raj

But, in a political sense, the integrity of her Sudan Dependency is as vital to Egypt as the integrity of Ireland is to us. No hostile Power can be tolerated within its gates. The surrounding deserts and the sea round off the unity of her dominion.

The expansion of Egypt—under her natural Protector, the Mistress of the Seas—must follow in the wake of the British Raj.

Fruitfulness and riches grow up in the path of the *Pax Britannica*.

The Renaissance of Egypt has dawned.

X

THE PATHWAY OF EMPIRE

(PAX BRITANNICA)

i DOMINATION OF THE NILE VALLEY

ii *PAX BRITANNICA*

X

THE PATHWAY OF EMPIRE

i DOMINATION OF THE NILE VALLEY

IN the concluding words of his *Report* for 1899, Lord Cromer remarks: Rehabilitation

'For many years past, those who have been in any degree responsible for the management of Egyptian affairs have kept prominently before their eyes the desirability of accomplishing two main objects. One of these was to occupy Khartum. The other was to store the waters of the Nile. During the past year, the first of these objects was accomplished, and arrangements were made which render the execution of the second a matter of certainty within a few years. . . . The year 1898 may, therefore, be said to have been singularly eventful.

'Henceforth, an additional and very important feature will be added to the work of Egyptian reform. It will be closely allied to the various issues which cluster round the work of rehabilitating the neighbouring Provinces in the Sudan. This latter problem presents some special difficulties of its own. The artificial obstacles which have, in some degree, retarded progress in Egypt will, indeed, be wanting. On the other hand, the country is in a far more backward condition than was the case with Egypt when the work of reform was taken seriously in hand. It can scarcely be said that any germs of civilization exist. The physical obstacles to be overcome are considerable. Neither, so far as can be judged, does the country possess that marvellous recuperative power which has done so much to facilitate the task of the Egyptian reformer.

. . . 'Time is, above all things, required. The main

condition of ultimate success [in the task of introducing civilization into the Sudan] is, I venture to think, that whatever measures are taken should be deliberate, and that the work of reform should not be hurried. It has taken sixteen years to elevate Egypt to its present relative degree of prosperity.'[1]

'Artificial obstacles'

These words of Lord Cromer—which reach me at the moment of writing—happily confirm the views I have expressed. The 'artificial obstacles' which alone stand between Egypt and the work of reform do not exist south of Wadi Halfa. Being artificial, they cannot long withstand the organic development of administrative autonomy and political unity which now prevail in the Nile Valley.

Lord Cromer's Policy

The success of the Single Control—or one-man rule—is due, in no small measure, to the master-mind of Viscount Cromer, who, having formulated a definite policy, has steadfastly pursued it to a logical conclusion,—refusing to be hurried, refusing to be either cajoled or bullied. Had the Foreign Office been left to follow its opportunist and vacillating policy, we might now have been tossing on a sea of troubled uncertainty. Definiteness of aim and the adaptation of means to an end are as essential to Foreign Policy as is the compass to the mariner. We have arrived at our haven: and it remains now to pay the port-dues, after Europe has given us a clean bill of health.

Value of Egypt

Egypt is the fulcrum of our Foreign Policy. She stands about midway, in Diplomacy and in Naval Strategy, between our Eastern and Western Empires. She is the nodal point which adjusts our Foreign Relations and balances our Imperial Possessions. In Egypt, therefore, the political equilibrium is most easily disturbed or restored. The Colossus that bestrides the isthmus of Suez necessarily holds a commanding position.

Gate of the East

Egypt is the Gate of the East. The storm-ridden conquests of bygone centuries have ravaged the country, leaving it immalleable, immutable, and dumb. Successive Sea-Powers have drained its treasuries and impounded its

[1] Egypt, No. 3 (1899).

granaries. The Sea-Power of to-day has come to stay, so long as the British Empire shall last.

Pathway of Empire

Egypt, the Gate of the East, opens on the Nile Valley—the pathway of empire. British rule dominates the Valley of the Nile from its source to its effluence, and, indeed, from sea to sea. The degree of that domination is the measure of our rule, graduating, as it does, in a descending scale of consolidation: from an Imperial Protectorate to a mere Military Occupation on the one hand, and to an Administrative Occupation on the other.

In the Upper Nile Valley, a British Sphere of Influence unites the British East Africa Protectorate with the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, which extends between Fashoda and Wadi Halfa. British rule in the south and British sea-power in the north converge at the gates of Egypt, in which a British army is already in possession and British tutelage is recognized. Railways will shortly unite the inland regions with the maritime bases.

A glance at the Table (No. 10) overpage will be sufficient to convince the most hardened sceptic, that, apart from the 'artificial obstacles' or International fetters in Egypt Proper, the Valley of the Nile is now dominated by the Mistress of the Seas.

Unity

It is impossible—clearly impossible, to my mind—that, under these circumstances, an alien Master or an unstable Native Government should be tolerated by the Tutelary Power in Egypt. The *de facto* situation must shortly receive a *de jure* recognition. Administrative unity must correspond with organic unity. A uniform system of government must weld together the correlated parts under one recognized and responsible ruler. A British Protectorate, or its equivalent, must be proclaimed throughout the Nile Valley.[1]

[1] The independence of Abyssinia is, of course, essential to the realization of such a scheme. And, in order to secure this, it would be greatly to the advantage of Great Britain to obtain possession of the French concessions in the Gulf of Aden (Tajura Bay, etc.). The Gambia might be given in exchange for these—a fair equivalent, amounting to an analogous situation. Both Powers would gain by this exchange.

TABLE NO. 10.

THE PATHWAY OF EMPIRE

(UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SEA)



The Valley of the Nile is surrounded by deserts and encompassed by the sea. It is physically isolated. Otherwise, a Sea-Power would have no business there. Egypt is a stepping-stone in the pathway of our Empire, uniting the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. It is at once the strongest and the weakest link in the chain of our communications with India and the Far East—the strongest, because it is self-supporting; the weakest, because it is not self-governed.

Egypt cannot govern herself: she cannot 'stand alone.' So much is certain. The facts of history attest it. She has always been ruled or dominated by the Power holding the Command of the Sea. She is so ruled to-day. She will be so ruled to-morrow.

Are we timorous of Empire, that we should hesitate to meet our high destiny? I think not. If we have not the courage of our convictions, at least we have the conviction of our courage. Our hesitation so far has been caused by an honest attempt neither to dispossess the rightful owners of the soil nor to usurp the vested interests of others, but to find another way out of the difficulty. Our destiny

There is no other way out. The longest way round is not the shortest way home, though we may thereby avoid lions in the path. There are lions also in the thicket. In the pathway of empire there are always lions.

The shortest way home is the most direct and honourable way. Why should Egypt pay two millions a-year for Internationalism, when we know that some day she must be released from these intolerable fetters? That question will certainly be asked in the year 1905, when the freedom of Egypt will be at the disposal of the Power pledged to secure it—a freedom that can only be guaranteed by the Mistress of the Seas, in military and administrative Occupation. 1905 A.D.

Remember that a clear title and a confident cause may triumph unopposed! And if troubles come, notwithstanding our pacific objects, remember that our existence as an Empire depends on the Command of the Sea, which would be imperilled by the loss of Egypt! Remember, too, that we are Remember!

the descendants of empire-builders, and hold, in trust for posterity, a sacred cause. Our *Pax Britannica* may claim its martyrs before it can secure peace and prosperity for the many millions under the British flag and for the countless cohorts which are friendly to it. To die in such a cause is the birthright of Englishmen. The modern prayer for peace at any price I consider to be a sign of degeneracy: Give peace in our time, O Lord, and don't bother about posterity! That is what it amounts to. But until the Millennium dawns, there can be no peace. It has been well said, that men should work as if they were to live for ever, and live as if they were to die to-morrow. It is with nations as with individuals.

ii PAX BRITANNICA

Our national honour

My last words must not, however, be a call to arms. Rather would I appeal to that sense of the national honour which, once recognized, is never repudiated. Our continuance in Egypt under false colours is a stain on the flag of Nelson, who gave us the empire of the Seas in the hour of his death. We know—and if we do not all know it now, then my book has been written in vain—that we can never hope to evacuate Egypt without dishonouring pledges and imperilling our Empire. That is our interpretation of the Egyptian Question. That, too, is the interpretation I have drawn from the complex International Situation, as defined in this book. It is the stern logic of accomplished facts. The French hold to another version: but we are not bound to accept foreign dictation. We are bound only to respect the interests of Europe and the rights of Egypt. And Europe, as a whole, does not complain. On the contrary, its tacit mandate has never been challenged.

International Law is not, however, the Justice of the Gods. We may have to buy that in the marts of Diplomacy, so as to secure a legal title to what we in reality possess. But we are rich, and can afford it. Elsewhere I have shown how the complaisance of Foreign Powers may be obtained—a forced complaisance on the part of one

Power only. We have made our bed, and we must lie on it. We all regret the necessity; but regrets are useless: the principal thing is to recognize it, and to accept it as part of the 'White Man's Burden.'

Our hegemony

Our position in Egypt and our world-dominion are not unlike those held by our great Roman prototype: and it may well be, that a *Pax Britannica*, supported by maritime primacy, shall follow as a logical consequence. Certain it is, or would appear, that if we can uphold this hegemony, and secure the adherence, even in principle, of the entire Anglo-Saxon race, the Gospel of peace and good-will towards men—which also is the doctrine of Free Trade—will be preached and practised in the uttermost parts of the earth. Conversely, the disintegration of the British Empire would inevitably lead to renewed International rivalries, until the Command of the Sea fell to the fittest. At present, maritime supremacy is benevolently exercised by Great Britain: but it depends in so vital a degree on the possession of Egypt, that, it may be hoped, the Central Powers of Europe—a League of Peace—will subscribe also to our *Pax Britannica*.

Our sons

The heart of the British Empire beats true, and with a single pulsation. Loyalty to our Queen and Constitution, faith in our pacific mission, and pride of race are our highest traditions. Stern resolve and unity of purpose justify our 'splendid isolation' and guarantee our individual, commercial, and national independence.

In the words of the late Laureate:

> 'Britain's myriad voices call:
> Sons, be welded, each and all,
> Into one imperial whole,
> One with Britain, heart and soul!
> One life, one flag, one fleet, one Throne.'

It is coming—this Greater Unity, in the future of the British Empire, of which Egypt is the keystone.

FINIS CORONAT OPUS

APPENDICES

i MOHAMMED ALI DYNASTY

ii FIRMANS, ETC.

iii DECREE ESTABLISHING THE *CAISSÆ*

iv THE ORGANIC LAW OF EGYPT

v ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM IN THE SUDAN

vi CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

APPENDIX I

THE DYNASTY OF MOHAMMED ALI

	Born.	Died.	Duration of Rule.
MOHAMMED ALI .	1769.	2 Aug. 1849.	1811 to July 1848.
IBRAHIM (Regent)	1789.	10 Nov. 1848.	July to November 1848.
ABBAS I. . . .	1813.	12 July 1854.	Nov. 1848 to 12 July 1854.
SAID	1822.	18 Jan. 1863.	12 July 1854 to 18 Jan. 1863.
ISMAIL	1830.	2 Mar. 1895.	18 Jan. 1863 to 26 June 1879.
TAUFIK	1852.	7 Jan. 1892.	26 June 1879 to 7 Jan. 1892.
ABBAS II. . . .	1874.	...	Since 7 Jan. 1892.

LINE OF SUCCESSION



*** The Firman of 27 May 1866 altered the line of Succession to Ismail's family. In June 1867, Ismail was appointed 'Khedive' by Imperial Firman.

APPENDIX II

FIRMANS, ETC.

Administrative Autonomy

The principle of Egyptian autonomy was laid down in the Separate Act annexed to the Treaty of London of 15th July 1840.

The Treaty itself, after preamble, commenced:

'ART. I. His Highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, as to the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of his Highness to grant to Mehemet Ali, conditions which are specified in the Separate Act hereunto annexed; their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord,' etc.

In the Separate Act annexed to the Convention, the following pertinent passages occur:

'ART. I. His Highness promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalik of Egypt. . . .

'ART. V. All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be applicable to Egypt. . . . The Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular payment of the tribute above-mentioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of His Highness, within the Provinces the administration of which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts legally established. It is moreover understood that, in consideration of the receipt of the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the expenses of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.

'ART. VI. The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the Pasha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as maintained for the service of the State.'[1]

I have already referred to Ismail's Firmans, altering the Order of Succession. This principle and others involving the Organic Law of Egypt were embodied in the definitive Firman of 8th June 1873, from which I make the following excerpts:—

Consolidation of Firmans

'Be it known that we have taken thy request into consideration, and that we have decided to unite in one single Firman all the Firmans and Khats Humayun which, since the Firman which granted the Egyptian succession to thy grandfather, Mehemet Ali, have been granted to the Khedives of Egypt. . . . It is our will that the present Firman . . . shall henceforth be executed and respected, and shall also in future replace the other Imperial Firmans, and that in the following manner:

Order of Succession

'The order of succession to the Government of Egypt granted by our Imperial Firman dated the 2nd Rehib-ul-ewel, 1257 [Firman of 1841], has been so modified that the Khediviate of Egypt passes to thy eldest son, and after him to his eldest son, and in like manner as regards others, that is to say, that the succession is to succeed by primogeniture. . . . I have resolved to establish as law that the succession to the Khediviate of Egypt and its dependencies . . . shall pass as aforesaid . . . in conformity with the law of primogeniture, to the eldest sons of future Khedives. . . .

Administration and internal legislation

'The civil and financial administration of the country, and all interests, material or otherwise, are in every respect under the control of the Egyptian Government, and are

[1] On 13th July 1841, the same Powers, through their representatives at London, signed and issued a Protocol intimating the submission of Mohammed Ali, and their intention to obtain the adherence of France to the above Convention. France, on the same day, signed a Convention to that effect: and so became a Signatory of the Treaty of London of 15th July 1840. The Great Powers and the Porte bound themselves to observe the stipulations of the Act, which more particularly referred to the passage of the Straits.

confided to it, and . . . the Khedive of Egypt is authorized to make internal regulations and laws as often as it may be necessary.

Non-political treaties

'He is also authorized to renew and to contract (without interfering with the Political Treaties of my Sublime Porte) Conventions with the Agents of foreign Powers.

Loans

. . . 'The Khedive has complete and entire control over the financial affairs of the country. He has full power to contract . . .[1], in the name of the Egyptian Government, any foreign loan, whenever he may think it necessary.

Troops

'The first and most essential duty of the Khedive being to guard and defend the country, he has full and entire authority to provide for all the means and establishments for defence and protection according to the exigencies of time and place, and to increase or diminish the number of my Imperial Egyptian troops as may be required. [Number of troops restricted to 18,000 in Firman of Investiture of Taufik, but increase allowed for defence of the Empire.]

Coinage, flags, warships

. . . 'The money coined in Egypt should be struck in my Imperial name; the flags of the land and sea forces will be the same as the flags of my other troops; and, as regards ships of war, ironclads alone shall not be constructed without my permission.

Perpetuity of Firman

. . . 'It is in accordance with my Imperial wish that the rules and principles contained in this Firman should be for ever observed and executed, instead of and in place of all others contained in my previous Firmans.

Tribute

. . . 'Thou wilt also pay great attention to remitting to my Imperial Treasury, every year, without delay, and in its entirety, the fixed tribute of 150,000 purses.'

The Firman of Investiture of 2nd Aug. 1879, granting to Taufik Pasha the Khediviate of Egypt, prohibited the Khedive from contracting loans without the consent of existing creditors, and from maintaining more than 18,000 troops, as already mentioned. The only other points to be noted are given in the extracts below:—

[1] 'Without leave' omitted, since this privilege was subsequently rescinded.

'The Khedive will be authorized to contract and to renew, without interfering with the political treaties of my Imperial Government, *nor with its sovereign rights over that country*, Conventions with the Agents of Foreign Powers . . . *These Conventions will be communicated to my Sublime Porte before their promulgation by the Khedive.*[1] Commercial Conventions

. . . 'The Khediviate cannot, under any pretext or motive, abandon to others, in whole or in part, the privileges accorded to Egypt and which are confided to her, and which are an emanation of the inherent prerogatives of sovereign right, nor any part of the territory.'[2] . . . Inalienability of Sovereign rights, etc.

APPENDIX III

Decree establishing the 'Caisse de la Dette publique' 2nd May 1879

We, the Khedive of Egypt, desiring to take definite and opportune measures for obtaining the unification of the different debts of the State and those of the Daïra Sanieh, and also desiring the reduction of the excessive charges resulting from these debts, and wishing to bear solemn testimony to our firm intention to secure every guarantee to all persons interested, have resolved to establish a special Treasury charged with the regular service of the public debt, and to appoint to its management foreign Commissioners, who at our request will be indicated by the respective Governments as fit officials to fill the post to which they will be appointed by us in the quality of Egyptian officials, and under the following conditions. Having consulted our Preamble

[1] This restriction was (in the italicized passages) subsequently reduced to a right of veto (Sawas Pasha to Sir Henry Layard, 29th July 1879).

[2] This passage was, on the representations of the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople, explained to mean: 'that the present Firman does not restrict in anything, except that which is expressly stated, the rights, privileges, and prerogatives previously and personally accorded to the Khedives of Egypt.' (Sawas Pasha to Sir H. Layard, 2 Aug. 1879).

Privy Council, we have decreed, and do hereby decree as follows :—

Establishment of the *Caisse*

ART. I. A Treasury of the Public Debt is established, charged with receiving the funds necessary for the interest and redemption of the debt, and with applying them to this object exclusively.

Hypothecated Revenues

ART. II. The officials, the local Treasuries, or the special Administrations, after collecting, receiving, or accumulating the revenues specially devoted to the payment of the debt, are or shall be in future charged to pay them *into the Central Treasury or to keep them at the disposal of the Intendants of Public Expenditure*[1] ('Ordonnateurs des Dépenses de l'État'). The Intendants of Public Expenditure are, by virtue of the present Decree, bound to pay these revenues on account of the State Treasury into the Special Treasury of the Public Debt, which will be considered in this respect as a special Treasury. These officials, treasuries, and administrations can only procure a valid discharge by means of the vouchers which will be delivered to them by the said 'Caisse' of the Public Debt. Any other order or voucher will not be valid. The same officials, treasuries, or administrations will every month send to the Minister of Finance a statement of the receipts or collections made by themselves directly or paid in by the receivers of the revenues specially assigned to the debt and the payments made into the Special Treasury of the Public Debt. The Minister of Finance will communicate these statements to the Administration of the Caisse of the Public Debt.

The Caisse of the Public Debt shall receive from the Daïra Sanieh the entire sum necessary for the interest and redemption of the amount of its unified Debt. It shall likewise receive the funds for the yearly

[1] The italicized passage is affected by Art. 31 of the Law of Liquidation, which provides for all hypothecated Revenue being paid direct to the *Caisse*.

payment due to the English Government, and representing the interest on the Suez Canal shares.

Insufficient and surplus Revenue

ART. III. If the payments of the revenue assigned to the debt be insufficient to meet the half-yearly charges, the special Public Debt Department will demand from the Treasury, through the intermediary of the Minister of Finance, the sum required to complete the half-yearly payments; the Treasury will have to deliver this sum a fortnight before the payments are due. If the funds in hand constitute a surplus over the amount necessary for the payment of the interest and the sinking fund, the special Treasury of the Public Debt will pay this surplus at the end of each year to the general Treasury of the Exchequer. The Treasury of the Public Debt will submit its accounts, which will be examined and reported upon according to law.

Actions of *Caisse* against Government to be brought in the International Courts

ART. IV. The suits which the Treasury and its Directors, on its behalf, acting in the name and in the interests of the creditors, mostly of foreign nationality, may consider they have to bring against the financial administration represented by the Minister of Finance in so far as regards the guardianship of the guarantee of the debt which we have confided to the said Treasury, will be brought in the terms of their jurisdiction before the new tribunals which, in conformity with the agreement entered into with the Powers, have been instituted in Egypt.

The Commissioners

ART. V. The Commissioners selected as stated above will have the direction of the special Treasury of the Public Debt. They will be appointed by us for five years, and will sit in Cairo. Their functions may be continued after the five years have expired, and in case of the death or resignation of one of them the vacancy will be filled by us in the manner of the original appointment. They may intrust one of themselves with the functions of President, and

the latter will notify his nomination to the Minister of Finance.

ART. VI. The cost of exchange, insurance, and conveyance of specie abroad, as well as the commission for the payment of the coupons, will be borne by the Government. The Directors of the Treasury will come to a previous arrangement with the Ministers of Finance with regard to all these operations, but the Minister will decide whether the despatch of these sums is to be effected in specie or by letters of exchange.

ART. VII. The Treasury will not be allowed to employ any funds, disposable or not, in operations of credit, commerce, industry, etc.

Government not to diminish yield of hypothecated taxes

ART. VIII. The Government will not be able, without an agreement with the majority of the Commissioners directing the Treasury of the Public Debt, to effect in any of the taxes specially devoted to the Debt any changes which might result in a diminution of the revenue from these taxes. At the same time the Government may farm out one or several of these taxes, provided that the contract entered into insure a revenue at least equal to that already existing, and may also conclude Treaties of Commerce introducing modifications in the Customs duties.

nor to contract new loans, without consent of *Caisse*

ART. IX. The Government undertakes not to issue any Treasury Bonds or any other new bonds, and not to contract any other loan of any nature whatsoever. This same engagement is entered into in the name of the Daïra Sanieh. Nevertheless, in case the Government, from urgent national reasons, should find itself placed under the necessity of having recourse to credit, it may do so within the limits of strict necessity, and without doing anything to affect the employment of the revenues set apart for the Treasury of the Public Debt, or to cause their diversion from their destination. These totally

exceptional loans can only be contracted after an agreement on the subject with the Commissioners directing the Treasury.

Art. X. In order that the arrangements stated in the preceding article shall not place obstacles in the way of the Administration, the Government may open a running-account with a bank to facilitate its payments by means of anticipations, to be regulated in accordance with the year's receipts. The debit or credit balance will be settled at the end of each year. This current account must never be overdrawn during the year by more than 50,000,000 fr.

Done at Cairo, the 2nd of May, 1876.

ISMAIL.

APPENDIX IV

Decree of 1st May 1883 promulgating

THE ORGANIC LAW OF EGYPT

NOUS, KHÉDIVE D'ÉGYPTE,

DÉCRÉTONS :

TITRE PREMIER

ARTICLE PREMIER. Il est institué :

1° Un Conseil provincial, dans chaque Moudirieh ;
2° Un Conseil législatif ;
3° Une Assemblée générale ;
4° Un Conseil d'État.

TITRE II

Des Conseils provinciaux

ART. II. Le Conseil provincial peut voter des contributions extraordinaires à établir en vue de dépenses d'utilité publique intéressant la Moudirieh. Les délibérations du

Conseil provincial, en cette matière, ne sont définitives qu'après avoir reçu la sanction du Gouvernement.

ART. III. L'avis préalable du Conseil provincial est nécessaire dans les questions suivantes :

1° Changements proposés à la circonscription du territoire de la Moudirieh et des villages ; 2° Direction des voies de communication par terre ou par eau et travaux d'irrigation ; 3° Etablissement, changement ou suppression des foires et marchés dans la Moudirieh ; 4° Les objets sur lesquels il pourra être appelé à donner son avis en vertu des lois, décrets ou règlements ; 5° Les questions sur lesquelles il est consulté par l'Administration.

ART. IV. Le Conseil provincial peut donner son avis : 1° sur les travaux de route et de navigation, d'irrigation et de tous autres objets d'utilité publique intéressant la Moudirieh ; 2° sur les acquisitions, aliénations, échanges, construction et reconstruction des édifices et bâtiments destinés à la Moudirieh, aux tribunaux, aux prisons ou à d'autres services spéciaux de la Moudirieh, ainsi que sur les changements de destination de ces édifices.

ART. V. Le Conseil provincial peut émettre spontanément des vœux sur les questions intéressant le progrès de l'instruction publique et de l'agriculture, tels que dessèchement des marais, amélioration des cultures et écoulement des eaux, etc., etc.

ART. VI. Un Conseil provincial ne peut se réunir que s'il a été convoqué par le Moudir, en vertu d'un Décret déterminant l'époque et la durée de la réunion. Les Conseils provinciaux doivent être réunis au moins une fois par an. Au jour indiqué pour la réunion du Conseil provincial, le Moudir donnera lecture de l'ordonnance de convocation, recevra des conseillers nouvellement élus le serment de fidélité à Notre Personne et d'obéissance aux lois du pays, et déclarera, en Notre Nom, la session ouverte. Le Conseil provincial est présidé par le Moudir qui a voix délibérative. L'Ingénieur en chef de la Moudirieh assiste aux séances avec voix délibérative.

ART. VII. Les séances du Conseil provincial ne sont pas

publiques. Il ne peut délibérer que si la moitié plus un au moins des conseillers sont présents.

ART. VIII. Tout acte ou toute délibération d'un Conseil provincial relatifs à des objets qui ne sont pas légalement compris dans ses attributions, sont nuls et de nul effet. La nullité en sera prononcée par la Commission spéciale prévue à l'art. 52 de la présente loi.

ART. IX. Toute délibération prise hors de la réunion légale du Conseil est nulle de plein droit. Le Moudir déclare la réunion illégale, prononce la nullité des actes et prend toutes les mesures nécessaires pour que l'assemblée se sépare immédiatement. Les membres des Conseils provinciaux peuvent se pourvoir devant le Ministre de l'Intérieur contre la décision du Moudir.

ART. X. Il est interdit à tout Conseil provincial de se mettre en communication avec d'autres Conseils provinciaux et de faire ou de publier aucune proclamation ou adresse.

ART. XI. La dissolution d'un Conseil provincial ne peut être prononcée que par Décret rendu sur la proposition de Notre Conseil des Ministres. Dans ce cas, il est procédé à de nouvelles élections dans le délai de trois mois à dater du jour de la dissolution.

ART. XII. Les Membres Délégués au Conseil législatif dont il va être parlé au Titre IV sont choisis dans le sein des Conseils provinciaux.

TITRE III

Composition des Conseils Provinciaux

ART. XIII. Le nombre des Conseillers provinciaux est déterminé ainsi qu'il suit :

Gharbieh, 8 ; Menoufieh, 6 ; Dakahlieh, 6 ; Charkieh, 6 ; Béhéra, 5 ; Ghizeh, 4 ; Gallioubieh, 4 ; Beni-Souef, 4 ; Fayoum, 3 ; Minieh, 4 ; Siout, 7 ; Ghirgheh, 5 ; Keneh, 4 ; Esneh, 4.

L'election des Conseillers provinciaux se fera dans les formes et conditions prescrites par la Loi électorale promulguée à la date de ce jour.

ART. XIV. Nul ne sera éligible au Conseil provincial s'il n'a trente ans révolus, s'il ne sait lire et écrire, s'il ne paie, depuis deux ans au moins, cinq mille piastres par an d'impôt foncier à la Moudirieh et s'il n'est inscrit sur la liste électorale depuis cinq ans au moins.

ART. XV. Les fonctionnaires et les militaires en activité ne pourront être nommés membres des Conseils provinciaux.

ART. XVI. Nul ne peut être membre de plusieurs Conseils provinciaux.

ART. XVII. Les membres des Conseils provinciaux sont nommés pour six ans ; ils sont renouvelés par moitié tous les trois ans et sont indéfiniment rééligibles. Les membres sortants sont désignés par tirage au sort.

TITRE IV

Du Conseil législatif

ART. XVIII. Aucune loi, aucun décret portant règlement d'Administration publique, ne sera promulgué, sans avoir été préalablement présenté pour avis au Conseil législatif. Si le Gouvernement ne s'arrête pas à cet avis, il notifiera au Conseil les motifs de sa décision. L'exposition de ces motifs ne peut donner lieu à aucune discussion.

ART. XIX. Le Conseil législatif pourra provoquer la présentation par le Gouvernement de projets de lois ou décrets portant règlement d'Administration publique.

ART. XX. Tout Egyptien peut Nous adresser une pétition. Les pétitions, envoyées au Président du Conseil législatif, seront, après examen par ce Conseil, rejetées ou prises en considération. Les pétitions prises en considération sont envoyées pour telles suites que de droit au Ministre compétent qui devra informer le Conseil de la suite donnée.

ART. XXI. Toute pétition ayant pour objet des droits et des intérêts personnels sera rejetée si elle ressort à la compétence des Tribunaux ou si elle n'a été préalablement adressée à l'autorité administrative compétente.

ART. XXII. Le Budget Général des recettes et des

dépenses devra être communiqué au Conseil législatif le premier décembre de chaque année. Le Conseil pourra émettre des avis et des vœux sur chaque chapitre du Budget. Ces avis et ces vœux seront transmis au Ministre des Finances qui devra, le cas échéant, motiver le rejet des propositions du Conseil. Cette motivation ne peut donner lieu à aucune discussion.

ART. XXIII. Le service du Tribut, celui de la Dette Publique et généralement toutes charges ou obligations résultant de la Loi de Liquidation ou de conventions internationales, ne peuvent être l'objet d'aucune discussion ni d'aucune expression de vœu.

ART. XXIV. En tous cas, le Budget sera rendu exécutoire par Décret, sur la proposition de Notre Conseil des Ministres avant le 25 Décembre de chaque année.

ART. XXV. Le compte général de l'administration des Finances, rendu pour l'exercice écoulé, sera présenté chaque année au Conseil législatif, pour avis ou observations, au moins quatre mois avant la présentation du nouveau Budget.

ART. XXVI. Le Conseil législatif se réunit les 1er Février, Avril, Juin, Août, Octobre et Décembre de chaque année. La première convocation aura lieu par Décret. Il peut en outre être convoqué par Nous, toutes les fois que les circonstances nécessiteront sa réunion. Les sessions sont closes dès que le Conseil législatif a épuisé l'examen des questions qui lui sont soumises. La dissolution du Conseil législatif est prononcée par Nous. Les Conseils provinciaux éliront, conformément à l'art. 32, les nouveaux membres délégués, dans les trois mois qui suivront la dissolution. Les membres pérmanents conserveront leurs fonctions dans le nouveau Conseil, conformément à l'art. 31.

ART. XXVII. Les Ministres prennent part aux séances du Conseil législatif et à toutes les discussions avec voix consultative. Ils peuvent aussi se faire assister ou représenter dans des questions spéciales par de hauts fonctionnaires de leur Département Ministériel.

ART. XXVIII. Les Ministres fournissent au Conseil législatif toutes les explications qu'il leur demande dans la limite de ses attributions.

ART. XXIX. Nul ne peut être admis aux séances du Conseil législatif en dehors des Ministres et de ceux qui les assistent ou les représentent.

TITRE V

Composition du Conseil législatif

ART. XXX. Le Conseil législatif se compose de trente membres, dont un président et deux vice-présidents. Les membres du Conseil législatif sont permanents ou délégués. Les membres permanents du Conseil législatif sont au nombre de quatorze, savoir :

Le président, l'un des vice-présidents et douze conseillers. Les membres délégués sont au nombre de seize, dont un vice-président.

ART. XXXI. Le président est nommé directement par Nous. Le vice-président et les membres permanents sont nommés par Nous, sur la proposition de Notre Conseil des Ministres. Les Président, Vice-Présidents et membres permanents reçoivent une indemnité. Ils ne peuvent être révoqués de leurs fonctions que par un Décret rendu sur la proposition de Notre Conseil des Ministres, à la suite d'une délibération prise par le Conseil législatif à la majorité des deux tiers des voix. Si des vacances viennent à se produire par la nomination de membres permanents aux fonctions de Ministre, il sera pourvu à leur remplacement par la nomination des Ministres sortants.

ART. XXXII. Le mandat des membres délégués a une durée de six années. Les membres délégués peuvent être indéfiniment réélus. Ils reçoivent une indemnité de déplacement. Les seize siéges des membres délégués sont ainsi répartis : pour le Caire, un ; pour Alexandrie, Damiette, Rosette, Suez, Port-Saïd, Ismaïlia et El-Arich, un ; et pour chacune des quatorze provinces, un, élu par le Conseil provincial respectif. L'élection des membres délégués se

fera dans les formes et conditions prescrites par la loi électorale promulguée à la date de ce jour. Le membre délégué qui, au renouvellement triennal de son Consei provincial, sortira de ce Conseil, par le tirage au sort, cessera de faire partie du Conseil législatif. Le Conseil provincial élira à sa place un autre membre délégué. Un des vice-présidents du Conseil nommés par Nous est pris parmi les membres délégués.

ART. XXXIII. Le Président du Conseil législatif nomme les employés formant le personnel nécessaire pour l'expédition des affaires.

TITRE VI

De l'Assemblée générale

ART. XXXIV. Nul impôt nouveau, direct, foncier ou personnel, ne peut être établi en Egypte, sans avoir été discuté et voté par l'Assemblée générale.

ART. XXXV. L'Assemblée générale doit être consultée pour avis : 1° Sur tout emprunt public ; 2° Sur la construction ou la suppression de tout canal et toute ligne de chemin de fer traversant plusieurs Moudiriehs ; 3° Sur la classification générale des terres du pays, au point de vue de l'impôt foncier.

Le Gouvernement devra faire connaître à l'Assemblée les motifs pour lesquels, le cas échéant, il n'aurait pas tenu compte de son avis. L'exposition de ces motifs ne peut donner lieu à aucune discussion.

ART. XXXVI. L'Assemblée générale émet son avis sur les questions et projets qui sont soumis à son examen par le Gouvernement. Elle peut aussi émettre spontanément des avis et des vœux en toutes matières : économiques, administratives ou financières.

Le Gouvernement devra faire connaître à l'Assemblée les motifs pour lesquels, le cas échéant, il n'aurait pas tenu compte de l'avis ou du vœu exprimés. L'exposition de ces motifs ne peut donner lieu à aucune discussion.

ART. XXXVII. Toute délibération prise par l'Assemblée

générale en dehors des conditions de la présente loi est nulle et de nul effet.

ART. XXXVIII. Nul ne sera admis aux séances de l'Assemblée générale en dehors des membres de l'Assemblée.

ART. XXXIX. L'Assemblée générale est convoquée par Nous une fois au moins tous les deux ans. Il Nous appartient également de la proroger et de la dissoudre. En cas de dissolution, les nouvelles élections devront avoir lieu dans un délai de six mois.

TITRE VII

Composition de l'Assemblée Générale

ART. XL. L'Assemblée générale est constituée ainsi qu'il suit :

1° Les Ministres ; 2° Les Président, Vice-Présidents et membres du Conseil législatif ; 3° Les Notables délégués.

ART. XLI. Les Notables délégués sont au nombre de quarante-six, savoir : [Omitted]

ART. XLII. Le mandat des Notables délégués a une durée de six années. Les Notables délégués peuvent être indéfiniment réélus. Ils reçoivent une indemnité de déplacement. L'élection des Notables délégués se fera dans les formes et conditions prescrites par la loi électorale promulguée à la date de ce jour. Nul ne peut être Notable délégué s'il n'a trente ans révolus, s'il ne sait lire et écrire, s'il ne paye, dans la ville ou dans la Moudirieh qu'il représente, depuis cinq ans au moins, deux mille piastres par an d'impôt foncier, immobilier ou de patente, et s'il n'est, depuis cinq ans au moins, inscrit sur la liste électorale.

ART. XLIII. Le Président de Notre Conseil législatif présidera de droit l'Assemblée générale.

ART. XLIV. Les Secrétaires du Conseil législatif rédigeront, sous la direction du Président de l'Assemblée, les procès-verbaux des séances.

ART. XLV. Les Notables délégués devront, dès la première séance, et avant d'exercer leurs fonctions, prêter serment de fidélité à Notre Personne et d'obéissance aux lois du pays.

TITRE VIII

Du Conseil d'Etat

ART. XLVI. L'organisation et les attributions du Conseil d'Etat seront déterminées par un Décret ultérieur.

TITRE IX

Dispositions Transitoires

ART. XLVII. Les articles XVIII, XXXIV et XXXV de la présente loi recevront leur application dès que le Conseil législatif se sera réuni pour la première fois.

TITRE X

Dispositions Générales

ART. XLVIII. Les Conseils provinciaux, le Conseil législatif et l'Assemblée générale ne peuvent délibérer valablement que si les deux tiers au moins de leurs membres, non compris ceux en congé régulier, assistent à la délibération. Hors les cas où la majorité des deux tiers est requise, les délibérations sont prises à la majorité des voix. En cas de partage, la voix du Président est prépondérante. Aucun vote ne peut être émis par mandataire.

ART. XLIX. En cas de vacance d'un siège de Membre d'un Conseil provincial, du Conseil législatif ou de l'Assemblée générale, on procédera, au plus tard dans le délai d'un mois, à une nouvelle élection. Le mandat du nouvel élu ne dure que jusqu'aux prochaines élections générales.

ART. L. Le Conseil législatif et l'Assemblée générale feront respectivement leur réglement intérieur. Un Décret ultérieur établira le règlement intérieur des Conseils provinciaux.

ART. LI. Aucune Loi, aucun Décret ne sera promulgué, sans avoir été contresigné par le Président du Conseil des Ministres et les Ministres compétents.

ART. LII. Toute question qui pourrait s'élever sur l'interprétation de la présente loi sera jugée souverainement par une Commission spéciale composée de deux Ministres, dont

l'un sera celui de la Justice et aura la présidence, de deux membres du Conseil législatif et de trois conseillers de la Cour d'Appel du Caire.

ART. LIII. Toutes dispositions des Lois, Décrets, Ordres Supérieurs et Règlements contraires au présent Décret sont et demeurent abrogés.

ART. LIV. Nos Ministres sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution de la présente loi qui sera promulguée en la forme ordinaire et affichée dans les villes et villages de la Haute- et de la Basse-Egypte.

Fait au Palais d'Abdin, le 24 djémad-el-akher 1300,
1er mai 1883.

(*Signé*) MÉHÉMET THEWFIK.

APPENDIX V

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM IN THE SUDAN

[Extract from the *Journal Officiel*, 19th January 1899]

AGREEMENT between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt, relative to the future administration of the Sudan.

WHEREAS certain provinces in the Sudan which were in rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive have now been reconquered by the joint military and financial efforts of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive;

AND whereas it has become necessary to decide upon a system for the administration of and for the making of laws for the said reconquered provinces, under which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled condition

of large portions thereof, and for the varying requirements of different localities;

AND whereas it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working and development of the said system of administration and legislation;

AND whereas it is conceived that for many purposes Wadi Halfa and Suákin may be most effectively administered in conjunction with the reconquered provinces to which they are respectively adjacent;

NOW, it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the Undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose, as follows:

ART. I. The word 'Sudan' in this Agreement means all the territories South of the 22nd parallel of latitude, which:

1. Have never been evacuated by Egyptian troops since the year 1882; or

2. Which, having before the late rebellion in the Sudan been administered by the Government of His Highness the Khedive, were temporarily lost to Egypt, and have been reconquered by Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government, acting in concert; or

3. Which may hereafter be reconquered by the two Governments acting in concert.

ART. II. The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together, both on land and water, throughout the Sudan, except in the town of Suákin, in which locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be used.

ART. III. The supreme military and civil command in the Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the 'Governor-General of the Sudan.' He shall be appointed by Khedivial Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and shall be removed only by Khedivial Decree, with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

ART. IV. Laws, as also Orders and Regulations with the

full force of law, for the good government of the Sudan, and for regulating the holding, disposal, and devolution of property of every kind therein situate, may from time to time be made, altered, or abrogated by Proclamation of the Governor-General. Such Laws, Orders and Regulations may apply to the whole or any named part of the Sudan, and may, either explicitly or by necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing Law or Regulation.

All such Proclamations shall be forthwith notified to Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, and to the President of the Council of Ministers of His Highness the Khedive.

ART. V. No Egyptian Law, Decree, Ministerial Arrêté, or other enactment hereafter to be made or promulgated shall apply to the Sudan or any part thereof, save in so far as the same shall be applied by Proclamation of the Governor-General in manner hereinbefore provided.

ART. VI. In the definition by Proclamation of the conditions under which Europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with or reside in the Sudan, or to hold property within its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to the subjects of any one or more Power.

ART. VII. Import duties on entering the Sudan shall not be payable on goods coming from Egyptian territory. Such duties may, however, be levied on goods coming from elsewhere than Egyptian territory, but in the case of goods entering the Sudan at Suákin, or any other port on the Red Sea Littoral, they shall not exceed the corresponding duties for the time being leviable on goods entering Egypt from abroad. Duties may be levied on goods leaving the Sudan, at such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by Proclamation.

ART. VIII. The jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals shall not extend, nor be recognized, for any purpose whatsoever, in any part of the Sudan, except in the town of Suákin.

ART. IX. Until, and save so far as it shall be otherwise

determined, by Proclamation, the Sudan, with the exception of the town of Suákin, shall be and remain under martial law.

ART. X. No Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents shall be accredited in respect of nor allowed to reside in the Sudan, without the previous consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

ART. XI. The importation of slaves into the Sudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made by Proclamation for the enforcement of this Regulation.

ART. XII. It is agreed between the two Governments that special attention shall be paid to the enforcement of the Brussels Act of the 2nd July 1890, in respect to the import, sale, and manufacture of fire-arms and their munitions, and distilled or spirituous liquors.

Done in Cairo, the 19th January, 1899.

(Signed) BOUTROS GHALI—CROMER.

[*An Agreement between the same Contracting Parties, signed at Cairo on 10th July 1899, abrogated the Provisions in the above Agreement whereby the town of Suákin is excepted from the general régime.*]

APPENDIX VI

HISTORICAL LANDMARKS AND CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

B.C.

527 Cambyses conquers Egypt.

480–470 The Greeks overthrow the naval supremacy of the Persian Empire.

425 The Egyptians throw off the Persian yoke.

358 The Persians re-establish their rule in Egypt.

333 The Persians are conquered by Alexander the Great at Issus.

332 Alexander conquers Egypt, and founds Alexandria.

B.C.

323 Alexander dies at Babylon. His Empire being divided among his generals, Egypt falls to the share of Ptolemy.

300 Ptolemy I., of Egypt, having created a powerful navy, becomes master of Cyprus and of the coasts of Palestine and Phœnicia.

273 Egypt first sends ambassadors to Rome, to establish friendly relations with the coming Empire.

260 The first Roman fleet built. The Egyptian navy dominates the Eastern Mediterranean before and after this period.

252 Zenith of Egypt's power in the Eastern Mediterranean, contemporaneously with the struggle between Rome and Carthage for supremacy in the western waters.

247 Ptolemy III. overruns Syria.

241 Roman victory off Ægates Islands. End of First Punic War. Roman sea-power impinges on the Greek world, and begins to displace that of the Ptolemies.

222 Ptolemy IV. defeats Antiochus, King of Syria.

205 Ptolemy V. craves the help of Rome against Antiochus. Egypt loses Palestine and Cœlesyria.

193 Rome defeats the fleet of Antiochus at Cyssus (Tchemé), and establishes her naval supremacy over the Eastern Mediterranean.

149–146 Third Punic War, ending in the destruction of Carthage and the establishment of Roman naval supremacy in the Western Mediterranean.

48 Cæsar arrives in Egypt, to support Cleopatra.

31 Battle of Actium. Destruction of Antony's Egyptian fleet. Egypt becomes a Roman Province.

A.D.

5 *Pax Romana.* Rome at peace with all the world.

250 Invasion of the Goths.

259 Great Roman Victory over the Goths.

321 Seat of Empire removed from Rome to Byzantium.

410 Rome taken and sacked by Alaric.

A.D.

620–640 Arab conquests in Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and North Africa generally.

750–870 The Abbassides rule over Egypt. During the 8th century, the Arabs, having acquired command of the sea, invade Europe.

969–1160 The Fatimites rule Egypt and North Africa, thereby acquiring supremacy at sea.

1171 Saladin, having supplanted the Fatimites in Egypt, creates a strong navy and recaptures Jerusalem.

1240 Louis IX. of France takes Damietta: but he and his army are made prisoners at Mansura.

1250 Mamluk dynasty established in Egypt.

1453 Capture of Constantinople by the Turks. End of Byzantine Empire.

1492–1497 Capture of Granada by Ferdinand, terminating eight centuries of conflict between Christians and Mussulmans for possession of Spain. Discovery of America and of Cape route to the Indies, thereby leading to destruction of Mediterranean commerce with the Far East, to the impoverishment of Egypt and of her naval Protector, Venice.

1509 An Egyptian fleet, being sent to Bombay, with the object of recovering this traffic, is defeated off Diu by the Portuguese, thereby securing the Atlantic route.

1517 Egypt becomes a Turkish Pashalik. Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers are subsequently occupied.

1571 Battle of Lepanto. The Allied fleets under Don John of Austria overthrow Turkish naval supremacy.

1609 The Moors finally expelled from Spain.

1704 Capture of Gibraltar by Sir George Rooke.

1770 Destruction of Turkish fleet by Admiral Elphinston and Prince Orloff in the bay of Tchemé.

1798 Napoleon Bonaparte invades Egypt, and subsequently Syria. Victory of Nelson over French fleet at Abukir, and of Abercrombie over the French land forces at same spot.

1801 The British finally compel 30,000 French troops to evacuate Egypt.

A.D.

1805 Nelson's victory off Trafalgar puts an end to the long rivalry between the European Powers—which, during the 18th century, had been reduced to a duel between France and England—for naval supremacy. Great Britain thenceforth Mistress of the Seas.

1806 Mohammed Ali recognized by the Porte as Pasha of Egypt.

1807 Second British Expedition to Egypt (to help the Mamluks). Mohammed Ali's victories lead to its ignominious defeat and withdrawal.

1811 Extermination of the Mamluks by Mohammed Ali.

1811–1818 The Wahábi War. Ibrahim finally subdues the Wahábis, of Arabia.

1820–1823 Conquest of the Sudan by Egypt. Khartum founded. Siwa annexed.

1824–1826 Egyptian Expedition to the Morea. First Treaty of London.

1827 Battle of Navarino. Turco-Egyptian fleet destroyed by the Allies under Codrington.

1829 Treaty of Adrianople. Independence of Greece.

1831 Mohammed Ali, being outlawed by the Porte, invades Syria.

1832 Mohammed Ali possesses a powerful navy, built at Alexandria. Fall of Acre. Great victories of the Egyptian army under Ibrahim. Invasion of Asia Minor.

1833 The Treaty of Kutaya ends the war. Mohammed Ali confirmed in the Pashalik of Egypt, and given possession of Syria. Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi places Turkey under Russian protection.

1834 Revolt in Syria against Egyptian rule.

1841 Mohammed Ali evacuates Syria; but is secured in the hereditary tenure of Egypt.

1849 Death of Mohammed Ali. Abbas I succeeds to the Pashalik of Egypt.

1854 Death of Abbas. Accession of Said. First Concession to M. de Lesseps (Suez Canal).

A.D.

1856 M. de Lesseps secures second Concession for Suez Canal. Treaty of Paris (Eastern Question).

1858 Land Law secures freehold rights for Felláhin proprietors.

1863 Death of Said. Accession of Ismail to the Pashalik of Egypt.

1866 Firman to Ismail, altering line of Succession. Definitive Convention (Suez Canal) and Sultan's Ratification.

1867 Title of Khedive granted to Ismail by Imperial Firman.

1869 Opening of Suez Canal.

1873 Firman consolidating all previous Firmans.

1876 The Public Debt of Egypt amounts to eighty-nine millions.

— Dual Control established.

— *Caisse de la Dette* established.

— International Courts established.

1878 Dual Control suspended.

— Treaty of Berlin (Eastern Question).

1879 Ismail deposed. Accession of Taufik.

— Firman of Investiture (Taufik).

— Dual Control revived.

1880 Law of Liquidation consolidates the Debt of Egypt and limits Expenditure.

1881 Military revolts at Cairo.

1882 Chamber of Delegates revived.

— Arábi revolt. Tel-el-Kebir. British Occupation.

1883 Dual Control abolished. Single Control established.

1884 First Sudan Campaign.

1885 Fall of Khartum. Evacuation of Sudan.

— The Convention of London regulates the financial position of Egypt.

— Suez Canal Commission, Paris.

1885–1887 Negotiations with the Porte to regularize the position in Egypt of the Protectoral Power. Abortive results.

1888 Suez Canal Convention.

A.D.

1889 Abolition of the *Corvée.*

1890 British undertaking not to again convert the Unified Debt before 1905.

1892 Death of Taufik. Accession of Abbas II.

1896 Expedition to Dongola.

1897 Second Sudan Campaign.

1898 Reconquest of the Sudan. Reservoir scheme.

1899 Pacification and Delimitation of the Sudan. Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Anglo-French Agreement.

INDEX

ABABDEH, the, 375
Abbas, Pasha of Egypt, reign of, 57; Khedive of Egypt, 75
Abbassides, the, 40
Abu Haraz, 433
Abyssinia, 10; 29; war with, 379; and Italy, 382; political boundaries of, 397 *seq.*; political situation in, 397; Historical Retrospect, 398; armed strength of, 399; Internal progress of, 400; Communications, 401; Treaties, 401 *seq.*; undelimited frontier, 403; Sir R. Rodd's Treaty with, 405 *seq.*; importance of, 406
Aden, Gulf of, Egyptian garrisons on, in 1882, 381; 403
Administration, Departmental, 193 *seq.*; —*See Anglo-Egyptian Administration*
Administrations, the Mixed, 159; 162
Administrative Authority, sources of, 184
Administrators, Native, capacity of, 152-154
Adua, Italian reverse at, 382
Adura, R., 434 (foot-note)
Afafit, battle of, 291
Agig, Slave Trade at, 278
Agreements, Political,—*See under respective subjects*
Agriculture, 20 *seq.*; School of, 233
Akaba, 394
Albert Edward Nyanza, 8; 412; 414
Albert Nyanza, 8; 29; 414
Alexander the Great, 34
Alexandria, 20; bombardment of, 66; Port of, 164; 265; drainage scheme, 269; Garrison, 295; Port of, 302
Algeria, French Policy in, 123
Alliances, European, compared, 117; Great Britain and, 118
Amadib, 401
Amarar, the, 375
American Mission, the, 144; 245
Anglo-Egyptian Administration, the, 183 *seq.*—*See also Condominium and Sudan*
Ankoli, 409
Anthrax, 270
Appeal, Court of, 256
Arab, Bahr el-, 9; 422; Empire, and Egypt, 38.—*See also Sheikhs*
Arábi Revolt, the, 65 *seq.*; and the Sultan, 131
Arabia, and the Slave Trade, 278
Arabs of the Sudan, 375
Argo, Is., 435
Armenian, Church, in Egypt, 144; massacres in Turkey, 115
Army, Egyptian, British Officers in the, 289; Historical Retrospect, 290; strength, 292; officers, 292; Brigade Commands, 293; Recruitment, 294; terms of service, 294
Army of Occupation, the, 294
Arsenal, at Alexandria, 285
Artin Pasha, Yakub, 213; 220; and *Preface*, p. x.
Arts et Métiers, École des, 232
Assiut, 17; 26
Aswán, 14; 18; 25; 26
Atbara, R., 11; 14; 404; battle of the, 384
Aujila, 396
Austrian Officials, number of, in Khedivial Service, 190
Autonomy, Administrative, 133; 450
Ayubites, the, 40
Azhar, El, 145; 241

BAGGARA, the, 371-4
Baker, Sir Samuel, Expedition to the Upper Nile, 378; General Valentine, and the Police, 259
Balance of Power, the, 99; 117 *seq.*
Baldwin, George, 59
Baraka, Khor, 402
Bari, the, 374
Barrage, the, 19
Bedden, 416
Belesa, 402
Belgium, Imports from, 312; and the Congo State, 415
Bellefonds, M. Linant de, 317
Bengazi, the Senussi at, 396
Beni Shangul, 431
Berber, re-occupation of, 384
Berlin, Treaty of, 114

Bertat, Dar, 431
Birriya, the, 19
Bisharin, the, 375
Black Sea, Clauses in Treaty of Paris, 112
Bogos, restored to Abyssinia, 401
Bonchamps, Mission to Abyssinia, 400 (foot-note)
Bonga, 417
Bor, 8
Bora, 416
Borku, 395; 422
Boundaries, Political,—*See Title-deeds.*
Brigandage, Commissions of, 246
British, Campaign in Abyssinia (1867-8) 398; Colonial Commerce, 94; East Africa Company, 408-410; Officials, number of, in Khedivial Service, 190; Minister, the, 154; Policy, 83 *seq.*; 121; 178; 358; prerogatives in Egypt, 183
Buildings, Public, 286
Bureaucracy, the Egyptian, 151; 187
Byzantines, the, 39

CAILLARD, Pasha, 295
Cairo, 193; drainage scheme, 269
Caisse de la Dette, the, 64; 135; 159; 165-167; Powers of the, commensurate with the life of the Debt of Egypt, 362.—*See also Decree establishing the Caisse* (*Appendix II*), 453
Canal, Suez.—*See Suez Canal*
Canals of the Delta, 19
Capital, Investment of foreign, 304; British, 305; French, 305; Native, 305
Capitulations, the, 133, 158
Cataracts, the, 11
Cattle-plague, 270
Cemeteries, 268 (foot-note)
Census, of 1897, in Egypt Proper, 135; Tables of, 136 *seq.*
Certificates, Education.—*See Education*
Cholera, epidemic (1895-1896), 267
Christian Cults and Sects, in Egypt, 138
Civil Service, the Egyptian, 189-192
Climate, 4
Climatic Zones, in the Sudan, 371
Coast Guard Service, 296
Codes, Penal and Criminal, 249
Colleges, 231; 235; Training, 237
Colonial (British) Commerce, 94
Colonies, Value of, 96
Command of the Sea, the, 102.—*See also Historical Retrospect*, 33 *seq.*, *and Egypt and Sea-power*, 76 *seq.*
Commerce, 295 *seq.*; Historical Retrospect, 295; Trade Returns, 297; Value and Volume of Trade, 297; Great Britain, Egypt's best customer, 298; Participation of other Countries, 298; Depreciation in Values, 299; Foreign Competition, 299; Chambers of Commerce, 301; Statistical Tables, 307 *seq.*—*See also Merchandise*
Commercial, Conventions, 295; 453; Travellers, 301
Communications, in the Delta, 19; in the Sudan, 432
Companies, Limited Liability, 306
Concert of Europe, the 113 *seq.*
Condominium, the Anglo-Egyptian, in the Sudan, 369; 423 *seq.*; Agreement of 1899, quoted *in extenso*, 466 *seq.*
Congo Free State, and Sir W. Mackinnon, 410; and Great Britain (Anglo-Congolese Agreement), 412 *seq.*; Pre-emptive rights of France, 415
Conscription, 294
Constantinople, Russia and, 117
Control, Need and Success of the Single, 353 *seq.*—*See also Dual and International*
Conventions, Political.—*See under respective subjects*
Convicts, 273 (foot-note)
Coptic, Church, 142; Schools, 242
Copts, 142 *seq.*
Corvée, the, abolition of, 264; 283
Cotton crop, 299; 312
Council of Ministers, the, 149; 185
Crime, categories of, 248
Crimean War, the, 110
Cromer, Viscount, 148; at Khartum, 426; Policy of, 440.—*See also Preface*
Crops, 20
Cultivation, areas of, 20
Cultures, staple, 20
Customs, Department of, 295 *seq.*; Revenue, 301; Growth of Revenue, 310
Cyprus Convention, the, 115

DAÏRA SANIEH, Administration, 162; Debt, 198
Damietta, 20
Danakil Coast, 391
Darfur, Province of, 388; 417 *seq.*; 421; 435
Debt, Public, of Egypt, 198; Proposed British Guarantee of, 360 *seq.*—*See also, Privileged, Unified, Guaranteed, Domains, Daïra, Loans*

Departmental Organization and Administration, 193 *seq.*
Dervishes, fall of dominion, 384
Digna, Osman, 291 ; 384
Dinka, Negroes, 371 ; 374
Discharge of the Nile.—*See Nile River*
Dispensaries, Government, 268 (foot-note)
Domains, Administration, 163; Debt, 198
Dongola, re-occupation of, 383 ; trade of, 435
Dor Bey, 212
Drainage, Canals, 21 ; of towns, 269
Dual Alliance, the, 107 ; 117 ; 121
Dual Control, the, 64 ; abolition of, 67
Dufferin, Lord, 68
Dufli, 8 ; 433
Dunlop, Mr Douglas, 220
Duties, Import and Export, 301

EAST AFRICA, British, Territories of, 407 ; Slavery in, 432 ; projected railways, 433 (foot-note)
Eastern Question, the, and Egypt, 107 *seq.* ; and British Policy, 121 ; the Far, 122
Education, Statistics (Census of 1897), 138 ; Historical Retrospect, 210 *seq.*; choice of Language as medium of Instruction, 214-217; Curriculum, 223 ; Syllabus, 224; Certificates, 225; Kuttabs, 225 ; Examinations for Primary and Secondary Certificates, results of, 229-230 ; Extra Government Agencies, 238 *seq.*—*See also Instruction (Public), Schools, Colleges*
Effendis, in Egypt, 188
Egypt Proper, 17 ; 19 ; 26 ; first British Expedition to, 45 ; second British Expedition to, 47 ; strategical value of, 101 ; Destiny of, 107 *seq.* ; the Political Situation in, 131 *seq.*; Population of, 135 *seq.*; Financial freedom of, 174 ; Regeneration of, 353 *seq.* ; boundaries of, 394 ; Value of, 440; and Suzerainty, 450 *seq.*; the Organic Law of, 457 *seq.*; and Great Britain (Agreement of 1899), 423 *seq.*; and Italy, 402.—*See also Anglo-Egyptian Administration*, 183 *seq.*
Egyptian Problem, the, 146
Elgon, Mt., 416
Emin Pasha, 382
Empire, the British, as an Ocean Empire, 85 *seq.*; Unity of, 90 *seq.* ; Defence of, 101 *seq.* ; The Pathway of, 442 *seq.*
Engineering, School of, 236
Ennedi, 396 ; 422
Equatorial Province, the, 378; 398; resources of, 435 (foot-note).
Equatorial Regions, Nile Basin, Treaty-rights in the, 407 *seq.*—*See also Nile.*
Equilibrium, factors of, in Egypt, 146
Eritrea, 393 *seq.* ; 402
Ethiopia.—*See Abyssinia*
Ethiopian tribes of the Sudan, 373
Europe, the Concert of, 113 *seq.*
Executive, the Government, 193
Expansion of Egypt, and British Imperial Policy, 83 *seq.*; 439 *seq.*
Expenditure, Administrative, 193; 199; 208 ; 'Authorized,' 203 ; prospective, 209
Exports, Value and Excess of, 307

FAR Eastern Question, the, 122
Fasher, El, 431
Fashoda, 382; French Expedition to, 418 *seq.* ; Anglo-Egyptian post established at, 420
Fatimites, the, 40
Fayum, the, 12 ; 17
Fazokl, Dar, 431
Fellâhin, indebtedness of the, 207
Ferkeh, battle of, 383
Fertît, Dar, 422
Fetters, International.—*See* International fetters
Fezzan, 396 ; 422
Finance, Department of, 193 *seq.*—*See Financial*
Financial, Adviser, position of the, 193 ; stages of progress, 194 ; statistics of progress, 196 *seq.* ; the Situation, in 1899, 199 ; Law of Egypt, the, 360
Firmans, operative at present day, 63 ; regarding Boundaries of Egypt, 387 *seq.* ; Consolidation of, 45 *seq.* ; quoted in Appendix II, 450.—*See also under respective subjects*
Fola Rapids, 8
Foreign Affairs, Department of, 287
Foreign elements in Civil Service, 189
Foreigners, in Egypt, 137 ; 141
France, Opposition of, in Egypt, 170 *seq.* ; and the Egyptian Press, 280 ; and Tripoli, 396 ; in Abyssinia, 400; and the Anglo-Congolese Agreement, 414 ; and Fashoda, 382, 418 ; and Great Britain (Agreement of 1899) 420.—*See also French, Caisse de la Dette, Suez Canal, International fetters, Mixed Administrations*
French, African Policy, 122 *seq.* ; Policy in Egypt, 175 *seq.* ; number

of officials in Khedivial Service, 190; Sphere in Central Africa, 418.—*See also France*
Frontiers,—*See Title-deeds.*
Funds, the Reserve. — *See Reserve Funds*

GAFFIRS, 263; 266
Garstin, Sir William, 281
Gash, R., 404.
General Assembly, the, 186; 463 *seq.*
Geological Survey, 286
German Officials, number of, in the Khedivial Service, 190
Germany, Imports from, 312; and the Anglo-Congolese Agreement, 414
Ghazal, Bahr el-, 9; 378; 413; 414; boundaries of, 417 *seq.*; French stations established in, 419; within the British Sphere, 422; the *Sudd* in, 434 (foot-note); trade of, 435
Gildessa, 406
Gondokoro, 8; 378
Gordon, General, 379; Memorial College, at Khartum, 429
Gorst, Mr, 261 (foot-note).
Gos Rejeb, 401
Governorats, 264
Great Britain, and Egypt, 154 *seq.*; and Somáli Coast, 392; and Tripoli, 396; and Fashoda, 419; and France (Agreement of 1899) 420; and Egypt (Agreement of 1899) 423 *seq.*—*See also Defence of the Empire*, 101 *seq.*; *Factors of Equilibrium*, 146 *seq.*; *Anglo-Egyptian Administration*, 183 *seq.*; *Suez Canal*, 315 *seq.*; *Regeneration of Egypt*, 353 *seq.*; *Situation in the Sudan*, 369 *seq.*; *Pathway of Empire*, 439 *seq.*; *and Appendix V*, 466 *seq.* *Cf. British*
Greek, Church, in Egypt, 144; Officials, number of, in the Khedivial Service, 190
Grenfell, Sir Francis, 290
Guaranteed Debt, the, 198
Guigon Bey, 232

HADENDOA, the, 375
Hagar-Nush, 402
Halfa, Wadi, 279; English and Egyptian flags hoisted at, 425
Hamed, Abu, capture of, 383
Harar, 392 *seq.*; occupied by Menelik, 401; 406
Haraz, Abu, 401
Hashish, insanities, 270 (foot-note); smuggling, 296
Health, Public, Department of, 267 *seq.*
Hejaz, the, and Cholera, 269
Hertslet, Sir Edward, quoted, 387 *seq.*
Hewett, Sir William, 398; 401
Hicks Pasha, 69
Historical Retrospect: Egypt of the Past, 33 *seq.*; Dynasty of Mohammed Ali, 45 *seq.*; Egypt under the Powers, 64 *seq.*; Egypt under the Single Control, 68 *seq.*—*See also History of Egypt*
History of Egypt, Landmarks in the, 469 *seq.*—*See also Historical Retrospect under separate Sections, or Departments of the Administration*
Hospitals, Government, 268 (foot-note). —*See also Kasr el-Aini, and Lunatic*
Hunter, Sir Archibald, 383
Hygiene, Institute of, 268

IBRAHIMÍA Canal, 17
Imports, Value of, 307
Infectious Diseases, Hospital for, 271
Institutions, Representative, 185
Instruction, Public, 210 *seq.*; Administrative checks, 218; Government Institutions, 219 *seq.*; Budget, 219; Central Administration, 220; Board of Examiners, 222; Wadi Tumailat Estates, 222; Inspectorate, 223.—*See also Education, Schools, and Colleges*
Interior, Department of the, 257 *seq.*; Historical Retrospect, 258 *seq.*; Central Organization, 260 *seq.*; Administration, 261; Direction of Reforms, 263; Local Organization, 264; Centralized Administrations, 266 *seq.*; Decentralized Organization, 279
International, Administrations, 191; Control, 193; Fetters, 157 *seq.*; Relations, 98 *seq.*
Internationalism, Cost of, to Egypt, 200; 167; Sir Alfred Milner on, 169
Irrigation, 16 *seq.*; Perennial, 22 *seq.*; Reservoir Scheme, 24-27.—*See also Public Works (Department of)*; *and Agriculture*, 20 *seq.*
Isa Habrawal, 405
Ismail, Pasha and Khedive of Egypt, accession, 59; career of, 60-63; 212. —*See also Finance*, 193 *seq.*
Italian Officials, number of, in the Khedivial Service, 190
Italy, and Abyssinia, 382, 402; and Danakil Coast, 391; and Massawa, 391; and Tripoli, 396

JAÄLIN, the, 372
Jalo, Slave Trade of, 274
Jerjub, port of, 395
Jesuits, the, in Egypt, 145
Jibuti, 401
Joffa, oasis of, residence of the Senussi Mahdi, 395
Johannis, Negús of Abyssinia, 398
Juba, R., 403; 416
Judicial Institutions, 249 *seq.*—*See also Justice and Jurisdiction*
Jur, the, 374
Jurisdiction, Co-ordinate and mutually exclusive, 246; Unity of, 256
Justice, Department of, 246 *seq.*; Administrative Reforms, 248; Categories of Crime, 248; Penal and Criminal Codes, 249; Judicial Tariff, 249; Judicial Institutions, 249 *seq.*; Mehkemés, 251; Public Prosecutor, the, 252; Judicial Surveillance, 254; National Tribunals, 255
Jusuf, Bahr, 17

KABBABISH, the, 375
Kakamot, Khor, 404
Kalabat, 389; 400; 401; 431
Karkoj, 435 (foot-note)
Karora, 402
Kasr el-Aini Hospital, 270; 271
Kassala, 401; 404; 433
Kedaref, 400; 401; 433
Khedive Abbas, the, position and character of, 149-150
Khedivial, Authority, 183; rights, noncession of, 389
Khartum, 9; re-occupation of, 384; British and Egyptian flags hoisted at, 425; Gordon Memorial College, 429; railways to, 433
Khusrev, influence of, on Mohammed Ali, 57
Kipini, 407
Kismayu, 403
Kitchener, of Khartum, Lord, 291; 402; at Fashoda, 419; Governor-General of the Sudan, 425
Koki, 409
Kordofan, Province of, 388: 417
Kufra, oasis, 395
Kutaya, Convention of, 54
Kuttabs, 225; 239

LABOUR Traffic, 275
Lado, 414; 415; 433
Lamu, Is., 407
Law, School of, 235
Lebanon, the, and France, 113
Legislative, Authority, 185; Assembly, the, 149; Council, the, 186, 460 *seq.*
Lemsen, Khor, 404
Leontieff, Count, 398
Leopold II., Sovereign of Independent Congo State, 413
Lepanto, battle of, 43
Lesseps, M. de, 58; 59; and the Suez Canal, 317 *seq.*
Library, the Khedivial, 222
Libyan Desert, the, boundaries, 395-397; within the Anglo-Egyptian Sphere, 422
Liquidation, Law of, 193
Lloyd, Mr Clifford, 69; 259
Loans, Egyptian, 452; 456.—*See also Debt of Egypt*
London, Convention (1885) of, 62, 69, 193; Declaration of, concerning the Suez Canal, in 1885, 323
Lunatic Hospital, 270
Luri, the, 374
Luxor, 433
Lyons, Captain, 285

MACDONALD, Colonel, 416
Mackinnon, Sir William, 410
Mahagi, 413-415
Mahan, Captain, U.S.N., quoted, 78
Mahdist revolt, the, 381 *seq.*
Mahdists, the, and Abyssinia, 406
Mahmud, Dervish emir, 384
Makunan, Ras, Treaty with Sir Rennell Rodd, 405 (foot-note)
Mamluks, the, 41; 46; 48
Mamurs, 264; 266
Manda, Is., 407
Marchand, Major, at Fashoda, 419
Mareb, R., 402
Martial Law, in the Sudan, 424
Martyr, Colonel, 416
Masindi, 379
Massawa, 378; 388 *seq.*
Medical Officers, 268
Medicine, School of, 236
Mediterranean, the, as a strategic area, 103
Mehkemés, the, 251
Menelik, Negús of Abyssinia, 397 *seq.*
Merchandise, Categories of (Imports and Exports), 307; Value of, 308.—*See also Commerce*
Meröe, Is., 435 (foot-note)
Meshra-er-Rek, 434 (foot-note)
Military Administrations, 288.—*See also War, and Sudan*
Milner, Sir Alfred, *Preface* x
Milton, Dr, 271

Ministers, the Council of.—*See Council of Ministers*
Missionary enterprise, in Egypt, 144; in the Sudan, 429
Mixed Administrations.—*See Administrations, Mixed*
Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, Conquest of Sudan, 376; Despotic rule of, 51; the Dynasty of, 45 *seq.*, 449; Fall of, 54; Reign of, 56
Mojabra, and the Slave Trade, 274
Mombasa (Kilindini) railway terminus, 433
Moncrieff, Sir Colin Scott-, 16
Moors, Expulsion of the, from Spain, 42
Moritz, Dr, 223
Mosque, Law, the, 268 (foot-note).—*See also Kuttabs and Azhar*
Mougel Bey, 16
Mudirs, 264
Muna, 402
Municipalities, 185; 263; 265
Munzinger Bey, 379
Murchison Falls, 8
Mussulmans, in Egypt, 142
Mwanga, of Uganda, 408

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, invasion of Egypt, 45-46
Nasser, Anglo-Egyptian post at, on the Sobat R., 434 (foot-note)
National Education, 239.—*See also Kuttabs and Azhar*
Navarino, Battle of, 51
Negroes of the Upper Nile, 372; 374
Nejumi, Wad el-, 291
Neutrality, of the Suez Canal, 334
Neutralization, of Egypt, 356
Niam-Niam.—*See Zandé*
Nile Basin, 3 *seq.*; physical insularity, 28
Nile River, 7 *seq.*; Upper, 7 *seq.*; Middle, 10 *seq.*; Lower, 12 *seq.*; Delta, 12; Regime of, 13 *seq.*; Discharge of, 15; Speed of current, 16; Blue, 9; 13; 403; 435; White, 8; 13; 435
Nile Valley, Political isolation of, 28; Control of Upper, 29; the Title-deeds of, 386 *seq.*; Historical Synopsis, 387; Egyptian Boundaries confirmed, 393; Analysis of Treaty-rights in, 394 *seq.*; Upper Nile Territories, 410-416; Territorial Integrity of, 423; Domination of the, 439 *seq.*—*See also Anglo-Egyptian Condominium*, 423 *seq.*
Nomads, 375
Normal Schools, 237
Northbrook, Lord, 69
Nuba race, in the Sudan, 375
Nubar Pasha, 69; 74; 259
Nubia, Province of, 388
Nuer, the, 374

OASES, the, 4; 266
Observatory, the Khedivial, 223
Occupation, the Army of, 294; British, of Egypt, 183 *seq.*—*See also Anglo-Egyptian Condominium*, 423; *Domination of the Nile Valley*, 439; and *Suez Canal*, 315 *seq.*
Oculé-Kusai, 402
Officials, the British, 155; Egyptian, 155.—*See also Civil Service*
Omdehs, 263; 265
Omdurman, decisive battle of, 384
Ommyades, the, 40
Opthalmia, 270
Organic Law of Egypt, the, 132; 457 *seq.*
Organization, Departmental, 193 *seq.*
Ottoman Special Commissioner, the, in Egypt, 185.—*See also Turkey*
Ottomans, the, 41; and sea-power, 43
Overland Route, the, 317.—*See also Suez Canal*, 315 *seq.*

PALMERSTON, Lord, and Mohammed Ali, 111
Paris, Treaty (1856) of, 110
Parquet, the, 252-254
Patta, Is., 407
Pauncefote, Sir Julian, and the Suez Canal Commission (1885), 335 *seq.*
Perennial Irrigation.—*See Irrigation*
Persian Empire, the, and Egypt, 33
Pibor, R. (Juba R.), 434 (foot-note)
Police, the Egyptian, 261; 265; 271; and Military Recruits, 294
Policy, British, in Egypt, 358; French, in Egypt, 175 *seq.*
Polytechnic School, 236
Population of Egypt, the, 141 *seq.*
Portal, Sir Gerald, 398; 408
Press, the Egyptian, 279 *seq.*
Prisons Administration, 272
Privileged Debt, the, 198
Professions, Choice of, by successful Candidates at Examinations, 230
Prosecutor, the Public, 252
Protectorate, our masked, in Egypt, 156; 357
Protocols.—*See under respective subjects*
Provincial Councils, 457 *seq.*

Ptolemies, the, and sea-power, 35
Public Works, Department of, 281 *seq.*; Central Administration, 281; Budget, 283

QUARANTINE, Board, 168; measures, 269; Parks, at Alexandria, 270

RAHAD, R., 404
Railway Board, the, 163
Railways, Egyptian, 163 (foot-note); in the Sudan, 433; and 'Cape to Cairo' project, 433 (foot-note)
Rainfall, 5
Rainy Seasons, 6
Ras Kasar, 402; 403
Recruitment, for Egyptian Army, 294
Red Sea, Drainage-area, 3; Littoral, 388 *seq.*, 402; Provinces, 379; Railways (projected) to, 433; Slave Trade of, 278.—*See also Abyssinia and Suákin*
Reformatory, 273
Reforms, needed, 173; obstructed, 178
Regime of the River Nile.—*See Nile River*
Religions, Census of 1897, 138
Representative Government in Egypt, 185
Reserve Funds, 165; the three, 205 *seq.*
Reservoir Scheme, the, 25.—*See also Irrigation*
Revenue of Egypt, the, 199; Sources of, 202; Distribution of, 203; Assigned, or hypothecated, 203 (footnote).—*See also Revenues*
Revenues, Hypothecated; 454; 456
Riaz Pasha, 69; 74
Ripon Falls, 8
Rodd, Sir Rennell, 393; 398; 405
Rogers Pasha (Sir John), 267
Roman Catholics, in Egypt, 144
Roman Empire, the, and Egypt, 36
Roseres, 431
Ross, Colonel, 17
Rudolf, Lake, 4; 416
Russia, and Turkey, 108 *seq.*; attitude of, in the Eastern Question, 119; in Abyssinia, 400
Ruwenzori, Mt., 8

SAID, Pasha of Egypt, reign of, 58; Visit to the Sudan, 377
Sandwith, Dr, 267; 271
San Stefano, Treaty of, 113
Schools, American Mission, 245; Coptic, 242; Foreign, 243; Primary, 227; Professional, 231; Secondary, 228; Technical, 232.—*See also Education, and Colleges*
Scott, Sir John, 74; 247
Sea-ports of Egypt, 309
Sea-power, Influence of, on the History of Egypt, 33 *seq.*; Egypt and, 76 *seq.*—*See also Defence of the Empire*, 101 *seq.*; *Balance of Power*, 117 *seq.*; *and Domination of the Nile Valley*, 439 *seq.*
Seasons, in the Nile Valley, 18
Security, Public, Department of, 272
Semliki, R., 8
Senhit, 379; 389; 401
Sennar, Province of, 388; 435
Senussi, the, 275; 395; Question, 396
Seraé, 402
Service, the Egyptian Civil.—*See Civil Service*
Shakur Bey, 265
Shambeh, 434 (foot-note)
Sharáki Works, 17
Shebeli, R., 417
Sheikhs, Arab, as Government Officials, 188.—*See also Omdehs*
Sherif Pasha, 69
Shilluk, Negroes, 371; 374
Shipping, Return of, at Alexandria, 311; Suez Canal, 347.—*See also Sea-ports*
Shoa, 398
Shukrié, the, 372
Shuli, country, occupation of the, 379; Negroes, 374
Sinaï Peninsula, 393
Single Control, the, established, 67; Egypt under the, 68 *seq.*—*See also Anglo-Egyptian Administration*, 183 *seq.*
Sinking Fund, the, proposed Suspension of, in 1885, 69; 166
Sirdar, the, supreme at War Office, 289.—*See also Kitchener (Lord)*
Siwa, oasis of, and the Slave Trade, 274; 395
Slavery, Repressive legislation, 277; Regulations against, 431 *seq.*
Slave Trade, the, 273 *seq.*; and Sir Samuel Baker, 378; in the Sudan, 429 *seq.*
Slave-traders, 372.—*See also Slave Trade*
Smith, Dr Donaldson, 416
Sobat, R., 9; 14; 416; Anglo-Egyptian post established on, 420; Reconnaissance up, 434 (foot-note)
Solum, Gulf of, 395
Somáli Coast, 390 *seq.*

Somáliland, 403; British, 404; Italian, 404
Sovereign rights, reservation of the Sultan's, 133; inalienability of, 453. —*See also Suzerainty and Turkey*
Stability, Financial, 202; Political, 146 *seq.*
Status, International, of Egypt, 131 *seq.*; of Suez Canal, 344
Steam Packets, 302
Suákin, 279; 378; 388 *seq.*; restored to general *régime* in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 425
Succession, Mohammed Ali Dynasty, Line of, 449; Order of, 449; 451
Sudan, the Egyptian, Conquest of, by Mohammed Ali, 50; and the Sultan's Suzerainty, 131; Provinces, now under the Military Authorities, 289; Campaigns, 291 *seq.*; Political Situation, 369 *seq.*; Native Races, 370; Distribution of Population, 371 *seq.*; Tribal Characteristics, 373 *seq.*; Historical Retrospect, 376 *seq.*; Boundaries and Egyptian Garrisons, 380; Reconquest of the, 75; 382 *seq.*; List of Battles in, 385; Cost of recent Campaign, 386; Title-deeds of the Nile Valley, 386 *seq.*; Egyptian Boundaries confirmed, 393; Analysis of Treaty-rights in, 394 *seq.*; Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 279; 423 *seq.*; the Governor-General of, 425; Administration, 425; Budget, 425; Departments of Administration, 426 (foot-note); Missionary enterprise in, 429; the Slave Trade in, 429; Communications in, 432; Commercial development of, 433 *seq.*—*See also Nile*
Sudd, the, and Communications, 433
Suez Canal, the, 59; Treaty obligations inoperative, 315; Attitude of the Powers concerning, 315; Control of, 316; Historical Retrospect, 317 *seq.*; Concessions, 318; Inauguration, 319; Political significance, 319; International negotiations concerning, 320 *seq.*; Paris Commission (1885), 324; Convention of 1888, 338 *seq.*; Commerce, 345 *seq.*; Administration of, 348
Sugar Crop, 299; 312
Suliman Pasha, 51; 53
Summary Courts, 255; 264
Surplus, disposal of, Egypt's right to, 367; the Annual, 199
Surveys, Department of, 285 *seq.*
Suzerainty, the Sultan's, 158; 159; 364.—*See also Sovereign Rights, and Turkey*
Syria, Ibrahim's Campaign in, 53; loss of, 55; strategic value of, 102 (foot-note)

TAJURA, 391; 392
Taka, Mudiría of, 388; 389
Tanganyika, Lake, 412; 414
Taufik, Khedive of Egypt, 66 *seq.*
Taxation, 207; remission of, 201
Tax-collection, 207
Tchemé, battle of, 44
Tel-el-Kebir, effect of British victory at, 68.—*See also Arábi*
Temperature, 5
Territorial, Rights in Egypt, 131 *seq.*; Rights in the Sudan, 394 *seq.*; Waters of Egypt, 335
Tibesti, 396; 422
Tigré, Province of Abyssinia, 398
Title-deeds, of Egypt, 132 *seq.*, 450 *seq.*; of the Sudan (Egyptian) and Upper Nile Territories, 386 *seq.*
Tobacco Revenues, 296
Tokar, re-occupation of, 291
Toski, battle of, 291
Town Councils (*Commissions locales*), 265.—*See also Municipalities*
Towns, Chief, of Egypt, population of, 139
Trade and Commerce, 295 *seq.*—*See also Commerce*
Trade-marks, 300
Tribal Characteristics in the Sudan, 373 *seq.*
Tribunals, the Mixed, 158-159; Lord Cromer on, 160; Languages recognized by, 161; 256; limits of Jurisdiction, 428 (foot-note)
Tribunals, the National, 255-256
Triple Alliance, the, 116; 117; 121
Tripoli, 102; 123; frontier, 394; and the Senussi Question, 396
Tsad Basin, 423
Tunis, French Protectorate over, 123-126
Turkey, abortive Convention (Drummond-Wolff) with, 71; the Fate of, 116, 120; and Tripoli, 396; and Egypt, 450 *seq.*—*See also Ottoman, Sovereign, and Suzerain*
Turkish, oligarchy in Egypt, 187; Agency, and the Egyptian Press, 280
Tutelary Power, the, in Egypt, 148 *seq.*—*See also Great Britain, and British*

UBANGI, French, 423; Upper, 373 (foot-note)
Uganda, 373; British Protectorate over, 394; 409 *seq.*; 408; railway to, 433.—*See also Waganda*
Uncultivated lands, 20
Unified Debt, the, 198
Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of, 54
Unyoro, 373; annexation of, 379; 409.—*See also Wanyoro*
Upper Nile and Territories.—*See Nile*
Usoga, 409

VEGETATION, 4
Venetians, the, and Egypt, 41
Vernacular School, the (Dar el-Olum), 237
Victoria Nyanza, 8; railway communition with, 433
Village Communities, 265.—*See also Gaffirs, Omdehs, and Sheikhs*

WADAI, 395; 421; 422
Wadelai, British flag hoisted at, 416
Waganda, the, 373.—*See also Uganda*
Waghorn, Lieut., and the Overland Route, 59
Wahábi War, the, 49
Wahuma, the, 373
Wakfs, the, Administration, 239
Wanga, 407
Wanyoro, the, 373.—*See also Unyoro*
War, Ministry of, 287 *seq.*; Administration of, 289; European Establishment, 289; Budget, 289.—*See also Army (Egyptian)*
Warnock, Dr, 270
War-risks, regarding Suez Canal, 345
Water-supply, 6; in the Delta, 269
Willcocks, Mr, 16
Wilson, Sir C. Rivers, and the Suez Canal Commission (1885), 337
Wingate, Sir Reginald, quoted, 431
Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond-, and the abortive Convention with the Porte, 71 *seq.*
Wood, Sir Evelyn, 290

ZANDÉ, the A-, 372
Zanzibar Coast, the, 407
Zeila, 392; 406
Zeraf, Bahr el-, 434 (foot-note)
Zoology, 12

PRINTED BY
TURNBULL AND SPEARS,
EDINBURGH

NORTH EAST AFRICA: OROGRAPHICAL FEATURES.

Scale 1: 12,000,000
English Miles
0 100 200 300 400

EXPLANATION OF COLOURING

Metres	Feet.
4000	13124
2000	6562
1000	3281
500	1640
200	656
0	0
Below	Sea Level

Limits of Drainage Areas.
Navigable Rivers.
Cataracts, Rapids, and Falls.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Gulf of Sidra
Syr. of Sidra
Abu Sidra
Bengazi
Tokra
Jebel el Akhdar
Barca (Cyrenaica)
TRIPOLI (Turkish Vilayet)
LIBYAN DESERT
TIBESTI OR TU
BORKU
Bodele
Enneri Kreima
Enneri Uri
Tibesti
Wan
Wan el Namus
Taiserbo
Buseima
Oasis of Kufra
Sella
Morai ye
Serir
Sarfaya
Tropic of Cancer
Bir Wolk
Mesora
Kaisono
Berai
Bardai
Yebbi Daze
Tao
Wanyanga
Gure
Ennedi
Oasis Mayer A
Erdebe
Adi Ming
Tekro
Tell B
Oasis of Selima
Sudaya es Ghard
Oasis (uninhabited)
Jeb. Tumtum el Mukkoni
Kurb es Simbel
Abu Hamed
Jesira Desert
Berber
Ambukol
Korosko
Wadi Halfa
2nd Cataract
3rd Cataract
Dongola
Old Dongola
el Debba
Khandak
Karikol
Merawi
Oasis of Dongola
el-Ordu
Oasis of Selima
Oasis of Bahriya
Oasis of Farafra
Oasis of Dakhla
Oasis of Kharga
Oasis Siwa (Jupiter Ammon)
Oasis Dismeh
Oasis of Jupiter Ammon
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt
EGYPT
CAIRO
ALEXANDRIA
Rosetta
Damietta
Port Said
Suez
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Akaba
Gulf of Aden
Red Sea
Nile Delta
Nile Valley
Fayum
Medinet
Beni Suef
Minia
Assiut
Tahta
Girga
Kena
Esna
Edfu
Aswan
1st Cataract
Philae
Dungun
Kalabsha
Dakka
Derr
Halfa
Semna
Sarras
Tinara
Hannek
Arko I.
Shendi
Meroë
Metammeh
Shabluka
Gerri
Khartum
Omdurman
Abdalla Wad el Getchi
Halfaya
Goz Rejeb
Kassala
el Fasher
Kedaref
Sennar
Karkoj
Fashoda
Kiro
Gaidacho
Yambio
Tambura
Wadelai
Albert Nyanza
Victoria Nyanza
Ukerewe
Ukaya
Ugowe
Kagehyi
Kisumu
Port Victoria
Entebbe
Mengo
Kampala
Uganda
Mackinnon Pk 18000
Ruwenzori
Mt Gordon
Mt Stanley
Mt Speke
Mt Baker
Mt Emin Pasha
Albert Edward Nyanza
Lake Leopold II
Lake Mantumbi
Lake Rikwa
Lake Tanganyika
Lake Chad
Lake Rudolf
Lake Stephanie or Basso Nabor
Lake Naivasha
Lake Elmenteita
Lake Nakuru
Lake Hannington
Lake Baringo
Lake Hannington
Lake Salisbury
Lake Elgeyo
Lake Kamasia
Lake Kavirondo
Lake Victoria
Lake Rudolf
Lake Stephanie
Lake Rudolf
Lake Basso Narok
Lake Rudolf
Lake Rudolf
Lake Rudolf

NORTH EAST AFRICA: CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA.

MEAN ANNUAL TEMPERATURE

SCALE OF TEMPERATURE COLOURING
FAHR. – CENT.
85° – 29·4°
80° – 26·6°
70° – 21·1°

MEAN ANNUAL RANGE OF TEMPERATURE

SCALE OF TEMPERATURE COLOURING
FAHR. – CENT.
33° – 16·7°
20° – 11·1°
10° – 5·6°

MEAN ANNUAL RAINFALL

SCALE OF RAINFALL COLOURING
INS. – MM.
under 10 – under 250
10 - 20 – 250 - 500
20 - 40 – 500 - 1000
40 - 60 – 1000 - 1500
over 60 – over 1500

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF DISEASE

MALARIA

Libya
Barka
Gulf of Sidra
Benghazi
Libyan Desert Plateau
TRIPOLI (Turkish Vilayet)
Jarabub
Aujila
Sokna
Oasis of Siwa
Oasis of Baharia
Oasis of Farafra
Taiserbo
Oases of Kufra
Great Oasis
Oasis of Dakhla
Oasis of Kharga
Gatrun
Kebabo
TIBESTI
Bardai
Tarso Mts
BORKU
Bodele
Ennedi
Egei
L. Chad
Bahr el Ghazal
Mao
Abeshr
WADAI
Jeb. Marra
Midogo
Masseriya
BAGHIRMI
Salamat
Tubori L.
Lai
Aukjedebbe
Yagusu
Grebingi
Foro
Baria
Bongo
Longo
Yakoma
Bangassu
Mbomu
Nzoro
Tangasi
Upoto
Sanga
New Antwerp
Congo
Lopori
Lulonga
Baringa
Coquilhatville
Bonga
L. Tumba
Kuta
L. Leopold II
CONGO STATE
Belgian
Lukenie
Kassai
Sankuru
Nyangwe
Lokandu
Kuilu
Kwango
Loange
Kasai
Kwilu
Kwa
Ubangi
Mongalla
Welle
Makua
Monbuttu
Niam-Niam
Dem Zubehr
Ombanga
Meres
Tambura
Yambio
Mbomu
Nabwina
Jabbir
Bomokandi
Rikwa
Tangasi
Wadelai
Dufile
Fola Cat.
Regaf
Lado
Tarrangole
Mahagi
Duwa
Lake Rudolf
L. Stefanie
Marchison Falls
L. Albert
L. Chioga
L. Sugota
Barderai
Albert Edward Nyanza
Viranga M.
Ruwenzori 16,000
Mt. Elgon
L. Baringo
Lorian Swamp
Kenya
Naivasha
Kampala
Uganda
Victoria Nyanza
Bukoba
Mwanza
Speke Gulf
Ukerewe
Kilima Njaro
L. Eyassi
Maharo
Unyamwezi
Tavete
Taveta
Sabaki
Malindi
Mombasa
Wanga
Lamu
Kismayu
Port Durnford
Borana
Galla
Somali
Ogaden
Harar
Jibuti
Zeila
Berbera
Hargeisa
Aden
Yemen
Hodeida
Mocha
Loheia
Kamaran
Farsan Is.
Rizan
Asir
Jizan
Abu Arish
Qunfudah
Qoz Regeb
Kassala
Gedaref
Tokar
Suakin
Berber
Abu Hamed
Shendi
Omdurman
Khartum
Sobat
Nile
Blue Nile
White Nile
Atbara
Dongola
Wadi Halfa
Korosko
Aswan
Cataract
Kerma
El Ordu
Old Dongola
Tarso
Bayuda Steppe
Nubian Desert
Libyan Desert
Arabian Desert
Red Sea
Gulf of Suez
Suez
Cairo
Alexandria
Rosetta
Damietta
Port Said
Haifa
Yafa
Jerusalem
Dead Sea
Akabah
et Tih
Sinai
Assiut
Kosseir
Akra
Ras Benas
Yambo
Medina
Jidda
Mecca
El Lid
Mastura
Ras Rawai
Ras Dashan
Adowa
Tigre
Asmara
Massawa
Saati
Kamaran
Hodeida
Mocha
Assab
Moka
Gondar
L. Tsana
Guma
Amhara
Gojam
Shoa
Addis Abeba
Ankober
Fashoda
Kiro
Shakka
Kadero
Dar Nuba
Kordofan
El Obeid
El Fasher
Hofrat en Nahas
Dar Fertit
Dar Fur
Kaffa
Omo
Queen Margherita L.
Lake Stefanie
Lake Rudolf
Turkana L.
Abyssinia
Eritrea
Italian Somaliland
British Somaliland
French Somali Land
Zeila
Jibuti
Aden
Yemen
Hejaz
Midian
Nubian Desert
Libyan Desert
Arabian Desert
Red Sea
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Aden
Suez Canal
Nile
Blue Nile
White Nile
Atbara
Sobat
Baro
Juba
Omo
Tana
Uaso Nyiro
Ewaso Ngiro
Lorian Swamp
Kenya
Naivasha
Victoria Nyanza
Bukoba
Speke Gulf
Ukerewe
Kilima Njaro
Mombasa
Wanga
Lamu
Kismayu
Port Durnford
Malindi
Tavete
Taveta
Sabaki
Mwanza
Unyamwezi
Tanganyika
Lukuga
Lukenie
Kassai
Sankuru
Nyangwe
Lokandu
Kuilu
Kwango
Loange

NORTH EAST AFRICA: ZONES OF VEGETATION

Scale 1 : 12,000,000
English Miles
0 100 200 300 400

EXPLANATION OF COLOURING

- Deserts.
- Steppes and Barren Lands.
- Grazing Lands.
- Cultivable Lands.
- Prairies and Open Forests.
- Dense Forests.
- Fresh Water Lakes.
- Salt Water Lakes.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Gulf of Sidra
TRIPOLI (Turkish Vilayet)
LIBYAN DESERT
TIBBU DESERT
EGYPT
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt
Nubian Desert
Arabian Desert
Eastern Desert
Libyan Desert
Nefud Desert
Little Nefud
Er Sedeir
SHAMMAR
NEJD
EGYPTIAN SUDAN
KORDOFAN
DAR FUR
WADAI
DAR FERTIT
BAGIRMI
BORKU
Bodele
Jesira Desert
Gezira
ABYSSINIA
FRENCH SOMALI LAND
BRITISH SOMALI LAND
Independent
ITALIAN SOMALILAND
ERITREA
AFAR OR DANAKIL
UPPER UBANGI
FRENCH CONGO
CONGO STATE (Belgian)
BRITISH EAST AFRICA
GERMAN EAST AFRICA
KAMERUN (German)
Lake Chad
Lake Leopold II
Lake Victoria Nyanza
Lake Albert Edward Nyanza
Lake Rudolph or Basso Narok
Lake Stephanie or Basso Nabor
Alexandria
Cairo
Suez
Khartum
Meroe
Berber
Kassala
Massawa
Harar
Jibuti
Zeila
Aden
Hodeida
Mocha
Mecca
Medina
Jeddah
Yambo el Bahr
Yanbo el Nakhl
Aswan
Assiut
Esna
Kosseir
Suakin
Tokra
Bengazi
Barca (Cyrenaica)
Derna
Tobruk
Port Said
Damietta
Rosetta
Jaffa
Jerusalem
Gaza
Dead Sea
Haifa
Acka
Mt. Hermon
Jebel Hauran
Nazareth
Bosra
Palestine
Sinai
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Akabah
Red Sea
Nile
Blue Nile
White Nile
Atbara
Sobat
Bahr el Ghazal
Bahr el Arab
Bahr el Jebel
Bahr el Zeraf
Bahr el Gebel
Bahr el Ghiraf
Bahr el Abiad
Bahr el Azrek
Bahr el Ahmar
Bahr el Mandeb
Abyssinian Plateau
Kilimanjaro
Mt. Kenia
Mt. Elgon
Ruwenzori
Mt. Marsabit
Mt. Sugota
Mt. Njiro
Mt. Kulall
Mt. Sambu
Mt. Samburu
Mt. Sanke
Mt. Gauna
Mt. Kalo
Mt. Kenia
Mt. Elgon
Mt. Ruwenzori
Mt. Marsabit
Mt. Njiro
Mt. Sugota
Mt. Kulall

NORTH EAST AFRICA: POLITICAL BOUNDARIES AND DATA.

Scale 1 : 12,000,000
English Miles
0 100 200 300 400

EXPLANATORY NOTE

- Places with more than 50,000 Inhabitants.
- " " " " 30,000 "
- " " " " 10,000 "
- " " less " 10,000 "

Railways open. Railways constructing. Railways projected.

The Red Figures indicate the density of Population to the Square Mile.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Gulf of Sidra
TRIPOLI (Turkish Vilayet)
LIBYAN DESERT
TIBESTI OR TU
FRENCH SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
ANCIENT BOUNDARY OF EGYPT
ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT MARCH 1899
ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT MARCH 1894
BRITISH OCCUPATION
EGYPT
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt
Nubian Desert
Arabian Desert
Libyan Desert
Jesira Desert
Bayuda Desert
Red Sea
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Akaba
Sinai
Peninsula
Palestine
Jordan
Dead Sea
Wady Sirhan
SHERARAT
SHAMMAR
Jebel Aja
Jebel Shammar
Kasim
Aneysa
Little Nefud
Er Sedeir
NEJD
HEJAZ
ASIR
TEHAMA
HADENDOA
ABYSSINIA
Independent
ERITREA
ITALIAN SOMALILAND
FRENCH SOMALI LAND
BRITISH SOMALI LAND
Gojam
Shoa
Kaffa
Galla
Somali
Danakil
AFAR OR DANAKIL
DAR FUR
DAR FERTIT
KORDOFAN
CONDOMINIUM
BRITISH SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
Bahr Ghazal
WADAI
BAGIRMI
DAR TAKONAWI
DAR-ABU-DIMA
DAR RUNGA
UPPER UBANGI
FRENCH CONGO
CONGO STATE (Belgian)
EGYPTIAN SUDAN
Lado Leased to King Leopold
MAY 1894
BRITISH EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE
UGANDA
Victoria Nyanza
Albert Edward Nyanza
Albert Nyanza
Lake Leopold II
Lake Chad
Nile
Blue Nile
White Nile
Atbara
Khartum
Omdurman
Meroe
Berber
Abu Hamed
Shendi
Metemma
Kassala
Gedaref
el Obeid
el Fasher
Suakin
Massawa
Harar
Jidda
MECCA
el Medina
Yambo el Bahr
Ras Benas
Kosseir
Suez
Cairo
Alexandria
Rosetta
Damietta
Port Said
Tripoli
Bengazi
Barca (Cyrenaica)
Derna
Tobruk
Sollum
Gulf of Sollum
Aswan
Wadi Halfa
Dongola
Kerma
Abu Klea
Gakdul
Berber
Ambukol
Omdurman
Khartum
Fashoda
Bahr el Ghazal
Bahr el Jebel
Bahr el Zeraf
Bahr el Arab
Bahr el Ghazal
Sobat
Baro
Pibor
Akobo
Gilo
Sobat
Victoria Nile
Albert Nile
Semliki
Kagera
Tanganyika
Nyanza
Victoria Nyanza
Albert Edward Nyanza
Albert Nyanza
Lake Leopold II
Lake Kivu
Lake Rudolf
Lake Stephanie or Basso Narok
Lake Margherita
Lake Abaya
Lake Tsana
Lake Hayk
Lake Ashangi
Lake Zwai
Lake Abbe
Lake Gardner
Lake Salisbury
Lake Baringo
Lake Naivasha
Lake Elmenteita
Lake Nakuru
Lake Hannington
Lake Rudolf
Lake Stephanie
Lake Margherita
Lake Abaya
Lake Tsana
Lake Hayk
Lake Ashangi
Lake Zwai
Lake Abbe
Lake Gardner
Lake Salisbury
Lake Baringo
Lake Naivasha
Lake Elmenteita
Lake Nakuru
Lake Hannington
Mt Hermon
Haifa
Nazareth
Jaffa
Jerusalem
Gaza
Jebel Hauran
Basra
Aleppo
Damascus
Palmyra
Euphrates
Tigris
Mesopotamia
Mosul
Baghdad
Basra
Persian Gulf
Red Sea
Gulf of Aden
Indian Ocean
Zanzibar
Pemba
Mombasa
Lamu
Kismayu
Brava
Obbia
Hafun
Cape Guardafui
Berbera
Zeila
Djibuti
Harar
Jijiga
Aussa
Adowa
Adigrat
Axum
Gondar
Lake Tsana
Blue Nile
Abyssinia
Harar
Jijiga
Aussa
Zeila
Djibuti
Berbera
Hargeisa
Burao
Obbia
Hafun
Cape Guardafui
Mombasa
Lamu
Kismayu
Brava
Obbia
Hafun
Cape Guardafui
Berbera
Zeila
Djibuti
Harar
Jijiga
Aussa
Adowa
Adigrat
Axum
Gondar
Lake Tsana
Blue Nile
Abyssinia

Longitude East of Greenwich.

The Edinburgh Geographical Institute

J.G. Bartholomew.



Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 31 October, 2019